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Abstract 
This thesis develops a framework for analysing the interrelationships 
between migration laws and national identities. The framework is grounded in 
considering the place of migration law in liberal societies. Migration law plays 
a role in constituting the nation. It erects the boundary of the nation and 
contributes to the mythology which sustains the nation. While both nations and 
their migration laws belong to a liberal paradigm, liberal theory does not create 
a standard for what is just in migration law. It does not tell us how many people 
we should admit to our national communities, nor who those people should be. 
Rather than justice, liberalism generates a humanitarian consensus that 
permeates philosophical and political discussions of migration. 
While we cannot assess migration law against a justice standard, we can 
assess it by analysing the national identity it both reflects and refines. We can 
determine if our migration laws are true to what we value about our own 
communities. We can reveal features of our nations that are hidden. Drawing 
on a rich literature describing the relationships between law and identity, this 
thesis examines the relationship of one particular kind of law - migration law -
with one particular kind of identity - national identity. 
The empirical work of the thesis focuses on humanitarian· admissions 
to Australia and Canada. It looks at contrasts between the two programs but also 
draws conclusions based upon their similarities. The empirical work examines 
three settings where the law operates. The first setting is the refugee 
determination process. The second setting is humanitarian decision-making. 
The third setting is the jurisprudence of the highest courts of the land . 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Hum.an migration occupies a curious place in our collective imaginations 
at this juncture in history. The case that more people are on the move than ever 
before is a difficult one to make, considering how many more people there are 
in the world now and that the twentieth century has seen a tremendous growth 
in the regulation, and concomitant restriction, of population movements. It is in 
part these restrictions which engender the discourse of increasing migration, or 
at least of the increasing importance of migration as a factor in the organisation 
of hum.an communities. Restrictions transform the issue of movement into one 
of migration; bringing a legal framework to travel that would have been 
analysed differently at earlier points in time. Entire nations understand 
themselves as nations of immigration, or in a related way, as multicultural 
nations because of the influence and importance of immigration to their 
populations. The myth of the global village represents a collapsing of 
boundaries and spaces between people. A wide array of technologies for 
compressing space and time by speeding communication and travel have 
remoulded our perceptions of the world. The past decade has brought a series 
of large scale environmental disasters that have caused people to move from 
their homes in huge numbers. Reflecting and contributing to all of these factors, 
migration occupies an important place in global public discourses. 
This thesis analyses legal discourses of migration and develops a 
framework for understanding how those discourses are linked to how we 
understand ourselves and our attachments to national communities. Legal 
discourses are a crucial component of broader discourses of migration as the 
formal rules of population movement are spelled out in legal terms. Popular 
discourses of migration therefore use the legal setting as a backdrop. Legal 
discourse is also important to the existence of the nation - defining its terms and 
limits and important parts of its symbolism. The nation is a mythic construct 
that draws on the law as one site of its construction. Without the nation, 
migration has no meaning as there are no borders to cross. Yet the nation does 
not simply analytically precede migration law, rather migration law is 
implicated in constituting the nation. The identity of the nation, the mythology 
which gives it form and meaning, does not exist in a world of isolated, similar 
entities. Rather, the identity of a nation is something that the individuals who 
belong to it participate in and contribute to. Migration is meaningful in this 
context because of how individuals experience it; because of the rupture it 
introduces to how we as individuals experience belonging, membership and the 
nation. 
In establishing a theoretical framework for analysing migration law, I 
draw on the concepts of identity and nation and outline a relationship between 
them, which is mediated by and reflected in migration law. I draw on the 
literature on the interrelationships between law and identity to articulate the 
relationship between one particular kind of law - migration law - and one 
particular version of identity - national identity. Migration law reflects and 
reifies aspects of national identity because it is a key site in the construction of 
that identity. Using identity as an analytic tool is particularly appropriate for 
migration law because of the critique of law and legal reasoning which is 
embedded in the law and identity literature. The attention this draws to 
2 
i 
hierarchies, categories and silences is especially apt at revealing the contours of 
migration law and the gradients of membership it contains. Considering the 
interrelationship of migration law and national identity contributes to that 
literature and refines that critique. In addition, assessment of this 
interrelationship provides the best way of evaluating migration laws as the 
liberal paradigm in which they exist does not generate a standard for measuring 
the justice or fairness of these laws. 
The concept of nation is also central to my analytic framework. As 
migration law is meaningful only because of its relationship to the nation, any 
theoretical tool for approaching it must take account of the meanings and uses 
of that concept. Two strands of analysis are relevant for my framework. First, I 
understand the nation as mythic, imaginary or ideal. The nation is at least in 
part a contingent creation of those who believe in its existence. Second, I 
understand the nation as an ideal intertwined with the hegemony of liberal 
political theory. Nations and liberalism share a complex history. The 
emergence of nations as the central organising concept for human political 
existence parallels the emergence of liberalism as the dominant political 
philosophy. Each of these strands of analysis of nation contributes to my use of 
the concept national identity. While the nation is imagined, it is imagined in a 
liberal paradigm. The law that contributes to the construction of the mythic 
nation is also imbued with liberal assumptions, which in turn contribute to how 
the nation can be imagined. 
My argument that migration law and national identity exist in a symbiotic 
relationship, and that each reveals something about the other, holds as a general 
proposition. Nonetheless, the contours of the relationship are easiest to see in 
3 
nations where immigration is an important part of the national ethos. For 
immigrant nations the relationships between migration law and national identity 
are heightened in intensity because in these nations, which have to some extent 
been "created" through migration, the importance of migration law as a site for 
the construction and reconstruction of national identities is enhanced. The 
mythology of migration is directly evident in accounts of the nation. For this 
reason, I have chosen to use nations of the New World as the particular 
examples I draw on in my thesis. The framework, however, has relevance 
beyond these new nations. The analysis which could begin by considering the 
formidable legal hurdles to permanent immigration to Japan, 1 or the symbolic 
importance of the German legal commitment to membership for ethnic 
Germans, 2 or the response played out in British nationality law to the 
dismantling of the British Empire,3 can be brought within this theoretical 
structure. These cases would undoubtedly contribute refinements, but due to the 
size of this project they only remain within the broad outlines of my analysis. 
The thesis accomplishes its goals in two ways. Chapter Two articulates 
the argument about the relationship between migration law and national identity 
drawing primarily on the law and identity literature. The following three 
chapters pick up aspects of this argument and test them using comparative 
1 Hampton J, "Immigration, Identity and Justice" in Schwartz W F (ed), Justice in Immigration 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 1995 at 67. It was not until the 1990s 
that fourth generation Japanese born Koreans, whose ancestors had been brought to Japan as 
slaves, were given citizenship. 
2 Coleman J L and Harding S K, "Citizenship, the Demands of Justice and the Moral Relevance 
of Political Borders" in Schwartz W F (ed) ibid at 18. 
3 Paliwala A, "Law and the Constitution of 'Immigrant' in Europe: Racism and the Rule of 
Law, Dartmouth Press, Aldershot UK and Brookfield USA, 1995 at 74; Dummett A and Nicol 
A, Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and Others: Nationality and Immigration Law, Weisenfeld and 
Nicolson, London, 1990. 
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examples from Australian and Canadian migration law. These empirical 
chapters follow the principal themes of the theoretical argument about the 
relationship between law and identity. One of the insights of the law and 
identity literature is that identity construction proceeds through a process of 
"othering" and that it is consequently often easier to see the contours of the 
other than to clearly perceive the self. Chapter Three examines the construction 
of the refugee as the ultimate other to the nation and uses this empirical focus to 
underscore how attention to identity draws attention to what is left out and 
silenced by legal discourse. Chapter Four then proceeds by looking at the 
reciprocal movement in the construction of identities, the reflection of an image 
of the self. The Chapter examines the humanitarian consensus shared by 
liberals who believe the nation's borders should be closed and those who 
believe they should be open. Both agree that at some - undefined - point, 
needy outsiders must be admitted. Drawing on this consensus, humanitarian 
admissions to Australia and Canada are integral to the construction of those 
nations as good and generous. This category of admission demonstrates that 
even allowing the ostensibly most needy to join the community serves the 
national interest. Chapter Five picks up on the critique of rights discourses 
which is contained in the law and identity literature and argues that migration 
law provides one exemplar of rights discourses narrowing and constraining 
identities. By examining the variety of ways that rights discourses are deployed 
in migration law, this Chapter demonstrates that the identity based critique of 
rights discourses must be nuanced by an understanding of how rights operate in 
specific contexts and that the principal context of migration law is the backdrop 
5 
of national sovereignty and the liberal nation. The conclusions in Chapter Six 
bring the argument back to a further elaboration of the Chapter Two framework. 
Accordingly, the main contributions this thesis makes are in clarifying the 
place of migration law in the liberal nation and in articulating the migration law 
- national identity relationship. These include insights about the relationship 
between law and identity construction, about identities and rights discourses, 
and about the place of migration and of humanitarianism in liberal theory. This 
is the first research to join these elements of contemporary legal and social 
theory. I set the framework of analysis against a backdrop ofliberal theory 
because the assumptions of liberalism hold hegemonic sway over migration law. 
Using the insights about the boundary of the liberal community found in the 
work of Rawls, Dworkin, Walzer, Carens, Galloway and others, I conclude that 
liberalism cannot answer the most fundamental questions about justice in 
migration law. I therefore tum to the critical theoretical work of scholars like 
Minow and Fitzpatrick as a starting point for my elaboration of a framework for 
assessing migration laws in the face of liberalism's inadequacies. The answers 
my framework generates are outside the countours of liberalism, as of course 
they must be. Nonetheless, my framework acknowledges the vital role of those 
contours in setting the terms of the debate. My theoretical contribution to 
debates about migration law is original in explaining the intransigence of liberal 
debates about just migration, in acknowledging their importance, and in 
providing a way of moving beyond them. 4 
4 I have previously written about parts of this argument in "Beyond Justice: The Consequences 
of Liberalism for Immigration Law" ( 1997) 10 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
323; "Confronting Chaos: Migration Law Responds to Images of Disorder" (1999) 5 Res 
Publica 23; "Amorality and Humanitarianism in Immigration Law" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal, in press. 
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The empirical work in the thesis serves in the first instance to illustrate 
and amplify the theoretical propositions. It also gathers together new material 
and puts it in a framework that yields fresh insights. Briefly put, the empirical 
work examines humanitarian admissions to Australia and Canada. It shares this 
comparative perspective with a number of studies on immigration in these two 
countries. 5 This thesis does not aim to cover the full range of either country's 
immigration program, although the theoretical framework could be used in this 
way. Nor does the empirical work make an historical argument, although the 
argument that migration law plays a vital role in constituting new nations 
clearly can be used with historical resonance. My use of particular aspects of 
Canadian and Australian migration law is in the nature of strategic sampling. 
Rather than providing the whole picture, which I believe is well done by others, 
I have instead examined some areas in detail. For this close scrutiny I have 
selected areas that lend themselves to extending the critical literature on law and 
identity: the domestic refugee decision-making that engages questions of 
identity construction in legal process; humanitarian decision-making that 
engages key jurisprudential issues; and the role of rights, which returns to the 
impetus for much of the law and identity critique. None of the earlier 
comparative studies consider migration law in this degree of detail. 
5 The two leading works are Hawkins F, Critical Years in Immigration: Canada and Australia 
Compared, New South Wales University Press, Sydney, 1989, and Adelman H et al (eds) 
Immigration and Refugee Policy: Australia and Canada Compared, Melbourne University 
Press, Melbourne, 1994. Hawkins' work focuses on the 1972-1986 time period from a 
sociological perspective. The Adelman collection gathers together twenty-two chapters co-
written by Australian and Canadian academics and bureaucrats. 
In addition to these two studies, Sean Brawley's book The White Peril: Foreign Relations and 
Asian Immigration to Australia and North America, UNSW Press, Sydney, 1995, considers 
immigration in the foreign relations of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States 
over the twentieth century. Charles Sinclair's Ph.D. thesis Who Would Want to Be a Refugee? A 
Comparative Analysis of Refugee Policy and Law in Australia and Canada, University of New 
England, 1995, considers refugee policy and law-making in both countries in some detail. His 
work is primarily concerned with law-making and with refugee law in its international setting. 
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I have chosen Australia and Canada as examples because they are 
similarly situated nations sharing a population pattern and an approach to nation 
building through immigration. The empirical analysis is partially built by 
comparing and contrasting differences between the two cases. In many 
instances, however, migration laws in Australia and Canada illustrate the same 
point. That is, the differences between the laws and national identities of the 
two nations are not the most important part of the story told by the evidence. 
Sometimes the conclusion drawn is about similarity and parallels rather than 
about difference. The overall conclusion, played out with differing aspects of 
the law in each of the empirical chapters, is that the migration law of a nation is 
best understood, interpreted, and manipulated through close attention to that 
nation's understanding of itself. Some differences in Australian and Canadian 
national identity are made visible through migration law, and in tum differences 
in the law and its application in each country are explained by reference to 
national identities. 
Australia and Canada are compelling examples for this argument because 
people in both places display some degree of angst about their national identity. 
Queries about the meaning of Canadian identity are arguably as much a marker 
of being Canadian as any other single factor.6 In Australia national identity is 
contested, and even the celebration of a national day is a source of introspection 
and debate. 7 Given this, the coherent national images that are presented in 
migration law settings are all the more intriguing. 
6 For one classic discussion of this see Grant GP, Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian 
Nationalism, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1970. 
7 In recent years, Australia Day celebrations commemorating the arrival of the first Colonial 
Governor have been the subject of debate. Re-enactments of Governor Phillip walking ashore 
and planting the British flag are slowly being replaced by celebrations of aboriginal heritage. 
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Although the main strand of theorisation in this work identifies 
similarities between the two nations, and asserts that these would be found 
elsewhere as well, considering humanitarian admissions allows me to also 
identify contrasts in the approaches of Canada and Australia. These contrasts 
are more evident in humanitarian migration than in family or economic 
migration patterns. Contrast is useful for refining the capabilities of the analytic 
framework. A focus on humanitarian admissions also connects well with the 
other elements of the framework. Humanitarianism occupies a unique place in 
the array of liberal arguments about just migration. The liberal humanitarian 
consensus makes humanitarian admissions a fruitful source of analysis. 
Humanitarianism is the only challenge to the sovereign liberal nation's control 
of its borders, and thus it provokes strong representations of that sovereignty. A 
further aspect of my argument is that migration law is harnessed to serve the 
needs of the nation. In some areas of migration, this argument is obvious, but 
the case of humanitarian admissions sets up the most serious challenge to this 
proposition and thus this category is vital to demonstrating the strength of the 
proposition. 8 
The United States is in many ways the paradigm of the nation of 
immigrants, the new nation, and the refuge for the world's huddled masses. 
Having asserted that my theoretical configuration holds generally and is 
particularly apposite in nations with these characteristics, some special 
justification for excluding the United States is required. There are three 
reasons. First, the United States is so overwhelming as to be unique. The scale 
8 I canvass the reach of this argument in the cases of economic and family migration in my 
article "Beyond Justice: The Consequences of Liberalism for Migration Law" (1997) above n4. 
Law and Jurisprudence 323. 
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of emigration, of immigration rhetoric, and of world political hegemony, make 
it difficult to reason from the American case to any other. Any conclusion 
drawn can be countered with the claim that it holds only in the particular 
unparalleled American instance. Second, the enormous array of migration 
provisions in the United States means that to adequately canvass them would 
drive the analysis to a broader level of generality.9 One of the contributions of 
this work is to consider jurisprudence and legal provisions at a level of fine 
detail rather than broad coverage. Including the United States would have made 
a comparative perspective much more difficult to maintain. Finally, while I 
could have obtained enough information without working extensively in the 
United States, my work is grounded in the experience of living and belonging in 
both the places of which I write. Writing to capture the essence of attachment 
to place is immeasurably enriched by sharing that attachment, by living and 
breathing it, and puzzling over it in the minutiae of everyday life. 
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
As the empirical approach of this thesis is to examine in detail some areas 
of migration law in Australia and Canada in order to illustrate an argument 
which is generally applicable in these countries and others, it is important to 
approach the analysis with some basic of understanding of the overall 
framework of the laws in each country. At the outset, there is a difference in 
terminology. In Australia, the law I am discussing is called migration law, in 
Canada it is called immigration law. The differences between the two legal 
frameworks are not related to the terminology. For the most part, I have chosen 
9 Some sense of this is gained by looking at the statistical overview in Appendix A. 
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to use the Australian term because it is shorter and because switching to use the 
correct terminology for each place would introduce an unnecessary layer of 
confusion. 
Migration to Australia is controlled by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and 
in Canada by the Immigration Act, RSC 1985 c.1-2. Both Acts govern 
permanent and temporary entry provisions. Each legislative framework 
underwent a major overhaul in the 1970s aimed at making the law more 
"neutral" and "removing" racism.10 In Australia, this change is associated with 
the end of the infamous "White Australia" policy. The White Canada policy 
was never as succinctly articulated, but migration restrictions in the first six 
decades of the twentieth century did include at times a complete ban on Chinese 
immigration, a "headtax," and targeted use of language testing. 11 Canadian 
provinces asserted themselves more vigorously than Australian states in the 
migration area and the ensuing legal battles meant that the Canadian national 
government could often further its interest in controlling the legislative power 
by arguing against racist provincial regulation. Law-making practices have been 
considerably refined since then, but language skills and money, and the race and 
gender biases they mask, remain important predictors of successful permanent 
entry to each country. 
There are three streams for permanent migration to both Canada and 
Australia: economic, family and humanitarian. 12 In the past five years, the 
10 Major amendments to the Immigration Act, came into effect in 1978, to the Migration Act in 
1980. 
11 Bagambiire D, "The Constitution and Immigration; The Impact of Proposed Changes to the 
Immigration Power Under the Constitution Act, 1967" ( 1992) 15 Dalhousie Law Journal 428. 
12 See Appendix A. Coleman and Harding find this division is standard in the eight countries 
they survey: above n2. 
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economic stream has surpassed family to become the largest category of 
admission to each country. 13 Economic migration offers admission to people 
who are highly skilled or have considerable funds to invest and therefore can be 
expected to contribute immediately to the national economy. The objective of 
family migration is to allow Australians and Canadian to be reunited at "home" 
with close family members. The past decade has, in both countries, seen a 
progressive narrowing of the definition of family so that now the category 
applies to spouses and children. Greater restrictions are placed on other family 
members, who must also bring so "economic advantage" in order to qualify. 14 
Both these categories of migration, thus, are overtly linked to the needs of the 
nation. In the economic category, the aim of policy makers is to tailor 
requirements narrowly to the changing labour market. In the family category 
the need is of individual members of the nation, but it projects and reinforces a 
state sanctioned vision of family and a view that this need is valued. 
Humanitarian admissions are less obviously linked to national need, but, as I 
explore in each ensuing Chapter, they nonetheless cannot be understood without 
considering the subtlety of their response to national need. This final category 
is considerably smaller than the first two, 15 and is made up of people who are 
refugees or in other needy circumstances. In both countries, all migration 
applicants are subjected to health and good character screening. Both factors 
13 This happened in Canada in 1995 and in Australia in 1997. 
14 In Australia, these relatives come under the "Skilled Australia Linked" Category and in 
Canada applicants receive bonus points if they have relatives in Canada. 
15 Humanitarian migration makes up just over 10% of admissions to both Australia and Canada 
at present. For details see Appendix 2. 
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are ripe for an analysis of their role as surveillance mechanisms and for a 
consideration of the discretionary applications of each. 16 
One of the central tools of the migration scheme in each country is the use 
of a "points system." An applicant for admission is assigned a certain number 
of points over a range of criteria 17 which are then added up to determine 
eligibility. The points system is partially applied to relatives who cannot be 
considered part of the family stream and is applied differentially in subgroups of 
the economic stream. While the points system does not apply to refugees 
applying onshore or inland, 18 those who are seeking resettlement from abroad 
are sometimes assessed on similar criteria as indicators of their ability to settle 
easily in Australia or Canada. 19 The points system provides migration law with 
a veneer of neutrality, although of course, the criteria which merit points 
replicate biases of earlier formulae. As well, the points system is easily adjusted 
to meet particular policy goals. In Canada, the "occupational factor" criteria is 
sometimes reduced to zero, effectively ending any chance of admission for 
16 There is, for example, an enormous difference between a 15 minute medical exam and a 90 
minute one. Some interesting work is being done in this area; see for example Mosoff J, 
"'Excessive Demand' on the Canadian Conscience: Disability, Family and Immigration"(1998-
99) 26 Manitoba Law Journal (In Press). 
17 The Canadian criteria are education, training, work experience, occupational factor, pre-
arranged employment, demographic factor [intended destination], age, knowledge of English or 
French, and personal suitability based on an interview. Immigration Act Schedule 1. The 
Australian criteria are employment, age, language skill, family, relationships, length of 
sponsor's Australian citizenship, location of sponsor. Migration Regulations 2.26 and 2.27, 
Schedule 6. 
18 Due to the international obligations of the Refugee Convention; see Chapter 3. 
19 Those with relatives or other ties to Australia currently have priorities "one" and "two" in 
Australia's humanitarian program. Those with "resettlement potential" are "priority three". 
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those in that occupation. The Australian policy of awarding "-25" points to 
physicians accomplishes the same end. 20 
The biggest contrast between the two legal schemes is that in 1989 the 
Australian Parliament attempted to eliminate discretionary decision-making 
under the Act.21 Discretion is an important feature of any administrative regime, 
and is particularly vital if migration law is to respond to and reflect perceived 
national need. There are two results of the 1989 changes. First, the attempt to 
eliminate discretion is, of course, futile. Discretion insinuates itself into all 
bureaucratic decision-making. The 1989 changes merely narrow discretion and 
rest more of it in at the highest levels of decision-making. Second, the 
Migration Act is frequently amended22 to tailor it to national need as the scope 
for broad discretionary adjustments is reduced. The Canadian Act, in contrast, 
has been amended less than one quarter as often. However, as Chapter Four in 
particular demonstrates, there is a great range of discretionary decision-making 
under the Canadian Act. 
Migration is managed in Canada by the national government department 
now known as Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC).23 The corresponding 
department in Australia is presently the Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs (DIMA). 24 Migration decisions are made within the 
departments and by tribunals. In Australia the two relevant tribunals are the 
20 This amount to be deducted from points given under "employment qualification" Migration 
Regulations para 2.26(3)(c). 
21 Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1989 (Cth). 
22 Thirty-two times between 1989 and 1995. 
23 Previously Employment and Immigration Canada. 
24 Formerly Immigration and Ethnic Affairs. 
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Migration Review Tribunal (MRT)25 and the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). 
Both conduct merits reviews. In Canada, the three division Immigration and 
Refugee Board determines refugee applications at first instance and reviews 
other decisions in the immigration portfolio. In both countries the supervising 
court is known as the Federal Court. 26 
A more detailed consideration of the migration laws of Australia and 
Canada is woven into later Chapters. The thesis does not, however, aspire to 
present a complete picture of the migration provisions in either country. Even 
in the humanitarian admissions area, my analysis focuses closely on some 
particular issues because the strength of the analysis cannot be demonstrated 
only through generalisations. In order to capture a full impression of the law in 
action, Chapter Three focuses on process questions, Chapter Four on Federal 
Court jurisprudence and Chapter Five on the highest level appellate 
jurisprudence, that of the Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court of 
Australia. First, however, Chapter Two elaborates the core of the thesis, the 
theoretical framework for analysing the relationship between migration law and 
national identity. 
25 This replaced the Immigration Review Tribunal (IRT) on l June 1999. 
26 See Appendix B. 
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Chapter Two 
Theorising Law and Identity 
This chapter describes the framework for my argument about the 
interrelationship of migration law and national identity and examines the 
theoretical structure of the key concepts. I begin by canvassing trends in the 
literature on law and identity, outlining the central themes of this growing body 
of work on which my analysis draws. The focus in these studies on the 
construction of boundaries and hierarchies makes it highly adaptable to my 
examination of migration law as a societal boundary. In addition, this work fits 
into a broader category of analysis linking law and social construction, of which 
my argument that migration law is constitutive of the liberal community is one 
example. The next portion of the Chapter examines the two central elements of 
my argument: identity and nation. I specify the ways I use each term and locate 
the terms in their interdisciplinary setting. Following these discussions, I 
consider the role of migration law in liberal society and how this role takes on 
added importance in countries whose dominant populations are composed of 
migrants. The discussion demonstrates the links between identity and nation. 
The subsequent section shows how migration law adapts to the needs of the 
nation. Finally, I conclude by drawing the elements together to present a 
framework for analysing migration law which fits within the law and identity 
literature. 
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A. LAW AND IDENTITY SCHOLARSIDP 
A growing body of legal analysis links the concepts law and identity, 
although so far this work has not been described as a unified theory, and most of 
its practitioners would reject such a grandiose label. Nonetheless, the literature 
is related by a group of common themes. Studies of law and identity share a 
view of identity as a social construct and suggest that law has a key role to play 
in that construction. In addition, these analyses present a critical perspective on 
legal reasoning and legal process, focussing on particular ways law obscures and 
simplifies a pre-existing social reality. I review these aspects of what I term 
"law and identity theory" in order to integrate their explanatory power into my 
own theoretical framework. Finally, I examine what an identity perspective can 
reveal about rights, a particular characteristic of legal reasoning. 
1. Identity as a Social Phenomenon 
a. Putting Identity in Question 
· Legal analysts who use identity as an organising concept in their work 
share the perspective that identity is not a fixed essence but a variable, a site of 
struggle, a contingent result of contestation over meaning. Thus Martha Minow 
refers to "the negotiated quality of identities,"1 and the "kaleidoscopic nature" of 
identity. 2 As identity is negotiated and malleable, it follows that there must also 
be at least the potential for multiple identities. Karen Engle and Dan Danielson 
argue that " .. .in order to generate more effective legal strategies, legal 
1 Minow M, "Identities" ( 1991) 3 Yale Journal of Law and The Humanities 91 at 99. 
2 Ibid. at 112. 
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consciousness should take account of the role of law in the constitution of 
identities and in the simultaneity of multiple identities and perspectives."3 
Elizabeth Mertz takes a similar position when she describes "the complex and 
mutually constitutive relationships that form between legal processes and social 
identities."4 Duncan Kennedy takes an optimistic view of the role of an 
individual in negotiating identity, stating: 
My view is that the identities celebrated both in modem 
multicultural rhetoric and in the traditionalist rhetoric of the mainstream 
are best seen as "positions" or "situations" within which people operate as 
free agents. Of course, the freedom is relative to the position or situation. 
But freedom does mean that we sometimes get to choose how to handle 
things after taking our identities into account. It does not mean that we 
can get beyond contextual constraint and do or be anything we want. And 
we can also choose to be loyal and true to our constrained identity 
positions, choose to be as little free as possible. 5 
In theorising the relationship between law and identity then, identity is never a 
given. It is a question, an object of analysis. It is bounded but its boundaries 
are to be explored and explained. 
Putting identity at the centre of the inquiry into how law works, however, 
does not make it the end product or the dependent result of legal process. 
Rather, identity is in a middle position, neither a dependent nor an independent 
variable. It is, therefore, a useful concept for understanding both law's potential 
for social transformation and its inherent conservatism. Reviewing the 
limitations of legal discourse Lisa Bower argues that gay rights activists must 
3 "Introduction", After Identity: A Reader in Law and Culture Danielson D and Engle K (eds) 
Routledge, New York and London, 1995 at xiii. 
4 Mertz E, "Introduction to Symposium Issue: Legal Loci and Places in the Heart: Community 
and Identity in Sociolegal Studies" (1994) 28 Law and Society Review 971 at 972. 
5 Kennedy D, Sexy Dressing Etc, London, Harvard University Press, 1993 at viii. 
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have " ... an awareness oflaw's capacity to constrain claims of identity and, at the 
same time, how they might deploy a strategic framework which seeks to 
articulate a subject who is not defined in unitary terms."6 Danielson and Engle 
write of "the contradictory roles" that legal rules play in postcolonial struggles: 
" .. .legal rules are used on the one hand to facilitate the emergence of "authentic" 
identities, and on the other to control that emergence."' In a different context, 
discussing American aboriginal fishing rights litigation, Susan Staiger Gooding 
uses parallel language, asserting that "law can be a tool for colonising and for 
decolonising."8 Linking the inquiry into identity in law to broad trends in social 
inquiry throughout the twentieth century, Minow states: 
I suggest that the question about the identity of a group [ ... ]will always be 
befuddling if it is detached from the purposes for which the question is 
being asked. Once the purposes are disclosed, the perspective of the 
inquirer and the perspective of the evaluator become critical. For some 
purposes, self-proclaimed identity will be most significant; for others, 
external community responses and understandings. But the perceptions of 
outsiders are not "objective" or removed from the interests of the outsiders 
themselves.9 
When law requires the construction of an identity, it is always for some 
particular purpose. Thus the dilemma Minow describes is that of the particle 
physicist: if she seeks a stationary entity she will find one, if she calibrates her 
instruments to chart the motion of a wave, they will do so. Any inquiry into law 
6 Bower LC, "Queer Acts and the Politics of'Direct Address': Rethinking Law, Culture and 
Community" (1994) 28 Law and Society Review 1009 at 1014. 
7 Above n3 at 188. 
8 Staiger Gooding S, "Place, Race and Names: Layered Identities in United States v Oregon, 
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, Plaintiff, Intervenor" (1994) 28 Law and 
Society Review 1181 at 1185. 
9 Minow M, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law Ithaca Cornell 
University Press, 1990 at 355. 
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and identity must begin with the caution that law can both constrain identities 
and liberate them. Directing attention to identity, therefore, requires us to 
consider how this constraint or liberation operates, to investigate its mechanics. 
It also requires us to examine conditions under which law becomes either 
constrictive or liberating and to analyse to what extent and by whom these 
conditions may be strategically manipulated. Migration is a highly politicised 
area of law at present and as a consequence political and public debate is 
directed towards manipulation of the identities shaped in this law. As I detail 
later, migration law is structured to accommodate political ebbs and flows by 
easily constricting or expanding the national identity it portrays. 
b. Broader theories of social construction 
The assertion that law is implicated in the construction of identity belongs 
to a broader argument that law has a role in social construction. The term 
"constitutive theory" was first used by Karl Klare in 1979 to describe the 
proposition that law has a role to play in constituting social relations. 10 Alan 
Hunt has developed the most fully articulated account of a constitutive theory of 
law, drawing on theoretical trends in the sociology of law, the critical legal 
studies movement, Marxist theory and Foucauldian social theory.11 Hunt's 
resulting theory relies more heavily on Marx than Foucault and more directly on 
the sociology of law than on critical legal studies. Despite these internal 
discrepancies in his argument, he addresses directly the central concerns I wish 
10 As reported by Alan Hunt in, Exp/orations in Law and Society: Toward a Constitutive Theory 
of Law Routledge, London and New York, 1993 at 149. 
11 This is given in Exp/orations in Law and Society: Toward a Constitutive Theory of Law, ibid. 
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to highlight in theorising law and identity. In his words, the significance of his 
theory is that: 
.. .it serves as a way out of the uncomfortable dichotomy between the 
importance and the unimportance of law. It serves to focus attention on 
the way in which law is implicated in social practices, as an always 
potentially present dimension of social relations, while at the same time 
reminding us the law is itself the product of the play and struggle of social 
relations. 12 
Hunt chastises critical legal scholars for failing to take theory seriously and for 
not paying sufficient attention to the problem of mediation, through which legal 
ideology and legal consciousness influence mass or popular consciousness.13 
Hunt argues the " ... thesis that law both constitutes and is constituted has to be 
pressed further. In this form it verges on the vacuous."14 To meet this criticism, 
he draws on Gramsci's concept of hegemony, Foucault's understanding of 
disciplinarity and regulation, Jessop's concept of"structural coupling" and 
Santos' theory of locations of law to articulate a theory which gives an account 
of law's relationship to the state, the usefulness of rights discourse, and the 
importance of boundaries in law. While Hunt does not make specific arguments 
about law and identity, the thesis that I and others who use these terms develop 
fits within his overall theory. 15 Rights and boundaries are particularly important 
12 Ibid. at 3. 
13 Ibid. at 148-150 and Chapter 7. The question of mediation is one that I take up through this 
thesis, by using a narrower theoretical framework than Hunt's, tailored to examining some legal 
discourses and some legal outcomes. 
14 Ibid. at 175. 
15 Hunt himself makes a similar argument about E.P. Thompson's work, stating that 
Thompson's seminal book Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act, Allen Lane, 
London, 1975, is an example of an application of constitutive theory; ibid. at 175. 
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to my analysis of migration law and national identity and I return to these 
aspects of Hunt's argument when developing my theory in those areas. 
Considering law as one element in social construction, Stuart Hall's 
research team presented a study addressing the links between legal and social 
discourse that Hunt is concerned to see studied more thoroughly. Policing The 
Crisis: Mugging The State and Law and Order16 demonstrates how "mugging" 
was constructed as a "moral panic" in British society in the early 1970s. Hall 
and his co-authors identify law and legal discourses as influential in this process 
in several ways. For example, they argue that judicial statements on sentencing 
"muggers" were a response to public feelings, interests, and pressures outside 
the courtroom, and in tum contributed to "structuring the public perception of 
the 'moral panic' ."17 They also argue that British citizenship law from the 
1960s attacked the citizenship status of black workers and therefore contributed 
to the social circumstances allowing for the racial attribution of the "mugging" 
phenomenon.18 Policing the Crisis provides crucial documentation of the role 
of law and legal discourses in broader social phenomenon. British law both 
responds to social pressures (e.g. with heavier sentences for "muggers") as well 
as contributes to the atmosphere producing those pressures (e.g. through 
citizenship restrictions generating a black unemployed class). 
A variety of legal scholars now make links between law and social 
construction. Marlee Kline links law and social construction in arguing that the 
16 Hall S et al, Policing the Crisis: Mugging the State and Law and Order, Macmillan, London 
and Basingstoke, 1978. 
17 Ibid. at 32. 
18 Ibid. at 343. 
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courts construct First Nations women as "bad mothers" by contrasting them 
with an ingrained ideology of motherhood. The courts draw on an ideology of 
motherhood which exists outside the law and transform that ideology into a 
legal standard for the best interests of the child, incorporating that ideology's 
cultural, racist and gender biases. 19 Echoing Policing the Crisis, Abdul Paliwala 
argues that post 1960s British immigration law has been increasingly racist, and 
that "immigration control is as much about constructing through a culture of 
control the (black) immigrant community within the country as about preventing 
outsiders from getting in."20 Gary Peller argues that the dominant middle class 
core of the American civil rights movement constructed race and integration in 
ways which claimed neutrality and gained legal dominance, setting the stage for 
the emergence of "black nationalism": 
... enlightened whites helped construct and deploy a liberal understanding 
of racial justice that incorporated universalist and objectivist assumptions. 
This understanding rejected race consciousness as a categorical matter, in 
part as a way to avoid issues of white cultural identity that black 
nationalism brought to the fore. 21 
Patricia Williams also asserts a central role for law in building social 
delineations, arguing that: 
Our system of jurisprudence is constantly negotiating the bounds of our 
communal civic body in the context of disputes about the limits of our 
physical edges (such as experimentation with foetal tissue, sales of body 
parts, and sterilisation), the limits of identity (male/female, citizen/non-
19 Kline M, "Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood: Child Welfare Law and First Nation 
Women" (1993) 18 Queen's Law Journal 306. 
20 Paliwala A, "Law and the Constitution of the 'Immigrant' in Europe: a United Kingdom 
Policy Perspective" in Fitzpatrick P ( ed) Nationalism, Racism and the Rule of Law, Dartmouth 
Press, Aldershot U.K. and Brookfield U.S.A., 1995, 77 at 91-92. 
21 Peller G ., "Race Consciousness" (1990) Duke Law Journal 758 at 840. 
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citizen, and so on) and the limits oflife itself (wrongful death cases, right 
to die, and executions). Law negotiates these boundaries by constructing 
verbal guideposts and a whole range of representational lenses and filters 
through which we see each other. 22 
While the argument that law is engaged in social construction has been 
most comprehensively asserted by critical race theorists, its analytic power is 
now brought to bear in many areas. The importance of this analysis for 
understanding racism in law, however, remains central and takes on particular 
significance in the study of migration law which is frequently a repository of 
racist sentiment. Equally, the fact that theories of law and social construction 
have been deployed by those probing racism highlights how a focus on identity 
fits well within this theoretical framework. Race is one element of socially 
constructed identity and law is one mechanism in that construction process. 
c. Identity is relational 
Another important theme uniting analyses of law and identity is that 
identity is relational. This perspective on identity, which can trace its roots to 
Hegel's philosophy and Lacan's psychoanalysis, is used in a relatively 
straightforward way in most legal analysis. One identity emerges only in 
contrast to another. This "other" is most frequently overlooked or submerged in 
legal reasoning. Attention to the way law constructs identities allows a 
consideration of these implicit others whose presence structures legal analysis. 
Peller, for example, points to the way the black nationalist movement in 
the United States drew attention to racial difference and the constructed nature 
22 Williams P J, The Rooster's Egg, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts and 
London England, l 995 at 230-31. 
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of race and how, as a consequence of this, the constructed nature of white 
identity was also put in issue. The early integrationist analyses of the civil 
rights movement had not focussed on racial difference and therefore had 
allowed white identity to operate as an unquestioned background assumption: 
... through the identification of racial identity and group consciousness as 
central to the structure of American social relations, the black nationalists 
of the 1960s also identified the particular aspect of avoidance and denial 
that white support of black liberation assumed- the commitment by 
whites to deny the centrality of race as an historically constructed, and 
powerful, factor in the social structure of American life. Understanding 
racism as a form of "discrimination" from an assumed neutral norm was 
the cognitive face of a widespread cultural flight from white self-
identity. 23 
Once black identity was made a central concern and critically examined, the 
white identity in implicit contrast to which it had been created also became 
subject to examination. Exploring difference brings the other into focus. 
The relational aspect of identity is most often hidden, and is the object of 
inquiry for those exploring the identities created in law. Martin Chanock, for 
example, challenges the assertion that the South African common law is racially 
neutral. He argues that: 
The creation of self and the exclusion of 'other' is basic to the nature of 
South Africa's laws in a more fundamental way than simply in the passing 
of discriminatory statutes. 24 
While the law may appear neutral, Chanock argues that two separate systems of 
common law operate in South Africa, one applicable to blacks, the other to 
23 Peller, above n 21at 842-43. 
24 Chanock M, "Race and Nation in South African Common Law" in P Fitzpatrick (ed) above n 
20, 195 at 197. 
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whites. The neutral language of the common law obscures this distinction. A 
theoretical focus on identity facilitates unearthing it. 
Martha Minow links the relational nature and malleability of identity to 
the observer's expectations. In her account, identity is constructed both in 
contrast to another and in response to pre-existing expectations. In many legal 
instances, these two influences on identity will be combined, for example when 
a refugee lawyer interviews a potential client for the first time, her assessment of 
her client's story will be influenced both by her expectations based on other 
experiences with refugee clients and on her understanding of the legal category 
of "refugee," which will operate either as an Other (because she assesses that the 
client does not fit within that identity) or as an expectation (because as the 
conversation continues she forms the view that the client will be able to make a 
successful claim). Discussing the story of a guardianship application for a 
special needs child Minow states: 
The judge, the lawyers, and the parties in effect showed how an individual 
like Philip has an identity only in relation to others and how the 
description of his situation depends upon who is offering the 
observations.25 
Thus to fully examine identity in law is also to consider who is doing the 
identifying and how that process affects them, aspects which are raised as part 
of the identity based critique of legal method. 
Kline's work on motherhood ideology in child welfare law also highlights 
the relational nature of identity. She states: 
25 Ibid. at 351. 
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... the expectations of 'good' mothering are presented as natural, necessary, 
and universal. The 'bad mother,' by corollary, is constructed as the 
"photographic negative" of the 'good mother,' again with the operation of 
racism and other such factors rendered invisible. "26 
The photographic negative metaphor is particularly apt as the assumed or 
implicit 'other' is often hard to make out, and is rarely the focus of attention. 
Karen Engle emphasises our tendency to overlook or ignore the other when she 
writes of the "exotic other female."27 She argues that Western activists' 
arguments about female circumcision or genital mutilation in Africa are 
structured against a largely unexplored image of African women: 
Although women's rights advocates rarely acknowledge the Exotic Other 
Female, I argue that their discourse is nevertheless dependent on her. The 
projection of the Exotic Other Female (as something "out there") seems to 
guide much of their advocacy.28 
In his discussion of the "constitutional subject" - the "we" in the American 
constitution's "We the people" - Michel Rosenfeld pushes this analysis of the 
unexamined other in a different direction. He argues that the constitutional 
subject can only be approached and understood in the negative; that it is much 
easier to determine what the constitutional subject is not than what it is. He 
concludes therefore "that it is ultimately preferable and more accurate to regard 
26 Kline, above n 19 at 315; internal citation to Marie Ashe '"Bad Mothers' and 'Good 
Lawyers:' Reflections on Representation and Relationship" (Paper presented. at the Workshop 
on Motherhood, Feminism and Legal Theory Project Workshop, Columbia University School of 
Law, December 4-5, 1992). 
27 Engle K, "Female Subjects of Public International Law: Human Rights and the Exotic Other 
Female" in D Danielsen and K Engle (eds), After Identity: A Reader in Law and Culture above 
n 3, 210. 
28 Ibid. at 212. 
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the constitutional subject as an absence."29 His analysis depends on the 
relational nature of identity as it requires that we understand the constitutional 
subject by looking at what it exists in contrast to. That is, that we develop the 
photograph from its negative. In my work, this perspective means that it is 
sometimes easiest to understand what it is to be Australian or Canadian by 
considering what it is not. 
The relational quality of identity makes it a key concept for considering 
national identity and migration law. Migration law is directed outwards, at 
those beyond the nation's borders. In labelling and controlling these others it 
builds a reflected image of the nation and those who are insiders. In addition, 
the relational nature of identity makes it a good tool in the search for exclusions 
and silences in law. Paying attention to the identities which are represented in 
and through legal discourses reminds us to search for the Others against which 
these identities derive their content. This perspective, therefore, draws attention 
to those most completely excluded by the law. This characteristic of identity 
creates an important intersection with legal reasoning, and is the key factor 
uniting several of the criticisms of legal reasoning examined in law and identity 
theory. 
2. A Critique of Legal Method 
Another important theme I draw on in analyses of law which use identity 
as an organising concept is a critique of legal reasoning and legal method. In 
broad terms, the argument is that legal reasoning is acutely categorical and 
29 Rosenfeld M, "The Identity of the Constitutional Subject" (1995) 16 Cardozo Law Review 
1049 at 1054-55. 
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through its categorisations it creates, defines and constrains identities. The 
categorisation effect is related to the focus in legal reasoning on binary 'either-
or' mechanics. The resulting categories have structured boundaries and are 
hierarchically related. In this section I consider these principal elements of the 
identity based critique of legal reasoning as well as how the legal process itself 
constrains and shapes the identities of those who engage with it. 
a. Categorisation 
Legal reasoning has a binary structure. It works through a series of 
'either-or' choices, leading to an ultimate pronouncement in the same 
framework: guilty-not guilty, liable-not liable, eligible-ineligible. This structure 
alone is not unique. Human reasoning generally proceeds in this fashion, 
comparing alternatives and making choices. In legal reasoning, however, the 
process is simplified. There are ultimately only two alternatives, which are 
diametrically opposed to each other. Everything outside that narrow framework 
becomes irrelevant, either through formal rules of evidence and admissibility or 
through subtler techniques by which lawyers mould stories told to them about 
individuals into legal arguments. There is little room for compromise, for 
considering multiple alternatives, or for examining the ways the legal choices 
available obscure complicated situations. One of the most important skills 
learned by law students is how to analyse a complex hypothetical scenario and 
identify within it the legal issues arising. Instructors make an effort to pack 
exam questions with extraneous detail, imitating "real life," so that bright 
students can distinguish themselves by strategically jettisoning much of the 
story. The legal argument narrows the factors to consider, thereby making the 
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question amenable to an either-or resolution. Martha Minow has likened this 
aspect of legal reasoning to the Sesame Street "one of these things does not 
belong here" game. In order to sort things into categories, we pay particular 
attention to one particular trait and ignore all others. 30 Lisa Bower considers the 
American Supreme Court decision in Bower v Harwick'1 a paradigmatic 
example of this type of reasoning. In that case challenging the constitutional 
validity of Georgia's sodomy law, homosexual identity was reduced by the 
Court to that particular act. 32 
Patricia Williams describes this characteristic of legal reasoning when she 
argues that "theoretical legal understanding" in Anglo-American jurisprudence 
is characterised by "the hypostatisation of exclusive categories and clear 
taxonomies that purport to make life simpler in the face of life's complication: 
rights/needs, moral/immoral, public/private, white/black."33 Binary categories 
are important to an identity based analysis of legal discourse because so many of 
the categories are used to identify individuals. The white/black categorisation 
which Williams refers to is only one of these. Other key legally bounded 
identities are innocent/guilty, sane/insane, adult/child. Each of these 
categorisations simplifies and fixes reality in an artificial way, particularly in 
cases at the margins: the woman who put a blouse in her shopping bag, forgot 
about it and left the shop (not guilty), the hermit who mails explosives to distant 
30 Above n 9 at 3. 
31 (1986), 478 US 186 (USSC). 
32 Bower L C, above n 6. 
33 Williams P J, The Alchemy of Race and Rights Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts, 1991 at 8. 
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cities in protest against civilisation (sane), the seventeen year old who lives on 
her own, caring for her child and completing high school by correspondence 
(child). And each of these identity labels has consequences in the lives of these 
individuals; consequences that affect their realities, even if the labels do not 
accurately reflect those realities. 
b. llierarchy 
The oversimplification of realities by legal categories has various effects. 
One of the most important of these is that the categories have a hierarchical 
relationship with each other. In Minow's words, our language " ... embeds 
unstated points of comparison inside categories that falsely imply a natural fit 
with the world."34 To again use her words: "When we identify one thing as 
unlike the others, we are dividing the world; we use our language to exclude, to 
distinguish - to discriminate."35 Categorisation in legal discourses rarely lives 
up to its assertion of neutrality both because of the consequences attached to 
legal categories and because the categories are frequently constructed through 
assuming a background norm which is necessarily privileged in the process. 
The background norm, as unstated category, occupies the most privileged 
position. Iyer describes the process with precision: 
Assignments of difference, or categorizations, are also expressions of 
hierarchies, assertions of power. When characteristics such as race and 
sex are perceived as differences, and are used to categorize people, they 
rarely merely distinguish among them. They are much more likely to be 
understood hierarchically ... .lt is evident that to be in the speaker's 
position, to be the categorizer or comparison maker, is to occupy a 
position of power. It is empowering in two ways. First, doing the 
34 Above n 9 at 4. 
35 Ibid. at 3. 
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categorizing allows you to draw comparisons between yourself and others 
on the basis of your choice of characteristics .... Second, as categorizer, I 
can make myself absent from the process: I can create one side of the 
comparison as 'a difference' inherent in the person or group labelled by 
that difference, while constituting my particular constellation of attributes 
as the invisible background norm. Thus, Gwen is white, Claire is tall, and 
Joel is male. Regardless of what feature each of them might have chosen 
to distinguish them from me, the differences I choose become part of 
them, and my brown-ness, short-ness, female-ness, which are the points of 
comparison from which these differences emerge, disappear.36 
The hierarchical nature of legal categories is embedded in the way that they are 
formed and in who does the forming. While Iyer writes of categories used in 
anti-discrimination law, her argument is equally apposite to legal categories not 
already linked to discrimination. Labels such as migrant, citizen, resident, and 
alien also contain an implicit hierarchy which derives from submerging the 
point of view against which these labels are affixed. 
Recent studies in First Nations law illustrate the hierarchical effects of 
legal categories as well as the reach of this analysis of the law. To claim under 
American land title provisions, indigenous groups must first be considered as 
''tribes." That is, a court must adjudicate their identity in a particular way 
before other aspects of a land claim will be considered.37 Of the various 
American studies on this point, the most comprehensive is by Gerald Torres and 
Kathryn Milun.38 Their analysis explores many facets of the Mashpee case, 
36 Iyer N, "Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of Social Identity" (1993) 19 
Queen's Law Journal 179 at 185-86. 
37 Robert Post notes that group rights provisions give national courts a strong degree of control 
over group identity, and this is one example. See "Democratic Constitutionalism and Cultural 
Heterogeneity" (2000) Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy forthcoming. 
38 "Translating YONNONDIO by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case" (1990) 
Duke Law Journal 625. Other studies exploring adjudication of the term tribe in the United 
States include: Carrillo J, "Identity as Idiom: Mashpee Reconsidered" (1995) 28 Indiana Law 
Review 511; Perry R W, "The Logic of the Modern Nation-State and the Legal Construction of 
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including the role played by precedent and by rules of evidence, and that the 
standard categorisation of "tribe" did not correspond to Mashpee experience. 
Torres and Milun conclude: 
The stories that members of the Mashpee Tribe told were stories that legal 
ears could not hear. Thus, the legal requirements of relevance rendered 
the Indian storytellers mute and the culture they were portraying invisible. 
The tragedy of power was manifest in the legally mute and invisible 
culture of those Mashpee Indians who stood before the court trying to 
prove that they existed. 39 
This demonstrates the hierarchical effect of the legal category ''tribe." In order 
to assert certain claims, one must be within the category. To be outside it, in the 
realm of "not-tribe" is to lack standing, the legal term for voice. The 
categorisation scheme privileges the half of the binary opposition that it makes 
visible. 
The issues of voice, visibility and hierarchy are all important aspects of 
legal reasoning which are brought to light in a focus on identity. Expressing a 
similar argument in the context of the law of intellectual and cultural property, 
Rosemary Coombe states that, "only by situating these claims in this context [of 
historical experience and contemporary political struggle] can we understand 
how supposedly abstract, general and universal principles (like authorship, art, 
culture, and identity) may operate to construct systematic structures of 
domination and exclusion in ... society."40 The hierarchical nature oflegal 
categorisations, and the implicit background norms which ground them, make 
Native American Tribal Identity" (1995) 28 Indiana Law Review 547; Staiger Gooding S, above 
n 8. 
39 Ibid. at 657. 
40 Coombe R J, "The Properties of Culture and the Politics of Possessing Identity: Native Claims 
in the Cultural Appropriation Controversy" in Engle and Danielsen (eds) above n 3, 251 at 276. 
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legal discourse particularly suited for domination and exclusion, and masks 
these effects at the same time. The critical perspective on legal reasoning 
employed by theorists of law and identity aids in lifting this mask. 
c. Boundaries 
Law's categorical reasoning reifies boundaries. In order for categories to 
be meaningful they must be clearly demarcated. An analytic focus on identity 
brings boundaries into question as identities themselves are bounded. The two 
terms often occur together, each highlighting a different aspect of the law's 
identity labelling role. In migration law, which describes a border for the polity 
and specifies who may cross it, the concept of boundary is particularly 
important. In an overt way, migration law is about boundaries, and the 
identities that emerge on either side of them. Theorists concerned with law and 
identity consider ways that identities are contested. One important way an 
identity can be contested is at its boundary; that is, whether one is inside or 
outside a given identity group can be debated.41 This was the issue in the 
Mashpee case. The importance of boundaries in legal reasoning contributes to 
the inflexibility of the categories which are created. Minow argues that "these 
[legal] rules contribute to labelling by favouring a view of certain and clear 
boundaries rather than relationships."42 In her analysis, the law has difficulty 
addressing conflicts within relationships because its focus is the boundaries 
41 The other principal way in which identities are contested is through debates over the meaning 
or expression of the particular identity, treating group membership as settled. For example, 
asking "what does it mean to be a citizen?" These two types of contestation can, of course, 
occur at the same time. 
42 Minow M, above n 9 at 6-7. 
34 
between people rather than the relationships which necessarily emerge on either 
side of a boundary as an expression of that boundary. 
Boundaries are also important in law because categorical reasoning relies 
on being able to treat certain questions as beyond the scope of inquiry or not at 
issue. That is, some things are clearly out of bounds. This mechanism works in 
many ways in the law, which also adopts and enshrines societal boundaries.43 
Thus analyses which consider law's methods for excluding and limiting 
arguments often raise the issue of boundary construction. Considering the 
effectiveness, for the capitalist class, of the nineteenth century distinction 
between "citizens" and "workers" Hunt states: 
There is a literal sense in which law, and most explicitly property law, 
demarcates and enforces boundaries; but this notion of boundary 
maintenance has wider significance. In the case of the workplace 
boundaries have special import precisely because of the critical 
significance of the division between work and politics within capitalist 
economies; it is here that there is the distinction between the incorporation 
of the working class within the polity while excluding workers from full 
participation in the workplace .... It is not that law creates this boundary 
but rather that once in place it is protected and reinforced by both legal 
ideology and legal practice.44 
An analysis of identity in law, then, introduces the concept of boundary in 
considering the contested bounds of identity and in doing so draws attention to 
other boundaries reified by the law. Both of these aspects of boundary are 
important to my study. Migration law establishes clear boundaries around 
identities such as citizen, resident, and visitor. It sets strict limits on categories 
such as bona fide spouse or refugee and provides tools for policing those 
43 One example which has been extensively considered by feminist legal theorists is law's 
adaptation of the public/private boundary. 
44 Hunt A, above n 10 at 325. 
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boundaries. It is also crucial to constructing the border or boundary of the 
nation, and the ways of crossing it. 
d. Individuals in the legal process 
A consideration of law and identity also yields insights about individuals 
who engage the legal process, both as professional actors - lawyers, judges, 
scholars - and individuals seeking legal outcomes. The process itself limits the 
identities of the roles these individuals can play. This is not to say that the legal 
process determines the identities of advocates, decision makers, or plaintiffs, but 
rather that it limits choices available to individuals in these roles. Further, the 
role one takes up in the process constrains what one observes about the process. 
These themes have been explored by Gary Bellow and Martha Minow in 
their edited collection Law Stories.45 One of their themes in considering law as 
narrative and in asking lawyers to reflect on the stories told in and by law was to 
raise ... "questions concerning the construction and alteration of identities in the 
process of accommodating and challenging limits in law practice. '"'6 They argue 
that "as they engage a legal problem, clients and legal workers experience shifts 
in the ways they see themselves and others and changes in the way they relate to 
and are seen by others. "47 The form of legal reasoning means that one of a 
lawyer's most important tasks is to shape her client's identity into one that fits 
within a desirable legal category: not-guilty, competent, refugee. In order to 
accomplish this, some aspects of that identity must be highlighted, others 
45 Bellow G and Minow M (eds) Law Stories, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1996. 
46 Ibid. at 3. 
47 Ibid. 
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downplayed. In an article in the same volume, Anthony Alfieri reflects on how 
poverty lawyers transform their client's own stories, imposing silences which 
amount to acts of narrative violence.48 In migration law, successful outcomes 
mean being able to fit a particular identity label such as "bona fide spouse" or 
"dependent relative." 
The lawyers building these cases and the decision makers presiding over 
them also project and are limited by identities cast for them as professional 
roles. Unlike the clients, however, these are identities which the professionals 
choose for themselves, whose contours they are trained and socialised to 
acquire. Identities of the individuals playing out roles on legal stages are 
important to explaining legal outcomes. But the variance between these 
identities is sharp. It is important to consider, as Minow does in a separate 
essay, the pattern of power relationships which underlie the emergence of 
particular identities. In her words, " .. .it is important to consider the contrast 
between choice and assignment. Who picks a given identity and who is 
consigned to it?"49 One may "win" a legal result by successfully fitting the 
identity mould of "incompetent" or "abused wife" but fitting this mould carries 
its own legal and non-legal consequences.50 
48 AV Alfieri, "Welfare Stories" in ibid, 31. 
49 "Identities" above n 1 at 112. 
50 This point is made in feminist critiques of the use of"battered women's syndrome" evidence 
in criminal law. See for example, Sheehy, E et al, "Defending Battered Women on Trial: The 
Battered Woman Syndrome and its Limitations" (1992) 16 Criminal Law Journal 369 and 
Leader-Elliot I, "Battered But Not Beaten: Women Who Kill in Self Defence" (1993) 15 
Sydney Law Review 1. 
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This again points to the intermediary positioning of identity as neither 
wholly determinative nor wholly determined. The value of examining the 
identities of individuals in legal processes, however, is not that it can necessarily 
predict outcomes for us, but rather that it is instructive in showing how those 
with power over the process, the lawyers and judges, choose to construct 
themselves, and how the legal setting shapes the options they choose from. It 
also guides us to examining how legal discourse transforms one's experience of 
self into a legally mediated outcome. A theoretical perspective linking law and 
identity provides room, therefore, for considering these aspects of the legal 
process, as well as drawing critical attention to the categorical and hierarchical 
characteristics of legal reasoning. In the next section I examine in more detail 
one facet of legal reasoning, the role of rights. 
3. Rights and identities 
The debate over the utility of rights for progressive causes and the value 
of formal human rights instruments rages in all corners of the legal academy. 
The role of rights is vital in the migration context because what rights outsiders 
should have in a polity is a contentious question. Chapter Five of this thesis 
considers how this debate has taken shape in Canada and Australia and what 
conclusions can be drawn from that comparison. This section sets the stage for 
that discussion by considering rights as a core element of legal reasoning and 
demonstrates the insights that a law and identity analysis brings to rights 
debates. Rights discourses are a paragon of the type of reasoning which those 
concerned with identity in law argue is categorical, hierarchical and 
characterised by clear boundaries. 
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The language of rights permeates legal talk at all levels. We speak in 
terms of human rights, contractual rights, procedural rights and others. At one 
level our legal discourse can express any entitlement as a right. Rights are 
distinguished from privileges for some purposes, but even this distinction is 
laden with rights language. It may be a "mere privilege" to hold a driver's 
licence, but it is nonetheless considered a "right" to have one's application fairly 
decided.51 Obviously some rights are more important than others. International 
human rights scholars debate the merits of universal fundamental human rights 
provisions, a particular set of rights (whose boundaries are by no means clear) 
which are more important than other rights such as a right to fair consideration 
of a licence application or a right to practice as a physician. Rights discourse 
and legal discourse are almost synonymous. This has spillover effects into 
extra-legal discourses and people make rights claims in everyday life to address 
a myriad of situations ranging from the right to play loud music at midnight, the 
right to eat peanut butter,52 or the right to spank one's own child.53 I agree with 
Carol Smart's characterisation of law as ''the discourse ofrights"54 and with her 
analysis that the traditional mode of legal power is the extension of rights (as 
opposed to the creation of wrongs). 55 
51 This is a core administrative law distinction. See Allars M, Introduction to Australian 
Administrative Law, Butterworths, Sydney, 1990, Chapter 6. 
52 Grant I, "The Right to Peanut Butter" Globe and Mail, 26 November 1997. 
53 Australian parents probably do have this "right." Canadian parents likely do not. 
54 Smart C, Feminism and the Power of Law, Routledge, New York and London, 1989 at 8. 
55 Ibid. at 12, 17 and passim. Smart rejects Foucault's thesis that the legal form of power has 
been superseded by disciplinary power, asserting instead that law combines these two modes of 
power to retain its hegemonic sway. She states that " ... the growth oflegal rights which can be 
claimed from the state has induced the concomitant growth of individual regulation. Hence 
39 
Considering the ways in which rights and identities are linked provides 
one avenue for analysing the utility of rights. Categorical rights discourse, as 
the paradigmatic legal discourse, obscures and silences underlying social 
realities and complications. The assertion of a right creates the categories of 
"rights-holder" and "non-rights-holder" as a basic starting point in the analysis. 
This simplifying effect is a central tenet for those who argue that human rights 
instruments have little potential for social transformation. 56 Rather than join the 
debate as set out in these terms, however, I would like to draw out the linkages 
between rights and identity which are sketched in some work linking the two 
and to assert that a focus on identity can illuminate the question of when rights 
will be strategically useful and when they will not. Patricia Williams' analysis 
provides a useful inroad to this perspective: 
In law, rights are islands of empowerment. To be unrighted is to be 
disempowered, and the line between rights and no-rights is most often the 
line between dominators and oppressors. Rights contain images of power 
and manipulating those images, either visually or linguistically, is central 
in the making and maintenance of rights. In principle, therefore, the more 
dizzyingly diverse the images that are propagated, the more empowered 
we will be as a society.57 
She links rights with the labels dominators and oppressors, and suggests that 
rights are generally empowering and can be created out of nothing. Rights are 
associated with particular identities, dominator and oppressor, but this structure 
rights can be claimed only if the claimant fits within the category of persons to whom the rights 
have been conceded." (at 162). While there is a struggle within legal discourses between new 
and old forms of power, law is at the same time extending its terrain in all directions. 
56 See Fudge J, "The Effects of Entreating a Bill of Rights Upon Political Discourse: Feminist 
Demands and Sexual Violence in Canada" (1989) 17 International Journal of the Sociology of 
Law 445; Glasbeck HJ, "From Constitutional Rights to 'Real' Rights - "R-1-G-HTS FO-R-WA-
RD-HO"!? 10 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 468; Bakan J, Just Words: 
Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1997. 
57 Above n 33 at 233-34. 
40 
has inbuilt flexibility. I would add to this argument that a rights-holder identity 
can be more easily taken up by some groups than by others. Groups which 
occupy dominant social positions are more likely to be able to successfully 
assert rights claims. 
This leads to a another point which is recognised in literature linking law 
and identity. Rights are a phenomenon of collective identity. Hunt, who 
advocates strongly for the utility of rights, states: 
Rights-in-action involve an articulation and mobilization of forms of 
collective identities. This does not imply that they need take the form of 
"collective rights," but simply that they play a part in constituting social 
actors, whether individual or collective, whose identity is changed by and 
through the mobilization of some particular rights discourse. They 
articulate a vision of entitlements, of how things might be, which in turn 
has the capacity to advance political aspiration and action. 58 
Rights are a form of collective identity because a "rights-holder" necessarily 
designates a group of individuals, even when the right is expressed as an 
individual right. While in Western law rights are most often or most 
successfully asserted by individuals,59 they belong to categories. The "accused," 
the "contracting party," the "plaintiff' can each exercise rights, but each of these 
legal categories can be filled by any individual whose identity is adaptable to the 
confines of the category. For those who assert, as Hunt does, that rights contain 
the potential for social transformation, the mechanics for such a transformation 
would be a manipulation of the identities of the right-holder and the creation of 
new generic group identities which could become rights-holders. One way to 
58 Above n 10 at 247. 
59 Dauvergne C, "A Reassessment of the Effects ofa Constitutional Charter of Rights on the 
Discourse of Sexual Violence in Canada" (1994) 22 International Journal of the Sociology of 
Law291. 
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evaluate the likely success of such transformations would be to consider the 
extent to which the new identities differ from the old, recognising that in legal 
discourse change could not be more than incremental. 
There is necessarily a trade off which comes from using this strategy, and 
lyer's work points directly to it. Considering the protected grounds 
formulations used in equality rights instruments,60 she states: 
... no matter how long or inclusive the list of protected grounds or 
characteristics, the mechanical, categorical, or category-based, approach to 
equality embedded in such a structure obscures the complexity of social 
identity in ways that are damaging both to particular rights claimants, and 
to the larger goal of redressing relations of inequality. The categorical 
approach to equality fails to comprehend complex social relations. 61 
In other words, the price to be paid for using rights instruments as a legal 
strategy is that the identities that can be portrayed in rights arguments are 
limited. Some aspects of social reality will be lost in the process, some social 
realities will just not fit into the boxes provided. Rights narrow identities, and 
arguments about them, in particular ways which are related directly to the 
centrality of rights discourse to legal discourse. That is, rights discourse does 
this because it is legal discourse, and therefore what a law and identity analysis 
reveals about legal reasoning pertains in the arena of rights as well. 
60 That is, that equality rights instruments provide protection from discrimination on a number 
of grounds such as sex, sexual orientation, race, nationality etc. For example, the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms states: 
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection 
and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination 
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical 
disability. 
One of Iyer' s points is that even when the list of categories of protection is open-ended it is still 
a list and still categorically grounded. 
61 Above n 36 at 181. 
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Minow analyses the tension at the centre of the rights debate by contrasting 
different versions of rights discourse: 
... rights analysis contains a central instability. It starts with the idea that 
everyone enjoys the same rights but proceeds with the possibility that 
some special rights may be necessary either to remove the effects of past 
deprivation or to address some special characteristics of certain groups. 
Special rights, justified by differences, undermine claims of equal 
treatment predicated on sameness. Thus not only may the argument for 
special rights lose for lack of precedent; it may also refuel distinctions and 
inequality. 62 
By linking her analysis of rights discourse to underlying sameness and 
difference, Minow makes a point that connects directly to the analysis of law 
and identities which she engages in elsewhere. Rights discourse incorporates 
and buries a particular view of which differences are legally relevant and which 
are superfluous. Among the most fully ingrained of these differences is the 
difference between a murderer and a falsely accused innocent. Some of the 
strongest and most revered rights protections are reserved for the criminal 
accused facing the coercive power of the state.63 This is a crucial element of the 
western criminal justice system and I do not intend any criticism of these 
particular rights protections. What these rights do demonstrate, however, is that 
the current debate about the value of rights tends to focus on the value of rights 
for people seeking particular kinds of redress, often in the context of what is 
now called "identity politics." It is for these "identities" that critics question the 
value of rights and sceptics frown upon their use. In contexts where we are, as a 
society, prepared to assume that there are no differences that matter, rights are 
62 Above n 9 at 108. 
63 I discuss this in detail in "A Reassessment of the Effects of a Constitutional Charter of Rights 
on the Discourse of Sexual Violence in Canada" above note 59. 
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accepted non-contentiously. In the migration law context, the rights debate 
confronts these issues, as well as the question of whether non-members have 
any entitlement to legal rights at all. 
The critique of legal reasoning and legal process which is grounded in an 
analysis of law and identity is applicable to the rights debate and informs that 
debate in several ways. It draws our attention to the link between rights and 
collective identities. It demonstrates how rights discourse is categorical and 
hierarchical and how it obscures pre-existing social realities. These insights can 
be used to assess when rights discourse will be strategically valuable and when 
it will be unlikely to succeed, or will succeed only at too great a cost to be 
worthwhile. Perhaps most importantly, considering rights and identities 
provides some insights into the issues of identity politics. At the centre of this 
issue is the question of how "identity" has come to be associated with 
marginalisation and how "rights" have come to represent the entire legal system. 
Critical assessments of identity in law call attention to how identities emerge 
through a process of silencing and othering. The identities which are made 
visible in identity politics appear against unstated background norms. The 
debate about how useful rights are to these groups, or about whether rights 
pander to special interests, often overlooks how well rights serve groups whose 
differences are accepted as irrelevant within the dominant legal ideology. 
Having explored the aspects of law and identity scholarship that make it 
especially suited for my argument, I now tum to elaborating the central concepts 
my work builds on. 
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B. IDENTITY 
Aside from observing that identity is a constructed product of 
relationships, the literature considering law and identity does little to explore 
what identity is, or how a legally constructed identity is experienced by an 
individual. The vagueness this cursory treatment generates can give way to 
confusion in the face of numerous studies across a range of disciplines which 
take identity as their focal point. Finally, the phrase 'identity politics' has 
emerged as a pop-cultural buzzword, further muddling the question of what 
social analysts mean when they talk of identity. I draw on social science and 
social psychology to clarify the aspects of the term identity I want to use here. I 
then explain how the questions I raise about identity in migration law are linked 
to identity politics but differ markedly from the body of work most often 
appearing under that rubric. 
1. What is an identity? 
Contemporary discussions of identity often reflect a debate between two 
poles labelled essentialism and constructivism. To simplify, the essentialist 
position is that at least some characteristics of identity are constant or innate, 
while the constructivist would argue that one's sense of identity is wholly 
constituted within and through the intersection of various social discourses and 
processes.64 The dominant view in the legal scholarship taking up identity as an 
analytic tool and an object of inquiry, is that identity is entirely socially 
64 Calhoun C, "Social Theory and the Politics of Identity" in Calhoun C ( ed) Social Theory and 
the Politics of Identity Blackwell, Oxford UK and Cambridge MA, 1994, 9 at 12-20 presents an 
overview of this debate. 
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constructed. Although, of course, law is only one site of this construction. To 
put the position in a postmodernist' s terms, an identity is a subject position 
contingent and temporarily fixed within a constellation of intersecting 
discourses. 
However analytically satisfying the triumph of constructivism over 
essentialism may be, and despite its ability to give a particularly cogent account 
of identities represented in various legal texts, a constructivist account of 
identity does not fit particularly well with how we experience ourselves as 
individuals on a day to day basis. No amount of mental discipline really 
convinces me that I am a temporarily fixed subject position. Essentialism is 
easier to meld with one's everyday experience, which accounts for Calhoun's 
observation that 
Essentialist invocations of races, nations, genders, classes, persons and a 
host of other identities nonetheless remain common in everyday discourse 
throughout the world. Pointing to the social and cultural histories by 
which they have been constructed has become the main way of trying to 
challenge the grip these essentialist identities have over us and the 
problems they create.65 
The insight that ought to be drawn from this experiential evidence is that the 
essentialism/constructivism debate is artificial at one level. Identity may be 
socially constructed, but when that construction is highly successful it becomes 
invisible, meaning that identity is experienced as essential. By making identity 
the object of inquiry, we can examine the social construction that underlies our 
lived experience and theorise the linkages between the two. In legal studies, this 
65 Ibid. at 14. 
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analysis is furthered by considering the role law has in making up the "social" in 
"social construction." 
The tension between constructivism and essentialism is subtly present in 
law and identity literature. The unifying theme that law somehow narrows and 
misrepresents social identities rests on an assumption that identity exists outside 
law. That, therefore, identity is either constructed elsewhere in the social 
system and then re-constructed imperfectly in law or that identity has at least a 
partially independent or essential existence. My purpose is not to take a 
position in the essentialist - constructivist debate but to acknowledge its 
existence and to underline the fact that theorists of law and identity have not 
engaged this debate to any significant degree, but at the same time have settled 
firmly on the constructivist side of the argument. While the resulting position 
may lack the satisfying comprehensiveness of social theory, it nonetheless 
provides a valuable advance and important insights for critical legal scholars.66 
It is possible to acknowledge that law constructs, or at least represents, identities 
which have an existence outside law without settling whether, ultimately, 
constructivism or essentialism gives a better account of modem identity. 67 The 
value in this intermediate posture is the vantage point it offers for understanding 
legal process and legal reasoning. 
A framework for understanding the relationship between migration law 
and national identity requires consideration of identity at both an individual and 
a collective level. National identity is important because individuals experience 
66 Calhoun argues that it is "not productive to be simply for or against essentialism." ibid. at 19. 
67 Legal academe is quite accustomed to this type of partial appropriation of theoretical 
constructs. See Duncan Kennedy, Sexy Dressing Etc. above n 5. 
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themselves as Australian, Canadian, American or some other nationality and 
this experience has some relevance in their individual lives. Nonetheless 
without the collective element (and leaving the discussion of "nation" to the 
next section), without some sense of the nation as a collectivity having an 
identity, there is no source from which an individual can draw in imagining and 
therefore making meaningful their own individual experience of national 
identity. An individual cannot have a national identity unless a considerable 
number of other individuals also participate in that shared identity. 
John Turner's work on the social psychology of groups is helpful in 
understanding how group identifications function for individuals.68 His self-
categorisation theory, or "social identity theory of the group," provides an 
account "which rejects both the notion of a group mind (in the simple literal 
sense) and the individualism that denies the distinctive psychological properties 
of the group."69 To the generally shared assumptions that the individual 
possesses multiple conceptions of self and that the functioning of the self-
concept is situation specific, he adds that cognitive representations of self derive 
from placing oneself into hierarchically arranged categories based on 
similarities and differences with others. 70 Turner's account of group social 
identity is helpful in conceiving of national identity because it provides an 
account of the relationship between individual and collective identity and of the 
68 Turner J C, Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory Oxford and New 
York, Blackwell, 1987. His ideas are further developed in Turner JC, Social Influence, Open 
University Press, Milton Keynes, 1991. 
69 Ibid. Rediscovering the Social Group at 17. 
70 Ibid. Ch. 3. 
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changing relevance of a given identity to an individual. Both these aspects are 
important to the way I use identity in my analysis. 
Turner argues that self-categorisations exist on three levels, the super-
ordinate level of human beings, the intermediate level of ingroup-outgroup 
categories and the subordinate level of personal characteristics. 71 Which self-
category becomes important at a given point in time depends on characteristics 
of the individual person and of the situation. As self-categorisations depend on 
comparisons, when one category becomes the most relevant this accentuates 
"intra-class similarities" and "inter-class differences. "72 That is, there is what 
Turner terms a "functional antagonism" between importance of identifying at 
one level of self-categorisation and at other levels. In terms of my analysis, 
there is a functional antagonism between perceiving oneself as Canadian and 
perceiving oneself as a member of a smaller group such as Canadian women or 
Albertans, and still another functional antagonism between group and individual 
identities. 
This is important in nations like Canada and Australia where the question 
of national identity is much debated and some people question whether there 
can be a national identity in any meaningful sense. My argument accepts this 
national angst about collective identity and asserts that migration law is a 
particular discourse in which identity as a collective phenomenon on a national 
level is of primary importance. Later in this chapter I detail the reasons for this 
importance (section D). At this juncture, I merely point out that the shifting 
71 Ibid. at 45. 
72 Ibid. at 48-9. 
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importance of a national identity, as well as its existence as a social 
phenomenon, can be accounted for in social psychology. In Turner's words, "at 
any given moment the similarities and differences between the person, ingroup 
and outgroup will vary ... "73 Linking this shifting importance to "group 
behaviours" which are familiar in migration settings such as stereotyping and 
discrimination, Turner continues: 
... factors which enhance the salience of ingroup-outgroup categorisations 
tend to increase the perceived identity (similarity ... ) between self and 
ingroup members (and difference from outgroup members) and so 
depersonalize individual self-perception on the stereotypical dimensions 
which define the relevant ingroup membership .... the depersonalization of 
self-perception is the basic process underlying group phenomena (social 
stereotyping, group cohesiveness, ethnocentrism, co-operation and 
altruism, emotional contagion and empathy, collective action, shared 
norms and social influence processes, etc.)74 
In this analysis, the stereotyping and ethnocentrism which so often emerge in 
migration law discourses are in social-psychological terms an outgrowth of 
one's self-categorisation on the level of a national group. 
Whether or not individuals identify as a national group will depend on the 
degree to which their subjectively perceived differences are less than differences 
perceived between them and other people. 75 Migration law discourse is a setting 
in which the perceptions of similarities and differences are most likely to align 
with the borders of the nation. Turner asserts that there are two "primary 
modes" for internalising group membership: 
73 Ibid. at 50. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. at 51-52. 
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(1) simply as a result of persuasive communications from credible, 
prestigious or attractive others ( ... from others with whom they identity), 
and (2) on the basis of public behaviour as group members leading to 
private self-attitude change. 76 
The migration law setting provides various opportunities for these two primary 
modes of group membership internalisation to operate. As migration issues are 
frequently reported in the media, a large number of statements by credible and 
influential public figures are made widely available. Tribunal and judicial 
decisions themselves can function in this role. In the present political climate, 
where immigration is a frequently debated subject, many individuals will have 
opportunities to express their views in more or less public settings, whether 
across the back fence or at the parents' association meeting. In nations of 
immigrants like Canada and Australia, opportunities to express overt or subtle 
views about migration are woven into our everyday lives, into the same spheres 
where a sense of "national identity" is perceived to be absent. 
The final point in Turner's theory which I wish to draw on is the account 
given of group behaviours. One of his overall objects is to demonstrate that 
while psychological processes belong only to individuals, it is nonetheless 
appropriate to consider group behaviour as separate and distinct, and that this 
behaviour can be explained by considering how individuals react and identify in 
group settings. He states that self-categorisation theory: 
... demonstrates the postulate that psychological processes belong only to 
individuals is fully compatible with the idea of a psychological 
discontinuity between individuals acting as 'individuals' and as group 
members. Group behaviour is psychologically different from and 
irreducible to interpersonal relationships and yet this need involve no 
76 Ibid. at 53. 
51 
metaphysical notions of a group mind. If the theory proves valid, then the 
group has psychological reality in the sense that there is a specific 
psychological process, a self-grouping process, which corresponds to and 
underlies the distinctive features of group behaviour. 77 
This aspect of Turner's theory is important to my work as my account of 
identity relies on stating that a very large group, a nation, can have a sense of 
identity and that this identity can affect the way the group behaves. As a group 
does not have its own psychological processes, this implies, therefore, that 
individuals acting as members of a group do or think certain things in response 
or in partial response to their sense of national identity. My argument is, of 
course, that this explanation will hold even in places like Canada and Australia 
where "nationalism" is viewed as a remote idea associated with "old world" 
rivalries and wars in emerging countries. The clarity which Turner's theory 
provides for describing the relationship between individual self-identification 
and group behavioural phenomena is especially valuable for my theoretical 
framework. In addition, my explanation of the interrelationship of migration 
law and national identity rests on the assumption that the importance of different 
aspects of identity depends on context, which Turner's research demonstrates a 
solid foundation for. 
Keeping this grounding in social psychology firmly in mind, I will briefly 
consider how social theorists of identity have defined identity. These accounts 
of identity are very similar to those used - less self-consciously or carefully - in 
studies of law and identity. The common theme is that however much identity 
is considered to fluctuate and to be socially constructed, it is nonetheless crucial 
77 Ibid. at 66. 
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to how individuals make sense of their lives. A sense of identity gives 
important meaning to one's life and this meaning has a collective aspect to the 
extent that identity is derived from comparisons of oneself with others. 
This collective dimension of identity means that identity has an inbuilt 
political potential. Homi Bhabha asserts that: 
Within the pluralist framework that seeks to contain and resolve the 
debate, identity is taken as the referential sign of a fixed set of customs, 
practices and meanings, an enduring heritage, a readily identifiable 
sociological category, a set of shared traits or experiences.78 
That is, identity connects an individual to the setting in which they live. Even in 
conceptions of identity which emphasise its fluidity, the emphasis on identity as 
social connecter is at the forefront, as in this description by Stanley Aronowitz: 
We may now regard the individual as a process constituted by its multiple 
and specific relations, not only to the institutions of socialization such as 
family, school and law, but also to significant others, all of whom are in 
motion and constantly changing. The ways in which individuals and the 
groups to which they affiliate were constituted as late as a generation 
earlier may now be archaic. New identities arise; old ones pass away (at 
least temporarily).79 
Craig Calhoun, after outlining the potential pitfalls of taking either a purely 
essentialist or a purely constructivist view of identity emphasises that identity 
always embodies a tension between the individual and collective levels and that 
it is never successfully equated with self-interest. These tensions and 
inconsistencies form Calhoun's explanation for the fluctuating nature of 
identity. He states: 
78 Bhabha H, "Commitment to Theory" Third Cinema Reader (1989) 111 at 125, cited by Scott 
J W "Multiculturalism and the Politics ofldentity" in Rajchaman J (ed) The Identity in 
Question, Routledge, New York, 1995. 
79 Aronowitz S, "Reflections on Identity" in J Rajchaman (ed.) ibid. 111 at 115. 
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To see identities only as reflections of "objective" social positions or 
circumstances is to see them always retrospectively. It does not make 
sense of the dynamic potential impact - for better or worse - in the 
tensions within persons and among the contending cultural discourses that 
locate persons. Identities are often personal and political projects in which 
we participate, empowered to greater or lesser extents by resources of 
experience and ability, culture and social organization.80 
Calhoun's description captures our sense of the extent to which any "identity-
box" never feels like a complete description of oneself, for as individuals we 
have many different labels, and experience ourselves as more than the sum of 
these disparate parts. While I may analyse some aspects of my experiences as 
typically of a woman's experience or a Canadian's view of the world, others are 
much less so, or are completely atypical. Thus to speak of an experience of 
national identity will never completely capture how a given individual will 
describe their own identity. In Turner's terminology, national identity occurs at 
an intermediate level of identity rather than at a personal level meaning that it 
necessarily involves generalisation and abstraction. Migration law is one textual 
setting of these generalisations and abstractions. 
I use the term identity in order to draw on the critical currents in legal 
theory which it is connected to. At the same time, I acknowledge that this legal 
scholarship leaves the answers to the full range of questions about the origins of 
identity to other disciplines. To specify what I mean by identity, I am drawing 
to some extent on work in social theory and psychology but this informs my use 
of the legal terminology, rather than making the analysis fully interdisciplinary. 
In order to discuss the relationship between migration law and national identity, 
8° Calhoun C, above n 64 at 28. 
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I use the term identity to speak about a group phenomenon which is experienced 
by individuals. National identity has both group and individual aspects which I 
draw on in different parts of my analysis. The experience of national identity, 
and the content of that identity varies with the situation. An individual's 
identity is the basis for their connections to the world around them and for their 
explanations of meaning in their own lives. Obviously, migration law is not a 
determining aspect in most peoples lives. I would suspect most people live their 
lives without any formal awareness of the migration laws of their home 
countries. Migration law is not determinative of national identity. Rather, 
migration law is one arena where national identity is reflected. 
2. Identity Politics 
In scholarly and popular discourse, the term identity has risen to 
prominence in connection with identity politics. This study draws on some of 
the themes in that work, but is not primarily about the issues which arise in the 
recurring identity politics debates. By focusing on national identity, I focus on a 
broader level of identification than is usually associated with identity politics. 
Minow describes identity politics as " ... the mobilisation around gender, racial 
and similar group-based categories in order to shape or alter the exercise of 
power to benefit group members."81 Perry states that identity politics 
" ... expresses a widely felt, weary cosmopolitan disdain for a certain sort of 
claim made against the state or its bureaucratic agencies on behalf of a broad 
81 Minow M, "Not Only For Myself: Identity, Politics and Law" (1996) 75 Oregon Law Review 
647 at 648. 
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range of collectivities."82 Both definitions refer to debate within a national 
community. While the debate may be about the meaning of that community, it 
is also and significantly about exclusion.83 Accordingly, the community is 
assumed to exist and to have some meaning and some established membership. 
The phrase identity politics is linked with advocacy by groups marginalised in 
different ways. It is also now at least tinged with political correctness. 
My inquiry is directed primarily to the meaning of the national 
community itself rather than to debates within it. The two necessarily overlap. 
Contestations about exclusion and marginalisation within the national 
community crystallise in the community's definition, whether that is self-
definition or description by outsiders. 84 The voices of excluded groups raise 
important issues about migration law, and migration law is itself a site of 
exclusions. The values which find expression in migration law are those which 
prevail in internal contestations. My principal aim is to explore the contents and 
consequences of identity at a national level. I focus on what is translated into 
the migration law setting, rather than on the struggles over race, gender and 
class which ground this law. Using the term identity as an analytic tool allows 
me to draw on the insights of identity politics, and to take account of the 
82 Perry R W "The Logic of the Modem Nation-State and the Legal Construction of Native 
American Tribal Identity" (1995) 28 Indiana Law Review 547 at 552-53. 
83 This is the defining characteristic of identity politics Wendy Brown's analysis in "Wounded 
Attachments: Late Modem Oppositional Political Formations" in J Rajchman (ed) above n 78, 
199. She argues that capitalism and disciplinarity " ... breed the emergence of politicized 
identity, rooted in disciplinary productions, but oriented by liberal discourse towards protest 
against exclusion from a discursive formation of universal justice." (at 205). 
84 Sherene Razack explores one example of this process in Razack S, "Domestic Violence as 
Gender Persecution: Policing the Borders of Nation, Race and Gender" (1995) 8 Canadian 
Journal of Women and the Law 45. 
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exclusion and marginalisation which identity politics draws our attention to. 
Nonetheless, national identity has not typically been considered a catalyst for 
identity politics debates, aside from those cases of nationalist assertions of self-
determination. 85 To consider national identity politics is to move the tensions of 
identity politics to their broadest level, for beyond the level of nations is that of 
humanity itself, which by its universalising vastness, and because of the absence 
of a comparator, makes all humans appear as individuals. 
Having considered how the term identity is being used by legal theorists 
and how an understanding of that term is enriched by drawing on other 
disciplines, I now turn to an examination of the concept of nation to complete 
my description of a national identity. By considering these concepts in detail, I 
aim to extend the analytic power of the identity concept beyond its present 
usage in legal literature. Developing a full picture of the term identity allows 
me to then draw on different aspects of the concept to achieve greater nuances in 
my analysis. 
C. NATION 
1. Defining nations 
It is axiomatic that if Australia and Canada have national identities, they 
must be nations. But the term nation itself has been subject to various 
definitions, and has ceded the ground in conventional political science and in 
international law to the less emotive "state" or the potentially redundant "nation-
state." The question of whether Canada and Australia are in fact nations, for 
85 See below at pp. 73-76 regarding a distinction between national identity and nationalism. 
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they are clearly both states and nation-states, arises more frequently in popular 
discourse in Canada where a "two nations" thesis is often articulated to explain 
the historical presence in Canada of both English and French speaking 
populations. I argue that Canada and Australia are indeed both nations, and that 
nation is best understood in a way that highlights the importance of law in 
general, and migration law in particular, to its existence. Nation is preferable to 
the term state for my purposes because of the emotive qualities which it 
conveys.86 
The most difficult aspect of using the term nation in the context of settler 
societies is sorting out to what extent the term refers to a people sharing an 
ethnic origin. 87 The assumption that goes with this is that the settler state itself 
does not generate an ethnicity; individuals cannot be ethnically "Australian" or 
"Canadian." Canadian census forms inquire about ethnic origins, meaning 
origins elsewhere. In Australia, it is common to refer to "ethnic communities" 
or "the ethnic vote" as meaning some sub- and marginalised portion of the 
"Australian" community. While these terms are less common in Canada, a 
Canadian "multicultural" festival does not include "Canadian" culture, except in 
self-conscious appropriations of First Nations cultural symbols. 
Anthony Smith explores the relationship between ethnicity and 
nationhood and concludes that all nations have at least some ethnic component. 
86 The term state has its own contested pedigree, but generally involves an alternative to nation 
which describes certain geopolitical factors as its definition. 
87 This is the meaning of nation referred to in the concise O.E.D., "l. a community of people 
mainly common descent, history, language, etc., forming a State or inhabiting a territory. 2. a 
tribe or confederation of tribes ofN. American Indians. 
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He argues that "conceptually, the nation has come to blend two sets of 
dimensions, the one civic and territorial, the other ethnic and genealogical, in 
varying proportions in particular cases."88 He accepts the estimate that only ten 
percent of states are true "nation-states" and maintains that "most states aspire 
to become nation-states in this sense. "89 Smith argues that there are two 
essential types of nations, those based primarily on territory and those based 
primarily on descent. Examining the emergence of nations in Europe, he finds 
that nations which have strong ethnic cores have been the most likely to thrive 
in the modem era. He further argues that nations without ethnic cores must "re-
invent" them. 90 While many of the conclusions Smith offers about the nature of 
nations are insightful, for example that myth and memory are the sine qua non 
ofnation,91 he never departs from the view that an ethnic core is associated with 
true nationhood. He implies that any re-invented ethnicity cannot be as 
successful in defining nation as an ethnicity with established historical roots in a 
"homeland. "92 
Smith's analysis of nation embodies a contradiction which he 
acknowledges. At the same time that he asserts myth and memory are crucial to 
88 Smith AD, National Identity Penguin, London and New York, 1991at15. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Smith A D, The Ethnic Origins of Nations Blackwell, Oxford and New York 1986 passim and 
at 212. 
91 Ibid. at 2. 
92 For example, he states that in the struggle against decentralisation and ethnic/national forces 
"state elites employ the tactic of 'bureaucratic nationalism': they claim that their state 
constitutes a 'nation,' and the nation is sovereign and therefor integral and alone legitimate, 
with the result that nationalism becomes an 'official' doctrine and the nation is taken over by 
the territorial and bureaucratic state." The Ethnic Origins of Nations above n 90 at 221. 
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the existence of a nation and may be deceptive or wholly false, he implies that 
some states are more nation-like than others because of an ethnic base that is 
"real" rather than mythic. All the while, he acknowledges that "in several states 
nations are being formed through an attempt to coalesce the cultures of 
successive waves of (mainly European) immigrants" 93 and offers America, 
Argentina and Australia as examples here. Smith's analysis suggests that 
Australia and Canada cannot be nations in the true sense of the word. While I 
reject this view, I have raised it here because Smith offers a detailed and 
sophisticated argument for this prevalent view. In discussing Smith's work I 
wish to emphasise both that he uses nation in a shifting way which would 
sometimes include Canada and Australia, and that many of the points he makes 
about nations do not depend on a strong and historical link to the land nor to a 
historical ethnic cohesion in the population. 
In my view, the mythic elements of a nation are its vital characteristics, 
and the decisive reason for keeping the term separate from "state." Benedict 
Anderson's definition of nation conveys this. He describes a nation as " ... an 
imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign. "94 This definition highlights the "imaginary" or mythic qualities of 
nations-indeed Anderson's seminal work is entitled Imagined Communities. 
In addition, Anderson's definition is preferable to similar others for my 
purposes because the elements he stresses correspond with my argument that 
migration law and national identity are interrelated. 
93 Above n 88 at 40. 
94 Anderson B, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(rev ed) Verso, London and New York, 1991at6. 
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Anderson's first criteria for the imagining of nation is that it be limited: 
... because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living 
human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other 
nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind .... 95 
Migration law is one expression of the boundary of a nation. In settler nations, 
this boundary is subject to remarkable elasticity, which Anderson allows for, but 
it nonetheless defines who can be or become a member of the nation, and who is 
to be excluded and the basis of such exclusions. Anderson's second criteria is 
sovereignty: 
... because the concept [of nation] was born in an age in which 
Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the 
divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. Coming to maturity at a 
stage of human history when even the most devout adherents of any 
universal religion were inescapably confronted with the living pluralism 
of such religions and the allomorphism between each faith's ontological 
claims and territorial stretch, nations dream of being free, and, if under 
God, directly so. The gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign 
state.96 
Sovereignty and migration law are inextricably intertwined. The central 
principle on which migration law in contemporary states rests is that nations 
have, as a consequence of sovereignty, the unconstrained power (and therefore 
the "right") to choose who will be admitted to their community and who will be 
excluded. International law leaves to individual states questions of criteria for 
citizenship and for temporary presence within their borders.97 The issue of 
95 Ibid. at 7. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Although this development is relatively recent and was not firmly settled in international law 
at the start of this century (Brawley S, The White Peril: Foreign Relations and Asian 
Immigration to Australia and North America 1919-1978, UNSW Press, Sydney, 1995. 
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refugee admission, which might theoretically be understood as a constraint on 
sovereignty does not operate that way in practice. Even among those nations 
which are signatories to the Refugee Convention98 refugee admissions are 
subject to politically determined quotas and surrounded by a rhetoric of national 
generosity rather than international obligation.99 
Anderson's final element in defining nation is community: 
... because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may 
prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal 
comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over 
the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, 
as willingly to die for such limited imaginings. 100 
It is this element of nation which I set out to investigate through examining 
migration law. Migration law in both Australia and Canada expresses in various 
ways a vision of community, of what Anderson calls "a deep, horizontal 
comradeship." Migration law does this is in part because of its involvement in 
setting the limits and expressing the sovereignty of the community, Anderson's 
first two criteria. My argument probes how community is expressed in this law 
and how the law serves the needs of the community. 
Likewise, worldwide comprehensive restrictions on population movements are a twentieth 
century phenomenon (Dummett A and Nicol A, Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and Others: 
Nationality and Immigration Law Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1990 at 11). 
98 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS_150, entry into force 22 April 
1954, as amended by the 1967 Protocol on the Convention Definition, 606 UNTS 8791, entry 
into force 4 October 1967. 
99 This is elaborated in Chapter Three. See also my article "Amorality and Humanitarianism in 
Immigration Law" ( 1999) 3 7 Osgoode Hall Law Journal, in press. 
100 Above note 94 at 7. 
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Anderson's use of"imaginary" as a descriptor of the national community 
is important for linking nation and identity on both the individual and the 
collective planes. He asserts that, 
... all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact 
(and perhaps even these) are imagined. Communities are to be 
distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which 
they are imagined particularistically - as indefinitely stretchable nets of 
kinship and clientship.101 
That is, a national community is not "knowable." While as a Canadian I have a 
sense of what it is to be Canadian and, in some settings, what Canadians "are 
like," this image is not derived from knowing all Canadians or even from 
surveying a statistically significant group, it is an image derived from the life 
experience of growing up in, being educated in, travelling abroad as a member 
of, the national community. It is, therefore, imaginary. To the extent that I 
identify as Canadian, or that I conceive of the nation itself as having an identity 
- as I clearly do when I think in terms of "Canada as a middle power" or 
"Canada as a humanitarian nation" - this imaginary plane on which the nation, 
as distinguished from the governmental apparatus, population and defined 
territory which makes it a "state," exists. This is what Anderson taps into with 
the phrase "imagined communities." 
Anderson's study of nation joins the emergence of large-scale print 
technology, national vernacular languages, and capitalism as the prime factors 
behind the emergence of nations in the modem era. Importantly, he asserts that 
the new American states of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
101 Ibid at 6. 
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developed a sense of their own "nation-ness"102 well before most of Europe. To 
explain this riddle, Anderson turns to the importance of print journalism and the 
existence of these nations as administrative units since the sixteenth century. 
On the latter point he states: 
To see how administrative units could, over time, come to be conceived as 
fatherlands, not merely in the Americas but in other parts of the world, 
one has to look at the ways in which administrative organisations create 
meaning.103 
My argument about migration law in Australia and Canada takes up these points 
directly. I argue that Australia and Canada have in fact become "fatherlands" 
and that this has occurred within approximately the same time frame that 
Anderson suggests. In part, this is because of the period of time over which 
they have functioned as administrative units creating meanings. One of the sites 
in which this meaning is created, and an important one because of its position at 
the boundary, is migration law. 
This argument dovetails that ofHobsbawn who asserts that while an 
ethnic base may be necessary for nationalist movements, it is not sufficient to 
create a nation, and ... "not essential for the formation of national patriotism and 
loyalty once a state has been founded. . .. nations are more often the consequence 
of setting up a state than they are its foundation."104 Hobsbawn makes the 
important point that the concept of nation is bound up with the idea of mass 
102 Anderson's term, at ibid 50. He is discussing principally the former Spanish possessions in 
Central and South America. 
103 Ibid at 53. 
104 Hobsbawn E J, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality, 2nd ed, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK and New York, 1992 at 78. 
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participation. In his words, " ... whatever else a nation was, the element of 
citizenship and mass participation or choice was never absent from it."105 This 
then becomes part of the story of why nations emerged at the beginning of the 
modem era, as a sense of political consciousness at a mass level was becoming 
prevalent. One of Hobsbawn's central points is that nations are "dual 
phenomena." That is, they are 
... constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be understood 
unless they are also analysed from below, that is, in terms of the 
assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people 
which are not necessarily national and still less nationalistic. 106 
What Hobsbawn describes as a dualism corresponds with what I have asserted 
as the individual and collective aspects of national identity. Hobsbawn's 
argument strengthens the case for regarding national identity as implicated in 
both the political manifestation of the nation and the mundane experiences of its 
individual members. He urges that this dual form of the understanding of nation 
is critical to grasping the essence of a nation. 
Hobsbawn also concludes that the formation of nations required a massive 
exercise in social engineering which he terms "the invention of tradition" 
because modem nations claim to be, but are not, rooted in antiquity. 107 He 
claims that because the modem "nation" consists of so many invented or 
constructed components and is associated with so many recent symbols and 
"suitably tailored discourses (such as 'national history'), the national 
105 Ibid. at 19. 
106 Ibid. at 11. 
107 Hobsbawn E J, "Introduction" in Hobsbawn E J and Ranger T (eds) The Invention of 
Tradition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1983 at 13-14. 
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phenomenon cannot be adequately investigated without careful attention to the 
'invention of tradition' ."108 And while the traditions may be "invented" and 
"false" the impulse to do so is almost primordial. In Hobsbawn's words, "the 
force of the sentiments which lead groups of "us" to give themselves an 
"ethnic" /linguistic identity against the foreign and threatening "them" cannot be 
denied."109 Migration law and its associated rituals such as border examinations 
and oath swearing is one site for the invention of tradition. It is also an 
important location for the construction of"us" and "them" images. These 
images are bound up in the existence of the nation at its broadest political level 
and also in the experiences of the individuals pledging and saluting. 
Writing of the settler society which has made the most unchallenged 
transition to the status of "nation," Hobsbawn asserts that problems of American 
national identity emerged because of massive immigration to the United States. 
"Americans had to be made. The invented traditions of the U.S.A. in this period 
[1870-1914] were primarily designed to achieve this object."110 That America 
may now more naturally be regarded as a nation than Australia or Canada, or 
that "American" may pass more easily as an ethnicity than Australian or 
Canadian may be merely a result of its longer history, its vastly larger 
population and its pre-eminent role on the world stage. These factors allows its 
108 Ibid. 
109 Above n 104 at 170. 
110 Hobsbawn E J, "Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe 1870-1914" in E J Hobsbawn and T 
Ranger (eds) above n 107, 263 at 279. 
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invented traditions, and its associated "nation-ness" to loom larger in the global 
imagination than those of either Canada or Australia. 
Australia and Canada are nations. They have a different pedigree than the 
nations to which the term first applied, but their vital distinguishing 
characteristics are the same. They are characterised by bounded sovereignty and 
a sense of community. Through their histories as administrative wholes, 
unifying traditions have been generated which their migration laws play a part 
in, reinforce and reflect. I would go so far as to claim that Australian and 
Canadian are emerging as quasi- or pseudo- ethnicities, and that this process is 
likely to continue over time, as increasingly individuals begin to understand 
themselves as "Australian" or as "Canadian." This phenomenon can be 
observed in many areas, in literature, art and film, in politics and diplomacy. 
Migration law provides one microcosm for observing this growth of national 
identity which has the potential to become as strong an aspect of personal 
identity as ethnicity presently is in these countries. 
2. Nation, law, myth 
The existence of a nation depends upon a mythic foundation. This 
more than anything else is what the word nation offers emotively above and 
beyond the word state. Some of our sustaining myths are so much part of our 
mental landscape that we may no longer perceive them as such. For Canadians, 
the image of the red-coated mountie, the poor-but-proud habitant, or the 
portaging fur trader seem as much historical fact as national myth. m For 
111 And, of course, in one sense they are historical fact, or were initially. 
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Australians, a sense of nation is conjured by the bronzed Anzac, 112 by diggers at 
Gallipoli or by The Bush. The sources and sites of national mythology are 
myriad. Migration law functions both as a source of this mythology, in that part 
of the image of Australia and Canada relates to the successive waves of settlers 
who have come to these places, and as a site where mythic national images are 
enshrined and furthered. 113 
Migration law is only one of the many settings where national 
mythology is generated and reified, but this does not diminish the importance of 
national imagery to this law. The appropriate qualifier is, rather, that examining 
national identity's interrelationship with migration law will only provide one 
perspective on that identity. Indeed, other types of law are also enmeshed in the 
formation of national mythology and, thus, of nations. One of the 
transformations of the nineteenth century which made the state the main arena 
for most activities was the standardisation of administration and law throughout 
states.114 The existence of administrative, and hence legal, units in the Americas 
was key to the emergence of a sense of nationhood in those states in Anderson's 
112 Forgetting, as is essential to all myth-making, that the 'n' and 'z' stood for New Zealand 
when the word functioned as an acronym. 
113 Audrey Kobayashi asserts that immigration law has a role in "changing the way Canada 
imagines itself as a nation" and that "the episodic nature of immigration, and of legal responses 
to immigration, has resulted in a successive re-imagining of Canada's national image and a re-
negotiation of the terms by which we share a common landscape." in "Challenging the National 
Dream: Gender Persecution and Canadian Immigration Law" in Fitzpatrick P ( ed) Nationalism 
Racism and the Rule of Law Dartmouth Press, Brookfield USA, 1995, 61at63. 
114 Hobsbawn E J, "Mass Producing Traditions" above n 110 at 264. Writing of an earlier but 
parallel transformation, Bruce Mann discusses changes in Connecticut laws prior to the 
American Revolution and argues that social and economic changes leading to an expansion of 
the notion of community were accompanied by legal changes moving from a series of highly 
localized legal systems to a more integrated system characterized by abstraction and 
generalizable rules. Mann B H, "Law, Legalism and Community Before the American 
Revolution" (1986) 84 Michigan Law Review 1415. 
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analysis. Today we make the assumption that law is associated with nation; that 
when we say "the law" we mean the law in the place we are speaking of. 
Speaking of law which is not national requires a qualifier, as in "international 
law," "Islamic law," "the common law," and "customary law." Peter Fitzpatrick 
expresses the relationship this way: 
Modem law necessarily clings to nation as its epitome. From the early 
nineteenth century, law is seen as definitely attached to a rigidly 
demarcated national territory and as expressing the interests of a particular 
nation. 115 
Both law and myth are therefore important to the emergence of nations. 
This equation highlights the mythic dimension of law; 116 that law is interwoven 
in the way we imagine our world and our place in it. When we talk about what 
it means to be Canadian or Australian, thus tapping into the mythic dimension 
in which those identities exist, we also tap into the legal framework that 
provides those places with borders and constitutions, with citizens and with 
rights. Fitzpatrick states: 
Although ... 'the legal aspect' varies in its significance for different 
nations, law is nonetheless central to the operation and often to the 
constitution of the nation: it erects and standardizes criteria of 
membership of the nation and of acceptable behaviour within it. Positive 
law, emptied of any necessary traditional content, was responsive to the 
imperatives of the nation state, including those of its self-construction. 
And, as Austin confirmed, the very ability to make law was the mark and 
preserve of independent political society. A deep existential attachment to 
law is often claimed to be characteristic of the people of the nation. In all, 
it is hardly surprising that law becomes a potent figure of national identity 
115 Fitzpatrick P, "Introduction" in P Fitzpatrick (ed), Nationalism, Racism and the Rule of Law 
(1995), xiii at xv. 
116 On this point see Fitzpatrick P, The Mythology of Modern Law Routledge, London and New 
York, 1992, esp Ch 2 "Law as Myth". 
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or that it remains capable of representing the purity and integrity of a race 
which claims to correspond to, or encompass or protect the nation.117 
Law, therefore, is deeply important to the existence of the nation. It provides 
the baseline mechanical criteria for the existence of a state and it is one basis of 
the unifying mythology which provide staying power for the state, transforming 
it into a nation. This is true of all law associated with the state, of which 
migration law is an important instance. Joel Migdal argues that law is one of 
three crucial areas of state and society relations which ensure the endurance of 
state structures in the face of increasing globalising forces. He argues that this 
is in part because "much of what law - state and others - does is delineate a 
universe of meaning for people ... "118 I argue that the delineation of a universe of 
meaning is a function which has some mythic dimensions. Further, the creation 
of a universe of meaning necessarily involves identity as it is through identity 
that individuals position themselves in regard to the social world around them. 
The emotive power of the word nation, its imagery of sovereignty and 
unity, is seen when the term is taken up by groups seeking to evoke that 
mythology. The terms black nationalism, queer nation and deaf nation make 
this political statement. In the Canadian political context, an important example 
of the use of nation is the term First Nations to refer to Canada's indigenous 
peoples. The accuracy of the term is undeniable, highlighting the historical 
precedence of the indigenes and emphasising that white Canada has had a 
negligent tendency to think of all indigenous people as one cultural group rather 
117 Ibid at 117, citations omitted. 
118 Migdal JS, "Why Do So Many States Stay in Tact?" in Dauvergne P (ed) Weak and Strong 
States in Asia Pacific Societies Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1998, 11 at 26. 
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than many independent peoples. The successful integration of the term into 
popular Canadian discourse is in part due to the clarity its use brings in referring 
to groups such as The Assembly of First Nations, 119 or the Saanich nation or 
Gitskan nation. 120 
It is important to consider the First Nations when discussing migration 
law and national mythology for, salubrious linguistic innovation 
notwithstanding, the aboriginal peoples of both Canada and Australia are absent 
from the mythology of these "nations of immigrants." Using the latter phrase 
explicitly denies the presence of the First Nations. The myth of a nation of 
immigrants is intertwined with visions of conquering a vast and empty land, and 
of "peopling" it with people from elsewhere, primarily Europe. Until very 
recently, this myth was supported by the legal doctrine of terra nullius, 121 itself 
only overturned once its true usefulness had passed. That is, once the spread of 
European civilisation was so complete that even removing its own account of 
self-justification could not threaten its hegemony. Despite the fears raised by 
the Wik decision in Australia 122 and the prospect of massive compensation 
payments following Delgamuukw, 123 Australia and Canada are nations of 
119 Which is the largest Canadian national council of chiefs. 
120 Here as a substitute for the less honorific and very American term "tribe" and for the 
government imposed "band." 
121 This doctrine was rejected by the Australian Hight Court in Mabo v Queensland (No 2) 
(1991) 175 CLR 1. The rejection was finalised in the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997) 3 SCR 1010. 
122 Wik Peoples v Queensland(1996) 141 ALR248 (HCA). In Wik the High Court held that a 
pastoral lease would not necessarily extinguish native title to land. The decision was followed 
by an intense and acrimonious debate and by legislation restricting the reach of the Court's 
ruling. 
123 Above n 121. 
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immigrants because the mythology and law which make them nations belong to 
these immigrants. The First Nations are first in linguistic retrospect only. The 
silence which the mythology of migration law and of nationhood confines 
aboriginal peoples to speaks its own powerful truth. These spaces were 
overtaken by migrants and made into nations by migration. Migration law and 
the mythology it engenders reflects the historical and legal oblivion which 
indigenous peoples in the these nations are now railing against. 
Another aspect of a nation's existence is the territory it occupies. A nation 
is also a piece of geography, a space on a map. Even in this territorial 
dimension, however, both law and myth are implicated. The border which 
encloses the nation, which gives effect to the imaginary lines separating one 
nation's rocks and trees and fish from another, is a legal one. It is migration law 
which determines who can cross that line and under what conditions. It is 
migration law therefore which imbues that line with meaning in human terms. 
The territory of a nation is vitally bound up in its mythology. We cannot think 
Canada without also thinking of the Cold, the rugged terrain of the Canadian 
shield, the immense stretch of wheat-filled prairie. The word Australia raises a 
cloud of red dust in the mind; along with, incongruously, long stretches of sandy 
beach and an endless blue horizon. Thus even conceiving of nation in purely 
geographic terms we confront the importance of law and myth to understanding 
it.124 
124 For more discussion of these issues see Bromley N K, Law, Space and the Geographies of 
Power, Guilford Press, New York, 1994. Donald Jet al (eds) Space and Place: Theories of 
Identity and Location, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1993; Hooson D (ed) Geography and 
National Identity Blackwell, Oxford UK and Cambridge Mass, 1994. 
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3. Putting nation in national identity 
An individual's national identity is her sense of belonging to a nation, of 
being a part of a political, territorial and mythic unit. On the collective plane, 
national identity is the image of the nation projected in its mythology. This 
image is enshrined and adapted each time a politician appeals to national 
sentiment or an opinion leader calls on the populace to act as "good 
Australians." It is tested and refined each time a diplomatic delegation 
represents "Canada" in an international forum. National identity functions in all 
these dimensions simultaneously. Anthony Smith defines it as "complex and 
abstract": 
A national identity is fundamentally multi-dimensional; it can never be 
reduced to a single element, even by particular factions of nationalists, nor 
can it be easily or swiftly induced in a population by artificial means. 125 
Hobsbawn makes the point that while it is widely accepted that a mass level 
"national consciousness" accompanied the emergence of nations, little is known 
about what that meant to the masses involved.126 
It is also necessary to recall that any individual's identification with a 
given group may not be the most significant aspect of their identity at any point 
in time. This comes to the fore in discussing Australian and Canadian identity 
because many individuals in each country feel that other identities are more 
important to them, most or even all of the time. 127 This does not mean, however, 
125 Smith AD, National Identity, above n 88 at 14. 
126 Hobsbawn E J, Nations and Nationalism above n 104 at 130. 
127 At a conference recently where I presented a paper making reference to Australian identity 
an audience member challenged me, saying that "being Australian made no difference to her at 
all." This is the point I want to address here. While it may make no difference to her, she is still 
"being Australian." 
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that they do not have a sense of national identity which could become vital in 
some situations. It may be that they only subjectively identify as Australian 
when unexpectedly jailed in a foreign country or when mistakenly detained at a 
border crossing. 
The situations in which most individuals would strongly assert their 
national identity lead to two points. The first is that national identity and 
nationalism are closely related but not indistinguishable phenomena. 
Nationalism has a political agenda, and is most often associated with an ethnic 
identity. Smith defines nationalism as, "an ideological movement,"128 which 
captures what distinguishes it from national identity. As nationalism requires an 
ideological commitment, it will become an important aspect of an individual's 
self-identification in a wider variety of settings than national identity. By 
talking of Canadian or Australian national identity I do not mean a commitment 
on behalf of a mass of the population to advance a particular set of interests, nor 
do I mean patriotism. Rather, I mean that most individuals in these countries, 
who are not visitors or temporary residents of some sort, locate themselves in 
the world with some reference to the mythic dimension of the Canadian or 
Australian nation. I mean that these individuals can make sense of a politician's 
exhortation to support the Aussie battler or to make sacrifices in the name of 
Canadian humanitarianism. I mean that these individuals share at least some 
collective imaginings of the land, its hardships and its history. Alienkoff gives 
128 Smith A D, National Identity above n 88 at 73 and he acknowledges that the term has lead to 
as much confusion as nation itself. 
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an example which draws out the extent to which national identity and sense of 
self are interwoven: 
Imagine that you awake one morning to find that your American 
citizenship has been taken away. What springs to mind? That travel to 
Europe may be difficult without an American passport? That no country 
will seek your release if you become a hostage overseas? That it will be 
impossible to vote in the next presidential election? I doubt that any of 
these issues are on the top of your concern list. More likely you feel 
violated, naked. You ask, how can I not be an American? What am I, 
then? A part of oneself is gone.129 
This example is valuable because it provides a contrast between those situations 
where even my conjured sceptics would likely consciously claim their national 
affiliations and the foundational level at which individuals integrate a sense of 
national identity into their understanding of self. In the not-yet-post modem 
world, it is difficult to imagine ourselves as individuals without national 
attachments. 
The second point raised by the apparent "weakness" of Australian and 
Canadian national identities is that, as emphasised in the literature on law and 
identity, identity emerges in contrast to an other. Even someone who rarely 
feels Canadian and who would argue that their Canadian identity is of no 
importance to their life, would likely claim to be Canadian at a border crossing 
or in a war zone. Fitzpatrick makes the point that for a nation to exist, there 
must be others, and because of this, the nation exists in a relationship with those 
others: 
As universal, the nation can have no positive limits and would, without 
more, lack identity. . .. This dynamic of identity inevitably results in the 
129 Aleinkoff T A, "Theories of Loss of Citizenship" ( 1986) 84 Michigan Law Review 14 71 at 
1495-96. 
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'failure' of the nation as universal. The nation must exclude the other -
and so be non-universal - in order to be universal. 
But as universal, the nation must also include what it excludes. It 
remains connected to the other. The other, in short, becomes the nation's 
double. There is a dual projection of identity onto this double. 130 
Migration law is a discourse which brings the nation and the others into contact, 
thereby creating images and reflections of each. It is therefore a logical site to 
find representations of national identity. 
D. MIGRATION LAW 
1. Locating migration law in liberal settler societies 
Migration law is an important site in searching for an understanding of 
national identity both because it is an interface between insiders and others and 
because of the specific role that migration law plays in liberal settler societies. 
The importance of migration law to settler societies, or nations of immigrants, is 
obvious in one sense. In cases where the majority of those who constitute the 
dominant culture and the elite of a nation consider themselves to have come 
from elsewhere, migration law plays a primary role in determining who those 
people, and therefore the culture and the elite of the nation, will be. Migration 
law literally constitutes the community, setting out the rules for who will be 
members of the community, who will be eligible to become members and who 
will be excluded. In both Australia and Canada, at different points throughout 
history, migration has been used to increase the population in general, or to 
increase the population in particular parts of the country. At present, Australia 
13° Fitzpatrick P, '"We know what it is when you do not ask us': Nationalism as Racism" in P 
Fitzpatrick ( ed) above n 20, 3 at 10. 
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provides incentives for new migrants to settle outside the major cities and has 
debated extending the reach of these programs.131 In the postwar period, assisted 
passage programs brought British immigrants to Australia, as part of a strategy 
of increasing the population through an immigrant intake of up to 170 000 per 
year.132 In Canada, Chinese workers were "imported" to provide the hard labour 
to fulfil the national dream of a cross-Canada railway link133 and present federal 
immigration arrangements provide for Quebec to manage the flow of 
immigrants to that province, acknowledging the importance of migration to the 
culture and future of the nation. These policies were or are facilitated by the 
migration laws of each country. 
For Australia and Canada, and for other settler societies like Argentina, 
the United States and New Zealand, immigration and the law regulating it have 
been central concerns of nation building from the outset. While the migration 
law of settler societies may today resemble similar provisions in other countries, 
the role of this law in nation-building and national mythology is very different. 
Brubaker makes this point in introducing his comparative study of European 
and North American migration laws: 
... there is a basic difference between nations constituted by immigration 
and countries in which occasional immigration has been incidental to 
nation-building. Canada and the United States have a continuous tradition 
of immigration. They were formed and reformed as nations through 
131 This program operates in the family migration scheme and provides sponsorship concessions 
and lower point thresholds for applicants. 
132 Jordens A M, Redefining Australians: Immigration Citizenship and National Identity Hale 
and Iremonger, Sydney, 1995, Ch 2 "Seeking Workers for a New Australia" passim and at 26. 
133 Hawkins F, Critical Years in Immigration: Canada and Australia Compared, UNSW Press, 
Sydney, 1989 at xv-xvii; Bagabiriime D, "The Constitution and Immigration: The Impact of 
Proposed Changes to the Immigration Power Under the Constitution Act, 1867" (1992) 15 
Dalhousie Law Journal 428. 
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immigration, and immigration figures prominently in their national 
myths.134 
The building of a national identity for immigrant nations requires the integration 
of the experience of migration into the national mythology. Discussing the role 
of English constitutional law in the construction of New Zealand, Kelsey writes: 
Creating the settler nation required something more. Its boundaries had to 
coincide not just with a particular territory, but with a given people who 
constituted a nation - an entity which would provide the sources of their 
identity and the sole legitimate object of their political allegiance.135 
In settler societies migration law and the mythology constructed in and around it 
is a prior condition to the community. As such it is foundational, and 
constitutes the community in a way that constitutional law alone cannot. The 
foundational role of immigration and the legal regimes that facilitate and control 
it is reflected in Levinson's analysis of the loyalty oath for new Americans136 
and Kobayashi's study of how changes in immigration law are bound up with 
changing images of Canada. 137 
Migration law is a prior foundational element to constitutional law 
because nations are established on a liberal model and liberalism presumes the 
existence of communities and assumes those communities to have closed 
134 Brubaker WR, "Introduction" in Brubaker WR (ed), Immigration and the Politics of 
Citizenship in Europe and North America University Press of America, Lanham USA, 1989, 1 
at 7. 
135 Kelsey J, "Restructuring the Nation: The Decline of the Colonial Nation-State and 
Competing Nationalisms in Aotearoa/New Zealand" in Fitzpatrick P (ed), above n 20, 177 at 
183. 
136 Levinson S, "Constituting Communities Through Words that Bind: Reflections on Loyality 
Oaths" (1986) 84 Michigan Law Review 1440. 
137 Above note 113. 
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borders. 138 Rawls theorises justice within a society he describes as a "closed 
system isolated from other societies."139 Individuals enter the community at birth 
and leave at death. It provides " ... a complete self-sufficient scheme of 
cooperation, making room for all the necessities and activities of life ... ; citizens 
do not join voluntarily but are born into it, where ... we assume they are to live 
their lives."140 Dworkin's community of principle is marked by its closed 
borders and clear distinctions between insiders and outsiders. 141 He asserts: 
We treat community as prior to justice and fairness in the sense that 
questions of justice and fairness are regarded as questions of what would 
be fair or just within a particular political group. 142 
Walzer confronts the issues of membership in the liberal community more 
directly than Rawls or Dworkin, and argues that the question of membership 
precedes that of justice. While membership is the chief good to be distributed 
by a community, it is not subject to the constraints of his distributive justice 
model. 143 
Various theorists have made arguments extrapolating liberal tenets to the 
migration law context, but there is little agreement about whether liberalism 
138 This argument is elaborated in my article "Beyond Justice: The Consequences of Liberalism 
for Immigration Law" ( 1997) 10 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 323. 
139 Rawls J, A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971at8. 
140 Rawls J, "Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical" (1985) 14 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 223. 
141 Dworkin R, Law's Empire, Belknap Press, Cambridge MA, 1986 at 208-12. 
142 Ibid. at 208. 
143 M Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality Basic Book, New York 
1983 Ch 2: Membership. 
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requires open borders or closed borders. 144 The only point of agreement among 
liberals is that borders must be opened to the extent required by 
humanitarianism.145 There are two important consequences of these features of 
liberal theory for migration law. The first is that liberal theory does not give a 
standard by which we can assess how many migrants, if any, a society which 
grounds its moral consensus in liberalism must admit. This contributes, from 
both an international and a domestic perspective, to the view that immigration 
and the nation's sovereignty are directly linked. The power to control migration 
is directly associated with sovereignty and derives from the prerogative powers 
of the Crown in common law regimes like Australia and Canada.146 
This linkage is hardly surprising for a type of law over which the 
executive retains close control and which falls outside democratic theory. 
Unlike other laws in a democracy, migration law regulates those outside the 
polity. 147 The usual democratic arguments in support of laws: that they reflect 
144 Walzer argues that closed borders are required for justice, ibid. Donald Galloway also argues 
that liberalism supports a closed border position. See "Liberalism, Globalism and Immigration" 
(1993) 18 Queen's Law Journal 266 and "Strangers and Members: Equality in an Immigration 
Setting" (1994) 7 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 149. For a contrasting view, see 
also Joseph Carens' various articles including "Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders" 
(1987) 49 The Review of Politics 251; "Membership and Morality: Admission to Citizenship in 
Liberal Democratic States" in W Brubaker R (ed.) above n 134; "Refugees and the Limits of 
Obligation" ( 1992) 6 Public Affairs Quarterly 31; "Who Belongs? Theoretical and Legal 
Questions About Birthright Citizenship in the United States" (1987) 37 University of Toronto 
Law Journal 413. 
145 I discuss this in detail in my paper "Amorality and Humanitarianism in Immigration Law" 
(1999) 37 Osgoode Hall Law Journal, in press. Walzer and Galloway, both take this position 
and Carens, reinforces this as a minimal requirement. See also Scanlon J A and Kent 0 T, "The 
Force of Moral Arguments for a Just Immigration Policy in a Hobbesian Universe" in Gibney 
M (ed) Open Borders? Closed Societies? The Ethical and Political Issues Greenwood Press, 
New York, 1988; P Singer and R Singer "The Ethics of Refugee Policy" in M Gibney (ed) 
above. 
146 See further the discussion in Chapter Four at 235-241. 
147 Both the Australian Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the Canadian Immigration Act RSC 1985 
c, 1-2 create some offences which apply to citizens of their own nations. These offences make 
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the will of the people, that they have been passed in a constitutional manner by 
duly elected representatives, that the government has a legitimate mandate to 
enact them, are applied in the migration law context in a fashion which again 
points to the role of migration law in the liberal nation. The interests which are 
reflected through the democratic calculus in the migration law of a democratic 
nation are those of the members of the nation, of people who already clearly 
belong to that polity. Migration law serves their needs and regulates others, 
outsiders, to achieve that end. Those the law applies to do not democratically 
approve it. 
The second consequence of liberalism for migration law is that 
humanitarianism dominates theoretical discussions of migration, even though 
the vast majority of immigrants to those nations with established migration 
programs are not admitted on a humanitarian basis. 148 Thus most of the 
theoretical energy is directed at an aspect of the migration debate that is not 
particularly contentious149 and which makes only a small contribution to the 
overall migration intake. Humanitarianism is also closely intertwined with 
popular discourses surrounding migration. Both Canada and Australia seek to 
up a very small percentage of the respective Act's provisions and are directed at citizens only in 
their dealings with outsiders, for example, fraudulent dealings as a migration agent (Migration 
Act Part 3 - Migration Agents and Immigration Assistance) or aiding, abetting or organising 
entry into Canada in contravention of the Immigration Act, s. 94.1. 
148 In 1997 (the last total available as at October 20, 199) the United States admitted 112, 158 
"refugees and asylees" ofa total 738,536 admissions (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service Web Site, http://www.usdoj.gov/ins/). In 1999 Canada planned to admit 22, 100 -
29,300 refugees of a planned total of between 200,000 and 225,000 admissions (Annual 
Immigration Plan, tabled in the House of Commons, November 1998). In 1998 - 99 Australia 
planned to admit 12,000 in its refugee and humanitarian program of a planned total 80,000 
admissions (Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Media Releases 27 /96 and 28/96, 03 
July 1996). 
149 In both Canada and Australia, there has been considerable popular support for the admission 
of"genuine refugees" see Hawkins F, above n 133 at 247-8. 
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build and uphold an image of themselves as humanitarian nations and 
international "do-gooders" on the basis of their contributions to and admission 
of refugees. Humanitarianism places the nation in a particular posture and 
reinforces sovereign power over admission to the polity. A humanitarian 
gesture is not something extended between equals, and it is not a question of 
justice. Rather, it is a question of bestowing. Humanitarianism embeds a 
profound inequality. It is something that the strong and powerful can give to the 
weak. When a nation admits individuals on a humanitarian basis, it does so in a 
gesture of goodness and of generosity, not because it must as a matter of legal 
obligation or even as a matter of justice. Rather, the nation does this because it 
is good, because it is rich and powerful and willing to share with the weak. The 
intertwining of humanitarianism and migration law reflects an image of the 
nation, and its nationals, as good. This is also a contribution to national 
identity, one to which I return in Chapter Four. 
2. The "us-them" line 
The boundary that migration law provides for liberal immigrant nations 
serves the needs of those polities in various ways. In the first instance, it is 
crucially bound up in the identity of the nation because it constitutes the 
community for which questions of justice and equality will be meaningful. It 
draws the line between "us" and "them," bringing an "us" into being. The 
sovereignty of the nation thus created means that this boundary can be 
manipulated to serve its needs. At one level, this is what is at stake when 
immigration levels are raised to boost the population, or when skilled migrants 
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are recruited to a given sector of the economy. But in a less overt way the "us-
them" line is manipulated to serve more deeply submerged needs of the "us" 
group. The humanitarianism which is enmeshed in liberal migration law 
nourishes images of the nation as powerful and good. The line between insiders 
and outsiders serves to galvanise national identity and unify disparate views. 
The boundary provides convenient scapegoats in times of high unemployment 
or stress on the welfare state. In order to meet these diverse needs, migration 
laws have particular characteristics. 
As the needs of the nation with respect to migration are changeable, in 
response to conditions within the country and interpretations of what those 
conditions mean, the boundary of the nation must, as a first priority, be 
malleable. At the same time, it retains an appearance of stability required in its 
role as limit of the nation. The image of the other, the outsider, is manipulated 
in order that the reflected picture of those who belong can appear constant. In 
this way, changes in migration law help ensure that "Australian" and 
"Canadian" identities have some constancy. Fitzpatrick comments on the 
malleability of the nation's limits: 
The ruptured or radical double marks the point of constant, and 
unmediated exclusion, the point of ultimate alterity. The protean double is 
forever in transition from such ultimate alterity to the realized pure form 
of nation. 150 
Migration law, which is renowned for its frequent changes in both Australia and 
Canada, achieves this through its stated aims and its structure. 
15° Fitzpatrick P," 'We know what it is when you do not ask us': Nationalism as Racism" in 
Fitzpatrick P ( ed), above n 20 at 11. 
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The Immigration Act and the Migration Act both contain statements of 
purpose which are ultimately completely manipulable. Section 3 of the 
Canadian Act, under the title "Canadian Immigration Policy - Objectives" 
enumerates ten aims of the Act, ranging from supporting demographic goals and 
fostering the development of a strong and vibrant economy to upholding its 
humanitarian tradition and keeping potential criminals out. 151 While these 
objectives are highly detailed, there are so many that almost any decision under 
151 The full text of section 3 reads: 
It is hereby declared that Canadian immigration policy and the rules and regulations made under 
this Act shall be designed and administered in such a manner as to promote the domestic and 
international interests of Canada and recognizing the need 
(a) to support the attainment of such demographic goals as may be established by the 
Government of Canada in respect of the size, rate of growth, structure and geographic 
distribution of the Canadian population; 
(b) to enrich and strengthen the cultural and social fabric of Canada, taking into account the 
federal and bilingual character of Canada; 
( c )to facilitate the reunion in Canada of Canadian citizens and permanent residents with their 
close relatives from abroad; 
( d) to encourage and facilitate the adaptation of persons who have been granted admission as 
permanent residents to Canadian society by promoting cooperation between the Government of 
Canada and other levels of government and non-governmental agencies in Canada with respect 
thereto; 
( e) to facilitate the entry of visitors into Canada for the purposes of fostering trade and 
commerce, tourism, cultural and scientific activities and international understanding; 
(f) to ensure that any person who seeks admission to Canada on either a permanent or 
temporary basis is subject to standards of admission that do not discriminate in a manner 
inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; 
(g) to fulfil Canada's international legal obligations with respect to refugees and to uphold its 
humanitarian tradition with respect to the displaced the persecuted; 
(h) to foster the development of a strong and vibrant economy and the prosperity of all regions 
in Canada; 
(i) to maintain and protect the health, safety and good order of Canadian society; and 
G) to promote international order and justice by denying the use of Canadian territory to persons 
who are likely to engage in criminal activity. 
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the Act would conform with at least some of them, without even minimal 
interpretive wordplay. At the same time, it would be almost impossible to 
conceive of a decision which would conform with all the objectives. This range 
of objectives lists the needs of the nation which immigration policy may be 
called upon to support. The list takes a non-exhaustive form, under the overall 
direction to "promote the domestic and international interests of Canada." If 
these objectives are too few, standard statutory interpretation permits additions. 
The Australian Migration Act takes a more direct route to the same end. Section 
4 of that Act provides that "the object of this Act is to regulate, in the national 
interest, the coming into, and presence in, Australia of non-citizens."152 This 
statement is bolstered by three subsections providing specific examples of how 
non-citizens are to be controlled. The guiding principle is the national interest 
and the primary mechanism is control. Both Acts share the emphasis on the 
national interest, conforming overtly with the instrumental and constitutive role 
of migration law in liberal settler societies. 
The difference between the two sets of objectives is primarily one of tone. 
Both Acts put the national interest first and foremost, the Australian formulation 
152 The full text of s.4 reads: 
(1) The object of this Act is to regulate, in the national interest, the coming into, and presence 
in, Australia of non-citizens. 
(2) To advance its object, this Act provides for visas permitting non-citizens to enter or remain 
in Australia and the Parliament intends that this Act be the only source of the right of non-
citizens to so enter or remain. 
(3) To advance its object, this Act requires persons, whether citizens or non-citizens, entering 
Australia to identify themselves so that the Commonwealth government can know who are the 
non-citizens so entering. 
(4) To advance its object, this Act provides for the removal or deportation from Australia of 
non-citizens whose presence in Australia is not permitted by this Act. 
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links this in a rigorous way to control. As the empirical work in Chapters 
Three, Four and Five demonstrates, Australian migration law and the mythology 
which surrounds and supports it is dominated by a control emphasis much more 
than the Canadian. While control is also important in the Canadian law, it is 
subverted and hidden to a much greater extent. This in turn is tied in important 
ways to differences between Canadian and Australian national identities, and to 
differences in national migration mythologies. 
While neither section 3 of the Immigration Act nor section 4 of the 
Migration Act are substantive sections, they do guide the interpretation of the 
Acts and are therefore important. In addition, standard administrative law 
doctrine dictates that the purpose of an act is the sole constraint on any 
discretionary powers exercised under that act.153 The Canadian Act spells out 
how diverse the potential meanings of the national interest are. The sparse case 
law in Australia which has considered section 4 demonstrates how little 
constraint the term "national interest" truly provides. One formulation of 
section 4 often referred to by the Immigration Review Tribunal is: 
... the discretion to impose a condition on a bridging visa Class E should be 
exercised in the national interest in a manner so as to facilitate the 
effective regulation of the presence in Australia of non-citizens. But this 
discretion should be exercised in a beneficial manner to ensure that 
consistent with such regulation, the discretion to impose conditions and 
thereby in the long run to issue a visa should be favourably exercised. It is 
not, after all, in the national interest unreasonably to detain people, at 
great fiscal and human cost.154 
153 Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food [ 1968] AC997 (HL ); Re Australian 
Broadcasting Tribunal and Other,; Ex parte 2HD Pty Ltd (1979) 27 ALR 321 (HCA). 
154 Qing Mei Fu IRT reference: N94/01303. Emphasis added. A colleague has pointed out to 
me that section 4 of the Migration Act is simply not regarded as important to the average 
migration law practitioner in Australia. To this, I have three responses. First, that the migration 
law serves the national interest whether or not is specifically acknowledged and the extent to 
which this is implicit supports my position that migration law plays this role in the national 
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The stated purpose of these two Acts demonstrates a need for mutability 
in the law which is provided by the structure of the substantive provisions in the 
Act. In the case of each Act, the all important provisions which influence the 
day to day decisions about who will be permitted entry and who will be 
excluded are not contained in the Act but in regulations and in executive 
pronouncements. In both countries, the target numbers, or quotas, which 
determine how many migrants in which categories are to be admitted are made 
by the responsible minister.155 While in practice, in times when migration levels 
are a contentious political issue, these numbers are undoubtedly subject to 
scrutiny by Cabinet at the very least, the executive has direct control over this 
number. 
The procedure surrounding these vital numbers again points up a 
difference between Australian and Canadian provisions. The Australian Act 
establishes a legal requirement that the target numbers cannot be exceeded and 
that excess applications will be "taken not to have been made."156 The Canadian 
Act provides only for "estimates." Here again the Australian Act takes a more 
overtly controlling tone than the Canadian. The Canadian requirement that the 
imagination. Second, that this perceived "lack of importance" is a inevitable as purpose 
statements are not substantive provisions of an act. Finally, the section was enacted shortly 
after a High Court decision stating that the purpose of a migration act was to facilitate entry into 
the country and some migration lawyers believe its aim was specifically to defeat this view. 
155 In Australia, these numbers must be gazetted, pursuant to section 39 of the Migration Act. In 
Canada, they must be tabled in Parliament as part of the Annual Immigration Plan, pursuant to 
s. 7 of the Immigration Act. 
156 Section 39(2). 
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numbers be tabled in Parliament is of little import as no opportunity is provided 
for review or comment by Parliamentarians. 
The operation of the critical "points system" is also hidden from view in 
each system. In Canada, the details of the system, the actual points to be 
awarded, are contained in an appendix to the Immigration Regulations. 157 This 
ensures that they can be amended without democratic scrutiny of any sort as 
Canadian regulations, unlike Australian, are not routinely reviewed by 
parliamentary committee. While the requisite consent of Cabinet required for 
an Order in Council could theoretically be difficult to obtain, this procedure 
ensures that changes are made with the cloak of Cabinet secrecy, safe from 
public scrutiny. The points to be awarded in any category change frequently. 
For example, sometimes "occupational demand" for all occupations is reduced 
to zero, effectively halting all applications subject to this system except those 
from applicants with high demand employment skills. 
The Australian points system is not as deeply hidden as the Canadian, it 
appears in the Migration Act Division 3, Subdivision 3. Nonetheless, the 
legislative provisions create only a framework, into which regulations insert 
substance. This provides some scrutiny of the categories named as the 
regulations are reviewed by parliamentary committee. Despite this difference 
from the Canadian scheme, the "pass" and "pool" marks for each migrant visa 
category, that is, the true "who gets in" numbers are still determined by the 
157 Schedule I of the Immigration Regulations, 1978, C.R.C. as provided for in Regulations 8 -
11.1. Points are awarded under the headings education, specific vocational preparation, 
experience, occupational factor [i.e. demand], arranged employment/designated occupation, 
demographic factor (based on destination within Canada), age, knowledge of French or English, 
and "personal suitability." This last is determined in an interview, which is granted if one's 
score on the other categories is sufficiently high. 
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Minister and gazetted, with a requirement that they later be tabled in 
Parliament. 158 
Both the Immigration Act and the Migration Act establish frameworks for 
migration policy in the national interest. Rather than providing a statement of 
the relevant law, each provides a sieve into which a changing view of the 
national interest can be poured and thereby made law. One consequence of the 
specificity of the Migration Act, the attempt to remove discretion, is that the Act 
is amended relatively frequently. While the Immigration Act is formally 
amended much less frequently, an abundance of regulatory change provides a 
similar effect. In the 1993-94 the Canadian government did a substantial review 
of immigration policy including a year long nationwide public consultation 
process. The far-reaching changes resulting from the process where tabled in 
Parliament under the section 7 provision for an annual "immigration plan." A 
year long legislative review, covering much of the same ground but with a view 
to amending the Act, was presented to the Minister in December 1998. In both 
countries, on-going pressure for changes in migration law are evident. This is 
necessary because migration law is the all important boundary of the nation. Its 
malleability, the constantly shifting of the "us-them" line, allows a coherent 
vision of "us" to persist, even though the actual substance of the national 
interest is incessantly adjusted. 
158 Section 96. 
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3. The identities emerging 
The boundary provided by migration law facilitates the emergence of "us" 
and "them" identities on either side of that line. This process is a vital concern 
of law and identity theory. 159 The boundary line acts as a reflecting mirror, in 
which we can see, depending on our vantage point, images of "ourselves" -
whomever we are - and images of the excluded "aliens." These images 
necessarily exist together. While migration law is not the only site for finding 
images of a nation's members and the excluded outsiders, it is important 
because of migration law's constitutive role in society, and it provides 
particularly clear reflections because it brings insiders and outsiders into close 
proximity. Members and others are intertwined in the text of a migration law, 
and in each of its applications. The policy statements in the Canadian 
Immigration Act provide a powerful example. While the law itself is directed 
almost exclusively towards outsiders, the objectives refer almost entirely to 
Canada and Canadians. Canada has demographic goals, a cultural fabric, a 
Charter of Rights, and a humanitarian tradition. The aims of the Act carefully 
portray an image of Canadians, the outsiders targeted by the law are absent. 
The identities which emerge around the boundary are a function of that 
boundary itself and of what migration law aims to achieve. Edward Morgan 
states: 
In a nutshell, the goal of the legal process, in the immigration context, 
might be said to be to distinguish between peoples - to differentiate 
citizens from foreigners, or "us" from "them" - in a world of supposedly 
undifferentiated persons to whom human rights are due. 160 
159 See above pp. 34-36. 
160 Morgan EM, "Aliens and Process Rights: The Open and Shut Case of Legal Sovereignty" 
(1988) 7 Wisconsin International Law Journal 107 at 107. 
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To return to the insights of social psychology, different aspects of our identity 
become important in different settings. In migration law, national identity 
becomes key. But this effect at the level of legal discourse is supported by our 
own non-legal non-analytic experiences of feeling more Canadian when we are 
abroad, or cheering instinctively for each Australian athlete in the Olympics. 
Minow writes: 
Encounters with people of more varied ethnic, racial, religious and class 
backgrounds challenge an individual's sense of self and community. 
Perhaps identity becomes important when it becomes a question, and it 
becomes a question when individuals and groups are mobile and able to 
change some of their identifying traits. When people come in frequent 
contact with others unlike themselves they can both heighten and 
submerge their sense of distinctiveness. 161 
Migration law also reflects some of the tensions which Australians and 
Canadians feel about their national identities, some of the ambiguities and 
uncertainties are echoed in contradictory legal provisions and frequent shifts. 
Morgan states: 
In domestic and international legal discourse, aliens are a reflection of 
ourselves. Ultimately, it is because we cannot focus on a single, 
determinative self-conception that we cannot in a determinate way 
pronounce on the stature of foreigners caught up in our legal system. At 
one moment we think of ourselves as individuals, undifferentiated in 
nature, and therefore, rights, from the universe of persons whom the state 
might happen to confront. At the very next instant, we conceive of 
ourselves as nationals, with a differentiated stature from each polity's 
members that accords with the separate existences and equal rights 
enjoyed by the world's nations. Since we are simultaneously human 
persons and national peoples, it is little wonder that aliens are both 
included and excluded form our norms. They are our mirror image.162 
161 Minow M, "Identities" above n 1 at 112. 
162 Morgan EM, above n 160 at 147. 
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Morgan captures a feature of the "us-them" distinction here. While the outsider 
is a reflection of "us" it is a difficult identity to pin down and describe because 
our own self-perception is ever shifting. This parallels precisely my earlier 
argument that migration law is highly flexible to accommodate increasing 
reshaping of the national interest. 
Understanding the role and relationships on either side of a boundary is 
always easier when the boundary is absolute. Migration law provides a 
boundary, but also ways of crossing it. Crossing the boundary is particularly 
important for nations of immigrants. In addition to the "us" and "them" 
identities ensconced in migration law, other identity categories emerge. 
Resident - temporary or permanent, refugee, visitor are common labels and each 
nation with an on-going migration program generates its own variations. These 
identities provide bridges between us and them. They also ensure that some 
who are inside remain firmly identified as outsiders. This ensures that making 
the boundary relatively easy to cross will not erode its role in providing a 
reliable limit to the community. 
One of the identifying labels used within migration law is "citizen." 
There is a growing body of theory which considers questions of citizenship, an 
important branch of which examines citizenship in settler societies.163 Some of 
163 Young I M, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship" 
(1989) 99 Ethics 250; Habennas J "Citizenship and National Identity" reprinted in Between 
Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, MIT Press, 
Cambridge MA, 1996; Andrews G (ed) Citizenship Lawrence and Wishart, London,1991; 
Barbalet J M, Citizenship: Rights, Struggle and Class Inequality Open University Press, Milton 
Keynes, 1988; Carens J, "Who Belongs? Theoretical and Legal Questions About Birthright 
Citizenship in the United States" (1987) 37 University of Toronto Law Journal 413; Hall Sand 
Held D, "Citizens and Citizenship" in Hall Sand Jacques M (eds) New Times: The Changing 
Face of Politics in the 1990s Lawrence and Wishart, London, (1989); Cooper D, "The Citizen's 
Charter and Radical Democracy: Empowerment and Exclusion within Citizenship Discourse" 
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the most challenging work in this area demonstrates how citizenship is used as 
an exclusionary and homogenising ideology.164 That is, how citizenship 
suppresses differences in identity and creates a unified identity along certain 
narrow dimensions. This strand of citizenship theory runs parallel to the 
questions I explore in this work. Nonetheless, my work differs from citizenship 
theory in several ways. I am interested in the law which regulates the boundary 
between members and non-members of a community and which regulates who 
may be admitted to live permanently in the community. This is a narrower 
concern than citizenship theory which, while concerned with questions of 
admission to membership, also investigates the consequences of membership, 
especially the rights and duties of members. These considerations play a much 
smaller role in this study, arising only in connection with considerations of 
rights members have in assisting others to enter the country permanently. 
In addition, in both Australia and Canada, migration law is of more 
practical consequence than citizenship law for questions of membership. In real 
terms there are few meaningful distinctions between permanent residents and 
citizens in these two countries. The most meaningful membership distinctions 
are the hurdles set within the migration law. After permanent residency has 
been achieved within the migration law framework, citizenship is largely a 
matter of choice. In both countries, only citizens can vote, and in Canada only 
(1993) 2 Social and Legal Studies 149; Kymlicka W, Recent Work in Citizenship Theory 
University of Toronto Faculty of Law Workshop Series, Toronto 1992; Kymlicka W, 
Multicultural Citizenship : A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995; 
Rubenstein K, "Citizenship in Australia: Unscrambling Its Meaning" (1995) 20 Melbourne 
University Law Review 503; Berns S, "Law, Citizenship and the Politics ofldentity: Sketching 
the Limits of Citizenship" (1988) 7 Griffith Law Review 1. 
164 See in particular I M Young, D Cooper, and S Hall and D Held all ibid. 
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citizens are have the constitutionally guaranteed right to "enter, remain in and 
leave Canada."165 Permanent residents convicted of serious crimes can now be 
deported in some circumstances.166 In Australia, permanent employment in the 
national civil service is restricted to citizens. But, most importantly, the hurdle 
for becoming a citizen in both countries is low; one must be a permanent 
resident for a set number of years. 167 Decisions about whether one is acceptable 
as a member of the community are made at the migration stage rather than 
later.168 Migration law rather than citizenship law constitutes the community 
and contains the most significant distinctions between members and others. 
E. CONCLUSION: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING 
MIGRATION LAW 
Drawing these elements together is the basis of my framework for 
analysing migration law. A critical focus on identity provides an ideal avenue 
165 Charter of Rights and Freedoms ss. 6.(1 ). Note however that ss. 6(2) states: 
Every citizen of Canada and every person who has the status of a permanent resident of Canada 
has the right 
(a) to move to and take up residence in any province; and 
(b) to pursue the gaining ofa livelihood in any province. 
All other Charter provisions do not make reference to citizenship. 
166 See further discussion in Chapter Five at pages 253-57. Canadian Immigration Act RSC 
1985 c.1-2 s.24 and the Australian Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss. 201-202. 
167 In Australia, 2 years permanent residency is required; Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth) 
s. 13. In Canada, 3 years permanent residency is required, Citizenship Act SC 1974-75-76 c. 
108, s5. 
168 I believe that the trend in both Australia and Canada is towards increasing the importance of 
citizenship, and that what I have said about migration law as being the crucial legal site for 
admission to the community may change in the future. Nonetheless, I believe that for the 
present the crucial decision that I am enquiring into is made when someone is granted 
permanent residence. 
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of inquiry into migration law. In legal studies, the term identity brings with it 
the insights of analysis of the role of law in social construction and the pedigree 
of critical race studies. Both of these aspects enrich an examination of 
migration law. The first because migration law is quite literally essential to the 
construction of nations. It puts a border around the community, constituting 
those for whom laws will be meaningful. In settler societies like Australia and 
Canada this role is enhanced as they have been peopled by individuals who have 
entered the community through provisions in the migration law, or, more rarely, 
in spite of provisions in the migration law prohibitin~ them. In either case, 
migration law is the newcomer's first encounter with the nation and the label it 
puts on an individual provides a context for their life within that country. 
Further, as liberalism provides no justice standard against which migration laws 
can be assessed, exploring the contours of the national identifications these laws 
construct is the best way of assessing the provisions. Although we cannot 
conclude that a given law is just or unjust in a traditional liberal sense, we can 
state what the law leads us to conclude about the nation, about what Australia 
and Canada value or find meaningful. 
Crucially, identity is neither determinative of the law nor determined by it, 
but an intermediate position. To make use of that insight we must consider why 
that is so and how that position means the law can be manipulated. Migration 
law is not the only source of national identity in settler societies. It is a site 
which reflects aspects of that identity, but which is also well adapted to 
accommodating changes in identity perceptions which occur elsewhere. At an 
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individual level, the consequences of conforming to "refugee" or "entrepreneur" 
identity are always complicated and only ever a starting point for one's 
experiences within the nation. Migration law communicates some messages 
about the values of being Australian or Canadian. It is also transformed and 
affected, in both its letter and its interpretation, by values and perspectives from 
other realms of national public life. Migration law reflects a picture of how the 
nation identifies itself, and in doing so reifies those aspects of national identity. 
To accomplish this role in the nation, migration provisions are highly malleable, 
accommodating and masking shifts in the national interest. Law and identity 
literature focuses on the fluid and negotiated quality of legally constructed 
identity which is so central to this setting, and thus is ideally suited for this 
framework. 
The association of legal identity analyses with critical race studies brings 
an important perspective to an examination of migration laws because these 
laws are designed to discriminate and to exclude.169 Migration law is a bold 
expression of the sovereign power of the nation, and of its absolute ability to 
control, to choose, who will be admitted to the community. This function is 
discriminating in the most neutral sense of the word. But it is much more than 
that as well. The histories of immigration to Australia and Canada are replete 
with overt racial discrimination. At present, the racial and gender biases of 
migration laws are obscured by genuine improvements compared with past 
practice, and by neutral language. By putting identity in the centre of the 
169 Dobson-Mack A, "Independent Immigration Selection Criteria and Equality Rights: 
Discretion, Discrimination and Due Process" (1993) 34 Les Cahiers de Droit 549. 
96 
analysis, the discriminatory effects of the law can be laid bare. The concerns of 
identity politics are appropriately raised in studies of migration provisions. The 
role of migration law in silencing and excluding some experiences remains 
important. 
Analyses of law and identity have also been used to explore implications 
of categories, hierarchies and boundaries in legal reasoning. This analysis is 
incisive in migration law which is both overtly and implicitly involved in 
creating clearly bounded categories hierarchically related to one another. In 
migration law, where categories and boundaries are so patently exposed, it is 
crucial to push this analysis of legal reasoning further. Doing so allows us to 
examine not only the label on a given category such as refugee or temporary 
worker but also the subtle ways this label moulds the identity and therefore the 
experiences of the individual who either chooses or is consigned to that label. 
Careful attention also gives us information about the society itself which 
generates these categories. The boundary created by migration law reveals 
much about those who erect it around themselves. The essential "us-them" 
hierarchy is replicated in a multitude of binary categories which make up the 
day to day functioning of migration law. Rights discourse is also of pressing 
importance in the migration law context which forces the confrontation between 
members' rights and the potential human rights of outsiders. The discourse of 
rights in migration law is diverse and contains lessons that move beyond a 
monolithic understanding of the roles and functions of rights. 
The term identity enriches the study of nation because a nation exists in 
part at the level of individual beliefs and of mythology. National identity, the 
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sense an individual has of belonging to a particular geopolitical configuration, is 
a modem phenomenon. But the state as a collective or formal government 
apparatus does not have a sense of self - a sense of identity - that can belong 
only to individuals. National consciousness is generated through individual 
identification with symbols and myths portraying the nation. Migration law is 
implicated in this process in several ways. For both Australians and Canadians, 
part of our understanding of self is of belonging to a nation of immigrants, of 
people from all comers of the world who have gathered in search of a better life. 
This is, at its core, a migration myth. Migration law also expresses images of 
ourselves and of our collective values. It contains definitions of "family" of 
"skilled" of "deserving." These definitions portray "us" to the world at large 
and also perform a double reflecting function. They reflect already existing 
beliefs and they reify those beliefs against further change. In this way, the 
identities in migration law are neither determined nor determining, but have a 
role to play in both processes, depending on the evolution of societal beliefs. 
A focus on law and identity also highlights two central aspects of liberal 
theory. The emergence and importance of the sovereign nation is historically 
intertwined with the dominance of liberalism as an individual and political 
philosophy. The sovereignty of the liberal nation is nowhere more clearly 
expressed than in its absolute control over its borders and its membership. The 
closed community which functions as a base assumption of liberal theorists is 
the working model for modem nations. The ability to determine who will be let 
in, both territorially and to citizenship, are closely guarded powers of the state. 
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By considering how the state exercises these powers we can trace imprints of 
how the state identifies itself and its members. 
In addition, liberalism is the basis for the long historical association of 
humanitarianism with migration law. The role of humanitarianism in migration 
law is complex. The liberal consensus that some individuals ought to be given 
the assistance of prosperous nations is one factor providing for the international 
consensus that refugees are "owed" some protection. But this consensus is 
closely framed by the nation's sovereignty and carefully constrained by national 
goals and domestic political imperatives. Thus there is an on-going tension 
between the nation's desire to be perceived as humanitarian and good, yet firmly 
in control of its sovereign borders. 
Having established this framework for analysing the interrelationship 
between migration law and national identity, I now tum to the second part of the 
thesis which demonstrates the analysis in particular settings. The first setting 
for this is the domestic refugee determination process, the subject of Chapter 
Three. 
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Chapter Three 
Constructing Others -The Refugee Process 
This Chapter examines how refugees are constructed in Australian and 
Canadian law and considers what that process reveals about migration law as a 
site for assembling a picture of national identity and as the effective boundary of 
the nation. Of all the categories of people admitted under the migration laws to 
live permanently in these nations, the label "refugee" describes those who, at 
least theoretically, differ most markedly from the members of the nation. While 
family and economic migrants are selected because they have something the 
nation values - family ties or a contribution to economic growth - refugees are 
admitted because of something they lack - the protection of another state. This 
key difference means that the law governing refugee admissions and the way it 
is applied is a good starting point for seeing the principles set out in Chapter 
Two take shape. Identity construction proceeds through a process of 
constructing boundaries and of portraying the other as like ''us". It is often 
easiest to see first how the outsider or the absent other is constructed and to 
search within this construction for reflected images of self. As well, images of 
self and other are often easiest to see in areas of sharp contrast. Both these 
conditions are met in the case of refugee admissions. Refugees are not selected 
I 
.. I because of their family ties or economic potential, and for that reason they are 
I 
simultaneously the most "unknown" of migrant categories and the group which 
represents the sharpest contrast with existing national values. Using identity as 
the fulcrum of analysis allows us to observe that the refugee is constructed as 
the ultimate other to the nation in order to be permitted entry. Refugees are the 
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most unlike us, as well as the most unknown, facilitating our imaginative 
construction of their identity. This process in turn creates a reflected image of 
how Australia and Canada, as nations, identify themselves. 
Examining refugee law also allows me to begin drawing out two other 
aspects of the Chapter Two framework. First, as refugee admissions are one 
type of humanitarian admission, this area of the law provides examples of how 
liberal humanitarianism takes shape in the law and influences the shape that law 
takes. This theme is taken up further in Chapter Four which analyses 
humanitarian admissions outside the refugee stream and investigates the 
humanitarian consensus in detail. Second, refugee law provides a clear way of 
focussing on the importance of sovereignty to migration law as refugee 
admission is the only aspect of migration law that contains a potential challenge 
to national sovereignty. 
To demonstrate how refugee law constructs the refugee as the ultimate 
other to the nation and how this process in turn reveals elements of national 
identity, I begin by describing the international legal regime which generates the 
legal standards both Australia and Canada apply in their refugee law. This 
starting point also allows me to anchor my analysis by examining the 
interrelationship of sovereignty and international legal standards and 
demonstrating the place of identity in the refugee definition itself. This points 
up key features of the legal framework which are a necessary precedent to 
considering how it is applied. I then comparatively consider the Australian and 
Canadian refugee admission processes, with particular emphasis on the 
decision-making processes in the refugee tribunals, and key roles played by 
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identity and credibility in refugee determinations. This refugee determination 
process raises salient questions engaging identity by bringing the potential 
refugee face to face with the nation in a setting dominated by legal reasoning 
and processes despite various efforts to temper this influence. In this setting the 
importance of background norms and silences -two factors which the identity-
based critique of law highlights - are vital. The next section analyses the 
emerging refugee identities in each country, including how this identity interacts 
with those of other actors in the refugee process. The final section of this 
Chapter considers how refugee admissions fit into the broader migration 
schemes in each country and what insights can be drawn about migration from 
examining the othering process taking place in the refugee realm. It also takes 
up the challenge described in Chapter Two of testing linkages between legal and 
popular discourses about refugees. 
A. REFUGEEASANINTERNATIONALLEGALSTANDARD 
1. The internationally accepted definition of a refugee 
The relationship of the refugee and the nation is complicated at the outset 
by the dissonance between the meanings which are commonly associated with 
the word refugee and the legal definition of the term. The images which we 
associate with refugees may include those fleeing recent famines in Ethiopia, 
residents of Sarajevo whose homes were destroyed in the war which rendered 
Yugoslavia "former," Chinese dissident defectors, and "boat people" from 
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China or the Middle East. 1 The Oxford English Dictionary defines refugee in a 
way which fits with these visions; "a person taking refuge, esp. in a foreign 
country from war or persecution or natural disaster."2 But the legal definition is 
much narrower. 
Both Australia and Canada have adopted the international definition of a 
refugee for use in their domestic law.3 This definition was agreed upon in 1951 
as part of the international response to the vast number of displaced persons in 
Europe following the Second World War. The definition built on a number of 
international agreements about refugees in the interwar period.4 A refugee was 
defined as any person who: 
As a result of event occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
1 The Australian press has recently coined the compound word "boatpeople" to describe 
aspiring refugee claimants arriving this way. See Toohey P, "A Roo Shooter and his Ute Hold 
the Line Against Illegals'', Australian, 13-14 November 1999 at 1; Saunders M, "PM Seeks 
Wahid's Sympathy on Illegals", Australian, 26 November 1999 at 6; Shanahan D, "Illegal 
'plane-people' Outnumber Boat Loads", Australian 25 November 1999 at 3. This change 
appears to date from November 1999. 
2 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, Allen RE (ed), Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1990. No alternative definitions are provided. 
3 Australian Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36 (2) states: 
A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen of 
Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees 
Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. 
The Convention and Protocol are described in the interpretation section (s.5) of the Act. 
The Canadian Immigration Act R.S.C. (1985) c. 1-2 defines "Convention" and "Convention 
refugee" in the interpretation section of the Act, s.2( 1 ). Additional provisions drawn directly 
from the international instruments are set out in subs. 2(2). 
4 It is notable that the post World War I rise ofrefugee movements coincides with the 
widespread introduction of passports and immigration restrictions. Dummett A and Nicol A, 
Subjects Citizens Aliens and Others: Nationality and Immigration Law, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, London, 1990, at 145. 
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nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence 
as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return to it. 5 
In 1967 the temporal limitation in the definition was removed, as was the option 
of interpreting the definition to refer only to events which had occurred in 
Europe.6 The components of the definition are 1) being outside one's country 
and not able or willing to return there; 2) having a well-founded fear of 
persecution; 3) that the fear of persecution be on the basis of certain 
characteristics or "grounds." People who are starving or whose lives are 
fractured by civil war are not refugees under this definition. Anyone who has 
not crossed an international border is not a refugee. Of those people imagined 
above, the only group almost certain to be considered refugees are the Chinese 
defectors. 
This points to two of the most significant ways the international legal 
definition of a refugee is limited. First, the Western powers who dominated the 
initial norm building process ensured that their ideological tradition of granting 
asylum to those fleeing the emerging Eastern bloc would be enshrined in the 
international agreement. This Western bias is at the root of making 
"persecution" a key factor in the definition and in the original time and place 
limitations, which operated to facilitate an understanding of the refugee as 
someone who came from Europe but for whom the world community bore some 
5 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 189UNTS150, entry into force on 22 
April 1954, Article l(A)(2). Original signatories had the option ofreading "events occurring 
before 1January1951" as "events occurring in Europe before 1January1951"; Article l(B)(l). 
Hereafter, the Refugee Convention. 
6 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 606 UNTS 267, entry into force 4 October 
1967, Article 1. Hereafter the Refugee Protocol. 
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responsibility.7 Second, the refugee definition is individualistic.8 It is 
impossible to say categorically that homeless Sarajevans, starving Ethiopians or 
Indochinese boat people are not refugees. Their individual circumstances may 
indeed bring them within the definition, and the inquiry is legally located at an 
individual level, but the labels I have given these groups do not refer to 
characteristics that would bring them within the refugee definition. The label 
Chinese dissident defector does, as dissident describes directly a political 
opinion directed at a state opposed to free speech and a defector has already left 
their country of origin. 
The stringency and bias of the refugee definition have met with thorough 
and detailed criticism from many quarters.9 Formal responses to address these 
concerns have included broadening the mandate of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees to include responsibility for "persons of concem"10 
7 Hathaway JC, The Law of Refugee Status, Butterworths, Toronto, 1991, at 6-10. 
8 Goodwin-Gill G, The Refugee in International Law, 2nd ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996 at 
8. 
9 Some examples include Tuitt P, False Images: Law's Construction of the Refugee, Pluto Press, 
London and East Haven CT, 1996; Hathaway JC (ed) Reconceiving International Refugee Law, 
M Nijhoff, The Hague and Boston, 1997; Goodwin-Gill G, "Refugees: The Functions and 
Limits of the Existing Protection System" in Human Rights and the Protection of Refugees 
Under International Law Nash A ( ed). Hathaway J C and Neve RA, "Making International 
Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivised and Solution-Oriented Protection" 
(1997) 10 Harvard Human Rights Journal 115; Sinclair C, Who Would Want to be a Refugee? 
PhD thesis, University of New England, 1995, Hyndman P, "Refugees Under International Law 
with a Reference to the Concept of Asylum" (1986)Australian Law Journal 148; Melandes G, 
"The Protection of Refugees" (1974) 18 Scandanavian Studies in Law 153. 
10 The UNHCR's 1997 Statistical Overview is entitled "Refugees and Others of Concern to the 
UNHCR" and states, "In recent years, the UNHCR's involvement with persons who have not 
crossed an international border, such as the internally displaced, refugees who have returned 
home (returnees) and persons threatened with displacement by, or otherwise at risk from, armed 
conflict, has increased substantially. In view of the above, and taking into consideration the rise 
in the number of persons granted temporary protection and those allowed to remain in countries 
of asylum on humanitarian grounds, it has become increasingly imprecise to talk about 
"refugees" without some further indication of the group concerned. In this report, the term 
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and the emergence of several regional norms defining refugees more broadly .11 
Australia and Canada both incorporate some humanitarian admissions into their 
migration programs which extend beyond the formal refugee program in 
recognition that many individuals seeking resettlement do not come within the 
refugee definition. Hathaway argues that while in the immediate postwar period 
a reasonable fit existed between national self-interest and the refugee definition, 
this convergence has diminished in recent years. That, in combination with a 
rising number of involuntary migrants whose circumstances fall outside the 
definition (even if nations were motivated to meet commitments under it) means 
that "refugee law serves fewer and fewer people, less and less well, as time goes 
on. ,,12 
In combination these factors - a narrow definition of refugee, a dissonance 
between the legal and popular definitions, and reliance on international legal 
norms in this area - reveal key observations about how refugee law operates 
within nations. The international legal regime enshrines national sovereignty. It 
is a long established tenet of international law that nations have complete 
control over their own naturalisation and citizenship law, that is, over their own 
"refugees and others of concern to UNHCR" has been used to address these various categories." 
www.unhcr.ch/refworld/refbib/refstat/l 998/98intro.htm at 1-2. 
11 These are the Organisation of African Unity 1969 Convention Governing the specific aspects 
of refugee problems in Africa 1000 UNTS 46 entered into force 20 June 1974; the Cartagena 
Declaration entered into by ten Latin American states in 1984 OAS/Ser .LN /11.66, doc. 10, 
rev .1 at 190-93. The Council of Europe has also recognised the existence of de facto refugees, 
but has not formalised this recognition, Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly 
Recommendation 773 (1976). 
12 Hathaway JC, "Preface" in Reconceiving International Refugee Law above note 9 at xxv. 
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borders and membership. 13 While there are now some international legal norms 
which transcend sovereignty either because they apply directly to individuals14 
or because a nation may be bound by them without specifically consenting to 
them, 15 refugee law is not one of these. The refugee convention reads as a 
constraint on sovereignty in that it obligates states not to return refugees to 
persecutory situations.16 This amounts to requiring states to keep the refugee 
within their borders in many instances, because international legal norms limit 
deportation options by only requiring states to admit their own nationals. In 
addition to this protection against refoulement, the convention reads like a rights 
document, guaranteeing various rights to refugees while in protection granting 
states. The Refugee Convention is therefore similar in tone and form to many of 
the human rights instruments which are now considered to constrain national 
sovereignty at some level. 17 
13 Confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm Case (Liechenstein v 
Guatemala) 1955 l.C.J. Reports 4. Nations have devised two basic regimes governing 
citizenship or membership:jus soli andjus sanguinis, belonging by being born there or 
belonging by being the child of a member. Variations and limitations on these two regimes 
explain most citizenship laws. Migration laws are not so easily categorised, but do relate 
directly to citizenship laws as citizens are automatically allowed entry into their nation of 
citizenship. 
14 For example some human rights provisions, war crimes prohibitions. 
15 Some aspects of the law of the sea have reached this status, as have international legal norms 
prohibiting genocide. 
16 Formally, this protection is provided by the provision against "refoulement" in Article 33 of 
the Convention: 
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion. 
17 For a general overview of this area see Brownlie I, Principles of Public International Law, 5th 
ed, 1998, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, Chapter XXV, "Protection of Individuals and Groups: 
Human Rights and Self-Determination." 
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But the convention operates as only a minimal constraint on sovereignty 
in practice, especially in prosperous Western nations remote from most 
situations which produce refugees. In Australia and Canada, admission of 
refugees is guided by quotas or target numbers set by the government on a 
yearly basis. Since refugees are not actually crossing the borders in 
overwhelming numbers, as may be the case in Tanzania or Macedonia, the 
number of refugees to be accepted is not determined by an international legal 
obligation but by internal political wrangling. Any obligation to accept refugees 
from afar is rooted in moral suasion rather than legal requisite. While some 
international human rights conventions contain provisions allowing at least the 
option of an international forum to bring complaints to, there is no such forum 
for breaches of the Refugee Convention. In Hathaway's view: 
International refugee law rarely determines how governments respond to 
involuntary migration. States pay lip service to the importance of 
honouring the right to seek asylum, but in practice devote significant 
resources to keep refugees away from their borders. Although the 
advocacy community invokes formal protection principles, it knows that 
governments are unlikely to live up to these supposedly minimum 
standards.18 
While the Refugee Convention is not treated by states as a significant 
constraint on sovereignty - and therefore is not one - incorporating its language 
into domestic law allows governments to maintain that they are meeting their 
international obligations in this area. The narrowness of the legal definition of 
refugee, and in particular the requirement that a refugee be outside her own 
country to come within this definition, means that even if a nation chose to treat 
18 Hathaway J C, above n 9 at xvii. 
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the convention as a robust constraint on sovereignty, the extent of this constraint 
in the case of nations distant from refugee producing situations would be slight. 
Instead, refugee law interpretation becomes a site of assertions of sovereignty, 
for expressions of the identity of the nation as nation. Deciding which refugees 
to admit and when becomes another potential tool in the construction of the 
national community. 
2. The role of identity in the refugee definition 
Using the term identity to explore the refugee definition is important in 
two ways; first because identity is a central component of that definition and 
second because "refugee" can emerge as an identity in and of itself. These two 
aspects facilitate the usage of refugee as a legal category which incorporates 
particular background norms and unstated perspectives, building an image of the 
nation which resembles a photographic negative. I take up the first aspect here 
and consider the second later in this Chapter. While the legal inquiry into 
whether one meets the refugee definition is individualistic, the permissible 
"grounds" on which persecution may be feared are largely group identity based. 
This narrows the definition, of course, a fear of persecution is not the only 
element. It also parallels a familiar trick of liberal legalism: the focus is on the 
individual but the labelling of individuals creates a group identity and regulates 
the boundary of that identity. This feature of legally constructed identities fits 
within John Turner's description of how identity is experienced at both group 
and individual levels. 
A refugee fears persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality or 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The first four of 
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these grounds can be viewed directly as components of identity. Identity also 
sheds important light on political opinion, which I discuss separately. While an 
individual may not identify as a member of a particular race, religion, 
nationality or social group in all or even any circumstances, in an atmosphere of 
persecution this identity will become important whether or not an individual 
subjectively accepts it as important to them. 19 The Nazi persecution of those 
with Jewish ancestry who did not view themselves as Jewish is an example 
which was easily available to the definition's drafters. Claiming refugee status 
on one of these grounds depends on being able to claim membership in an 
identity-based group. The process of asserting this claim will necessarily make 
this aspect of one's identity come to the fore. The law, therefore, shapes an 
individual's self-identification in this sense. 
The importance of identity to the refugee definition is highlighted by the 
problematic jurisprudence interpreting the ground "membership in a particular 
social group. "20 In Australia and Canada, as elsewhere, the courts have been 
unsuccessful in providing a clear understanding of what will count as a 
particular social group. The leading Canadian case, Canada (Attorney-General) 
v W ard21 draws a highly problematic distinction between "what one is" and 
"what one does", the former meeting the definition and the latter not. The 
Australian High Court decision on point emphasises that particular social groups 
19 See Chapter Two at pp. 45-58. 
20 See the discussion in Fullerton M, "A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on 
Persecution Due to Membership in a Particular Social Group" (1993) 26 Cornell International 
Law Journal 505; Graves M, "From Definition to Exploration: Social Groups and Political 
Asylum Eligibility" (1989) 26 San Diego Law Review 740; Macklin A, "Canada (Attorney-
General) v. Ward A Review Essay" (1994) 6 International Journal of Refugee Law 362. 
21 (1993) 103 DLR (4th) 1 (SCC). 
110 
must be more than "merely demographic. "22 In each case, the court is grasping 
at a definition of particular social group which articulates a sense of belonging 
or identity. The Australian court relies on whether the group in question is 
identifiable in society.23 It seems that in each country any group whose claims 
are familiar in identity politics debates would qualify as a particular social 
group. Identity politics can be viewed as having "pre-constructed" those groups 
outside the law, thus making them identifiable in the legal inquiry. This is one 
example of why the essentialist-constructivist debate is sidelined in law and 
identity literature. It is not incongruous to accept both that the law has a role in 
constructing identity (e.g. "refugee") and that identities exist outside the law. 
This line of reasoning does not need to decide whether identities exist outside 
all social settings. The identity politics links with these claims also show the 
cultural bias of the law: groups which the receiving country has no experience 
of will be much less likely to be deemed "identifiable" and thus viewed as 
"particular social groups." 
The inquiry into whether a group is a particular social group is about one's 
sense of self and about societal perceptions of selves, and about assertions of 
belonging (because voluntarily associated groups are captured by this ground). 
A person claiming refugee status on this ground fears persecution because of 
some aspect of their identity which is shared with others, rather than because of 
some individual characteristic. The jurisprudence can be viewed as aiming to 
22 Applicant A and Another v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and Another (1997), 
142 ALR 331. 
23 Ibid. I consider this jurisprudence in detail in "Chinese Fleeing Sterilisation: Australia's 
Response Against a Canadian Backdrop" (1998) 10 International Journal of Refagee Law 77. 
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draw parallels between "particular social groups" and races, religions and 
nationalities. The crux of each of these four grounds of potential persecution is 
that while the legal inquiry relates to the individual, the persecution must be 
directed at an individual because of their status as a group member. 
Membership in a particular social group is also the ground which has been 
used as the legal support for implementation of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugee's (UNHCR) Women at Risk Program in Canada.24 
The legal inquiry therefore becomes: "in what circumstances does being a 
woman make one a member of a particular social group?"25 Both Canada and 
Australia have implemented a responses to the UNHCR's efforts to address the 
plight of women refugees which the UNHCR has worked for over a decade to 
publicise. That is, that while over 80% of those awaiting resettlement elsewhere 
are women and children, prosperous countries often accept more male than 
female refugees because men are more likely to be well-educated or English-
speaking.26 The guiding principle behind the Canadian approach is to encourage 
interpretation of the refugee definition which recognise that sometimes women 
24 See Guidelines Issued by the Chairperson Pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act: 
Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution Immigration and Refugee 
Board, Canada, 9 March 1993, updated 1996. 
25 Mawani N, "Introduction to the Immigration and Refugee Board Guidelines on Gender-
Related Persecution" ( 1993) 5 International Journal of Refugee Law 240. Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Refugee and Humanitarian Division) One-Pager entitled 
"Australia's Women at Risk Program", see also Australia's Migration Regulations, subclass 204: 
Women at Risk Visa. 
26 Canada has been criticised for this behaviour by European nations; reported in interviews 
with CIC officials, Ottawa, June 1997. Australia's Women at Risk program makes a small 
contribution to addressing this disparity. While the program has now been operating for 10 
years, male refugees still outnumber female (primary applicants stats from the Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs show the following: 1997/98 men 711, women 428; 
1996/97 men 850 women 392; 1995/96 men 1035 women 510). The target number of women 
at risk visas is 420 in 1998/99 and 367 visas were issued. 
112 
are persecuted because they are women. Hence they should be recognised as 
refugees. The Australia program takes a different focus, aiming to assist women 
in their particular circumstances, even though they are not necessarily refugees. 
Under the Australian program, some Women at Risk visas are taken from the 
refugee target number and some from other humanitarian class targets, 
depending on the circumstances of the individual involved. 27 The key difference 
is that Canada expands the refugee definition while Australia keeps tight control 
over it. These various initiatives call attention to difficulties in meshing female 
identity with the refugee definition. First, by highlighting the definition's bias 
towards political and therefore male-dominated experience. 28 Second, by 
underscoring the difficulties of treating "women" as a social group. That is, this 
experience forms the background norm for the refugee definition. Observing 
identity function in the law is one way of highlighting this. Finally, by 
exposing the control imperative of the refugee definition which is threatened by 
the potential admittance of half of some populations as "social groups." 
The fifth ground of eligible persecution in the refugee definition, political 
opinion, is not so obviously an identity label but nonetheless merges in identity 
based analysis as political opinion can be imputed by the prosecuting authority, 
in which case it functions in the same way as identity stereotyping. 29 In a twist 
27 Interview with DIMA staff, February 1998. 
28 Macklin A, "Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories" (1995) 17 Human Rights 
Quarterly 213. 
29 Imputed political opinion was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ward, above n 
21 and by the High Court of Australia in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo Wei 
Rong (1997) 144 ALR 567 at 575. 
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1 
on the Supreme Court of Canada's Ward3°reasoning, being a refugee is who you 
are, not what is done to you. Returning to Minow' s insights discussed in 
Chapter Two, we must pay attention to the integral distinction between those 
who choose identities and those who are consigned to them. The refugee 
standard is highly personalised both at this definitional level, and in its 
individualised application. Using the analytic tool of identity to examine the 
law and its application draws attention to the strictures of this definition, to the 
background norms it embeds, the incentives it creates for individuals to choose 
some identities over others and the role of both persecuting states and receiving 
states in consigning individuals to identity boxes. 
Political opinion has been elaborated jurisprudentially in part through 
reliance on a strong sense of selves and of consciences.31 This reflects the Cold 
War backdrop to the negotiations leading to the Refugee Convention where the 
Western nations sought to protect their tradition of granting asylum to Eastern 
Bloc defectors. The case law supports this tradition by viewing political 
opinion as a belief that one ought not be forced to relinquish because of its 
importance to one's sense of self. 32 The Supreme Court of Canada ruled that 
Mr. Ward, "who believes that the killing of innocent people to achieve political 
change is unacceptable,"33 was persecuted by a paramilitary organisation 
because his conscience could not allow him to depart from this view, and 
30 Above n 21. 
31 The range of views on whether a conscientious objection to military service can be grounds 
for refugee status provides an example. See the discussion in Goodwin-Gill G S, above n 8 at 
54-59. 
32 Ward, above n 21. This case has an influential status internationally; see ibid. at 49. 
33 Above n 8 at 40. 
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implicitly that the Refugee Convention protects politically linked expressions of 
conscience. This very personalised interpretation of political opinion links 
political and self-identity very closely, drawing the ground of persecution 
because of political opinion parallel to the other identity-based grounds. The 
approach implicitly divides political opinions into those which are linked to a 
sense of self and therefore which could ground status as a refugee and those 
which we would expect people to relinquish, for example a preference for 
voting Liberal to gain a personal tax advantage. 
The refugee definition fits squarely into the role for migration law in the 
liberal nation which I described in Chapter Two. It could theoretically impinge 
on sovereignty but does not do so in any meaningful way in practice and thus 
becomes another mechanism for the nation to meet its needs and to constitute its 
community. Although it is written in the language of group membership and 
sense of belonging, it is honed by liberal legalism's commitment to analysis at 
the level of the individual. As it is taken up by sovereign nations it becomes 
imprinted with their sovereign identity. Simultaneously, it is a key element in 
the construction of refugee as an identity category with a precise relationship to 
that nation. Looking at the refugee admission processes in Australia and 
Canada provides a basis for deepening my analysis of the refugee standard and 
of illustrating the importance of identity to that standard and to the nation. 
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B. REFUGEE ADMISSION IN AUSTRALIA AND CANADA 
1. Legislative Frameworks 
Australia and Canada both have two ways of allowing people who meet 
the international definition of refugee to become permanent members of the 
community. Refugees are selected abroad and some of the people who arrive on 
their own in Australia and Canada are determined to be refugees and are 
allowed to stay on that basis. The two procedures are distinct. When refugees 
are selected abroad and brought "home," no international legal obligation is 
triggered. By all existing legal standards, a nation is free to take in refugees in 
this way or not. There may be some pressure in the international community to 
do this,34 and there may from time to time be international agreements to 
facilitate this,35 but there is nothing more. On the other hand, when a person has 
made it to Canada or Australia36 and then claims to be a refugee the obligation 
under the Refugee Convention not to return a person to a place where they may 
be persecuted is triggered. 37 My principal interest in this Chapter is in 
considering how Australia and Canada respond to this international obligation. 
34 The United Nations High Commission for Refugees, for example, tries to exert pressure on 
states to take in refugees, and quasi refugees, from abroad. 
35 For example, the Comprehensive Plan of Action relating to Indo-Chinese refugees initiated in 
1989 under which participating governments made specific commitments regarding issues such 
as resettlement, deterring clandestine departures, repartitions and regular communications. See 
"Statement of the Steering Committee: Reaffirmation of the Comprehensive Plan of Action" 
( 1991) 3 International Journal of Refugee Law 367. This agreement was as much about limiting 
resettlement of refugees abroad as it was about facilitating it. 
36 By this I mean those who have physically reached the country, including those who make a 
refugee claim at a port of entry and therefore could be considered to not have legally entered the 
country. For a time in the 1980s, Australia made much of this legal distinction as a way of 
limiting refugee claims. See Crawford J and Hyndman P, "Three Heresies in the Application of 
the Refugee Convention" (1989) I International Journal of Refugee Law 152. 
37 Article 33, see above n 5 and surrounding text. 
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That is, how they respond to those who are already within the borders of the 
nation. 
While offshore programs do not trigger an obligation in international law 
and therefore do not raise the intersection of sovereignty and rights claims, both 
Australian and Canadian offshore programs have features which should be noted 
at this point. 38 In Australia, the offshore program makes up the larger portion of 
refugees admitted39 and is treated by the current Minister as being the neediest 
group. 40 As the Australian programs are formally linked, the offshore intake is 
reduced when onshore claimants increase. The effect of these provisions is to 
ensure a very high level of control over refugees admitted as most are 
preselected before arrival in Australia, and to ensure tight control over the total 
number admitted, as any unanticipated increase in successful onshore claims can 
be absorbed without increasing total numbers. The Minister uses the policy link 
between the two programs in anti-refugee rhetoric, claiming that those who gain 
admittance within Australia are stealing the places of the others.41 This 
ostensible result of the current system could easily be altered by the 
government, but not without sacrificing some degree of control. 
38 Although the refugee standard is used, therefore, offshore programs fit more directly within 
the ambit of humanitarian admissions canvassed in Chapter Four, see especially pp. 204-201. 
39 The targets for 1998-99 are 4000 refugees from offshore and 2000 from onshore. These 
numbers have been consistent over the past three years under John Howard's government. 
40 Ruddock P, Address to the Conference on Immigrant Justice, 6 June 1997, Sydney. 
41 Ibid. Also, Ruddock P, Address to Australian Institute for Administrative Law Twilight 
Seminar, Canberra, October 30, 1997. 
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The overseas program in Canada is considerably smaller than the domestic 
program.42 The Canadian government has been criticised for using its offshore 
program as an adjunct of its independent migration program, that is for choosing 
offshore refugees who are well-educated and able-bodied and therefore likely to 
quickly become contributors to the Canadian economy.43 This demonstrates that 
even in admitting the very needy, the usual logic of immigration - that the 
national interest is paramount-is not far from view. Educated, able-bodied 
refugees are most like the "us" group and most able to "fit in" to the community 
quickly. There is, of course, an economic angle to this: fewer settlement 
support costs. But it also reflects a vision of what the nation values. 
The most interesting feature of the Canadian program is the opportunities 
which exist for private sponsorship. Following very successful private 
sponsorship programs during the Indochinese refugee influx of the 1980s, the 
Canadian government has now formalised opportunities for Canadians to 
increase the total annual number of refugees admitted through private 
sponsorships.44 Private-sponsorship both allows the government an easy 
response to domestic pressure to act more humanely and allows it to withdraw 
from direct responsibility for admission totals. It also underscores the point 
42 Although still slightly larger than the Australian program in raw numbers. In the Immigration 
Plan for 1999 (tabled in the House of Commons in October 1998) between 10,100 and 11, 300 
refugees will be admitted from abroad and 12, 000 - 18, 000 will be admitted in the domestic 
determination program (along with 2,000 -3,000 of their dependants from abroad). 
43 This criticism was reported in two separate interviews with officials in Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada in June 1997. European nations are especially critical, arguing that 
Canada takes the "cream" of the refugee crop and leaves the nations who are closer to the crisis 
regions to grapple with the remaining refugees. 
44 2, 800 to 4, 000 privately sponsored refugees are to be admitted in 1999 under subs. 6(3) and 
6(4) of the Immigration Act. 
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Don Galloway makes about the moral duty of the liberal nation. That is, a 
nation must allow its individual members to help needy others if they choose to, 
but the nation itself does not have this duty.45 In this account of 
humanitarianism, the obligation is privatised and thus the responsibility of the 
nation is drastically reduced. Some recent Australian developments such as 
community and church partial sponsorship of Kosovars in 1999 begin an 
Australian trend in this direction. 
Refugee admission in both countries is part of their respective 
immigration programs. While refugee determination is set aside from economic 
and family migration, it is provided for in the same legislation and administered 
by the same department. Also, while the Refugee Convention would suggest 
that only temporary protection need be afforded for refugees, 46 those determined 
to be refugees are effectively given the right to remain permanently.47 The 
internationally agreed definition of refugee has been written into the Canadian 
law since the immigration legislation was rewritten in 1978.48 It has been 
45 See Chapter Two at pp. 76-82 and also Chapter Four at pp. 189-195. 
46 Making temporary protection the norm is a central aspect of Hathaway and Neve's plan for 
revitalising international refugee law, see Hathaway J and Neve RA, above n 9 at 156-169. 
47 In Canada the result of a successful refugee determination is the right to remain in Canada 
(subs. 4(2.1) and the right to apply for permanent residency. In Australia, those determined to 
be refugees are given a "protection" visa (visa class AZ provided for under s.36 of the 
Migration Act) which carries the same rights and privileges as other categories of permanent 
residency visa, including the right to apply for citizenship after two years in the country. In 
November 1999 the Minister for Immigration created a new visa with reduced rights for 
refugees who arrive by boat. Holders of this three year temporary entry visa (subclass 785) 
have reduced entitlements to medical insurance, social security and no entitlement to family 
reunion. 
48 This is the year the present Immigration Act was proclaimed. The Canadian government is 
now preparing for another major alteration of its immigration legislation which could come to 
fruition by late 1999. While an independent investigative team given a year-long mandate to 
undertake public consultations and then make legislative recommendations suggested separating 
immigration and refugee admissions under a new Immigration Act and Protection Act (See Not 
Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future Immigration (1997) Ottawa: Minister of 
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specifically referenced in the Australian law since 1980.49 There is, thus, no 
difference in the refugee definition in the two countries. Significantly, however, 
the definition has been written directly into the Canadian legislation, whereas 
the Australian Migration Act makes reference to the Refugee Convention. The 
effect of this is to make international rules of treaty interpretation directly 
relevant to interpreting the definition in Australia50 but to keep them at arms 
length in Canada.51 Therefore, in Canadian courts the refugee definition can be 
examined as a matter of statutory interpretation to which treaty interpretation 
rules such as interpretation in good faith52 are relevant but not binding. 
Expressed conversely, this means the refugee definition, while an integral part 
of Canadian law, is at arms length from Australian law. This difference is 
underscored by a 1991 Australian amendment providing that a protection visa 
will be granted when the Minister "is satisfied" that a person meets the 
convention definition. The High Court has determined that this alters the 
inquiry on judicial review so that the focus must now be on whether there is any 
evidence upon which the Minister could be satisfied that an applicant did or did 
Supply and Services). The government has rejected this proposal. Following another round of 
consultations throughout 1998 Citizenship and Immigration Canada released its own reform 
proposals which would not remove refugee determination from the Immigration Act (Building 
on a Strong Foundation for the 21st Century (1999) Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada). Under this plan the refugee determination system would be modified but the basic 
model would be retained. 
49 The Migration Act first referred to the Refugee Convention in s. 6A(l )( c) which was 
introduced into the Act in 1980. 
so Discussed by the Australian High Court in Applicant A above n 22 in each of the separate 
judgments. 
si The Supreme Court of Canada in Ward, (above n 21) considers some sources which are 
relevant to treaty interpretation but treats its enterprise as one of statutory interpretation to 
which the rules of treaty interpretation therefore have no application. 
s2 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, 1155 UNT.S 331, Article 31. 
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not meet the definition. s3 These variations between how the Australian and 
Canadian law use of the definition demonstrate that the international 
commitment can be taken up differently, even in such similarly situated nations. 
The differences also ensure an additional layer of insulation for executive 
decision-making in Australia. This provides one way for the nation to imprint its 
identity on the law, even when the text of the law is identical. Incorporating the 
definition into domestic law directly strengthens its status because domestic law 
has higher status than international law in national legal systems. s4 
Both Australia and Canada set annual targets for the number of refugees 
who will be admitted through the domestic determination process. ss The 
Canadian target is a soft one as a range is specified (22, 100 to 29, 300 for 1999) 
and compliance with it is not rigorously required. The Australian policy of 
reducing overseas refugee numbers to accommodate the domestic target makes 
the target much firmer in Australia. The targets tell us two things. First that 
Canada is admitting approximately twelve times as many refugees as Australia 
when domestic landings are compared, s6 in the context of a much larger overall 
53 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang ( 1996) 185 CLR 259. 
54 This point is treated in more detail in Chapter Five, see pp. 290-291. 
55 This is a legislative requirement in Canada as part of the annual Immigration Plan under s. 7 
of the Immigration Act. In Australia the targets are part of a well established process but are not 
legally required. 
56 The overseas intake programs are much more comparable, with Australia taking in 4000 
refugees and 6000 'other humanitarian' migrants from overseas over the past few years. The 
Canadian figure for 1999 is 7,300 government sponsored and an additional 2, 800 to 3, 200 
privately sponsored. This is strong evidence for Mary Crock's conclusion that "Australia has 
had a substantial overseas program for many years, upon which it has founded its international 
reputation as a caring and generous country." Crock M, Immigration and Refugee Law in 
Australia, Federation Press, Sydney, 1998, at 124. 
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immigration program. 57 Second, that domestic refugee claims are not treated as 
rights claims by either nation. The logic of a target is antithetical to that of a 
rights claim. While both programs do partially reflect a right on behalf of a 
successful claimant not to be returned to danger because the targets can be 
expanded, this is countered both by measures ensuring that it is difficult to get 
to the country in the first place58 and by rhetoric which equates refugee 
admission with the generosity of the nation rather than with its legal 
commitments. 
In Australia, a refugee claim is first assessed by the Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Refugee and Humanitarian Division. 
The applicant submits a written account of their story and is interviewed about 
10% of cases. 59 Approximately 12% of claims are successful at this stage. 60 
57 For some time the annual immigration intake in Canada has been set at roughly 1 % of the 
population whereas in Australia it is presently 0.3% of the population. The national Labour 
opposition party unveiled in February 1999 a plan to significantly increase the migrant intake. 
Whether this policy would survive a speculative Labour election victory is unknown. 
58 Both countries use carrier sanctions to penalise transport companies who bring in people 
without a prearranged right to stay. Australia also employs a universal visa system and makes 
the living circumstances of those awaiting refugee determination miserable (many claimants are 
denied work rights, access to state support was reduced in 1998, and some are put in detention) 
in a high profile effort to discourage refugee claimants. These measures all work to reduce the 
number of people who are in a position to assert this rights claim. A spate of boat arrivals in the 
first months of 1999 prompted calls for improvements to Australia's security net. (e.g. 
O'Connor M, "Forceful Need for Change in Shore Protection" Australian 14 April 1999 at 13; 
Wynhausen E, "Rusty Boats Beat Leaky Security" Australian 12 April 1999 at 1.) In 
September 1999 the Australian government proposed enhancing measures to allow 
confrontation with "boat people" on the high seas. The Crimes at Sea Bill 1999 (Cth) extends 
powers beyond the territorial sea. It has been passed by the House and is now before the 
Senate. The Opposition has given its support in principle which will guarantee its passage. The 
Border Protection Legislation Amendment Bill 1999 (Cth) strengthens a range of sanctions 
against "people smugglers". It has been passed by both houses and awaits the rubber stamp of 
royal assent. 
59 The Department would not confirm this figure in November 1999 and advised me to file a 
Freedom of Information request. I have generously estimated the rate based on conversations 
with refugee law practitioners in Sydney over the course of 1999. The percentage of claimants 
being interviewed is decreasing with increased economic pressures on this and other 
departments. 
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Unsuccessful claimants can seek a merits review before the Refugee Review 
Tribunal (RRT).61 The RRT alters the Department's determination in 
approximately 10% of cases.62 Judicial review ofRRT decisions can be sought 
before the Federal Court and appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court and 
the High Court. Migration cases comprise 65% of the Federal Court's 
administrative law caseload, which is a matter of grave concern to the 
govemment.63 The Minister can replace a negative decision of the RRT with a 
favourable determination at his discretion, a procedure I discuss in detail in 
Chapter Four.64 Very few RRT decisions are reversed by the courts.65 
In Canada, a refugee claim is considered in the first instance by the 
Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD) of the Immigration and 
Refugee Board (IRB), usually on referral by Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada (CIC). Unsuccessful claimants may seek leave to appeal to the Federal 
60 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 1998-99 Annual Report at 
www.immi.gov.au/annual_report/annrep99/htnl. In that year, 985 protection visas were granted 
at this stage from 8,257 applications. 
61 This Tribunal has been in operation since 1993. Its operation is outlined in Part 7 of the 
Migration Act. 
62 This number has been steadily decreasing in recent years: 436 of 5,344 in 1998/99, 451 of 
5,078 in 1997/98, 262 of2,629 (14.7%) in 1996/97, 316 of2,144 (16.3%) in 1995/96. See 
www .rrt.gov .au/finalnyr .html. 
63 Ruddock P, "Narrowing of Judicial Review in the Migration Context" (1997) 15 Australian 
Institute of Administrative Law Forum 13 at 16. The principal concern is that people who are 
not bona fide refugees engage in pointless judicial review and further appeals to prolong their 
stay in Australia. 
64 See pp. 226-232. 
65 In 1997-98 464 RRT cases were reviewed with 20 being set aside by the courts and 54 being 
remitted by consent (RRT Annual Report 1997-98). The government is attempting, for a 
second time, to add a privative clause which will ostensibly strictly limit the role of the Federal 
Court, Migration Legislation (Judicial Review) Bill 1998 (Cth). See Creyke R "Restricting 
Judicial Review" (1997) 15 Australian Institute of Administrative Law Forum 22; Crock M 
"Privative Clauses and the Rule of Law: The Place of Judicial Review within the Construction 
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Court, although this is granted rarely with the result that CRDD decisions were 
set aside in only 1 % of cases between 1994 and 1997. 66 The Minister may also 
seek leave from the Federal Court. Once leave is granted, the Federal Court of 
Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada are also open avenues.67 An 
unsuccessful claimant may also seek to have the provisions of the Immigration 
Act waived on the basis of humanitarian and compassionate considerations.68 In 
some cases, the CRDD will recommend this avenue along with its reasons for 
rejecting a refugee claim. A third option presently available for unsuccessful 
claimants in Canada is to have their circumstances assessed against the criteria 
of the Post-Determination Refugee Claimants in Canada class which provides 
permanent residency for some people in refugee-like situations. 69 
The next section considers the refugee hearing process in Australia and 
Canada as the key site of refugee identity construction. While the RR T and the 
CRDD are not identically placed in the respective refugee determination 
of Australian Democracy" in Kneebone S ( ed) Administrative Law and the Rule of Law: Still 
Part of the Same Package? Australian Institute of Administrative Law, Canberra, 1999, 57. 
66 As reported in the IRB Performance Report 1998, available from the Board's website at 
www .cisr.gc.ca/perform/perform98/perform98e.htm. 
The requirement to seek leave was introduced in 1989 and applies to all IRB decisions, not just 
CRDD decisions. No reasons for refusing leave are given by the court. This provision 
obviously limits the number of immigration cases reaching the Court and curbs the Court's 
influence over the IRB as few decisions are handed down. Australia considered but rejected a 
leave provision to reduce the flow ofrefugee cases to its Federal Court and finds the privative 
clause to be a preferred solution, Ruddock P, "Narrowing of Judicial Review in the Migration 
Context" above n 63 at 20. 
67 The refugee determination processes of Australia and Canada which I have sketched here are 
compared in detail by Charles Sinclair in his Ph.D. dissertation entitled, Who Would Want to Be 
A Refugee?, University of New England, 1995. 
68 This is provided for under s.114(2) and is discussed at length in Chapter Four see pp. 212-
226. 
69 Sees. 11.4 of the Immigration Regulations, 1978. 
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processes, their roles are highly comparable. Each tribunal is responsible for the 
majority of successful refugee determinations in the country, each tribunal 
provides the opportunity for face-to-face contact between the individual 
claimant and the state.70 The tribunals are also similarly situated as being at 
arms length to the government and embody features of the ideology of judicial 
independence. 71 They have similar legal staffs and information gathering 
apparatuses. Finally, the Canadian model was in place when the Australian 
model was established and undoubtedly served as an example, if only a negative 
one. 
2. The Other in the Refugee Tribunals 
Any comparison between the refugee tribunals in Australia and Canada 
will highlight differences between the two forums. While these differences 
draw attention to key facets of the process, I aim to also retain a focus on 
parallels between the two tribunals. This central site for the construction and 
dissection of the refugee as other has important similarities in each nation. 
Those similarities show how this stream of migration law fits within the 
framework of liberal migration laws I have described. By looking at 
similarities, along with some of the divergences, I outline how these tribunals 
carry out an othering function which is at the core of refugee identities. I look 
70 A small number of cases which go before the Australian RRT are resolved "on the papers". 
In 1996-97, 191 of 15, 139 cases or 1.3 % were decided on the papers. A further 25% percent 
ofRRT cases are settled when the claimant fails to attend the hearing. In Canada when a 
claimant does not attend the hearing the claim is deemed abandoned and no decision is made. 
71 This is more prominent in Canada where the IRB is described as a quasi - judicial body with 
the status ofa superior court of record (Mawani N, Speech to the Canadian Bar Association, 
Toronto, 1 March 1997). In Australia the constitutional separation of powers doctrine ensures 
that the tribunal remains firmly located as part of the executive branch of government. This 
affects the strength of the independence of the judiciary ideology in the tribunal setting. 
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in particular at how identity and credibility are intertwined in the process, and at 
what counts as "proof' in these settings. To conclude the analysis, I step back 
from the similarities and consider what refugee othering contributes to an 
understanding of Australia and Canada as nations. 
a. The Elements of a refugee hearing 
A refugee hearing is intensely personal and the stakes are dramatic. The 
claimant tells a story and the ensuing decision determines whether they will be 
allowed to live the rest of their lives in a new and very different place. In 
observing the hearings72 the most challenging task was to remain an observer 
and evaluator rather than becoming completely immersed in the story. The first 
tribunal I saw concluded oral reasons by tritely saying "welcome to Canada and 
best wishes for your life here." The burly, confrontational claimant and I were 
equally surprised to find ourselves weeping. 
Both Australian and Canadian refugee hearings are symbolically charged: 
the nation is on display. The Canadian flag was displayed in each room I saw; in 
Australia the opaque glass which enclosed one wall of each hearing room was 
imprinted with the kangaroo and emu crest. Claimants, and the occasional 
witness, must swear or affirm that they will tell the truth, even though this ritual 
is evidently the barest of formalities as they are frequently disbelieved. 73 The 
hearings are closed to the public, adding to the sense of intimacy and the rooms 
72 To assist in my analysis of the refugee process I observed RRT and CRDD hearings. I 
observed the CRDD in Ottawa, Toronto and Vancouver in June 1997 and April 1998 and saw a 
total of 13 hearings. I observed 8 RRT hearings in Sydney in January 1998. In each case I also 
interviewed the presiding tribunal member (or members in some Canadian cases) and discussed 
the case with the claimants' legal representatives (all the claimants in Canada were represented 
but only one was in Australia). 
73See discussion below at pp. 143-145. 
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are smaller than most courtrooms in either country. At the RR T hearing rooms 
in Sydney, the doors have no handles on the public side. Those waiting to enter 
and tell their stories see only a keyhole. Even when their name is called, they 
cannot enter the room without an escort. The symbolic passage to the nation is 
complete in this one detail. 
Both Tribunals were introduced at times when the nations were facing a 
sharp increase in inland refugee claims and the courts were demanding 
procedural protections for refugee claimants. 74 These opposing pressures 
contribute to hearing systems which strain to meet the divergent objectives of 
their originators. Recalling that legally constructed identities reflect the 
objectives of those who exercise power over the process, these opposing 
pressures lead to tension about refugee identities in the hearing process. The 
refugee hearing occupies a unique place in migration law because its features 
are a poor fit with the dominant paradigm of liberal legalism. Hearings are held 
in camera in both countries to accommodate the personal stories and the 
vulnerabilities of genuine claimants. For this reason they are immunised from 
the ideological need for justice to be seen to be done. One unintended result is 
to remove claimants from the procedural protections which visibility provides 
and to protect the hearing from scrutiny, which is therefore reserved for the 
written reasons.75 The crucial process for construction of refugee identity is 
hidden from view. While the goals this achieves are vital and to conduct 
hearings in public would lose more than it would gain, it does facilitate public 
74 The role of the courts in establishing these "rights" is taken up in Chapter 5 at pp. 280-286. 
75 See below at pp. 151-153. 
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misunderstanding of the process and provide imaginative scope for speculation 
about the content and meaning of refugee identity. It facilitates the other 
remaining unknown. 
The hearing is in both instances designed to be non-adversarial. In 
Canada this aim is reflected in the roles assigned to people in the room: the case 
is led by a Refugee Case Officer (RC0)76 who does not "prosecute" the case but 
assists the tribunal by selecting issues to be explored and questioning the 
claimant.77 In the model, the tribunal is constituted by two members and the 
claimant need only convince one.78 The hearing is not conducted as though the 
claimant has a case to meet. Rather, the claimant, who is in most cases 
represented by counsel, 79 takes the lead in the hearing, with the Refugee Case 
Officer joining the proceedings later if necessary. Most Tribunal members play 
an active role in the hearings through establishing an agenda in a pre-hearing 
conference and through active questioning during the hearing. In Vancouver, 
76 Formerly Refugee Hearing Officer. 
77 The role and behaviour of Refugee Hearing Officers is one of the principal topics of James 
Hathaway's Rebuilding Trust: Report of the Review of Fundamental Justice in Information 
Gathering and Dissemination at the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, submitted to 
the Chair of the IRB, Ottawa, December 1993, a report which was commissioned to address 
concerns of inappropriate behaviour Refugee Hearing Officer practices and information 
gathering practices at the IRB. Practice in the CRDD has altered since this report and in my 
observations significant improvements along the lines Hathaway recommended have been 
made. 
78 The CRDD is moving away from this format. Many hearings are now led by only one 
member. However, this can presently only be done with the consent of the claimant. Most 
claimants do consent as their lawyers advise them at the members rarely differ in their opinions 
(Four claimants lawyers I spoke to at the CRDD in April 1998 estimated that is happens in only 
approximately 5% of cases.). 
79 Cuts in legal aid funding have had an effect on the number of claimants who are represented. 
The hearing system in Canada was devised with the presumption that the majority of claimants 
would be represented and alterations to adjust to the change had not taken place when I was 
observing the hearings in 1997 and 1998. I did not see any non-represented claimants despite 
choosing hearings to observe randomly and frequently moving at the last minute to 
accommodate no shows and procedural delays. 
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the layout of the hearing rooms deliberately differs from that of a court, with the 
Refugee Case Officer facing the interpreter, not the opposing party.80 These 
efforts to move away from the adversarial model, to reflect both the informality 
and efficiency values of the tribunal and the fact that the claimant is not on trial, 
are only moderately successful in meeting that goal. Since lawyers represent 
most claimants, and many tribunal members are legally trained, implicit norms 
of the adversarial system do tend to dominate the proceedings. 81 I only once 
saw a Refugee Case Officer sum up a case in a way favourable to the claimant, a 
move which was surprising after the other hearings I had seen and which the 
claimant's lawyer said was almost unheard of. 82 
The Australian hearings have moved further from the adversarial model. 
The tribunal is constituted by one member and the hearing proceeds through the 
member putting questions to the claimant. Even when the claimant has a legal 
representative, 83 that person has no formal role in the hearing and can only 
address the tribunal if invited to do so. Most hearings proceed with only three 
80 This is not the case in Toronto and Ottawa. I am not familiar with hearing room structures in 
Montreal, Calgary and Halifax. 
81 In Rebuilding Trust, above n 77, James Hathaway argues that refugee hearings in the CRDD 
achieve a non-adversarial format. I agree that the potential for this is provided but in the 
hearings I observed it was only occasionally achieved. One reason for the difference may be 
the changes in procedure, e.g. more applications are now dealt with in the expedited procedure 
so I would have seen a great proportion of claims regarded as containing difficult issues to 
resolve. 
82 CRDD Hearing in Toronto, 17 April 1998. 
83 In 1996-97, 5 8. 79% of claimants before the RR T had an "advisor" on the record (statistic 
generated at my request from the RRT database). At the RRT the term advisor can mean 
anyone, even a friend, who is assisting with the application. No statistics are kept on how many 
advisers actually attend the hearings, but tribunal members and refugee lawyers suggested in 
interviews that often the advisor would not attend the hearing as it was time consuming and 
therefore expensive for the client and their potential role in the hearing process was minimal. 
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voices in the room, the sitting member, the claimant and the interpreter. The 
Hearing Officer is a member of the administrative staff who starts the tape-
recorder and swears in the claimant (and any others who may give evidence), 
then leaves the room. Their role is in no way parallel to the Canadian RCO. As 
with the CRDD, some RRT members have legal training and others do not. The 
hearing is a very private setting and the personal style of the member greatly 
influences how the event proceeds. Accordingly, whether that person is legally 
trained or not is likely the biggest factor in determining the extent to which the 
values of the adversarial system influence the hearing. Australian tribunal 
members receive far less initial and on-going training than their Canadian 
counterparts and never work as a team in the hearing room. 84 After I had 
observed eight different hearings and procedural matters in several others, one 
senior member commented that I had seen more of his colleagues at work than 
any of them had. The Australian hearing is designed to follow an inquisitorial 
process, but even those who are legally trained would not likely have training in 
the procedural mechanisms of the inquisitorial process. 
84 When new members join the RRT, the undergo a 5 day training period. This training includes 
an introduction to the Tribunal's role and function, an introduction to administrative 
arrangements, session on different aspects of the refugee definition, instructions on managing 
caseload and writing reasons. New members also observe two or three hearings before 
beginning their own. The receive regular written updates on legal developments and meet to 
discuss important cases from the Federal Court or the High Court. New members of the CRDD 
begin with a two week training period covering similar materials. in addition they complete 
session on job specific topics such as "weighing the evidence" and "assessing 
credibility"( copies of these training modules are on file with the writer). For the first six 
months of their tenure they sit as the second member in their hearings (this norm will likely 
change as more hearings are convened by single members). They also receive regular updates 
on legal developments. The IRB has a training department and offers on-going training 
modules for all tribunal members. A proportion of these sessions are tailored for CRDD 
members. 
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One reason for moving away from the adversarial format is to make the 
hearing less onerous for the applicant. 85 Hathaway points out that when the 
purpose of the hearing is conceived as being to assist the nation in meeting its 
legal obligations, there are no adversaries.86 The hearing could be conceived 
this way in Canada but often seems not to be. In Australia, the RRT is a review 
tribunal. Accordingly, the refugee claimant is confronting the state which has 
already rejected her. This adversarial structure element is tempered, however, 
by the fact that the state does not send a representative to the hearing, only 
written reasons. Concerns over abuse of the refugee process are widespread in 
the popular discourse of both nations, belying the non-adversarial vision. 87 
While a classic adversarial process is impossible in the tribunal setting, the 
difficulties of jettisoning it point to the overall complexity of refugee 
determination. The extent to which a non-adversarial process is achieved 
depends in part on the tone set by the individuals in the room, rather than on any 
difference in the Australian and Canadian formats. As well, judicial review of 
tribunal decisions plays a role in constraining procedure. 88 Here there is more 
85 Although it is notable that many tribunals have abandoned aspects of the formal adversarial 
process, such as the rules of evidence, in the name of cost and time efficiency. 
86 Hathaway J, Rebuilding Trust above n 77 at 6. 
87 Examples of this concern in Australia can be found in articles such as Toohey P, "A Roo 
Shooter and his Ute Hold the Line Against Illegals", Australian 13-14 November 1999 at 1; 
O'Brien N and Green P, "Boat People Influx a Matter of Crime", Australian 17 August 1999 at 
4; Saunders Mand Toohey P "Human Cargo, Return to Sender", Australian at 1, 12 November 
1999; McGregor R, Hardline Staunches Refugee Tide" Australian 20 January 1999 at 5. For 
Canadian examples see Bronskill J, "Thousands of People Smuggled into Canada", Vancouver 
Sun 25 August 1998; Jiminez M, "Report Identified Litany of Problems at Refugee Board", 
National Post 9 November 1998; Norris A, "Fast Track for Refugees Probed: Mounties Raid 
City Office ofIRB Official Montreal Gazette, 25 November 1998; Godfrey T, "Terrorists Sneak 
in as Refugees'', Ottawa Sun, 1 February 1999. 
88 Av Veterans' Review Board (1995) 38 ALO 315 which indicates the need for tribunals to 
adhere to tenets of fair process. 
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room for divergence between the two systems. 89 That is, while the Australian 
system is formally less adversarial because it takes the form of a conversation 
between member and claimant, it is not necessarily less of an ordeal for the 
claimant. 
Moving away from the adversarial format is problematic when the hearing 
is set within a legal paradigm which relies on the adversarial system to protect 
the interests of the individual and to ensure fair process. While the adversarial 
system is not the only measure of fairness,90 Australian and Canadian notions of 
what constitutes a fair hearing and of the extent to which an adjudicator is 
responsible for assisting someone appearing before them have been honed in a 
system presuming professional representation. Thus the federal court decisions 
which build the parameters for the Tribunals' actions assume the adversarial 
norms. While the RRT member is correct in saying to a claimant, "I am not 
responsible for making your case for you,"91 there is equally no one else who is 
responsible for assisting the claimant in making a case. In the CRDD hearings I 
saw, the "redirect" portion of the hearing often introduced new information or 
successfully clarified concerns evident in the Tribunal's questions which would 
be apparent to those familiar with refugee law. Although concerns are put to 
the claimants in the less structured RRT process, those whom I observed were 
not able to address them with the skill of a trained advocate. As well, RRT 
89 See below at pp. 279-296. 
90 In Australia the courts have explicitly held that fairness will vary with each setting: Mobil Oil 
Pty Ltdv Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 113 CLR 475. 
91 This statement was made in a hearing I observed and follows the Federal Court decision in 
Xiang Sheng Liv RRT, 23 August 1996, Sackville J.(unreported). 
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members differed in how they pointed out concerns; some made direct reference 
to legal points, others were less precise so that only someone with a knowledge 
of refugee law could interpret their true concerns. Judges in a civil law system 
receive specialist training for their inquisitorial role, but the common law norm 
is that good advocates become good judges because the truth of any matter is 
honed through the clash of informed adversaries. When this norm is taken 
away, as in the refugee hearings, the values and norms of the inquisitorial 
system do not simply flow in to take its place. The adversarial system remains 
the operating background norm. The Canadian Federal Court has done more 
than the Australian to alter this in its scrutiny of tribunal procedure.92 In both 
instances, hearing format shapes the interaction between the outsider and the 
state and influences how the identity of each will be forged in their interaction. 
The central role of the tribunal member in setting the tone for the hearing, 
especially in Australia, draws attention to another way that identity is 
constructed and played out in the hearing room. The member's identity is also 
constructed in this setting - although, significantly, this is an identity the 
individual chooses, rather than one to which they are assigned. Those who 
comprise the tribunals are very similar in both countries. Members are selected 
from among lawyers, bureaucrats and NGO members who have experience with 
refugees and refugee issues.93 Most tribunal members come to the job with a 
92 See below at pp. 149-50. 
93 CRDD members are appointed by the Governor in Council under s. 59 of the Immigration 
Act. An independent Ministerial Advisory Committee (comprised of members of the NGO and 
legal communities) was created in 1995 to advise on appointments. RRT members are 
appointed by the Governor-General under s. 459 of the Migration Act. In practice they are 
selected by a committee including the Minister of Immigration. 
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high degree of personal commitment to assisting refugees. The identity of the 
tribunal member emerges through the matrix of personal and role expectations 
in the setting, fitting within the social psychology framework Turner describes.94 
That is, they categorise themselves as members of the "group" and follow group 
norms. What a tribunal member believes about her role in this setting 
influences her approach to the hearing and, ultimately, her ruling.95 As Minow 
and Bellow argue, when legal workers engage with a particular problem they 
experience shifts in the way they are seen by others, such as the claimants, and 
the way they perceive themselves.96 These factors mean there are important 
differences in the way self-identifications of tribunal members affect Australian 
and Canadian processes. 
There is less variation in the self-perception of roles by CRDD members 
because of their greater level of training and because of the greater number of 
people in the room. The training provides each member, directly and indirectly, 
with more information about how tribunal should act. These norms of 
behaviour are constructed and reinforced by working side by side with a 
colleague and by conducting a hearing with a Refugee Case Officer and a 
lawyer representing the claimant. These two factors mean that norms of 
behaviour and of self-identifications are likely to vary less in Canada, and 
certainly the behaviour of the tribunal members I observed displayed less 
variation in Canada. This will probably change as the CRDD moves to single 
94 See Chapter Two at pp. 45-53. 
95 See discussion in Chapter 2 at pp. 36-38. 
96 Minow Mand Bellow G, "Introduction" in Law Stories, University of Michigan Press, Ann 
Arbour, 1996 at 3; see also Chapter Two at pp. 36-38. 
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member hearings. Having tribunal members do the same things in the same 
way promotes one view of fairness. While fairness is not the only value of 
importance in the tribunals and sameness is not the only path to achieving it, 
fairness is a crucial part of the rationale for providing a hearing and sameness is 
one of the easier fairness indicators to provide. The rationale for attempting to 
do this in a setting where little else can be standardised is strong. 
The multiple players in the CRDD hearings mean that the identities at 
play can be divided into professional and claimant: insiders and outsiders: 
nation and other. For the Members, the Refugee Case Officers and the 
lawyers,97 the hearing is a professional pursuit. It is one hearing among many 
and their personal stake in it is low. Many of these individuals know each other 
from earlier hearings and know that their paths will cross again, and of course 
the Tribunal members and the Refugee Case Officers work in the same office. 98 
They chat informally during hearing breaks and have more in common with 
each other than with the claimant. This is true even for the claimant's lawyer. 
The collegiality which we could characterise as the sign of a good working 
relationship makes the demarcation between members and others particularly 
obvious. The claimant is an outsider to the nation necessarily, and in the 
hearing room this is underscored by their exclusion from the friendly banter and 
the professional courtesies. This insider-outsider demarcation is enhanced by 
97 Interpreters are not involved in this group to the same extent. This could be because they are 
often seen by the others as an extension of the claimant herself. Interpreters are often members 
of the same cultural community as the claimant which may account for this difference to some 
extent. Also, interpreters share a level of communication with claimants which is impossible 
for the others. During breaks in the hearings, I often saw interpreters talking with the claimants. 
98 Inappropriate informal contact between CRDD members and Refugee Hearing Officers was 
one of the key concerns investigated in Rebuilding Trust, above n 77. 
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the informality of the hearing room and the non-adversarial features which 
allow the common interests and common enterprise of the professionals to be 
evident, as opposed to a court where formality fixes roles. What the tribunal 
hears of the claimant is mediated not only by interpretation99 but also by the 
questions and analyses of the Refugee Case Officer and the lawyer. These 
people strongly influence how the individual claimant's identity is constructed 
and to what purpose. 
The structuring of the story by professionals is not so apparent in the 
Australian hearings. In the RRT the contact between tribunal and the claimant 
is more intimate, mediated only by interpretation, which fades into the 
background as the hearing progresses. While the tribunal member is part of a 
professional team within her working environment, in the hearing room she, like 
the claimant, is alone. There are fewer legal advisers in the RRT and their role 
is markedly more limited than in the CRDD. Accordingly, the opportunities for 
familiarity and collegiality are minimised. These factors contribute to the 
heightened intimacy of the Australian hearing process. The hearing unfolds as a 
long conversation between Member and claimant. The distancing devices, such 
as questions and directions of others, which map out the boundary between the 
two identities are minimal. This, in combination with the other factors making 
the RRT member's identity more flexible, means the Australian process is more 
open to the intertwining of identities which can potentially produce either 
empathy or bias. The boundary between the nation's representative and the 
outer-outsider is more malleable in this model than in the Canadian. There are 
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more opportunities for renegotiation of identities by both parties. The othering 
of the claimant is less obvious in the hearing room as there are fewer 
interventions guiding the story and the hearing proceeds often seamlessly, 
without the law's endless procedural interruptions. There is strong potential in 
this setting to move beyond or through an "insider" and "outsider" formulation 
and to escape the legal strictures which many argue are inappropriate in refugee 
hearings. However, this is largely untapped because of other factors shaping 
tribunal members' identity, because the process operates in the shadow of the 
law100 and because of the influence ofreview by the Federal Court. 
The most significant influence on the identity ofRRT members is that of 
the institutional culture. The Principal Member remarked that he would have 
absolutely no way to influence the decisions made by individual members 
because of their uniformly high level of independence. 101 This independence and 
personal commitment is part of the institutional culture, as is the knowledge that 
each claim under review has already been rejected by the Department and 
various pressures to keep the "set aside rate" down. 102 Tribunal members work 
99 Not all claimants use interpreters but most do. 
100 This phrase is well known in literature on alternative dispute resolution. I first read it in 
Mnookin R and Kornhauser L, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce" 
(1979) 88 Yale Law Journal 950. 
101 Interview with former Principal Member Shun Chetty, January 1998. 
102 Some pressure on the tribunal comes from the current climate of hostility towards refugee 
claimants and concern over rising levels of claims which is now frequently reported in the 
mainstream press. Some pressure is also generated directly by the current Minister's hostility 
towards inland claimants (see above n 40 and n 41 ). In 1997 the Minister publicly stated that 
Tribunal members who set aside too many of his Department's decisions would not have their 
terms renewed Steketee M, "Tribunal Defends Refugees' Status'', Australian 6 February 1997 
at 2. This threat appears to have been carried out, according to my discussions with two former 
Tribunal members. 
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in a setting where 90% of the claims they hear are determined to be invalid. 103 
This rate alone contributes to a view of tribunal member as a gatekeeper who 
must work to ensure that the correct determinations are made so that the entire 
inland refugee determination system is not ground to a political halt. The low 
set aside rate and the intimacy of the hearing where so much is dependent on the 
member herself, means that the RR T members work in a more stressful 
environment than CRDD members. 104 Their identities as tribunal members are 
also shaped by this stress. The RRT member's self-perception, shaped by these 
factors, is in tum the greatest influence on the tenor and outcome of the hearing 
in a system where there are so few players in the hearing room and such 
minimal training for members. 
Attention to the identities in the hearing room demonstrates how many of 
the differences between the two systems can be explained by considering the 
construction of the Tribunal member's identity. This identity is key to the 
process when legal norms are put aside as inappropriate or unworkable and the 
Tribunal member stands in the place of the nation sizing up the other. The 
informality of the refugee hearing serves to make the identities involved in the 
hearing more malleable. While identity-based critiques of law point to the 
malleable and negotiated qualities of all legally constructed identities, these 
features are particularly important in these settings. The tribunal and the 
claimant come face to face in the hearing room and their interaction creates an 
103 See above n 60. 
104 Several RRT members commented on this in interviews in December 1997, Melbourne, and 
in January 1998, Sydney, particularly in light of the Minister's criticisms of the Tribunal for 
accepting too many claims. 
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image of the boundary of the nation. This construction is aided by the strong 
symbolism of the hearing context and the way the adversarial system becomes a 
hidden background norm to the process. In this setting, the identity of the 
individual is tested against that of the refugee category. 
b. The Central Issues: Identity and Credibility 
In a refugee determination hearing there are two central issues: identity 
and credibility. They are necessarily intertwined. By the time a claimant gets to 
a hearing, they are usually telling a story which fits within the refugee definition 
because in Canada they likely have a lawyer and in Australia they have already 
been through the Departmental process. The Tribunal is then faced with 
determining whether this person is who they say they are and whether the story 
is true. Is this person a Kenyan posing as a Somali? Was he really a member of 
the Mujahadeen? How are divorced women treated in Liberia? What needs to 
be proved and how it may be proven is markedly different in a refugee 
determination tribunal than in a courtroom setting. Proving identity and 
assessing credibility raise problems which deepen our understanding of the role 
of identity in refugee hearings and offer further insights into the encounter of the 
refugee claimant with the background norms of the nation and with the fitted 
form of the refugee definition. 
The basic issue of identifying oneself is the starting point of a successful 
refugee claim. For most of us, proving our identities is done through 
documents; passports, birth certificates, drivers' licences. Our identity is 
genuine because it is certified and numbered by the state. These foundations for 
identity are destabilised in a refugee claim in several ways. Many people arrive 
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to seek refuge without documentation and are then faced with establishing their 
identity in other ways. These claimants pose a profound challenge to the 
refugee determination system as a core assumption of this and all other legal 
processes is a reliance on knowing who is the person standing before the 
tribunal. One's own account of self is not sufficient - a truth that most of us are 
spared confronting. Personal identity in this border-crossing scenario is about 
ties to a particular state, about membership in a given community, about 
belonging somewhere. As my framework of analysis suggests, these border 
crossing scenarios are where the group identity brought to the fore is national 
identity. Without documentation an individual's account of their identity is left 
to be assessed along with all other aspects of the story. The problem of 
undocumented arrivals is extensive105 and the 1999 proposals to reform the 
Canadian immigration legislation aim to increase incentives to cooperate in the 
government's efforts to "establish one's identity" through increased security 
measure and detention for "claimants who refuse to cooperate" .106 
Even when claimants arrive with some documentary evidence of their 
identity, it is often not the piece of paper that we as Australians or Canadians are 
expecting. Claimants arrive with military service records or baptismal 
certificates, only some of which are we have the capacity to conclusively decide 
105"More than half of refugee claimants do not present a passport or other legitimate travel 
document at the time they claim status. The majority of these claimants do not have any other 
identification." Building On a Strong Foundation For the 21st Century: New Directions for 
Immigration and Refugee Policy and Legislation Supply and Services Canada, Hull Canada, 
1999, Chapter 11 at webpage 3. (available on the Departmental Website at cicnet.ci.gc.ca). 
Given Australia's universal visa requirement, the problem is transformed into one of false 
documents or documents destroy en route. For one example see McGregor R, "Visa Officials in 
a Pickle Over Dodgy Documents", Australian, 8 December 1997, at 6. 
106 Ibid., Ch 12 at Webpage 3. 
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the authenticity. A considerable number of claimants arrive with admittedly 
false documents, a necessary result of the now almost universal carrier sanction 
program which requires that transport companies must ensure all those boarding 
have appropriate travel documents or face heavy fines for non-compliance.107 
The array of documents from around the world which may be presented as proof 
of identity in the refugee process jars against the standard practices of legal 
systems which generally operate on the basis of narrowly defined rules about 
what kinds of documents, under what sorts of circumstances, will be viewed as 
authoritative. 
The question of what oral evidence we can give of ourselves has been 
addressed in various ways in the Tribunals. I have seen Tribunals set up 
language tests to differentiate ethnic Albanians from Kosovar Serbs and quiz 
Somali claimants about the founding myths of their people. Claimants who 
assert identity with a particular religion are often asked about articles of their 
faith. 108 In Canadian hearings, which are more standardised, the "identity test" is 
often the first phase of the hearing. To begin, the claimant must have a known 
and stable identity, a starting point label, as without this the other issues do not 
matter. The stakes are high in the refugee hearing, as are the incentives to lie.109 
107 Migration Act s. 229 provides that carriage of non-citizens to Australia without 
documentation carries a penalty ofup to $10 000, plus the cost ofreturning the person. Under 
the Canadian Act the penalty is up to $10,000 for a first offence and up to $50,000 for 
subsequent offence; Immigration Act s. 97 .1. 
108 One Jewish lawyer who had represented many Jewish claimants from the former Soviet Bloc 
stated that he always tested his client's bona fides and was most suspicious of those who knew 
all the answers, as if they were making a studied presentation. This observation underscores 
that credibility is a fine line in all these sorts of "identity tests". 
109 There are a large number of people who may simply be said to 'feel they are refugees.' They 
want to escape situations where they are impoverished, oppressed, threatened by violence. 
They know that rich nations like Australia and Canada sometimes help people in misery. They 
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This original identity is a prerequisite to the refugee identity. Those with 
identity documents which are suspect are asked to give an account of how they 
obtained the documents and why the state would agree to provide them. Letters 
addressed to the claimant at the address they are fleeing are useful evidence, 
particularly if they are written in the "correct" language. 
Proving identity often places the refugee claimant in an unresolvable 
dilemma. For many claimants obtaining identity documents from the state they 
are leaving is difficult or impossible. On the other hand, to travel to somewhere 
as distant as Australia or Canada, some sort of documentation is necessary .110 
The incentives for genuine refugees to use falsified documents are high. In 
order to get into the position to make a refugee claim based on truthful evidence, 
one must tell some sort of lie along the way. To give a coherent account of 
one's identity that lie must be revealed, in a story which gives a full account of 
the lie. The false and the true identities are both an essential part of the refugee 
identity. The challenge for both the claimant and the decision-maker is not to 
see that life in one of these places is much easier than the life they have come from, and so they 
claim refugee status. The dissonance between the popular understanding of 'refugee' and the 
formal legal definition may account for what politicians refer to a abuse of the system. Most 
people seeking refuge from horrible life circumstances are not, legally, refugees, but may 
genuinely identify as refugees. Patricia Tuitt takes the provocative approach of considering all 
who seek refuge in a wide variety of circumstances as refugees and begins her analysis of 
refugee law by considering the vast number of refugees whose lives the law does not affect. 
From this starting point she inevitably concludes that "refugee law is at the margin of most 
refugees' lives ... " Tuitt P, above n 9 at 23. 
110 Except in the comparatively rare cases of boat arrivals in Australia, of which there had been 
only 3030 from 1989 to the end of 1998 (Department oflmmigration and Multicultural Affairs 
"Key Facts in Immigration", available at the Departmental Website www.immi.gov.au/facts). 
In 1999 a marked increase in boat arrivals, and the government's response to them, sparked a 
national panic in Australia. The results of this are not yet know. As of 18 November 1999, 
1,671 people have arrived by boat in 1999. See discussion in Chapter Six. It is possible to 
come from the United States into Canada without documentation but some documents would 
have been necessary to reach the U.S. originally. 
142 
trip over the lines between the two. 111 Both false and true identities, however, 
are intertwined in the "genuine refugee" identity as the need for a false identity 
enhances the likelihood of meeting the refugee identity threshold. 
The story of identity in the refugee hearing is one part of the broader 
analysis of how the Tribunals decide whether to believe a claimant. The 
common law's ways of knowing are foreign to this setting. There are usually no 
witnesses to the story being told. The claimant's narrative is the key to the 
outcome. The formal rules of evidence are obviously unworkable in these 
settings and are inapplicable. 112 But it remains important to consider the values 
these rules represent, what is traded away for that necessary efficiency, and how 
the hearings are overshadowed by the absent evidence rules. However 
idiosyncratic those rules may be, they do represent an agreed upon code for 
accepting that certain things are true or known. Part of that code involves 
asking anyone giving testimony to swear an oath to tell the truth. This ritual is 
striking as each hearing room contains an assortment of holy books so that one 
may swear on the culturally appropriate symbol. Alternatively claimants and 
witnesses may simply swear to tell the truth. The contents of the oath do not 
change with the religion chosen, and no one I spoke to at the Tribunals could 
"
1 In one hearing I observed, the Tribunal was troubled by the Swedish passport the claimant 
had arrived in Canada with. Discussion for more than one hour turned on the extent of the 
claimant's ability to speak Swedish, as the gate agent (under the incentive of carrier sanctions) 
had signed an affidavit saying the claimant was Swedish speaking but the claimant stated he had 
merely memorised a few phrases to go with his fake passport. No one in the hearing room 
could speak Swedish and the claimant's lawyer asked that the gate agent be made available for 
questioning about his or her own Swedish skills and the extend of the interview. While the 
Tribunal refused and asserted that nothing turned on this point, the extent of questioning belied 
that. 
112 This is provided for in the Australian Migration Act subs. 420(2) and the Canadian 
Immigration Act subs. 68(1). 
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confirm that this form of oath swearing plays the same role in Muslim or Jewish 
cultures as it does in Christian ones. The assumption that a religious oath has 
the same function in any religion requires a more thorough examination. This 
serves as a symbol of how inadequate our interpretations of the other are in this 
setting. It also demonstrates how the evidence code - in which the belief that 
we are bound to tell the truth because we have sworn an oath is anchored -
injects values into the process even though rules of evidence need not be 
followed. 
Even beyond the narrow technicalities of the law of evidence, most of that 
code cannot be applied in a setting where the adversarial format has been set 
aside and the only witness is the claimant. The ideological foundation of the 
adversarial system - that the best way to the truth is through equal adversaries 
arguing from positions of self-interest - is absent in this setting.113 While the 
flaws in that ideology are easy to point to, no equally persuasive account of the 
pursuit of truth in legal settings has yet captured the common law imagination. 
The crucible of cross-examination, while available in modified form in refugee 
hearings, is inappropriate for those who have been persecuted and sometimes 
tortured and interrogated by states with little respect for human rights. 
Credibility assessments are further complicated by the use of interpreters and by 
cross-cultural communication. 
Given this setting, particular techniques of proof have evolved for the 
refugee hearing. The dominant among these is extensive reliance on 
independently gathered documentary evidence of conditions in the countries that 
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refugees are fleeing. The RR T maintains a library of selected documents and 
has a fulltime staff of 10 who work on preparing country reports and responding 
to Members' queries. The Immigration and Refugee Board's Documentation 
and Information Research Centre is considerably more sophisticated. There are 
twenty full-time staff involved in the Research Program in the Ottawa 
headquarters and an additional fifteen positions among the other offices. 114 The 
Documentation Centre works to an annual research agenda which is fine-tuned 
at monthly meetings, and also deals with specific member's requests. Both 
Tribunals rely on information gathered by newspapers, by NGOs - especially 
those concerned with human rights issues such as Amnesty International, by 
their own government's diplomats, and by other governmental sources, such as 
the annual reports of the United States' State Department. The Australian 
Tribunal draws on the resources of the highly-regarded Canadian IRB 
Documentation Centre. 
The availability of this "country information" allows the Tribunal to 
assess the claimant's story against independently gathered information. It also 
allows the Tribunal to accept certain "facts" without evidence provided by the 
claimant. This documentary evidence is central to Tribunal proceedings in both 
countries and gives the hearings a character unique from other hearings in these 
legal systems. While much of this documentary evidence would not necessarily 
be accepted for proof of fact in an Australian or Canadian court, it has 
authoritative weight in the refugee hearing. Hathaway noted in 1993 that in the 
113 The rules of evidence are absent in many administrative tribunals. However the shadow they 
cast over tribunal operation varies with each setting. 
114 Interview with Graham Howell, Director of the Documentation Centre, June 1997. 
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CRDD " ... nearly any piece of documentary evidence adduced has been 
received" 115 despite the Tribunal's discretion to exclude documents if they are 
not deemed to be credible or trustworthy .116 The principal technique of proof is 
to assess the claimant's narrative against the situation described in the 
documents. Tribunal members are aware that circumstances can change 
quickly, and claimants are encouraged to bring recent news clippings with 
them. 117 Newspaper clippings and NGO reports have a greater authority in this 
setting as the situations they describe are remote from the experience and the 
imagination of Australians and Canadians. They provide an alternative avenue 
to truth which a Tribunal member can then try to fit within the claimant's story. 
Reliance on these types of documentary sources to measure credibility 
adds a measure of objectivity to the process, and the process is enriched and 
improved by the use of information from other sources.118 However, in the 
context of a refugee hearing where oral evidence, even when it is delivered in a 
way that fits with Western stereotypes ofreliability,119 describes situations 
115 Hathaway J, above n 77 at 22. 
116 Subs. 68(2). The possibility of excluding documents on this basis is an example of the 
shadow which the law of evidence casts over the process despite being formally banished. 
117 I observed this in several Canadian hearings and Susan Kneebone reports that claimants do 
also bring their own documentary country evidence to their Australian hearings to challenge 
their rejection at the Departmental stage; Kneebone S, "The Refugee Tribunal and the 
Assessment of Credibility: an Inquisitorial Role" (1998) 5 Australian Journal of Administrative 
Law78. 
118 This technique of credibility assessment by document analysis is strengthened by the practice 
in both Tribunals of having members specialise in claims from a given country or region. This 
allows a member to become familiar with the types of issues raised, with the range of 
documentary evidence available, and with the demeanour of claimants from that region giving 
evidence. All these factors can assist in overcoming the problems posed in assessing credibility. 
119 Several Canadian refugee lawyers commented that they viewed their key role as preparing 
their client to tell their story in an acceptable way for the Canadian hearing context. 
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which are literally unimaginable, recourse to anything at all that is published 
takes on heightened importance. While CRDD members in particular are given 
considerable training in weighing evidence from diverse sources, 120 there is 
often only one source available and so this balancing act cannot be performed. 
Discussing an observation I had conducted, one CRDD Member commented 
that the Amnesty International Report had been his primary source of 
information in preparing for the hearing. When I then questioned him about 
another Amnesty International report condemning the Canadian refugee 
determination process, he rejected it as completely unfounded. My point is not 
to pillory one individual's reasoning, but to suggest that our acceptance of these 
documentary sources often depends on other sources of personal knowledge, 
which may be missing in the refugee hearing. The context is such that there will 
almost always be holes in the evidence and a decision about credibility will 
frequently involve a leap of faith which cannot be filled with newspaper reports 
of human rights abuses.121 
Among documentary evidence, some sources are more reliable than 
others. Some refugee lawyers I interviewed in Australia asserted that the RRT 
placed an undue reliance on the information provided by the Australian 
120 Weighing evidence and assessing credibility are identified as separate training issues for the 
initial training of members. The Legal Services Branch of the IRB has produced separate 
reports on "Assessment of Credibility in the Context ofCRDD Hearings" (39 pages), "Weighing 
Evidence" (50 pages) and "Commentary on Undocumented and Improperly Documented 
Claimants: Assessing the Evidence, Enhancing Procedures" (30 pages) to be used in initial and 
on-going training. 
121 In the recent high profile Australian case of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21, the RRT rejected the claimant's account of political 
persecution in part because there was no available newspaper account of a key event he 
described. 
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Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.122 Of course, that alone does not pose 
a problem. What is more problematic is the location of the tribunal as part of 
the executive which generates that particular information. It is impossible to see 
if there is any political pressure on the Tribunal to accept DF A T's "word" but 
such pressure is not inconceivable in the current climate. The influence of 
DF AT information is also likely to be enhanced by scanty training in assessing 
evidence. A further Australian issue in the information stakes is that the RRT's 
information gathering resources are not available to the public. While claimants 
in Canada can access the resources of the Documentation Centre, 123 this is not 
the case in Australia and pre-hearing disclosure of information obtained varies 
from member to member. 124 Adverse information must be put to the claimant at 
the hearing but the inaccessibility of the documents gathered by the RRT means 
the claimant must discover documents on their own if they wish to present them. 
As there is frequently little else to assess beyond the claimant's oral 
evidence and the documents, 125 Tribunal members test the claimant's evidence 
122 My own examination of the High Court files in the Applicant A case confinn that this source 
is highly regarded. The stack of documents concerning the application of the one child policy in 
China was approximately 30 ems high and included reports from academics and NGOs. The 
DF AT infonnation totalled approximately 10 pages, but it was the DF AT version of the policy 
which was taken up by the RRT and hence by the High Court. In reviewing RRT and CRDD 
reasons (see below pp. 151-163) I found that DFAT infonnation was referred to in each case I 
examined and was frequently cited extensively. Although the parallel source ofinfonnation is 
available to the CRDD (that is, infonnation supplied by the Canadian Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade), it was not referred to in any case I reviewed or hearing I 
observed. 
123 Although unlike members, claimants cannot lodge specific requests for infonnation. 
124 Kneebone S, above n 117 at 17 and 21. An applicant may request that the RRT call certain 
witnesses, but the Tribunal retains discretion to refuse the request (s.426). 
125 There are some members of both Tribunals who have experience living in the regions which 
are producing refugees which aids in credibility assessment at one level. However, it is difficult 
for these members to express what this experience adds to the process in a manner which is 
acceptable on judicial review. 
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against their own earlier written accounts and look for inconsistencies in the 
stories. Overzealous use of these techniques is discouraged for good reason by 
the respective Federal Courts126 but they persist in varying forms. This is firstly 
because this way of seeking the truth is so ingrained in our culture that it does 
not need the support of the ideology of cross-examination and is instead a 
grounding for it. We believe people who tell us the same thing over and over, 
no matter who asks them and how they word the question. Secondly, even if the 
tribunal can be partially non-adversarial, it nonetheless must find the facts and 
state which facts it believes. These "found facts" are then treated by reviewing 
courts as the facts generated by any other tribunal or court of first instance. 
Through a trick of the law, what is acknowledged as unknowable or only 
partially believed based on the work of a NGO or government report becomes a 
firm fact to carry forward. The fragility of the truths which the tribunals 
confront disappears at the instance of judicial review. 
The review of the courts ensures that the rules of evidence cast a long 
shadow over tribunal procedures. While the evidence rules are banished, their 
126 Discussing the Federal Court jurisprudence on point the IRB Manual Assessment of 
Credibility in the Context ofCRDD Hearings (1996) states at 30: 
The Court has cautioned the Board that it should not display excessive zeal in an attempt to find 
contradictions in the claimant's testimony. In Attakora ((1989), 99 National Reports 168 
(F.C.A.)), the Court of Appeal recognised that, while Members have a difficult task when 
assessing credibility, the Board "should not be over-vigilant in its microscopic examination of 
persons who ... testify through an interpreter and tell tales of horror in whose objective reality 
there is no reason to believe" (at 169 per Hugessen J.A.). 
In Mensah (Mensah, George Akohene v Minister of Employment and Immigration, November 
23, 1989, F.C.A. no. A-1173-88), the Court made it clear that it is important that the claimant 
not be placed in a "Catch 22" situation by finding that the claimant is not credible if either too 
many details or not enough details are provided. 
The Federal Court of Australia has criticised the RRT's assessments of credibility in a number 
of cases, for example: Jorge Murillo-Nuez v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs No. 
NG827of1994 (AnstLii database); Sahra Abdullahi Elmi v Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs [1998] 1442 FCA; Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs [ 1999] FCA 957; Bhattachan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 
[1999] FCA 547. 
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discourse (credibility, trustworthy, probative value) and their results (found 
facts) are not. 127 While cross-examination is officially removed, its allure is 
irresistible. The values of liberal legality need stable identities and known facts. 
Where, as in refugee determination, this is not possible, the law can make it so. 
These characteristics are key to the hearing as identity construction process. By 
believing an individual's account of their identity, the tribunal makes that 
identity exist as a legal fact. By rejecting that account, the tribunal rejects the 
individual's identity, along with their aspiration of a refugee identity. The role 
of documentary evidence in the process of proving a refugee identity 
emphasises the place of the refugee as the ultimate other to the nation. We 
understand and believe the refugee on the basis of information gathered in 
foreign lands. Their stories are so unimaginable to us, so unknown and 
unknowable, that our usual methods of proof are unreliable or impossible. To 
make a refugee determination the tribunal must imagine that other place and 
situate the claimant within it. 128 This provides another way of distinguishing 
refugee from other migrants: we allow refugees to stay on the basis of their 
"other-ness", on the basis of knowing things we cannot imagine. Family and 
economic migrants are allowed to stay on the basis of knowledge which they 
share with us: knowing family, language, skills, professional standards, 
127 In Australia a number of cases have challenged inadequacy of tribunal reasons: 
Paramanathan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 160 ALR 24; 
Mulalidharan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1996) 62 FCR 402.' 
128 One way of testing credibility which I observed in both tribunals is by using maps and asking 
the claimant to describe from memory the distances and travel times between places while the 
tribunal member looks at the map. Here the spatial dimensions of the nation are paramount. 
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economic trends. We measure them against the known and refugees against the 
unknown. 
c. The final product: Tribunal decisions 
The way that identity and credibility dominate the hearing process is, of 
course, reflected in the reasons of the Tribunals, but in significantly differing 
ways in each country.129 Reasons of the Australian Tribunal make stultifyingly 
dull reading. The RRT is required to provide written reasons in each case, even 
where the case is so compelling that a positive decision is made on the papers130 
or in cases where the applicant does not attend the hearing. RRT reasons reflect 
a formula which includes a canvass of all the principal cases of the High Court 
and Federal Court on the contours of the refugee definition and often involves 
extensive and detailed citation of documentary sources which are considered in 
the decision. The decisions contain a number of boilerplate paragraphs, a 
practice which has been approved by the courts. m In some cases, a claim is not 
made out even if the applicant is believed in full as their story does not fit within 
the contours of the definition and thus credibility is a minor issue in the 
129 This analysis is based on a review of two sets of reasons, in total approximately 100 tribunal 
decisions. The first set of comparisons comprise recent decisions regarding claimants from the 
People's Republic of China. I selected the PRC because both Australia and Canada see a 
significant number of claims from PRC nationals and it is a country where refugee advocates 
generally agree that some but not all claims come within the agreed definition. The second set is 
comprised of claims of feared persecution on the basis of sexual orientation. These decisions 
provide a rich source for an identity-based analysis of the Tribunals' approaches. See Table of 
Cases: Refugee Tribunal Decisions for a complete list. 
130 A negative decision cannot be made without offering the applicant an opportunity for a 
hearing, ss.424-425. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 
CLR259. 
131 This is particularly noticeable because I reviewed a number of cases from the same country. 
While I aimed to ensure a I read the reasons of a range of Tribunal members, the practice of 
having members specialise geographically meant that I read several decisions from each 
member who has recently work on PRC claims. 
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claims.132 However, where an applicant's story suggests the potential for a 
positive finding, credibility assessment is crucial, with the Tribunal makings 
statements such as, "The applicant varied and enlarged progressively over time 
the reasons for the demonstration,"133 and "The Tribunal is not satisfied that the 
Applicant has provided completely accurate information."134 The most 
important parts of any account are those which can be compared to the other 
sources of information in the credibility assessment process. 
The CRDD reasons are more compelling reasons largely because the 
convention of the Tribunal is to focus narrowly and precisely on credibility 
issues. While the RRT discusses evidence in a general way, the CRDD, 
instructed by the Canadian Federal Court, isolates precisely contradictions in 
evidence and makes their reasoning about credibility explicit. CRDD decisions 
are much shorter, do not contain boilerplate, and deal primarily with fact rather 
than law. There are several reasons for this. First, the CRDD does not provide 
reasons in every case, and is only obliged to provide reasons in cases where 
claims are rejected after a full hearing.135 Second, the CRDD has the benefit of a 
longer and more established jurisprudence and the use of pre-hearing 
conferences to narrow the issues to be discussed. In part, therefore, a narrow 
132 It is notable that among the claims I reviewed, these tended to be cases where the claimant 
did not attend the hearing, lending some support to the Minister's 'abuse' theory. 
133 RRT Ref No. V98/09074 at 6 (of electronic version). 
134 RRT Ref No. V96/05071at8 (of electronic version). 
135 Section 69 .1. Reasons for positive findings are written in a number of cases at the request of 
the Chair of the IRB. For example, reasons may be requested where there appears to be a 
divergence in practice between CRDD locations or where a newly arising type of claim is being 
considered. If the Minister seeks judicial review of a positive decision, written reasons will be 
provided. 
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focus on facts and credibility represents a type of maturity of the refugee 
determination process. The Tribunal itself stated in 1998: 
Decisions of claims to Convention Refugee status have become 
increasingly difficult. The majority of claimants present a Personal 
Information Form [original application] including a narrative which, if 
credible, gives rise to a well-founded fear of persecution. Few claims are 
decided on definitional grounds, for example, whether there is a nexus to 
the definition. This is quite different than in the early years of the 
Refugee Division when many cases were decided on legal issues, for 
example that the claimant feared persecution by a non-state agent.136 
The RRT is still operating in the mode this decision associates with the CRDD's 
"early years." Finally, the fact that almost all claimants tell stories that fit within 
the definition easily undoubtedly reflects the greater involvement of lawyers in 
the Canadian process. Like the reasons of the RRT, the CRDD reasons 
demonstrate the crucial importance of documentary evidence as a test of the 
story. 
It is tempting to assert on reviewing the cases that the CRDD is more 
likely to believe a story than is the RRT.137 But this type of conclusion is 
impossible precisely because of the role of credibility in the process and the 
importance of assessing differences in the stories carefully, of considering how 
evidence is delivered and the effects of interpretation, trauma and culture in this 
process. In addition, the hearing processes are remarkably different, making it 
very hard to compare the conclusions. The written reasons, in whichever 
136 Re SSW [1998] CRDD No. 104 (No. U96-05945) at para 43. 
137 This must be considered too against the backdrop of the guiding courts' decisions in each 
country. For example, the CRDD will consider that someone fleeing compulsory or forced 
sterilisation under the PRC's one child policy may be a refugee, the RRT will not. A separate 
difference is reflected in the documents to be relied upon. The RRT generally finds that 
Christians in China are not persecuted, the CRDD is still finding persecution in some cases. 
Both Tribunals note that religious persecution in the PRC has been declining, but rely on 
differing documentary sources in their decision-making. 
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format, do little to convey the atmosphere of the hearing room and the subtleties 
of the process through which refugee identity is constructed. Both process and 
written reasons confirm that refugee determination decision-making occupies a 
space at the very limit of our system of legal decisions. 
Considering recent cases dealing with claims made on the basis of feared 
persecution on the grounds of sexual orientation reveals the respective 
Tribunals' differing approaches to identity and credibility. This is confirmed by 
looking at how the Federal Courts review these claims. These claims provide a 
powerful example of the role of identity in refugee claims because they rely for 
the most part138 rely on the "particular social group" ground of persecution and 
because sexual orientation as identity has had a prominent _{>lace in the evolving 
identity politics of both Australia and Canada. The construction of identity in 
these decisions points up some differences in the way the two countries 
approach both identity and credibility. 
The Australian decisions first confront identity in these claims in their 
concern over whether the claimant is gay or lesbian. Predictably, given the 
extent to which individual tribunal members control the hearing process, the 
reasons vary enormously. The Tribunal's approach to this question reveals a 
view of the essence of identity as gay or lesbian. For some RRT members, 
sexual orientation is about particular sexual acts. In summarising evidence 
138 Sometimes a claim on the grounds of sexual orientation overlaps with a claim on another 
ground. See in the RRT table of cases: V95/03527, V96/04324, N98/21948, N98/241l16, 
N98/24 718, V97 /06971, N98/252 l 6, N99/278 l 8. In the CRDD table of cases see: Re FCB 
[1999] CRDD No. 89 and Re HGP [1999] CRDD No. 188. I have not included claims made in 
the CRDD by lesbians which are considered under the guidelines on women refugee claimants 
in this list. 
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given about persecution the Tribunal notes that, "they had a sexual encounter, 
although not anal intercourse."139 In analysing a claim that where the applicant 
had not initially stated that he was gay, the Tribunal considered whether this 
identity could have been inferred and stated, "I am prepared to concede that it 
would be a reasonable inference from the fact of sexual abuse by organisation X 
that the applicant had become a homosexual."140 In analysing the question of 
membership in a particular social group, the Federal Court of Australia has 
recently stated that "the mere possession of some homosexual feelings might 
not necessarily be enough."141 
The Tribunal in these cases is clearly relying on conflating sexual 
orientation with sexual activity which then generates pressure on the 
accompanying credibility conclusions.142 One Tribunal stated that a claimant's 
former lawyer "presumably realised that the applicant was homosexual."143 As 
the claimant had not disclosed this to his lawyer and was offering an explanation 
for lodging an earlier claim on different grounds, the Tribunal's conclusion must 
surely reflect discriminatory stereotyping not explained in the reasons. While 
the Tribunal almost invariably states whether they find the claimant to be gay or 
lesbian, some members do this without focusing on particular sexual activities 
which therefore fosters a broader understanding of identity as gay or lesbian. "I 
139 N99/27499 at 3. 
140 V96/05496 at 5. 
141 F v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [ 1999] FCA 94 7 at 6. 
142 The CRDD also engages in this type of analysis, although less often. In one case that 
Tribunal states that it accepts the claimant is lesbian, even though she is not in a relationship 
with anyone at present, Re EKB [ 1999] CRDD No. 175. 
143 V96/05496 at 5. 
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am satisfied that the applicant is genuine in his homosexuality. He stated that it 
was not so much a choice as the way he is."144 Another Tribunal member 
summarised evidence by stating, "He said that he recognised that he was gay for 
some time, yet it took several years to admit that it was an integral and 
permanent feature of himself."145 Rather than reflecting discriminatory 
stereotypes, these statements reflect the "particular social group" jurisprudence. 
In the cases I reviewed, it was rare for the Tribunal to consider a claim 
without making a finding on whether the claimant was gay or lesbian.146 This 
was a marked difference form the CRDD cases, where the existence of sexual 
orientation is often not treated as an issue in the case. In part, this may be due to 
the use of pre-hearing conferences where the RCOs and legal representatives 
assist in clarifying in advance what the issues are. Another potential 
explanation is the RR T's convention of covering each potential issue in 
considerable depth in their reasons. Despite these potential influences, however, 
subjecting identity as a gay man or lesbian to a credibility assessment in each 
instance introduces an air of suspicion into the reasons and conveys the 
judgment that it is too "easy" to claim to be gay or lesbian and thereby gain 
passage into Australia. The Federal Court has recently criticised the Tribunal 
for not plainly stating their concerns to the applicant, but following Eshetu v 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 147 the Court can no longer 
144 V96/04143 at 3. 
145 V95/03527 at 4. 
146 Some examples are: V96/04324, V96/04813, V98/09498, V98/09501, V98/09564, 
N98/23824, N98/24137, N98/22363, N9719558, N97/20044. 
147 Above n 121. 
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review on grounds of procedural fairness and thus cannot return decisions which 
display this error. 148 Constantly focussing on the question of whether one's 
identity as gay or lesbian is "genuine," in the RRT atmosphere oflittle 
standardisation, also ensures that the Tribunal reasons are a vehicle for the 
expression of individual member's own stereotypes and prejudices. As the 
refugee hearing brings the nation and the other into direct contact and 
establishes the meaning of the boundary between them, these factors become 
part of that boundary. Discriminatory stereotyping is reflected as national value 
and conforming to stereotype becomes a requirement of entry. 
Both the RR T and the Federal Court have also addressed identity from the 
perspective of whether a gay man or lesbian can or should conceal the sexual 
orientation aspects of their identity so as to avoid persecution. This analysis 
does not fit the logic of other aspects of the refugee definition. That is, it is not 
a feature of refugee cases concerning religion or political opinion, both 
identifying markers which could be concealed, suppressed, or even changed.149 
Instead it points to the Tribunal's unease with sexual orientation as identity and 
to its difficulty in grappling with criminal sanctions against gay and lesbian 
sexual and social activities. In Bhattachan the Tribunal "put it to the applicant 
that homosexuality had existed in traditional Nepalese society, as it had in all 
societies, and asked whether he had considered living a secret gay life and 
148 Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 957. 
149 This might also be true of ethnicity or even race. Religion and political opinion are 
malleable in a way that sexual orientation is not. 
157 
perhaps even marrying as many had."150 This reasoning was rejected in the 
strongest terms in that instance by the Federal Court. The more recent Full 
Federal Court reasons in Guo Ping Gui, 151 however, signal the appellate court 
may be prepared to take a different position. In a decision which rests heavily 
on the shift in judicial review signaled by Wu Shan Liang152 the unanimous 
court stated, "what precipitated the police action was not Mr. Gui's membership 
of a particular social group but his conduct in a public place."153 The facts 
differ significantly from Bhattachan and therefore we can still hope the issue is 
not settled.154 
Surprisingly, however, even in cases which reject the argument that a 
"secret gay life" is an appropriate solution or in keeping with the intention of the 
Refugee Convention, the possibility is raised. While ultimately finding the 
claimant to be a refugee, and stating that it would be "unacceptable" to require 
someone to live a "hidden inconspicuous life," the RRT in V95/03527 states 
that "neither heterosexuals or homosexuals have a right to behave indiscreetly" 
and that "persons should, to the extent that it is possible, co-operate in their own 
150 As cited in the Federal Court reasons, Bhattachan v Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 547. 
151 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Gui [1999] FCA 1496. 
152 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 292. 
See discussion in Chapter 5 at pp. 290-291. 
153 Above n 151 at para 28. Mr. Gui had been detained for three months after being caught 
kissing his boyfriend in a public park. 
154 The court notes that Mr. Gui" ... was often able to organise homosexual parties and engage in 
social activities such as opera singing, fashion shows, watching gay videos and holding parties 
on a weekly basis" at ibid. para 13. This description is markedly different from the facts in 
Bhattachan and also displays the Tribunal's view of"gay culture." 
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protection."155 Similar comments, also in cases which led to positive findings, 
include: 
My difficulty as a decision-maker, even when armed with the above 
reports on attitudes towards and treatment of homosexuals, is in deciding 
what the degree of risk would be for the applicant if he returns to Brazil 
and no longer hides his sexual orientation. I am of the view that if he 
were to exercise caution and steer clear of meeting places where 
homosexuals are likely to be attacked he would minimise the risk to 
himself. 156 
And ... 
Even if one accepts the view that it is not unreasonable for homosexuals in 
the PRC to exercise discretion in giving expression to their sexuality, this 
does not end the matter. What does "discretion" mean in this context? 
When does the degree of discretion required to avoid the chance of 
persecution become unreasonable? How discreet must an applicant be? 
Clearly it cannot mean avoiding all homosexual activity, even adult 
consensual sexual activity in private, this being covered by the concept of 
"privacy" under Article 17 of the I CCPR .... 157 
The proposition that one's sexual orientation could or should be hidden 
highlights a particular view of what constitutes identity. Identity here is treated 
as an optional accoutrement, not something integral to one's being. In 
presenting identity this way, the reasons construct identity as a gay man or a 
lesbian as a lesser order of identity, somehow not the same as one's ethnic or 
racial identity, or even as one's gender.158 The word "discretion" continues the 
presentation of gay or lesbian identity as being about sexual activity itself, rather 
than something about intrinsic self-concept. This version of identity also differs 
155 At 7 and 18. 
156 V96/04324 at 11. 
157 V96/04813. 
158 Claims to the CRDD made by lesbians are often dealt with under the Canadian guidelines on 
Gender Persecution. 
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markedly from the treatment of political opinion or religion in the refugee 
definition, which are treated as non-relinguishable because they are matters of 
conscience. While identity as a gay man or lesbian is not a question of 
conscience, oddly it seemingly would be accorded a greater level of respect if 
that were the case. 
The CRDD and Canadian Federal Court construct identity based on sexual 
orientation in a markedly different way. In part this is accomplished by not 
always treating the question of whether the claimant is gay or lesbian as an issue 
which requires credibility testing. Even when this issue is tested, the analysis 
differs from some of the RRT approaches. InPolyakov v Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration) the Federal Court upheld a decision where "aside 
from two homosexual encounters ... the Board found that the applicant offered 
no evidence regarding his sexual orientation." 159 In Tchernilevski v Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) the applicant's own testimony 
regarding his identity was accepted even though the woman he was married to 
was pregnant at the time of the incidents he recounted. 160 In Re EKG161 the 
testimony of a friend (not a lover) that the claimant was gay was accepted 
without question. 162 In these cases, the issue of identity as a gay man or lesbian 
is treated as being explicitly not about particular sexual activities. In this 
analysis, identity is therefore integral to one's being, rather than something that 
159 (1996] FCJ No. 300 at para 5. 
160 (1995] FCJ No. 894 at para 3. 
161 (1999] CRDD No 54. 
162 See also Re NWP (1999] CRDD No. 3; Re VPC (1999] CRDD No. 191. 
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one does occasionally or not at all. This understanding of identity facilitates 
fitting these cases within the refugee definition as it presents an understanding 
of identity based on sexual orientation which makes it more like the other 
grounds of persecution.163 
The Canadian cases which I reviewed did not raise the issue of whether 
identity as a gay man or a lesbian could be hidden. In contrast, this set of cases 
contains several where the applicant was involved in gay and lesbian activist 
politics. The Tribunal considered that this participation fell within the ambit of 
protection from persecution.164 The CRDD has also found that persecution 
because of dressing in drag was intolerable.165 While the Australian cases 
concluded in several instances that criminal provisions outlawing gay and 
lesbian sexual activities did not in themselves amount to persecution, 166 the 
Canadian cases in contrast contain several examples of positive refugee 
determinations where homosexuality is not criminalised and other actions alone 
constitute the persecution.167 
163 This also means the analysis of whether gay men or lesbians or homosexuals can constitute a 
particular social group under the refugee definition is not particularly important in these cases. 
Following the obiter of the High Court in Applicant A and B v Minister for Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs above n 66, this also seems settled in Australia. Accordingly, I have not 
discussed the range ofRRT and Federal Court views on this point. 
164 FCB [1999] CRDD No 89, L.J. v Canada (Minister for Citizenship and Immigration) [1996] 
FCJ no. 1042; Re HFP [1999] CRDD No. 188. 
165 ReEHF [1999] CRDDNo.142. 
166 F v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 947; MMM v Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] 1664 FCA. See also Millbank J, "Fear of 
Persecution or Just a Queer Feeling" ( 1995) 20 Alternative Law Journal 261. 
167 Muzychka v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1997] FCJ no. 279; Re EKB 
[1999] CRDD No. 175; Re UOD [1999] CRDD No. 106. 
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My objective in this brief analysis is not to present a comprehensive 
overview of the analysis of refugee claims based on feared persecution on the 
grounds of sexual orientation in both countries. Rather, the principal issues that 
emerge in these reasons demonstrate the capacity of an identity based analysis 
to generate insights into the way the law is operating. These cases also highlight 
that the differences in Tribunal processes in each country contribute to different 
outcomes by allowing RRT members more influence over shaping how 
evidence is delivered and how credibility is assessed. The standardisation in the 
CRDD mitigates against translating stereotyping directly into law. The 
acknowledged problems of proving identity and credibility, which are 
highlighted in these cases, are one reason why they are the crucial issues in the 
refugee determination process. 
In a setting which is impervious to what our legal system normally accepts 
as "proof" the identity of a refugee is constructed from pieces of stories told and 
documents preserved. The ability to detail personal experiences which dovetail 
with reported instances of human rights abuse become a key to establishing 
one's identity. This is, after all, what it is to be a refugee.168 In the hearing 
room, the tentativeness of all potential truths is manifest. This setting is at the 
coalface of law's work in identity construction; from fragments of "evidence" 
which other legal processes would discredit and discard, something new is 
forged. Members prod at a story which has necessarily been recounted many 
168 A CRDD Refugee Hearing Officer offered the observation that, claimants who cry are 
usually telling the truth. It is hard to know what to do with this observation. I am, of course, 
tempted to be sceptical - how easy is it to fake tears I wonder. I recognise at the same time that 
being sceptical is not being true to the logic of the process. This law is aimed at some kinds of 
human suffering, it is important not to lose sight of that. 
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times and which equally necessarily has been lied about at some point. The role 
of the lawyer in constructing the refugee story is important. First in the sense 
that the professional advocate skilled in the pitfalls of legal definitions is best 
suited to telling the story in the most persuasive way. Second because a 
successful refugee story is one which is completely other, unknown. Having a 
lawyer shape the story, like using an interpreter, keeps the refugee at a distance, 
unknowable, other. 
C. THE LESSONS OF IDENTITY 
The process of fitting into the refugee category and thereby gaining 
permission to remain permanently in Australia or Canada involves the 
construction of an identity as other and then of an identity as refugee. The 
claimant must fit into the narrowly defined category which the nation views as 
most needy in order to be granted the privilege of membership. The prize that is 
offered is belonging, a new identity as a member of a new nation. This identity 
shift is poignant in settler societies, where the nation itself is new and all 
members can claim varying degrees of attachment to another nation.169 The 
national identification of the refugee is reconfigured through this process which 
in a parallel movement brings a new identity into the nation itself. The law and 
identity relationship is displayed at several levels in this process. The refugee 
definition sets up a category in the migration law hierarchy. This identity is 
169 Indigenous peoples in settler societies also fit into this analysis as they have attachments with 
older nations, nations which have been pushed aside by the settler nation's development. The 
voices of indigenous peoples are absent from migration narratives. This is part of the 
mythological power of those narratives, they exist in order to validate an account of the nation 
which does not recognise the original inhabitants. 
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constructed within the text of the law but it then becomes a standard that 
individuals aim to fit within on the basis of other identity characteristics. Law 
does nof simply construct the identity, but provides a map of which 
characteristics are important in the legal setting. In this way it acts as a standard 
for the identity of refugees as a group themselves within the society that 
approves them because of this identity - it provides some features of the group 
identity indicators of which Turner writes. 
1. The Ultimate Other to the Nation 
The importance of establishing identity in the refugee hearing points to the 
first phase in the nation's absorption of the other. Refugee claimants, many of 
whom cannot prove their self-identity, who cannot authenticate their 
membership of a state, are the extreme point of contrast with the nation itself. 
The claimant appears in the hearing room isolated and atomised. While we 
accept that all individuals are identified with some nation, our ways of knowing 
that identity are brought to the forefront here. The identity is proven through 
legal text: passport, visa, national identity card, military record. The imprimatur 
of the state is the chief value here, providing a succinct definition of what the 
law will accept as national identity. Barring that imprimatur, other identifiers 
can be offered. These provide a map of the constructs of mythological nation -
of the collective imagination which is the signifier of belonging. What would 
we ask an Australian or Canadian in a hypothetical hearing elsewhere? Do you 
know the words to 0 Canada? What is fair dinkum? Where is Rockhampton? 
Which is further south Toronto or Vancouver? Explain the importance of 
ANZAC Day. Name the smell of the first snow of a prairie winter. Draw the 
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map in red sand with a gum leaf. In the absence of law, we offer these accounts 
of ourselves. To authenticate the documents, to prove they are real, we tell 
stories learned and relearned in primary school. Through this first phase of the 
refugee process, we ensure that we know the other as other. Not as some 
trickster who may take advantage of our goodness, but as someone who is 
genuinely linked to another named nation. 
The identity labelling process also points to how little we know of this 
other. Their identity is reduced to a pinpoint - a passport printed on the correct 
type of paper, a number registered in the correct way, a nursery rhyme correctly 
recalled, the scars of a regime's favourite torture exposed. This pinpoint is what 
it is to be other: to be reduced to almost nothing, a blank space against which we 
can imagine otherness.170 The refugee determination process hidden from view 
preserves the unknown otherness of the claimants in the public imagination -
leaves us space to imagine, alternately, the horrors they have faced or the lies 
they are telling. The other is always largely unknown, constructed in opposition 
to the self in a move which reinforces and affirms the identity of the self. The 
refugee claimant, whose very identity is so tenuous as to be always at issue in a 
hearing and that the operation of our law must solidify it by finding it as a fact, 
plays this role for the new nation. Refugee law is structured to ensure that the 
refugee is everything, everyone, that we as members of a prosperous nation are 
not. Above all, a refugee is persecuted by their own nation. 171 Their nation itself 
170 Recall the discussion in Chapter Two at pp. 27-28. 
171 Both Australian and Canadian courts have now ruled held that persecution need not be by an 
organ of the state itself, but that the state must at least be complicit in the persecution to the 
extent of being unable or unwilling to end it; Ward and Magyari (unreported Fed Ct, 
O"Loughlin J. 22 May 1997) and Dogra (unreported, Fed Ct, Madgwick J, 28 April 1997). 
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has treated them in such a way that our nation feels compelled to allow them 
haven and allows the compulsion to acts as a constraint on sovereignty.172 We 
condemn the behaviour of the other nation in a gesture signifying that our 
standards are better. 
The refugee is the ultimate other to the nation in part because their identity 
is defined so narrowly. When someone applies for admission as an economic or 
family migrant, their identity is closely scrutinised and recorded. Not only are 
the official state documents a sine qua non for the process but the picture of 
their identity is filled in considerable detail. Police certifications of good 
citizenship and detailed medical examinations are required. For some categories 
bank statements and employment histories are verified. The immigration 
process creates a concentrated pool of information about identity which for 
members, would be dispersed through the networks of the state. In the refugee 
category, the nation accepts that the same depth of information may not be 
available, and may not be susceptible to proof in the same way. While the 
emphasis on identity is maintained in all migration categories, it is the refugee 
who most closely fits the idea of other to the nation. Other migrants fit this role 
to some extent as part of the identification process ensures that they are labelled 
and categorised as not one of us and ensures that most of them will not be 
172 Refugee law is frequently perceived in these political terms. Accepting refugees from a 
given state is viewed as a statement against that regime's policies, particularly its human rights 
records. During the Cold War, refugee policy of the United States was highly influenced by 
Cold War lines of allegiance, Gibney M and Stohl M, "Human Rights and US Refugee Policy" 
in Gibney M (ed) Open Borders? Closed Societies? The Ethical and Political Issues, 
Greenwood Books, New York, 1988 at 152. 
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admitted. But the refugee process does that and more, putting a cipher in the 
place of the outsider. 
Once the identity of the claimant has been established, construction of 
refugee identity can begin.173 "Refugee" is a narrow legal category box with 
specified borders. The claimant must fit within that box to become identified as 
a refugee, rather than an "illegal" or a "mere economic migrant'', the category 
labels for the putative abusers of the system. As self and social identities are the 
crux of the refugee definition, sometimes the phase where identity is established 
fulfils all the requirements of the process. Identity alone is sufficient to ensure 
our belief in persecution and no further story about what has happened is 
needed. This is the case of those who established their identity as ethnic 
Albanians from Kosovo in the first half of 1999174 or as Iraqi women alone in 
Australia in 1998.175 
173 Robert Barsky has analysed the pre-1989 refugee determination process in Canada (which 
differed significantly from current practice) as an exercise in "constructing a productive other". 
His analysis draws extensively on literary and discourse theory and he pays particular attention 
to conditions of communication within a refugee hearing. While his methods are quite different 
from mine, as is the subject of his analysis, his conclusions run a parallel course to those I 
present in this section. He states: 
In fact, one (albeit cynical) hypothesis is that the hearing could be seen as a test of 
the claimant's ability to construct an appropriate version of the "Convention refugee;" 
in this sense the measure of one's success in constructing a productive other as a 
refugee could be seen as a measure of one's future ability to construct a productive 
other as integrated citizen. 
(Barsky R I, Constructing a Productive Other: Discourse Theory and the Convention Refugee 
Hearing, John Benjamins Pub. Co., Philadelphia and Amsterdam, 1994 at 6.) 
174 The campaign by Slobodan Milosevic against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo which emerged 
into war with NATO in March 1999 had begun at least a year earlier. I observed a hearing in 
April 1998 where a young man of this description was granted refugee status in Canada on that 
basis. The presiding Member commented that six months earlier he would have refused the 
claim, and that the standard information package had not caught up with the intensification of 
the campaign but that the Member's own attention to current affairs news reports led him to 
change his way of dealing with such claims. 
175 In recognition that identity often is all there is to a refugee case, Australian policy is to have 
what are know as "standing claims" available for particular groups. One hearing I observed in 
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That identity alone sometimes grounds a refugee claim highlights the 
interaction I referred to earlier of self and group identities in the refugee 
definition. The jmisprudence directs a two step analysis; the successful 
claimant is persecuted, and that persecution is carried out on the basis of one of 
the five underlying grounds. The formula is individualised, but some people, 
some identities, are persecuted so uniformly that an individual story of 
persecution becomes a redundancy. These are the easy cases - the exemplars of 
the refugee definition which was written in the aftermath of the Holocaust: 
Rwandan Tsutsi's, ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, ethnic Chinese in some parts of 
Indonesia. 176 But identity alone will not make a Tibetan in China a refugee, nor 
a Jew in Russia. The story of feared individualised persecution must be added. 
Group identity is one part of the equation, but personal identity as someone in 
whom the state takes an interest is also crucial. 177 When identity is not enough, 
the refugee must also be identified by the persecutor, be singled out and noted. 
The individualisation movement in refugee identity is political in that is defined 
by the actions (identification and persecution) of the state. 
When the group or self identity of the claimant can be constructed to fit 
the definition, the refugee identity is completed. Otherness and individualised 
1998 concerned a woman claiming to be an Iraqi citizen. The Tribunal Member was interested 
only in the truth of this assertion as a standing claim for Iraqi citizens was then in place. 
176 Of course, none of these groups come within the refugee definition until they leave their 
homeland. Also, Australian Prime Minister John Howard stated in early 1998 at a time of 
intense ethnically motivated violence in the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis that Chinese 
Indonesians were welcome to benefit from Australia's refugee program. This statement met 
with strong protests and statements of"clarification" from DIMA. This example illustrates the 
fleeting nature of our certainty about who fits in the category given its dependence on politics. 
177 The persecuting agent need not always be the state itself. This distinction is used in both 
Australia and Canada. See discussion in GS Goodwin-Gill, above n 8 at 66-69. 
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persecution become the passkey into the new nation. The legal framework 
categorises and names personal experience as "persecution" or "mere 
discrimination," as based on specific grounds or generalised enough to escape 
the refugee definition by prevalence alone.178 The refugee identity certifies one's 
admission to the nation, but at the same time confines one's experience of that 
new nation. "Refugee" is not a free-floating identity category with an existence 
outside the law. It is generated by legal pronouncement and then awarded as a 
prize through a specific legal process. The hearing process determines who are 
refugees and who are not. Refugees can stay in Canada and Australia because 
of their identity as refugees. Refugee identity is linked to the purpose for which 
it is created. For the nation controlling the process and recognising the 
definition as a constraint on sovereignty, the boundaries of the refugee identity 
are patrolled with an eye to controlling how large the constraint on sovereignty 
becomes. In the hearing room, the tribunal member and others in the room must 
determine whether refugee identity will become the entry to the nation or the 
barrier. For the claimant herself, the difference Minow describes between 
choosing and being consigned to an identity is a tricky one. At the hearing, a 
refugee chooses this identity and, if successful, becomes consigned to it as their 
identity within the new nation- an object of charity and beneficence. At one 
isolated point this identity is chosen as the best option. Nonetheless the 
question of choices must also incorporate the range of choices available. This 
178 This is one analysis of the Applicant A above n 22 case in Australia, dealing with China's 
one child policy. For some judges, this was simply an application of generally applicable law 
(see in particular McHugh and Gummow JJ). See also Goodwin-Gill, above n 8 at 362. 
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range, as much as choice itself, reveals the power configurations underlying the 
identities. 
Refugee identity provides a particular kind of entre to the new nation. 
They are not recruited because of their skills or their ties with us. Regardless of 
the extent of our commitment to multiculturalism, we expect that refugee 
identity will be a passing phase on the way to becoming "us."179 Refugee fits in 
the hierarchy of migration categories at differing points depending on one's 
perspective. As migration is supposed to serve the national interest, some 
versions of the hierarchy place refugees at the bottom of the heap: we are 
helping them, they have nothing to offer us. In others though, refugee 
admissions are valued for their moral goodness; the value is not of the refugees 
themselves, but of the nation for admitting them. In either case, refugee is 
constructed as an identity within the nation, a label which individuals wear 
which conditions their legal entitlements.180 While this identity label is 
179 At least when we admit them permanently that is the expectation. The Kosovar crisis marks 
a departure from the tradition of admitting refugees for permanent resettlement in Australia. 
Australia agreed to admit 4000 people for temporary protection, to be housed on unused 
military bases in remote areas. That is, to remain as isolated as possible from 'us'. This 
departure from tradition is in part due to reluctance to extent the annual admissions quota, and 
in part from a desire not to assist the Milosevic regime with its ethnic agenda. 
Canada agreed to accept 5000 refugees and stressed in official statements (e.g. Press Release, 
Minister Lucienne Robillard, 30 April 1999) that most will return to their homes. The 
difference is that they will be eligible to lodge applications with the CRDD so could potentially 
stay permanently in Canada. 
The Western response to the Kosovo crisis may be the opening to make refugee protection a 
temporary standard, which James Hathaway has argued will revitalise the law (above n 9). 
180 Those determined to be refugee claimants are given more immediate access to state services 
than other migrants and are given access to settlement assistance. In Australia, recent changes 
in the law of reduced the entitlements of potential refugees to medicare and work permits while 
awaiting determination or appeal results in order to reduce incentives for claiming refugee 
status. The effects of these changes have yet to be full analysed, but they are testimony to the 
discourses of control and abuse of the system. Also, November 1999 proposals would limit 
welfare entitlements for refugees arriving on boats, even though they meet the refugee 
definition. 
Canadian proposals for change in the 1999 document Building on a Strong Foundation for the 
21st Century (above n 48) also reflect these discourses, for example proposals to introduce 
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supposedly temporary, it has a certain endurance. Speaking of the 1997 Young 
Australian of the Year who had settled in Australia sixteen years earlier, the 
Minister of Immigration stated that without a commitment inclusive to 
citizenship, "We would not have seen a five-minute standing ovation for this 
young Vietnamese refugee ... "181 The pride with which Australians or Canadians 
identify their parents as having been refugees is one reminder that refugee itself 
is an identity, which has an existence beyond its legal category. The law sets up 
the category, but what happens beyond the law engages other social ordering 
systems as well. 
The implications of refugee as identity are complex. Discussing the 
operation of the Women at Risk program in Canada, Audrey Kobayashi argues 
that the refugee determination process assures one's "otherness" and "status 
outside the normative realm of independent immigrants."182 While the 
successful claimant " .. .is potentially granted 'rights', [ ... ] she is simultaneously 
marginalised as practises of gender- and racialisation reduce her access to social 
justice in the larger sense." 183 As the nature of refugee identity and the refugee 
determination process locate the refugee as the ultimate other to the nation, the 
endurance and potential for marginalisation of this label ought not surprise us. 
stronger "incentives for cooperation" for undocumented refugee claimants, and to grant the 
Minister a right to intervene in CRDD hearings and to vacate refugee determination 
applications. 
181 Honourable Phillip Ruddock, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 
"Immigration Reform: The Unfinished Agenda" Address to the National Press Club, Canberra, 
18 March 1998 as reported on the Minister's website atwww.minister.immi.gov.au. 
182 Kobayashi A, "Challenging the National Dream: Gender Persecution and Canadian 
immigration Law" in Fitzpatrick P ( ed) Racism, Nationalism and the Rule of Law Dartmouth 
Press, Aldershot, 1995, 61 at 70. 
183 Ibid. 
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Barsky's insights are equally apposite, as he argues that the refugee hearing184 
reduces an individual's identity so that " ... the Other who emerges from these 
transcriptions is diminished to the point of near non-existence"185 which in turn 
facilitates the construction of the new productive citizen. When refugees are 
admitted as permanent members of the community they are literally invited to 
change their national identity. This shift in identity is facilitated through a 
process which judges the old nation as bad and emphasises the goodness of the 
new nation. 
In the current structure of both Australian and Canadian migration law, 
refugee identity is a stop on the way to new bonds of national attachment. Like 
family and economic migrants, this outsider can become a member. The 
conditions of that membership are their differences, their ultimate alterity, their 
essentialised identity. The refugee process constructs the ultimate other to the 
nation, and then allows them to enter the nation. These basic features of the 
refugee determination process are carried out similarly in Australia and Canada 
- similarly situated nations applying the same international legal standard. In 
turning now to the contrasts in those 'others' constructed by these two nations, 
we find traces of Australian and Canadian national identities. 
184 He is referring to the pre-1989 version of the Canadian hearing, which is more similar to the 
bureaucratic phase of contemporary Australian practice than to the current Canadian practice. 
185 Barsky, above n 173 at 3-4. 
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2. Images of the nation 
Australian and Canadian refugee admissions processes have much in 
common and administrators in each country follow the other's actions closely.186 
Despite the overwhelming similarities of situation, the similar rhetoric, the close 
working relationship and the shared common law heritage, however, there 
remain significant differences in both the process and the outcomes of refugee 
determination which point to aspects of national identity. In this area of the law, 
as with family migration and economic migration, the operations of the 
immigration regime leave an imprint of national mores. Refugee admissions 
represent the hardest case for this argument as admission criteria in this category 
are not a direct statement of national needs and values. But even with refugee 
admissions, decisions about how the internationally agreed definition is applied 
and interpreted reflect national characteristics. 
The refugee admission is treated more expansively in Canada than in 
Australia.187 More people per capita are permanently admitted each year, the 
inland processing system is better resourced, 188 there is no routine provision for 
186 This close relationship was frequently mentioned to me by bureaucrats in both countries. 
187 The acceptance rate of the CRDD is considerably higher (approx 50% over past few years) 
than that of the Departmental process (13%) and the RRT (approx 10% over past 3 years). It is 
tempting to conclude from this that the Canadian system is more lenient, or that the law is 
interpreted more generously, but given that the source countries that claimants come from are 
very different, this conclusion is not a firm one. 
188 The RRT Administrative Expenditure total for 1997-98 was $14 680 700AUD. The CRDD 
budget for 1997-98 (although not for the same 12 month period) was $43 457 000 CON. The 
figures are not really comparable for a number of reasons, including that the RRT made 6 508 
decisions during this time and the CRDD made 25, 100. These figures reflect the costs of the 
more developed documentation gathering system and having two member tribunals at the initial 
determination stage. Far more is also spent in Canada on providing legal aid to claimants, an 
amount which is not seen here. What is hard to compare are the costs of having many failed 
claimants in Australia continue onto the RRT, which means that most claimants received two 
determinations on the merits, whereas they only receive one in Canada. 
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the detention of some classes of refugee claimants, 189 and those awaiting 
determination receive more extensive access to the social welfare net.190 By 
contrast, the waiting time for an initial determination in Australia is 
considerably shorter than in Canada, 191 and the Australian government assists 
more people per capita to arrive under its offshore humanitarian program. All 
of these factors point to refugee admission as having a more accepted place in 
Canadian culture. As I elaborated in Chapter Two, this does not make the 
Canadian system better. Since there is no just standard for who should be 
admitted to the liberal nation it is impossible to conclude that admitting more 
refugees, or more refugees per capita is better or morally superior. While 
individual morality will lead each of us to make a judgment about these issues, 
there is no standard for the liberal nation. 
189 Ss. 176-197 of the Migration Act provide for the detention of certain non-citizens in 
Australia. Unauthorised people who have arrived by boat between 1989 and 1994 were the first 
category of people for whom detention was mandatory. The provisions now extend to include 
more recent "boat people" and other unlawful non-citizens. Under the decision of the High 
Court in Chu Kheng Lim and Ors v Minister for Immigration Local Government and Ethnic 
Affairs andAnor (1992) 176 CLR 1, these provisions were upheld even though s.183 provides 
that "a court is not to order the release from immigration detention of a designated person." 
Claimants can also be detained in Canada, although it is discretionary rather than mandatory. 
Until 1999 it was not often used, although a number of boat arrivals in mid-1999 have been 
detained until their CROP hearing (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Speech to 
Canadian Council for Refugees, Niagara Falls, 3 December 1999). 
190 In Canada refugee claimants are entitled to an employment authorisation if failure to grant 
one would result in hardship, to limited healthcare coverage (similar to Australia) and to some 
income support (levels vary by province of residence). See Ion S, "Benefits/Entitlements for 
Refugee Claimants: What They Get and Why They Get It", paper submitted in part completion 
of LLB at the University of British Columbia, 1998. In Australia, refugee claimants are now 
entitled to limited health care and may only work if they hold a visa which gives them this right. 
They are not eligible for social security but after a six month waiting period may apply for 
Asylum Seekers Assistance which provides a lower level of support. 
191 Average processing time for the CRDD in 1997-98 was 12.5 months (Annual Report p.10). 
In Australia, Departmental statistics show that 60% of detention cases were fmalised within six 
weeks, 33% of priority applications from people who have suffered torture and trauma were 
finalised within 3 months, 74 percent of applications from people in receipt of needs based 
funding for impoverished asylum seekers were finalised within 3 months and 57% of 
determinations were processed within 3 months. These statistics refer to the pre-RRT phase of 
decision-making (Annual Report, Website version, Sub-program 3.2 p.4). 
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The conclusion that can be drawn from the comparison is about the 
character of the nation. Canadian culture is more accepting of refugees than is 
Australian. This is partially linked to an overall tolerance for higher rates of 
migration and partially related to the fact that refugee admission is the most 
challenging branch of the migration program to control and strikes closest to the 
heart of national sovereignty. The two areas where I noted that the Australian 
refugee program is more expansive than the Canadian are instructive. A more 
efficient processing time allows the government to remove people who are not 
determined to be refugees in a shorter time, thereby reducing the amount of time 
that they are potentially assisted by the state and reducing the likelihood that 
they will develop significant ties to the Australian community, especially if they 
are in detention. The time difference may be illusory as unsuccessful refugee 
claimants have access not only to the RRT at a review stage, but also to the 
Federal and High Courts,192 but one aim of the system is clearly to have 
ineligible claimants leave as quickly as possible. The government is now 
working to introduce a privative clause which will strictly curtail access to the 
courts for unsuccessful claimants193 to further this goal. The Australian 
preference for offshore refugees also fits in with the control ideology as offshore 
refugees have no legal claim to Australian protection and can be selected 
192 Unsuccessful claimants at the CRDD in Canada can seek leave to appeal to the Canadian 
Federal Court for judicial review on the full range of grounds specified in the Federal Court Act 
RSC 1985, c.F-7, s.18. This leave is granted in about 1% of cases. At present, claimants 
unsuccessful before the RRT can ask the Federal Court to judicially review a decision, without 
seeking leave, on a range of grounds specified in the Migration Act (s.476). This range is 
narrower than the Canadian list. Most significantly, RRT decisions are not reviewable for 
breaches of the rules ofnaturaljustice (s.476(2)). 
193 First introduced as Migration Legislation Amendment Bill No 5of1997 and reintroduced in 
1998 as the Migration Legislation (Judicial Review) Amendment Bill. 
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according to any criteria which Australia chooses. In a revealing comment, one 
Immigration and Citizenship Canada official stated that that Department had 
tried to reduce the number of refugees admitted to be closer to the Australian 
scheme but had simply not been as "successful" because of citizen pressure.194 
Canadian refugee policy taps directly into this public sentiment through the 
private sponsorship scheme.195 
The operation of refugee law in both countries leaves an image of the 
nation with the quality of a photographic negative - stripped of its colour and 
oddly reversed. Australia is identified as striving for a homogenous identity 
despite its multicultural commitments, as concerned about the size of its 
population, as wanting a rigid and impenetrable border. As befits a nation 
founded on multi-cultures and north of a land border, Canada appears here as 
more committed to multicultures, given that the alternative is not possible, more 
concerned with fairness in process than with efficiency - even though the end 
result is not much different. 
The control which the Australian nation imprints on its refugee law is an 
image of the control it wishes to exert over its national identity. Contemporary 
refugee law, even with its acceptance of the international definition of a refugee, 
does not escape the shadow of the White Australia Policy and the carefully 
constructed migration schemes aimed to reproduce the English nation. 
Canadian refugee law tells a somewhat different story, paralleling in some ways 
194 Interview, June 1997. 
195 Private-sponsorship accounted for 2,659 refugee landings in fiscal 1997 (April 1, 1997-
March 31, 1998). This scheme was introduced during the Indochinese refugee crisis of the 
1980s and proved hugely successful. 
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the more contested White Canada policies. In a curious precursor to the 
bureaucratic comments above, the constellation of policies which constituted 
White Canada were less successfully implemented. The interpretations of the 
Refugee Convention in the national courts also contributes somewhat to this 
picture, a point which is further addressed by engaging the relationship between 
rights and identity in Chapter Five. 
D. CONCLUSION: REFUGEES IN THE MIGRATION LAWS OF 
LIBERAL NATIONS 
The differences in the refugee determination processes in Australia and 
Canada are revealing but are overshadowed by the similarities in the two 
systems which conform to the place of refugee admission in the migration laws 
of liberal nations. The process reflects and reinforces the identity of the refugee 
as the ultimate other to the nation, the extreme point of contrast. As well as 
occurring at the border of the nation, refugee determination occurs at the edge of 
the law, just beyond the reach of many of the core values of the common law. 
As refugee admissions are part of the immigration regime in both countries, they 
belong to the legal regime where there is no justice standard against which the 
nation's law or policy can be adequately measured. For all these reasons, using 
identity as an analytic tool to examine the refugee admission process is 
appropriate. Other legal and ethical assessments are severely limited in their 
applicability to this realm of decision-making precisely because it is an area of 
sovereign assertion that constructs an identity for the nation, an identity as 
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refugee, and finally by reducing pre-existing identities to a few narrow points, 
an identity as new member of the nation. A focus on the roles of identity in 
refugee law points to several conclusions about the place of refugees in liberal 
migration laws and about those laws more generally. 
First, despite the placement of refugees within the immigration program, 
refugee admission and migrant admission raise different issues in the popular 
discourse of the nation as well as in its law. The Western nations which admit 
the largest numbers of refugees have historically welcomed immigrants. To 
admit people who are not welcome in their own homelands today joins the 
tradition in both Australia and Canada of admitting others seeking to rebuild 
their lives in places with more freedom. What is different, however, is the 
immigrant-refugee distinction. This distinction is a product of the twentieth 
century and reflects the relationship of each group to the nation. The traditional 
mythology of immigration in both Australia and Canada portrays immigrants as 
the builders and founders of the nation. Their courage, independence, hard 
work and sheer will are held up, in various ways, as important to establishing 
the prosperous nations their descendants live in. The role of immigrants as 
service providers for the nation remains a key plank of migration law and 
migration rhetoric. 196 Modern immigrants are supposed to bring economic 
resources or support for families. Refugees, however, are not viewed in this 
way. In the collective imagining of refugees, it is the individual who benefits 
from admission to the nation. The nation is generous and good, sharing its 
prosperity with the huddled masses. 
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This is a late modem turn in migration discourse. The "mere economic 
refugees" for whom Australian and Canadian public discourse exhibits so much 
scorn are no different from most of the founding immigrants.197 But Australia 
and Canada are no longer in need of hardworking pioneers, and most of the 
founding waves of migrants would not be admissible under contemporary rules. 
The new world is no longer the unmapped frontier far from the safe hearths of 
Europe. These new nations of - former - immigrants have established identities 
and by many measures have eclipsed the living standards of the old world. 
National prosperity has grounded the establishment of the welfare state and it is 
no longer only the toughest who can survive here. In this climate, then, it is 
possible to divide newcomers into immigrant and refugee categories; the former 
serving the nation, the latter being served. This development becomes possible 
when the nation is no longer identified with the frontier. 
A second set of conclusions about the liberal nation can be drawn from the 
distinct slippage between the term refugee and the term immigrant, a discursive 
confusion which demonstrates a degree of unease with separating the categories 
and offers a strong potential for political exploitation. The unease arises 
because the distinction between refugees and immigrants complicates the 
196 Both Australia and Canada have recently shifted to make economic migration a larger 
category than family migration. In Canada this shift came in 1995 and in Australia in 1997-98. 
197 This theme is seen often in the press. For example O'Donnell L, "When the Boat Comes In, 
Australian 17-18 April 1999 at 19; Ryszard P, "Charitable Cases Undermine the Integrity of the 
Refugee Net", Australian, 20 November 1998, at 15. Canada's Building on a Strong 
Foundation for the 21st Century (above n 48 at Ch 11 p.3) states: 
Some economic migrants apply for refugee status because they know that this avenue 
allows entry and possibly a lengthy stay in Canada, during which they are permitted 
to work or receive social assistance if needed. The abuse of the asylum process by 
migrants not in need of protection undermines the credibility of Canada's refugee 
determination system and diverts limited resources from the original purpose, which 
is to protect genuine refugees through an expeditious adjudication of their claim. 
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boundary between members and others. The outsiders are differentiated by this 
distinction. Decisions about admitting immigrants are in part made on the basis 
of what those people have in common with members of the community; we 
select people who can speak our languages, who can participate in our 
workforce, who already have close relatives among us and whose presence 
therefore meets the emotional needs of those we already count as members. 
Decisions about refugees are envisioned on an entirely different basis. Refugees 
are admitted because of what they lack: legal and actual protections from 
dangers we assume (usually rightly) do not occur within our borders. But once 
refugees are admitted they are treated as immigrants, expected to become like-
us, to build the new identities we have created the space for by strategically 
reshaping and reducing their previous ones.198 Thus refugees have a complex 
relationship with national identity building. They are expected to contribute in 
the way which all immigrants do to the identity of the nation, by first reflecting 
and then adopting national values and becoming members of the national 
community. Refugees through their neediness contribute to the identity of the 
nation as good, generous and prosperous, as does the refugee determination 
process which labels some other nation as "bad". 
These dual facets of the refugee's relationship to national identity explain 
part of the slippage between the refugee and immigrant roles. Another part of 
the explanation is found in the complexity of the refugee definition and the fact 
that it does not parallel common understanding of the word. The opportunity 
198 The latest Canadian Government report at least partially recognises some of the problems of 
having the same expectations for both groups and recommends that refugees be given more than 
1 year to "settle" (above n 48, Ch 11 at 1.) 
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for political manipulation is found in the lack of popular understanding of the 
differences between the two groups. One contemporary example is of "boat 
people" "queue jumpers", as though they could simply join in line and wait their 
turn, whereas in reality they do not qualify for any immigrant queue.199 
Government officials can draw on public humanitarian good will towards 
refugees when immigration quotas are expanded and can tap into public hostility 
towards more open immigration when introducing measures which make 
refugee admission harder. While the issues ought to be analytically separate, 
they overlap in popular discourse. When the Australian Minister of 
Immigration says that the young woman named Australian of the year is a 
former Vietnamese refugee and an immigrant success story, he is of course 
telling a version of the truth.200 Although she was not an immigrant in a strict 
sense, the achievements which brought this honour to her belong to the 
mythology of migrants, not the abject need of refugees. The confusion in the 
first half of 1999 about whether refugees from Kosovo should be admitted to 
non-European nations permanently, temporarily or not at all reflects part of this 
confusion. In the United States and Australia public sentiment raged against 
plans to admit people temporarily and isolate them from the population. 201 Many 
199 This statement is part of the governing party's policy statement in the recent national 
election: 
The Coalition will not tolerate blatant queue-jumping. This practice unfairly benefits 
a minority at the expense of the majority with equal or superior claims to entry. 
(Liberal Party of Australia, Immigration Building on Integrity and Compassion, 
www .liberal.org.au/ ARCHIVE ... locx/immigration) 
200 Hon Phillip Ruddock, Address, National Press Club, 18 March 1998. 
201 Shanahan D, "Anyone Who Had a Heart", Australian, 10-11April1999, at 27; Murray J, 
"Noblesse Oblige Should Begin at Home, Australian 17 June 1999 at 13. 
181 
members of the public wanted the newcomers treated as immigrants even 
though they clearly were not. The strength of sentiment was so strong in 
Australia that arguably the discursive confusion was successfully deployed 
against government interests, even though in the end the matter was resolved at 
the international level by a UNHCR decision to keep the majority of refugees 
close to their former home to emphasise their temporary status and facilitate a 
return home.202 
The final point to be made about the migration law of the liberal nation 
based on the discussion of refugee admittance emerges directly from the issues 
presented by this discursive conflation of the two identities. The international 
norms surrounding refugees fall short of an obligation to admit refugees, let 
alone to admit them as permanent members of the community. For some 
nations, admission of refugees is not a choice at all - refugees cross their 
borders uninvited and it becomes a real or political impossibility to invoke the 
coercive force of the state to remove them. It is no coincidence that this is not 
the case for most prosperous Western nations, for those who developed the 
refugee definition. Both Canada and Australia are distant from nations which 
are currently generating large numbers of refugees. The spectre of boat loads of 
Indochinese arriving on Australia's northern shores and Canada's long largely 
unpoliced border with the United States notwithstanding, neither nation has ever 
coped with a Kosovar exodus. For these nations, admitting refugees is a 
political choice which partly reflects genuine liberal humanitarianism. That is, 
while the Refugee Convention may not effectively limit sovereignty, the 
202 Overcrowding in refugee camps in near states led the UNHCR to ask distant states to take 
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humanitarian sentiment it embodies has a moral resonance in these nations. 
This cannot be a complete explanation. And indeed much of the structure of 
contemporary refugee law would not exist if it were. 203 The resonance of 
humanitarianism in this area of migrant admissions underscores the importance 
of looking behind that value to see its persistent importance to liberal 
understandings of migration law. I turn to that topic in Chapter Four. 
refugees, even temporarily, by the end of April, 1999. 
203 Patricia Tuitt argues that "refugee law is not motivated by exclusively humanitarian concerns 
- indeed, if the concerns of the law are humanitarian it is only marginally and incidentally so" 
above n 9 at 7. 
183 
Chapter Four 
Reflecting Ourselves - The Mirror of Humanitarianism 
In both Australia and Canada, the refugee program is only one of several 
ways in which migrants are admitted on a humanitarian basis. In this Chapter, I 
consider the full range of humanitarian admissions to each country. Through 
this discussion I extend the argument developed thus far in two directions. By 
considering the ways individuals and groups are admitted under the 
humanitarian rubric I broaden the conclusions about the othering process 
discussed in Chapter Three. Second, by considering the overall phenomenon 
and mechanics of humanitarian admissions I expose and draw conclusions about 
the role of humanitarianism in liberal migration law and about the importance of 
humanitarianism for the construction of the identity of the nation. These aspects 
of the Chapter refine and develop the Chapter Two discussion of the 
humanitarian consensus in liberal discourses regarding migration. 
The core of the argument in Chapter Three was that the othering process 
contributes to constructing the nation's identity through its emphasis on those 
who are outsiders to the nation, who do not belong, and whose admission must 
be closely scrutinised. Through this process, the members of the in-group are 
identified in contrast. The others are everything that we are not, everything that 
we reject and quarantine. Considering the role of humanitarianism in migration 
law and in relation to national identification adds another dimension to the 
picture of national identity. Migration law not only portrays the nation and its 
members as having distinct values and attributes from outsiders, through 
humanitarianism it also paints the insiders as good, generous, and 
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magnanimous. Through this label both the nation and its members are 
portrayed as virtuous. 
As established in the Chapter Two framework, humanitarianism occupies 
a curiously central place in migration discourses. Despite the relatively small 
proportion of migrants who are admitted each year to prosperous Western 
nations on humanitarian bases, 1 humanitarianism is an important aspect of 
migration discourses. On expelling a group of unsuccessful refugee claimants, 
the office of the Canadian Minister of Citizenship and Immigration issued a 
press release entitled "The Government of Canada Honours its Humanitarian 
Tradition. "2 The Australian Minister of Immigration has stated proudly that 
"how we respond to the humanitarian crises that continue to plague the world 
defines us as a nation .... We are a nation that can be proud of its record of 
responding to refugee and humanitarian problems. "3 Humanitarianism is a 
rallying cry for those who feel that more refugees should be admitted4 and a 
point of pride held out by national representatives in international fora. 5 In 
political discourses about immigration past and present, humanitarianism 
1 See Appendix A. See also Chapter Two, note 148. 
2 "Situation of the Chileans in Montreal: The Government of Canada Honours its Humanitarian 
Tradition" press release, Honourable Lucienne Robitaille, Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada, 28 September 1998. 
3 Minister of Immigration, Honourable Phillip Ruddock, 26 March 1998, Address to the 
Victorian Press Club. 
4 Despite the argument that onshore refugee admissions could be viewed as rights claims, see 
Ch. 3 at pp. 116-123. The rhetoric ofrights is antithetical to that of humanitarianism. 
5 "How we respond to the humanitarian crises that continue to plague the world defines us as a 
nation. How we act on the global stage conveys to others what we are." Honourable Phillip 
Ruddock, Minister of Immigration in Address to the Victorian Press Club, Melbourne, 26 
March 1998. In a similar vein, Honourable Eleanor Caplan, Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada, stated in a 3 December 1999 Address to the Canadian Council for 
Refugees meeting in Niagara Falls, " ... if immigration has been a vital part of Canada's social, 
economics and cultural success, our refugee system has earned us our reputation as a 
humanitarian leader in the world." 
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occupies a place which belies its relatively minor contribution to annual 
migration intake in both Australia and Canada. Examining the construction of 
humanitarianism in this discourse sheds light both on its crucial role in 
migration discussions and on how migration law serves the needs of the liberal 
nation and in the process contributes to the identity of the nation. 
The analysis in this Chapter begins with a discussion of the contours and 
the limits of liberalism's humanitarian consensus. It then outlines how 
humanitarianism is written into the Canadian Immigration Act and the 
Australian Migration Act. Drawing on this description, I consider how the 
Canadian courts have developed the notion of humanitarianism and how the 
Australian Minister exercises humanitarian discretion. The contrasts in 
Australian and Canadian deployments of humanitarianism provide grounding 
for the subsequent analyses of the differences between judicial and executive 
control of this aspect of the law, the particular identities of the beneficiaries of 
humanitarianism, and how humanitarianism points up differences between 
Australian and Canadian perceptions of the national self. 
A. HUMANITARIANISM IN LIBERAL THEORY 
1. The Humanitarian Consensus 
Despite the absence of a liberal agreement about how many immigrants 
must be admitted by a just nation, 6 liberal theorists writing about migration do 
agree that the borders of the nation must be opened to some needy outsiders. 7 
This agreement is articulated differently in the work of closed border theorists 
6 Described in Chapter Two at pp. 76-82. 
7 I have explored the humanitarian consensus in more detail in "Amorality and Humanitarianism 
in Immigration Law" ( 1999) 3 7 Osgoode Hall Law Journal in press. 
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than in that of those advocating open borders. The various ways that this 
humanitarian commitment is expressed are important to understanding its role 
in migration laws and its relationship to national self-identifications. It is also 
useful to consider how the rhetoric of humanitarianism masks other issues, and 
historical shifts, in migration to Australia and Canada. 
For Walzer, whose seminal work Spheres of Justice, presents a 
comprehensive defence of closed borders as a necessary condition for the just 
liberal community,8 the principle of mutual aid generates particular duties to 
admit some outsiders. Admitting that the requirements of mutual aid are 
indeterminate, Walzer argues that the duty to provide mutual aid arises in cases 
of need or urgent need and when the risks or costs of providing such aid are 
relatively low.9 While this duty can sometimes be met by yielding territory-
that is changing the geography rather than the composition of the community -
or by exporting wealth, 10 the needs of some outsiders are for membership itself 
and therefore can only be met by allowing them to join the community. I I The 
guidance which this principle provides to the hypothetical liberal community is 
limited because Walzer asserts that at some unspecified point the community 
will be justified in closing its borders even to those who have a need for 
membership itself. The community faced with more needy outsiders than it can 
8 Walzer M, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, Basic Books, New York, 
1983, see especially Chapter Two: Membership. 
9 Ibid. at 33-34. 
10 Massive increases in foreign aid are often hypothesised as the just alternative to massive 
increases in migration to prosperous Western nations. This is part of Walzer's argument as 
well. What these arguments ignore is that the political sentiments opposing open borders are 
equally opposed to implementing increases in foreign aid. Louis Michael Seidman discusses 
this in "Fear and Loathing at the Border" in Schwartz W F ( ed), Justice in Immigration, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, 136 at 142 and passim. 
11 Above n 8 at 48. 
187 
admit ought to then choose from among them on the basis of their connection 
with the community. That is, there is a higher obligation to those whose plight 
we are responsible for12 or who are persecuted because they are like us in some 
way. 13 Walzer's principles for humanitarian admission then are limited to those 
who cannot be assisted in other ways and who can be admitted with little impact 
on the community. 
Not surprisingly given both the minimal and the indeterminate nature of 
this commitment, both Australian and Canadian current humanitarian 
admissions policies fit within these theoretical parameters. Walzer concludes 
that "the principle of mutual aid can only modify and not transform admissions 
policies rooted in a particular community's understanding of itself."14 In 
Walzer's communitarian analysis, admission policies and community identity 
are, predictably, linked directly. 15 Turning to other, avowedly non-
communitarian perspectives, however, this link remains crucial. Furthermore, 
12 The culturally specific and dated example which Walzer refers to are Vietnamese refugees, 
ibid at 49. 
13 Walzer distinguishes between refugees and asylees, using the terms in ways which do not 
correspond with their legal uses in Australia and Canada. He refers to refugees as those who 
have not yet entered the nation and asylees as those who meet the neediness standard which 
triggers the mutual aid principle and have already entered the country. The obligation to asylees 
is higher because " .. .its denial would require us to use force against helpless and desperate 
people, and because the numbers likely to be involved, except in unusual cases, are small and 
the people are easily absorbed." ibid at 51. 
14 Ibid at 51. 
15 Coleman J L and Harding S K, "Citizenship, Justice and Political Borders" in Schwartz W F 
( ed) above n 10 at 18 take a similar communitarian position arguing that political communities 
are entitled to exclude because of their characteristics as communities. They also assert that 
"refugees have a right to immigrate" (at 46). Their conclusions are based on a survey of current 
immigration laws and policies in 8 nations. Their assertion of a right to immigrate does not 
accord with international law, as was detailed in Chapter 3 at pp. l 02-109. The Refugee 
Convention does not grant any "rights" save the right not to be returned to a place where one 
will be persecuted for a Convention reason. Further, the obligations of the Convention are not 
triggered until the individuals have arrived in the country whose protection is sought and even at 
that the claims raised are not regarded as rights claims by most domestic courts. 
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while I agree with Walzer that humanitarian admissions can modify a 
community's understanding of itself, this modification is always accompanied 
and superseded by the nation's identity as humanitarian. This is the point I will 
return to after examining some other perspectives on the duty to admit needy 
outsiders. 
Galloway's articulation ofthis argument is important because he 
advocates closed borders without specifically embracing communitarianism. 16 
In Galloway's view, the liberal state ought to function as a "self-help device for 
moral individuals."17 It is this function of the state which leads to the 
requirement that some humanitarian migrants must be accepted. While the state 
is morally free to close its borders to claims raised from outside, when its own 
members seek the admission of outsiders as a fulfilment of their own personal 
moral duties, then the state ought allow these admissions. He summarises the 
proposition this way: 
It may be the case that some members of a community rightly identify 
it to be their moral duty to render assistance to an alien in need, not by 
giving that person money or other resources, but by providing shelter and 
a human support network. If the state prevented the admission of people 
for whom provision would be made by a member, it would be hindering 
that member's fulfilment of her moral duty. A liberal would be justified 
in criticising an immigration scheme which did not allow for private 
sponsorships . 
. . . Insofar as there are citizens who are willing and able to provide for 
needy aliens, and who are also able to satisfy the needs of their 
dependants, it is incumbent on the liberal state not to create barriers which 
would impede them in their attempt to provide the conditions of autonomy 
to foreigners. 18 
16 Galloway asserts that "closed borders are consistent with 'pure' liberalism." Galloway D, 
"Liberalism, Globalism and Immigration" (1993) 18 Queen's Law Journal 266 at 286. 
Galloway's analysis of liberalism in immigration law is further developed in "Three Models of 
(ln)equality" (1993) 38 McGill Law Journal 64, and "Strangers and Members: Equality in an 
Immigration Setting" (1994) 7 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 149. 
17 Ibid. "Liberalism, Globalism and Immigration" at 294. 
18 Ibid. at 295-6. 
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In Galloway's analysis, the commitment to humanitarianism draws its principal 
support not from the need or other characteristics of those seeking to be 
admitted, but from the individual moralities of those who are members of the 
community. The identity which matters in this equation is that of the member, 
not that of the outsider. This demonstrates another aspect of humanitarianism 
which figures in my analysis. For Galloway, the personal moral duty to assist 
an outsider through physical support that could not be provided outside the 
community tells us something about the morality of the individual who holds 
this duty. That individual is someone we would call good, generous, or even 
(erroneously) selfless. This level of moral commitment is higher than what is 
required of members of the liberal community that Galloway describes, and 
would necessarily in his analysis be outside the norm. 19 Humanitarianism is 
more than is expected, more than justice demands; it tells us several things 
about those who offer it and little about those who receive its benefits. 
For theorists who advocate open borders to the liberal community, 
humanitarianism obviously plays a different role in the analysis as it is not 
treated as an exception to what is otherwise the rule. Interestingly, however, the 
open borders position is often supported through a detailed argument precisely 
about humanitarianism. Carens is one of the most prolific and theoretically 
thorough of the open border advocates.20 His argument that liberalism supports 
19 If it were not outside the norm his defence of closed borders would be internally inconsistent 
on this standard. This moral commitment crosses what James Fishkin describes as the threshold 
of heroism; Fiskin J, The Limits of Obligation, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1982. 
Fishkin's description of the central tension in liberalism between impartiality and individuality 
can be mapped onto this discussion. See further my "Amorality and Humanitarianism in 
Immigration Law" above n 7. 
20 Aspects of his position are elaborated in Carens J H, "Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open 
Borders" ( 1987) 49 The Review of Politics 251; "Membership and Morality: Admission to 
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open borders draws on his claim that utilitarian, Rawlsian and Nozickian 
versions of liberalism converge upon this point and that the argument is further 
supported by extrapolating Rawls' original position device to the international 
plane.21 While his analysis ofNozick's argument is not grounded in a 
humanitarian argument, it is by considering admissions of a humanitarian 
character that he builds his conclusions about Rawls and about utilitarianism. 
Regarding the former, Carens urges that considering the Rawlsian principles of 
the priority of liberty and the perspective of the worst off we would be 
compelled to admit at least those whose liberty was not protected in their 
current situations as well as the worst off of the potential migrant pool. 22 That 
is, we would be compelled to admit those who in our current migration regimes 
are considered to be classic political refugees and destitute humanitarian 
claimants. For the latter, Carens argues that when the greatest good of the 
greatest number is calculated particular attention must be paid to those outsiders 
to the nation who have the most to gain from entry. When their good is entered 
into the calculus, it is hard to deny admission. 23 
This argument as well is concerned with the type of admission which is 
usually provided for in the various humanitarian categories, rather than under 
family or economic migration programs. Carens' argument that borders should 
Citizenship in Liberal Democratic States" in Brubaker W (ed) Immigration and the Politics of 
Citizenship in Europe and North America, University Press of America, Lanham MD, 1989, 31; 
"Who Belongs? Theoretical and Legal Questions About Birthright Citizenship in the United 
States" (1987) 37 University of Toronto Law Review413; "Refugees and the Limits of 
Obligation" (1992) 6 Public Affairs Quarterly 31; "Migration and Morality: A Liberal 
Egalitarian Perspective" in B Barry and R Goodin (eds) Free Movement: Ethical Issues in the 
Transnational Migration of People and Money, Pennsylvania State University Press, University 
Park PA, 1992, 25. 
21 "Aliens and Citizens" ibid. at 258. 
22 Ibid. at 260-62. 
23 Ibid. at 262-63. 
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generally be open, 24 even to those who do not raise humanitarian claims, is 
grounded in the same liberal consensus about humanitarian admission which I 
am sketching here. In arguing out the case for open borders, it is not the spectre 
of wealthy jet-setters with multiple citizenships, or of investors with financial 
interests around the globe which forms the back drop for the argument. Rather, 
this argument draws on the emotive power of vast disparities in wealth between 
nations in the world and the assumption that many people in poorer countries 
would prefer to live in more prosperous states.25 To make their case, open 
border advocates appeal to the humanitarian impulse, even though most 
migration to prosperous Western nations is approved on family reunion or 
economic bases and has little to do with humanitarianism. 
Peter and Renata Singer offer yet another perspective on the open border 
position which draws strongly on a humanitarian setting. Their version of the 
utilitarian calculus is that the doubling of refugee admissions to prosperous 
states could continue for a considerable time before the benefits to those being 
admitted would outweigh any detriment to the community.26 In its extreme this 
argument is of course controversiai27 and suggests a commitment to radical 
global redistribution ofwealth.28 Their more modest view is that Walzer's 
mutual aid principle ought to be viewed much more expansively and that our 
24 Carens would allow the least possible restrictions if the sheer numbers seeking admission 
threaten national security, ibid at 260. 
25 The closed border argument draws on this image as well, of course, to vastly differing ends. 
26 Singer P and Singer R, "The Ethics of Refugee Policy" in Open Borders? Closed Societies? 
The Ethical and Political Issues, Greenwood Press, New York, 1988, 111. Their argument is a 
literal example of lifeboat ethics. 
27 Carens takes issue with aspects of it in "Refugees and the Limits of Obligation" above n 20. 
28 To this extent is echoes Carens' view that birth in a prosperous Western nation is the modern 
equivalent of feudal privilege, "Aliens and Citizens" above n 20 at 251-52. 
192 
understanding of 'need' should ground a considerable increase in admissions for 
permanent settlement even with no alterations to family or economic migrant 
categories. Where their argument parallels Carens' is in using the established 
humanitarian consensus as a building block in an argument for far-reaching 
change. 
Another important branch of liberal theory about migration is formed by 
theorists who do not engage in the debate about whether liberalism requires 
open or closed borders but who, instead, assert on a pragmatic basis that the 
value of humanitarianism requires that more needy people be admitted to 
prosperous nations regardless of our views about the ultimate morality of 
borders. This avenue of theorisation is important both because it emphasises 
humanitarianism and therefore can reveal something about its contours and 
because it provides an agenda for political action in the world dominated by 
national sovereignty, by taking sovereignty as a given and seeking ways to 
manipulate politics within that framework. 
Writing of the American setting, Kent and Scanlan articulate this position 
fully. They argue that while liberalism requires open borders, implementing 
such a policy is politically impossible.29 They claim that a call for shifting 
immigration policy on the ground of a liberal conception of justice will be ever 
unsuccessful. Rather, given the paramountcy in American culture of rhetoric of 
political freedom and human rights, arguments which focus on the these types 
of claims by migrants will garner support. In other words, Scanlan and Kent 
assert that only humanitarian rhetoric will support a shift in the law in the 
29 Scanlan J A and Kent 0 T, "The Force of Moral Arguments for a Just Immigration Policy in a 
Hobbesian Universe" in M Gibney (ed), above n 26, 61 at 65. 
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United States and that other claims, regardless of their philosophical soundness, 
will fail to win sufficient political support.30 In their view, those who advocate 
expansion of admission quotas are best to draw on the well established "myth of 
American generosity."31 That is, they advocate enhancing and then courting the 
humanitarian self-identification of the liberal nation. 
Seidman's argument that any serious analysis of migration law and policy 
must take account of the limits of our capacity for empathy is similarly 
positioned. He argues convincingly that our capacity to care is partially 
associated with physical location within our borders. 32 Given the curious nature 
of our compassion - that it seems to diminish at our borders, the politically 
possible humanitarian option in migration is to continue with restrictive laws 
but to also permit and accept very lax enforcement of them. 33 This treatment of 
the issue reveals that humanitarianism may be something that is unworkable as 
a legal standard. While our impulse may be to humanitarian gesture in a given 
scenario, we may be reluctant to make generosity the rule. This is another 
reason for its position in the traditional law versus discretion dichotomy. 
Equally, it may be difficult to formulate a rule based on humanitarianism 
because the concept itself is elusive. Like Scanlan and Kent, Seidman does not 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. at 63. 
32 Seidman L M, "Fear and Loathing at the Border" in Schwartz W F (ed) above n 10 at 142. 
33 Ibid at 137. In some ways this corresponds with the current position in Canada. While many 
people are told each year that they must leave the country, few removal or exclusion orders are 
followed up (deportation orders are, however). Furthermore, Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada does not collect statistics on how many orders are complied with. In a private 
interview, one Departmental official suggested that it would not be in the Department's best 
interests to try and find out who was actually leaving. In response to my question in a public 
forum in October 1997, the then Australian Minister for Immigration stated that his Department 
similarly did not keep statistics on enforcement of its various departure orders. This position 
also corresponds with the Canadian practice of allowing exceptions to various Immigration Act 
provisions on humanitarian grounds, see below at pp. 203-209. 
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argue that this is morally right, but, rather, that it is politically feasible. In his 
conclusion he states: 
Membership is important not because it is a moral right that justifies 
exclusion, but because it is a political reality that blocks inclusion. We 
should not ignore that reality when we formulate immigration policy. But 
neither should we reinforce it so as to provide ammunition for those 
interested in justifying the status quo.34 
Both these analyses emphasise that when we argue for changes in the law to 
allow increased admissions, it is the language of humanitarianism which is most 
persuasive in liberal cultures. The humanitarian consensus runs through all 
strands of liberal theoretical discussions about immigration, which is itself an 
indicator of the potential instability of its meaning. 
2. The meaning of humanitarianism 
One important reason for the pre-eminent role of humanitarianism in 
immigration discourses is precisely that it is the point of convergence for those 
liberals who claim the need for closed borders, those who assert the importance 
of open borders, and those who claim that this intractable argument must be 
circumvented to achieve real change. For those who take up the question of just 
immigration on a theoretical plane, humanitarianism is the crux of the issue. 
Looking beyond this to specify the meaning of humanitarianism reveals its 
relationship to national identity in the liberal nation. 
Every liberal theorist looking at this question argues that more needy 
outsiders ought to be admitted to wealthy Western nations. 35 At a minimum, 
34 Above n 32 at 144-45. 
35 Of those discussed above, this is the explicit position of Walzer, Coleman and Harding, 
Carens, Singer and Singer, Scanlan and Kent, Seidman. This position is also implied in 
Galloway's work, especially considering his argument in "Strangers and Members: Equality in 
an Immigration Setting" above n 16. Others who would support this position include Tushnet 
M, "Immigration Policy in Liberal Political Theory "in Schwartz WF (ed) above n 10, 147, and 
Adelman H, "Justice, Immigration and Refugees 'in Adelman H et al {eds), Immigration and 
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this is the substance of the humanitarian consensus: by any liberal standard 
contemporary nations are failing in their moral obligations. Beyond this 
humanitarianism spells out little. Both Walzer and the Singers would agree that 
a nation must only admit those it has the capacity to admit, but that capacity 
would be defined dramatically differently in each argument. For Galloway, the 
limit of humanitarianism is unknowable, given that it depends on the individual 
moralities of all members. Carens' restriction for national security concerns is 
open, at least, to manipulation. For those taking a pragmatic position, the limit 
of humanitarianism will be drawn when its rhetorical political potential is 
exhausted. In any given nation this provides an imaginable limit, but not more. 
The humanitarian consensus tells us nothing about the numbers of economic or 
family migrants who ought to be admitted, and therefore adds very little to the 
core issues of popular political debate in Canada and Australia. 36 
Humanitarianism cannot tell us how many immigrants a just nation should 
admit because at its core it differs profoundly from justice. Humanitarianism is 
the term describing all the best and most generous elements of liberal 
immigration laws. It sums up the emotional appeal of "give us your huddled 
masses" and defines our willingness to share our prosperity. Liberal 
humanitarianism, which is the pride of many nations which have comparatively 
open borders and are important international actors in questions of refugee 
Refugee Policy: Australia and Canada Compared, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 
1994, 63. 
36 In Australia and Canada popular debate and concern tends to focus on the overall number of 
new immigrants allowed, the vast majority of whom are in the economic or family migrant 
categories. This is not the case in Europe where popular controversy centres on admitting 
refugee claimants. This is partly because the older European nations are not 'nations of 
immigration', do not have on-going programs for immigration and only deal with the issue 
when faced with the demands of those already in their territory. These differences in setting 
would need to be accounted for in adapting my theoretical presentation of the relationship 
between immigration laws and national identity to 'old world' settings. 
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assistance, is based on inequality rather than justice. The central role of 
humanitarianism in immigration law makes the search for fair law and policy 
more difficult because it emphasises beneficence despite being ostensibly 
derived from a duty to needy outsiders. 
·I 
Humanitarianism provides a stand-in for justice in the immigration realm, 
i 
while reinforcing the boundary between an "us" group and a ''them" group. 
Justice is a standard that implies, and applies, equality between individuals. 
Humanitarianism is the opposite; it is grounded in a specific type of difference 
created by material inequality. We have something, in the case of migration law 
membership in a prosperous rights respecting state, that they do not. 
Humanitarianism in migration law functions only because of the profound 
inequalities between members and non-members. When we are humanitarian 
we bestow, as a gift, something upon others who have no rightful claim to it. 
Keeping humanitarianism as the central concept in immigration and 
refugee law ensures that the law is about what "we" can give to "them." 
Humanitarianism is not a standard of obligation, as justice would be, but rather 
of charity. Humanitarianism defines us as good when we are able to meet the 
standard, and justifiable when we are not. As is the case with the principle of 
mutual aid, humanitarianism is very flexible. It does not provide principled 
guidance about whom to admit when. The obligation is minimal, depending on 
subjective perceptions of state capacity, of actions which can be taken with no 
risk or loss. It is well suited to the ways liberal societies use migration law to 
accommodate changing perceptions of national need, it can expand and contract 
easily with the domestic political environment. The elasticity of the boundary of 
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the nation has a perfect parallel in the concept of humanitarianism. The 
standard which humanitarianism provides for migration law is only to lay bare 
the complete dependence of this branch of the nation's legal framework on 
political consensus and rhetorical support. That is, this close examination of 
humanitarianism provides further support for Chapter Two's assertions about 
the roles of migration law in constituting the liberal nation. 
The inequality which humanitarianism enshrines reinforces difference 
between members and others. Through this function, it contributes to defining 
the identity of the nation. Part of this shaping of identity is achieved through 
the othering process described in Chapter Three. That is, we find aspects of 
identity by looking at those who are excluded, or who benefit from our 
beneficence. The humanitarianism of our laws also defines us directly, without 
any reference to those "others," as good and as generous. The mirror of 
humanitarianism reflects us as members of a nation which does more than it is 
required to do, which is more than just, better than fair. This sentiment is 
reflected in the Australian Minister for Immigration's comments regarding the 
1997 Australian of the Year who had come to the country as a refugee from 
Vietnam: 
Those who applauded this young woman, not only applaud her individual 
courage and achievements, but, I suspect, applauded themselves for being 
members of a community that, as she said in her acceptance speech, 
welcomed her so unquestioningly.37 
Part of our humanitarianism is about just that, applauding ourselves. When 
humanitarianism is used in immigration laws and discourses it tells us 
37 Minister Phillip Ruddock, "Immigration Reform: The Unfinished Agenda" Address at the 
National Press Club, Canberra, 18 March 1998. Notes available on Departmental Website, 
www.minister.immi.gov .au. 
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something about ourselves as a nation - that is, the extent of our aspirations to 
goodness - and something implicit about our national identity - that is, how we 
go about balancing the needs and claims of insiders and outsiders. The self-
conscious construction of ourselves as good becomes clearer through the 
examination in the next section of how humanitarianism is written into 
Australian and Canadian law. 
While I demonstrate that humanitarianism enshrines inequality and 
circumvents justice, and often holds the position of a self-serving ruse in the 
law, I would also strongly urge that it is a discourse of immense value in both 
law reform and national aspiration. Although arguments about what is the just 
number of migrants to admit will never be resolved in a way which takes 
account of justice for those outside the nation,38 aspiring to be generous and 
good introduces an important value to this law, even if it does not yield 
precision or clear standards and results in provisions which are difficult to 
interpret. The value of humanitarianism tempers, without altering, the blatant 
"self-centred-ness" of migration law. In analysing how this value is translated 
into legal effect, I conclude that the aspiration to generosity and goodness is 
often missed, in both Australia and Canada. Nonetheless, the rhetoric of 
humanitarianism is valuable because it calls on us to think beyond ourselves, 
even if we do fall short of the mark. While it is fraught with problems, it 
remains what is "best" about our liberal migration laws. Precisely because it is 
the point of liberal consensus, it is strategically, as Kent and Scanlan and 
Seidman suggest, the discourse which is most likely to be persuasive for those 
38 This is a proposition I discuss in Chapter Two at pp. 76-82. Analysing liberalism's failure to 
provide a justice standard for migration laws is a necessary precursor to the argument here about 
humanitarianism as the effective "stand in" for justice in liberal migration laws. 
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aspiring to change the law to make admissions policies more open or more 
responsive to those in need. 
3. Bifurcated Migration Laws 
The place of humanitarianism in Western migration laws is a 
comparatively recent development. As I discussed in Chapter Three in regard to 
refugee law,39 the importance of humanitarianism has emerged only in the latter 
half of the twentieth century. Specific provisions for narrowly defined refugees 
are one aspect of the broader migration stream encompassed by the term 
humanitarian. Two factors account for this emergence. First, it was not until 
the twentieth century that widespread immigration control and restrictive 
regimes became the norm;40 Second, the move to restrictive immigration 
regimes directly harnessed migration laws to the needs of the sovereign liberal 
nation. Once this linkage has been made, the rationale for migration must be 
understood in terms of national objectives. In the cases of family reunification 
migration and economic migration the linkages are easily drawn. 
When migration law is articulated as a means of fulfilling national ends, 
humanitarian migration emerges both as an exception, and as something which 
must somehow be fitted into the national need spectre, even if the connection is 
more subtle in this case. The need which is met by humanitarian migration is 
the need to define and understand the nation as compassionate and caring. The 
extent of our collective commitment to these aims is reflected in the amount of 
humanitarian migration we will tolerate. Humanitarian migration becomes the 
39 See Chapter Three at pp.102-104. 
40 Dummett A and Nicols A, Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and Others: Nationality and 
Immigration Law, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1990. 
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exception whereas in earlier times it would have been at least part of the rule. 
The starving Irish who fled to the Canadian colonies, those fleeing religious 
persecution who broke the earth of the Canadian prairie, the former convicts 
who chose freedom and remained in what was to become Australia, and the 
post-World War two migrants who manned the foundation of the contemporary 
Australian economy, and many or even most of the groups and individuals who 
originally grounded these nations of immigrants would all be humanitarian 
migrants by today's standards. The nature of migration, of what is at stake and 
of what type of person will serve a national need, has shifted. This is partially 
because Australia and Canada have become in the latter half of this century 
fully sovereign nations, and therefore completely in control of their borders. 
But the same shift has occurred even in Europe to a lesser extent. As migration 
laws in general stand as bulwarks against globalisation, migration increasingly 
becomes an option for the privileged. There is thus a bifurcation in the law 
between humanitarian and 'other' classes of migration. The notion of privileged 
and non-privileged migration is replicated within the humanitarian scheme as it 
is often the well-off who can pay for passage to a place like Canada or Australia 
and therefore gain the possibility of lodging a refugee claim, and, if the 
coincidence of other factors works in their favour have the nation treat their 
presence as a constraint on sovereignty. 
The same logic no longer applies to humanitarian and non-humanitarian 
migrants. Evidence of this is seen in the Australian separation between its 
"migration program" and its "humanitarian program"41 and in the 
recommendation of the 1997 Canadian Legislative Review panel that the 
41 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs "Fact Sheet: Key Facts in Immigration" 
available on the Departmental Website, www.immi.gov.au. 
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present immigration regime be replaced with two new acts, one dealing with 
immigration and citizenship and a second dealing with "protection."42 
Hathaway's proposal to reform international refugee law by implementing a 
truly temporary standard for refugee protection in other countries also relies 
crucially on separating responses to those who need humanitarian assistance 
from the usual concerns of migration law.43 While in the previous century settler 
societies were peopled by those we would now call humanitarian migrants, it 
seems the next century will see a further diminished place for permanent 
migration as a means to address humanitarian concerns. 
This bifurcation of the logical underpinning of migration law contributes 
to the conceptualisation of humanitarianism and to articulating the relationship 
between migration law and national identity. Humanitarianism is an exception 
to the rule of migration serving the national agenda, but it is such a limited 
exception that it must bend to the national agenda in some ways. As a result, 
humanitarianism cannot be more than aspirational, even while that aspiration 
retains its own value. The role of the humanitarian impulses in identifying the 
nation as good and generous is elaborated through examining the Canadian 
Immigration Act and the Australia Migration Act in the next section. 
42 Not Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future Immigration available on the 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada Website at cicnet.ingenia.com. The proposal for two new 
acts was the centrepiece of the legislative review and was therefore discussed throughout the 
report. This aspect of the report was rejected. Citizenship and Immigration Canada's response 
to the report Building on a Strong Foundation for the 21st Century: New Directions for 
Immigration and Refugee Policy and Legislation, cicnet.di.gc.ca/english/about/policy/lr 
43Hathaway JC, "Preface" in Hathaway JC (ed) Reconceiving International Refugee Law 
(1997) at xviii and Hathaway JC and Neve A, "Making International Refugee Law Relevant 
Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection" (1997) 10 Harvard 
Human Rights Law Journal 115. 
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B. LOCATING HUMANITARIANISM IN THE LAW 
Despite humanitarianism having a similar place in Australian and 
Canadian rhetoric about immigration, the place it takes in the laws of each 
country is markedly different. A comparative analysis of these provisions 
illustrates and allows for refinements of my analysis above of the liberal 
consensus about humanitarianism. It also allows me to demonstrate important 
differences between the two systems, and to draw insights about national self 
identification in each place from those contrasts. 
1. The Canadian Immigration Act 
The contrasts are easiest to see if we start with the Canadian Immigration 
Act. The notion of humanitarianism appears at several key points in the Act. It 
occupies a prominent place in the regulatory regime under the Act and is further 
developed in the Policy Advice Manuals which outline for CIC bureaucrats the 
day to day application of the statutory instruments. 44 The combined effect of 
these three sources is to ensure that the concept of humanitarianism can 
potentially play a role in almost all aspects of Canadian immigration law. 
One of the ten stated aims of the Act is "to fulfil Canada's international 
legal obligations with respect to refugees and to uphold its humanitarian 
tradition with respect to the displaced and persecuted. "45 Stated thus, this 
objective serves both to explicitly locate humanitarianism as an objective of 
44 While the Policy Manuals are targeted towards the Minister's own staff, in practice they are 
widely used by immigration refugee lawyers. They are internal documents of Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada updated as policy and procedures change. 
45 Section 3(g). The first part of the section, "It is hereby declared that Canadian immigration 
policy and the rules and regulations made under this Act shall be designed and administered in 
such a manner as to promote the domestic and international interests of Canada recognising the 
need (a) ... , (b) ... " 
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Canadian law and policy and to separate it from any form of legal obligation. 
The tension between these two poles is evident in the way humanitarianism is 
used in the Act. It also makes transparent - because it says so explicitly - that 
humanitarianism is a national tradition. Construction of tradition is integral to 
building nation and national identity. 
Subsection 6(3) provides that the Governor in Council may designate 
classes of admissible immigrants, "the admission of members of which would 
be in accordance with Canada's humanitarian tradition with respect to the 
displaced and the persecuted." At present two classes are designated; "country 
of asylum class" and "source country class."46 These allow for the admission of 
individuals who would not meet the definition of a Convention Refugee47 but 
who come from dire circumstances such that they would be considered refugees 
in popular parlance. In the past humanitarian designated classes have been 
identified more narrowly using labels such as "self-exiled persons designated 
class" or "Indochinese designated class". This type of identity based 
designation more closely parallels Australian practice discussed below. 
46 The Country of Asylum class includes individuals outside their country of origin who have 
been and continue to be personally and seriously affected by a massive human rights violation, 
armed conflict, or civil war in their country of origin, and in respect of whom there is no 
possibility, within a reasonable period, of a durable solution. 
The Source Country class includes those still residing in their country of origin who (a) have 
been imprisoned for exercise of civil rights pertaining to dissent or trade union activity, or (b) 
have been affected by civil war or armed conflict in their country of origin, or (c) would fit 
within the definition of Convention refugee had they been outside their country of origin, and in 
respect of whom there is no possibility, within a reasonable period, of a durable solution. 
These definitions are set out in the Humanitarian Designated Class Regulations SOR/97-183. 
The regulations also provide that countries may be designated to meet the source country 
definition. 
47 See Chapter Three at pp.102-104. 
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Several of the appeal provisions in the Act make explicit reference to the 
possibility of lodging what is effectively known as a humanitarian and 
compassionate appeal. This is a non-legal appeal and does not depend for its 
success on an error in the earlier decision. These appeals are possible for 
Convention Refugees and persons with visas who are subject to a removal 
order48 and also for Canadian citizens and permanent residents whose 
applications to sponsor the immigration of a family member has been refused on 
certain grounds.49 Permanent residents facing removal orders can appeal "on 
the ground that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the person 
should not be removed from Canada,"50 a provision which is broad enough to 
bring in humanitarian and compassionate grounds.51 Cases under this provision 
48 Section 70(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (5), an appeal lies to the Appeal Division from a 
removal order or conditional removal order made against a person who 
has been determined under this Act or the regulations to be a Convention Refugee but is not a 
permanent resident; or 
seeks landing or entry and, at the time that a report with respect to the person was made by an 
immigration officer pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(a), was in possession of a valid immigrant visa, 
in the case of a person seeking entry. 
(3) An appeal to the Appeal Division under subsection(2) may be based on either or both of the 
following grounds: 
on any ground of appeal that involves a question of law or fact, or mixed law and fact; and 
on the ground that, having regard to the existence of compassionate or humanitarian 
considerations, the person should not be removed from Canada. 
49 Section 77(3) Subject to subsections (3.01), (3.02), (3.1), a Canadian citizen or permanent 
resident who has sponsored an application for landing that is refused pursuant to subsection 1 
[the applicant or the sponsor does not meet the requirements set out in the Act or regulations] 
may appeal to the Appeal Division on either or both of the following grounds: 
on any ground of appeal that involves a question of law or fact, or mixed law and fact; and 
on the ground that there exist compassionate or humanitarian considerations that warrant the 
granting of special relief. 
50 Section 70(1)(b) 
51 The broader formula does not always lead to a more sympathetic result. In Kirpa/ v Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996) 35 Imm LR (2d) 229 (FCTD) the court held 
that under the narrower humanitarian and compassionate formula it was inappropriate to 
consider ability to pay for medical care and this need for care alone was the appropriate focus of 
consideration. In analysing "all circumstances of the case" under s. 70(1)(b) ability to pay and 
cost to the state would also be relevant factors. 
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frequently discuss similar factors to those considered where the appeal is on the 
basis of humanitarian and compassionate considerations only. 
These appeal provisions fit into the analysis of humanitarianism and 
identity in two ways because they provide an avenue for the Federal Court to 
generate a jurisprudence of humanitarianism and because they are only 
accessible to certain individuals. These avenues are only open to individuals 
who already belong to the Canadian community, as citizens or permanent 
residents, or who have already been stamped with Canadian approval in the 
form of a visa or a refugee determination. As well, these appeals are not 
available to people who have been convicted of serious criminal offences or are 
suspected of having been convicted of such offences. The eligibility restrictions 
limit compassion directly, making it available to "upstanding members of the 
community." This clearly reflects that we do not want to misplace our 
generosity- it goes to deserving members of the community. This is not the 
most needy group which comes in contact with our migration law, not the group 
that immediately springs to mind when we talk of compassion. What is going 
on here is evidently more than straightforward generosity. 
The final key appearance of humanitarianism in the Immigration Act is in 
section 114(2) stating: 
The Governor in Council may, by regulation, authorise the Minister to 
exempt any person from any regulation made under subsection (1) or 
otherwise facilitate the admission of any person where the Minister is 
satisfied that the person should be exempted from that regulation or that 
the person's admission should be facilitated owing to the existence of 
compassionate or humanitarian considerations. 
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The regulation which supports this section is similarly broad52 and the 
delegation of this authority from the Minister to his departmental officials has 
been approved by the courts. 53 This provision has been broadly interpreted to 
create a duty of the Minister to consider applications for exemption from 
various provisions of the Act on compassionate or humanitarian grounds. 54 This 
section is the basis for frequent exemptions from the provision that visa 
applications must be made outside the country55 and for exemptions from 
various visa requirements. 56 The Immigration Manual gives some examples of 
what might warrant a humanitarian and compassionate response to aid in 
interpreting s.114(2)57 but the Federal Court of Canada has plainly stated that 
the manual provides guidelines only.58 The guideline status of the policy 
52 Regulation 2.1 states 
The Minister is hereby authorized to exempt any person from any regulation made 
under subsection 114(1) of the Act or otherwise facilitate the admission to Canada of 
any person where the Minister is satisfied that the person should be exempted from 
that regulation or that the person's admission should be facilitated owing to the 
existence of compassionate or humanitarian considerations. 
53 Minister of Employment and Immigration v Jiminez-Perez (1984), 14 DLR (4th) 609; [ 1984] 
2 SCR565. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Section 9(1) 
56 Rotenberg CL, "Humanitarian and Compassionate" (1989) 8 ImmLR (2d)295, noting that 
these are two of the three most common uses of humanitarian and compassionate grounds. The 
third occurs in appeals under ss. 70 and 77 discussed above. 
The program managers of visa offices have been authorised to waive selection criteria relating 
to independent immigrants as well as the requirement that an applicant must possess a valid 
passport or other travel document. To waive other requirements, a recommendation must be 
made to the Minister. 
57 The test in the Manual is that "unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardship" is 
encountered. The Manual lists 11 "general case types: spouses of Canadian citizens or 
permanent residents, parents and grandparents, separation of parents and children, common-law 
and same-sex partners, de facto family members, unexecuted removals due to generalised risk, 
personalised risk of inhumane treatment, refugees who apply for landing too late, abusive 
relationships, inability to obtain a travel document, former Canadian citizens. Volume IP 5 -
Processing Inland Applications for Landing on Humanitarian and Compassionate Grounds_at 
15-24. 
58 Yhap v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1990] 1FC722 (TD). 
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statements contributes to inconsistencies in the exercise of the s.114(2) duty. 
Expressing disdain for the guidelines, the authors of the 1997 Legislative 
Review stated: 
They are used differently by different managers. Some managers will 
routinely use their powers under this section of the Act to permit over age 
dependants or an elderly parent to accompany an independent immigrant; 
others will do so only in very unusual circumstances. . .. entire programs 
involving thousands of individuals have effectively been created under 
this broad and undefined umbrella. Some applicants will know of these 
practices, and will quite reasonably take advantage of them; others will 
not and be unwittingly penalized. 59 
The Immigration Act's s.3 7 provision that the Minister may at any tim€? 
issue a permit allowing an inadmissible or removable person to enter or remain 
in Canada is also a part of the humanitarian and compassionate framework 
because the Immigration Manual states that these permits only be granted on 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds or in the national interest. A total of 
4059 permits were granted in the year ending March 30, 1997, which a 
ministerial press released proudly announced was a drop of75% since 1992 
when 12 000 were granted.60 This tone echoes the political desire to respond to 
a prominent trend in contemporary public discourse about migration by limiting 
discretionary entries.61 In1998, 2600 permits were issued, a stated decline of 35 
percent over 1997. 62 
59 Legislative Review, above n 42, Chapter 10, at l. 
60 "1997 Report Shows the Number of Minister's Permits Issued Holding at the 1996 Level" 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, News Release 98-20, April 2, 1998. 
61 Australian Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock is similarly proud of his rare use of 
discretion. Telephone interview with ministerial office, October 1998. See below pp. 226-231 
re this discretion. 
62 Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, News Release 99-23, 29 April 1999. 
Figures are for the Canadian government financial year which ends on March 31. 
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The combined effect of these features of the Immigration Act, its 
regulations and Policy Manual is to provide that humanitarianism and 
compassion become a duty and a ground of appeal. These factors have lead to 
the growth of a jurisprudence of humanitarianism which I discuss below. The 
provision allowing exemption from any regulation and the perpetually possible 
ministerial permit ensure that humanitarian and compassionate grounds can 
become a factor in any category of immigration decision. Considering the role 
played by these grounds alone provides a good illustration of how migration law 
is embued with flexibility to meet the changing needs of the nation. As the 
standard of humanitarianism is difficult to pin down, and attempts to do so must 
be regarded as mere guidelines, its use in the law ensures the boundary can 
expand and contract without any perceptible legal or rhetorical shifts. This 
allows for responses, such as cutting the number of Ministerial permits, which 
address shifts in popular discourses. At the same time, the proliferation of the 
phrase identifies the Canadian nation and its members as humanitarian and 
compassionate, constructing the tradition the Act's objectives name. 
2. The Australian Migration Act 
The Australian Migration Act, by contrast, is not a document about 
humanitarianism. As discussed in Chapter Two, humanitarianism is not 
mentioned in the Act's objectives, nor anywhere in the text of the Act.63 
Humanitarianism is incorporated into the Australian migration scheme at a 
policy level rather than in the legal text. For example, the department gives 
processing priority to some types of applications with a humanitarian angle such 
63 See Chapter Two at pp. 84-90. 
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as orphaned relatives in compelling and compassionate circumstances and 
family members of those who hold a refugee or humanitarian visa. 64 
The immigration stream offering permanent entry to Australia for 
refugees and others located offshore or found to be refugees while in Australia 
is named the Humanitarian Program. The label signifies that inland refugee 
claimants are not primarily regarded as rights claimants but as beneficiaries of 
Australian generosity. Approximately half of the admissions in this Program 
are granted on the basis of membership in designated identity based groups 
resembling the humanitarian designated classes used in Canada until 1997. This 
part of the Humanitarian Program provides the possibility of entering Australia 
to some individuals who do not meet the narrow refugee definition, provided 
their identity can fit in another, even more narrow, category. Admission is 
based on shared group identity characteristics and chances of receiving one of 
the visas available are enhanced by existing ties, usually family, to Australia. 
The availability of non-refugee visas in the Humanitarian Program is 
determined by regulation rather than being set out in the Act. 65 
The final significant avenue for humanitarianism to play a role in 
admission to Australia is found in the discretion of the Minister to replace 
decisions unfavourable to applicants. 66 There is no legislative requirement that 
this substitution be made on a humanitarian basis, however when dealing with 
failed refugee applicants, the former Minister has issued, and the current 
Minister is using and rewriting, guidelines suggesting that this discretion will 
64 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Annual Report 1996-97. The current 
Annual Report does not reflect this priority). 
65 Migration Regulation, Schedule 2, sub-classes 201-217 
66 See below at pp. 226-231. 
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only be used for "persons of humanitarian concern," in situations which closely 
approximate refugee status. Between 1995 and 1998, under two Ministers, 350 
decisions were reversed. 67 The Minister's staff estimate that less than one 
percent of the requests received for personal discretionary consideration result 
in a new decision. 68 It is accepted among those working in refugee law in 
Australia that high profile cases taken up by political friends of the Minister are 
most likely to succeed. 
The contrast in the place of humanitarianism in Australian and Canadian 
legislation is stark. The overall effect is mitigated somewhat when we consider 
the entire legislation-regulation-policy panoply but it remains important to note 
that regulation and policy retain significant flexibility and can be changed with 
little or no public scrutiny. The contrast in the place of humanitarianism is 
somewhat surprising given the strong and similar place that it occupies in 
discourses of migration in each nation. The differential position of 
humanitarianism can provide some insights into national identities in each 
nation. Before proceeding to this analysis, however, it is important to consider 
how the structures of the two acts have influenced interpretations and uses of 
humanitarianism. In Canada, the prevalence of humanitarianism in the Act has 
generated a '1urisprudence of humanitarianism." In Australia, the emergence in 
the 1980s of a rather different "jurisprudence of humanitarianism" is part of the 
67 242 were decisions of the Refugee Review Tribunal (s.417), 62 were decisions of the 
Immigration Review Tribunal (s.351), and 42 were internally reviewed decisions which do not 
go to either specialist tribunal (s.345). 
68 Telephone interview, October 1998. No officials statistics are available on the number of 
requests received. In 1998-99 the Minister used is s.417 discretion in l 08 cases, Annual Report, 
www .immi.gov .au/annual_report/annrep99 
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explanation for the Migration Act's current structure, and can be compared both 
with the Canadian rulings and with the Minister's humanitarian discretion. 
3. The Canadian Jurisprudence of Humanitarianism 
Canadian courts are called upon to consider the grounds for humanitarian 
and compassionate consideration when an applicant who has been refused the 
benefit of s.114(2) applies for judicial review of that decision or when a visa 
holder or sponsor appeals a negative decision (ss.70 and 77). While the first 
group of cases are judicial review applications and the second are appeals, this 
difference has only minor effects on the resulting jurisprudence. 69 Many 
applications for judicial review are framed such that judges cannot avoid, or do 
not want to avoid, commenting on the specific circumstances that make up the 
alleged humanitarian and compassionate grounds, even if the end result of a 
favourable ruling is only to turn the matter back to the bureaucrats. Similarly, 
most appeals brought under ss. 70 and 77 are put forward both as arguments on 
the law or the facts, and as arguments for special relief on humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds. Accordingly, in many cases that canvass the question 
of humanitarian and compassionate grounds the decision is made on the 
alternative argument and returned to the first instance decision-maker. Both 
types of case, therefore, generate a volume of commentary from the Appeal 
Division of the IRB and from the Federal Court regarding the meaning of 
humanitarianism and compassion. The Supreme Court of Canada has handed 
down only two significant decisions in this area. Minister of Employment and 
Immigration v Jiminez-Perez, 70 where it merely affirmed the Federal Court's 
69 In general, Canadian courts are less deferential to administrative decision makers than 
Australian courts. 
70 Above n 53. 
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reasoning on humanitarian and compassionate grounds and, in July 1999, Baker 
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration/1 where the Court went 
some way to addressing humanitarianism. I shall return to this case shortly after 
canvassing the lower court jurisprudence which preceded it. . 
There are a number of important caveats in considering this jurisprudence. 
The number of cases involved is vast, particularly those which involve requests 
for exemptions from a legislative provision. 72 In the period between mid 1989 
and October 1990, there were almost 40 000 requests for review on 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds under s.114(2) 73 and there is no 
reason to expect that this figure would have been significantly reduced in 
subsequent years. The cases that reach the Federal Court (or the IRB Appeal 
Division in the case of ss. 70 and 77) are those where the initial determination 
has been negative. Presumably, therefore, the jurisprudence of humanitarianism 
is concerned primarily with circumstances where the element of compassionate 
concern is not compelling enough to clear the hurdle at first instance and where 
the applicant has enough resources to continue the process. Finally, in order to 
narrow the cases, I have drawn on those appearing in the most comprehensive 
Canadian immigration law reporter and have cross referenced this selection with 
the most well known annotated version of the Immigration Act.14 This 
71 File No 25823, 9 July 1999, not yet available in Supreme Court Reports. 
72 The Federal Court of Appeal held in Jiminez-Perez, above n 53 [confinned by the SCC 
without reference to this point] that s.114(2) may exempt any application from a provision in the 
Act or the regulations. 
73 As reported in Vidal v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 13 ImmLR (2d) 
123 at para 30. 
74 I have drawn on cases reported in the Immigration Law Reporter (2d) between 1987 and 13 
November 1998 and have selected them from the Quicklaw electronic database service. I 
searched for cases which made reference to the section of the Act I was interested in and to the 
tenn "humanitarian and compassionate" grounds. This method generated a set of 110 cases 
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significantly narrows the field of cases and undoubtedly generates more 
variance than would appear were it possible to consider the entire range of cases 
decided. 
All this having been noted, examining a small sample of these cases does 
serve to give the flavour of this jurisprudence and is unlikely to be misleading 
given that the final decision regarding when humanitarianism is important 
enough to override the strictly 'legal provisions of the Immigration Act usually 
rests in bureaucratic hands and that the early and leading cases have explicitly 
held that humanitarian and compassionate grounds, while subject to 
Departmental guidelines, must be determined on a case by case basis. Given 
that, as noted in the Legislative Review, entire migration programs have grown 
up under the provisions of s.114(2) and that access to the appeal provisions in 
ss. 70 and 77 is limited, the circumstances which generate these cases have 
significant similarities and patterns can be discerned. 
Many of the cases under s.114(2) involve people seeking an exemption 
from the rule that applications for permanent residency must be lodged outside 
the country,75 and a significant number in this group are spouses of Canadians 
or permanent residents. There are several themes which emerge in the cases. 
First, it is clear that while s.114(2) uses permissive language suggesting the 
relating to s.114(2), 67 cases on s. 77 and 60 cases on s. 70. Many of the s. 70 cases were not 
relevant and the analysis relates primarily to the s.114(2) and s.77 cases. I also referred to 
Marrocco F N and Goslett H M (eds) The 1998 Annotated Immigration Act of Canada, rev' d ed, 
Carswell, Toronto, 1998. A full list of cases considered in contained in Table of Cases: 
Canadian Humanitarian and Compassionate Grounds cases. 
75 Partially on the basis of how widespread these applications are, the 1997 Legislative Review 
recommended that spouses be allowed to apply for permanent residency from within the 
country, rather than developing a system of regularised exceptions. Until 1993, s.114(2) allowed 
for exceptions to be made on the basis of humanitarian and compassionate grounds or public 
policy. One of the relevant public policies was the Spousal Policy, which also fostered this 
program of regular exceptions. As "public policy" grounds are no longer specified in the Act, 
exceptions for spouses are now only possible on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. 
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decision is at the discretion of the Minister, the Minister, or more correctly her 
delegate, is under a duty to consider all applications made for exemptions. 76 It is 
equally clear the departmental guidelines are not determinative or exhaustive of 
potential outcomes.77 Beyond these points, however, the jurisprudence takes up 
several themes in inconsistent ways. 
Although it is an established administrative law principle that the standard 
of procedural fairness to be applied to particular decision varies with the context 
of that decision, in the case of s.114(2) rulings the notion of context seems to 
extend to the particular circumstances of the case. A line of cases establishes 
that a review of humanitarian and compassionate considerations does not 
require an oral hearing, 78 but conversely, in particular circumstances failure to 
interview the applicant will constitute reviewable error.79 In Vaca the Court 
went so far as to state that a 'mere' thirty minute interview was insufficient.80 
The Court seemed to be responding to a particularly high degree of bureaucratic 
ineptitude. 81 This theme recurs in the cases82 and it is hardly surprising that 
76 Nijjar v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) ( 1997) 42 ImmLR (2d) 54 
{FCTD) holding that the immigration officer had a duty to submit the application for 
consideration on humanitarian and compassionate grounds even when the applicants had not 
specifically requested this. 
77 Yhap above n 58. 
78 Nanatakyi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1994) 30 Imm LR (2d) 97 
{FCTD); Selakkandu v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) {1993) 22 Imm LR 
(2d) 232 (FCTD); Carson v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995) 95 FTR 
137 (FCTD); Charran V Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995) 28 Imm LR 
(2d) 282 (FCTD). 
79 Chhokar V Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1991) 13 ImmLR (2d) 282 
(FCTD); Vaca v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1991) 15 Imm LR (2d) 
123 (FCTD). 
80 Ibid. 
81 The scheduled hearing had not been held because the applicants' file was misplaced and the 
delay forced the applicants into the refugee processing stream to their disadvantage. 
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executive incompetence raises the courts' ire. What is more surprising, 
however, it that humanitarianism and compassion become the legal response to 
this annoyance. If this option did not exist in the legislation83 the courts would 
be forced to choose between expanding the traditional grounds of reviewable 
error84 and allowing some ineptitude to escape sanction. The "humanitarian" 
solution may, therefore, be a particularly apt one. However, it creates a basis 
for humanitarian concern which is at odds with a common sense understanding 
of humanitarianism and compassion. Compassion becomes compensation for 
having to deal with a frustrating bureaucracy, rather than with personal 
hardship. It communicates something about Canadian values but nothing about 
the person who is granted membership in that community. 
The cases also take a variety of approaches to economic factors. 
Intuitively we reserve our compassion for those who are the most needy. 
Equally, money is our most common way of quantifying and comparing need. 
We might expect, therefore, that the benefit of a humanitarian and 
compassionate legal provision would go to those with the least money. Or, to 
put it another way, to those with the most need. Canadian courts treat economic 
factors in a variety of ways, none of which correspond closely with a common 
sense understanding of compassion. The policy manual states that 
"establishment factors" alone are not sufficient to ground an application for 
82 See also Muoz v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995) 30 Imm LR (2d) 
166 (FCTD); Rizzo v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1997) 41 Imm LR 
(2d) 86 (FCTD); Marques v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1997) 35 Imm 
LR (2d) 81 (FCTD) where costs were awarded to the applicant as a exceptional response to 
bureaucratic error; Sandhu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1997) 40 Imm 
LR (2d) 142 (FCTD). 
83 As the Legislative Review has proposed. 
84 Sees. 8.1 of the Federal Court Act, RSC 1985, C.F-7 
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exemption on humanitarian grounds85 and this has been repeated by the Federal 
Court. 86 Despite this, "establishment factors" often loom large in humanitarian 
and compassionate reviews87 and it is difficult to predict when they will be a 
deciding influence. Certainly any competent application will include reference 
to how well established the applicant is in the Canadian community, and 
practitioners claim that these factors are highly important.88 At the extreme, the 
court may regard establishment factors as decisive, as in Muoz where Justice 
Muldoon stated, 
The exhibited documents attached demonstrate what valuable members of 
Canadian society are the applicants, parents and children alike. From 
praiseworthy accomplishments in employment to praiseworthy 
accomplishments in education and praiseworthy participation in their 
general residential community, it is evident that Canada is the better for 
their presence here. [ ... ] from the evidence which the court sees herein, it 
would be highly astonishing if their h. & c. assessment [sic] were not 
positively favourable. 89 
It is of course compassionate not to dislocate successful, happy families. But to 
use established success as a measure - even as one indicator among many - of 
who we ought to be most charitable towards is again counter intuitive. The 
Muoz family is far from the bottom of the hierarchy of need.90 In Vaca the 
85 Above n 57. Many "establishment factors" have an economic dimension, such as holding a 
job, having a Canadian educational or training qualification or owning a house. Others include 
having friends and family in Canada and community ties such as links to voluntary 
organisations. 
86 Vidal, above n 73; Pereira v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 31 Imm LR 
(2d) 294 (FCTD). 
87 Muoz above n 82; Cabal.fin et al v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 12 
Imm LR (2d) 287 (TD); Vaca v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) above n 78. 
88 Interview data, June and July 1997. A lawyer's affidavit evidence presented in the Muoz case 
above makes the same point. 
89 Muoz above n 82 at para 5. 
90 These cases do often go the other way, but the reasoning has the same counter intuitive ring to 
it. In Periera the court held that self-sufficiency alone does not warrant a positive humanitarian 
and compassionate consideration and that the applicant would be denied an exemption because 
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Court attempts to separate the economic element from the factors under 
consideration in the humanitarian assessment, in recognition that economic 
success alone ought not guarantee that one can circumvent the usual application 
of the rules. Justice Cullen states, "The myriad letters and affidavits of support 
from family, friends and neighbours, the English language certificate, the doctor 
and the priest's support, the purchase of a home, the participation in a business, 
all go to compassionate and humanitarian grounds - but they were not 
considered other than as economic establishment."91 While this list reaches 
beyond economic factors, it does not reach beyond success indicators and 
demonstrating that Mr. Vaca is not among the most needy who would seek to 
remain in Canada. 
The role of establishment and economic factors is simply unclear. One 
judge rules it is appropriate to consider ability to pay for medical expenses when 
weighing up factors in a humanitarian assessment92 another explicitly rules this 
factor out of bounds. 93 One judge allows a spouse to apply for permanent 
residency from within Canada to avoid having the rest of the family become 
dependent on the state.94 Another upholds a denial of the benefit of s.114(2) to 
an individual in part because they had been in receipt of social assistance for 
she had stronger family ties in her home country than in Canada. Neither factor has much to do 
with what we think of as humanitarian outside the migration law context. 
91 Above n 78 at 13 of Quicklaw version. 
92 Sema v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995) 30 Imm LR (2d) 249 
(FCTD). 
93 Kirpal v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996) 35 Imm LR (2d) 229 
{FCTD). Both these cases were s.77 appeals but this issue of what is appropriately considered 
under the term humanitarian and compassionate grounds is identical to the s.114(2) cases. 
94 Smith v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) ( 1992) 18 Imm LR (2d) 71 
(FCTD) 
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sometime.95 The courts are obviously interested in the question of dependence 
on the state, and it is never presented in a favourable light, despite what could 
be considered a logical argument that those most in need of compassion may 
need state support as a matter of course. 
The jurisprudence under the ss. 70 and 77 appeals provisions is scarcely 
more coherent. Interpretations of humanitarianism arise most often when an 
application for sponsored immigration of a family member has been rejected. In 
all of these cases, therefore, there is an argument to be made about the 
humanitarian value of reuniting the family. In this area as well, the Appeal 
Division and the Federal Court appear inconsistent. Allowing an appeal on 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds and noting in particular the sponsor's 
genuine commitment to her mother and sister the Appeal Division asserted that 
"in assessing compassionate and humanitarian grounds the Board must give 
effect to the Act's objective to facilitate the reunion in Canada of Canadian 
citizens and permanent residents with their close relatives from abroad. "96 In 
refusing a similar application97 the same Board stated that: 
It clearly cannot be that every appeal with respect to a close relative 
will warrant granting of special relief, notwithstanding the broad policy 
objective of s.3( c) [reuniting Canadians and permanent residents with 
95 Orantes v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1990) 34 FTR 184 (TD). 
96 Rudrakumar v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996) 38 Imm LR (2d) 82 
(IRB-AppDiv). Other cases where the closeness of the family is among the principal 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds include Mena v Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration) (1990) 13 Imm LR (2d) 147 (IRB-AppDiv); Chan v Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration) 28 Imm LR (2d) 317 (IRB-AppDiv); Sall v Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration) (1993) 22 Imm LR (2d) 66 (IRB-AppDiv). In Parmar v Canada 
(Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993) 21 Imm LR (2d) 102 (IRB-AppDiv) and 
Chan v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993) 21 Imm LR (2d) 259 (IRB-
AppDiv) the Board examined the facts and found that the family was not particularly close and 
used this factor in their reasoning to reject the appeal on humanitarian and compassionate 
grounds. 
97 Parmar ibid. In both cases the sponsorship had initially been rejected because a mentally 
retarded family member was included in the application. 
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their close relatives from abroad]98 . [ ... ] •.• the desire to be reunited with 
family is the basis of all s~onsorship appeals and is not a special factor 
warranting special relief. 9 
While arguably the difference is that some families are closer than others, the 
language used to describe the families differs little and the family image which 
assessments are made against is that of a stereotypical Canadian family. Even if 
such a standard as degree of closeness is discernible, it is not being applied 
consistently in the jurisprudence. There are inconsistencies in what the Appeal 
Division says about the families it encounters, and it is these inconsistencies 
which leave a jurisprudential trace to be followed by courts, tribunals and 
bureaucratic decision-makers in the future. 
Another theme which is prevalent in the appeal cases is the fragility of the 
line between an appealable error and a humanitarian consideration. This is 
especially apparent in cases where the application has been refused because one 
of the family members in the application is medically inadmissible. Following 
the leading case Uppal, 100 the courts are prepared to scrutinise medical opinions 
in detail and to consider alternative evidence. 101 Uppal provides a way of 
98 Parmar ibid at 16 ofQL version. 
99 Parmar ibid at 26 of QL version. 
100 Uppal v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1987) 2 Imm LR (2d) 143 
(FedCA). 
101 Tan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)(I997) 40 Imm LR (2d) 113 (IRB-
AppDiv); Partab v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989) 8 Imm LR (2d) 
282 (IRB-AppDiv); Nagra v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1997) 38 Imm 
LR (2d) 197 (IRB-AppDiv); Rudrakumar, above n 96; Sidhu v Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration) (1994) 28 Imm LR (2d) 236 (IRB-AppDiv); Lai v Canada 
(Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993) 22 Imm LR (2d) 185 (IRB-AppDiv); Chan v 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1994) 28 Imm LR (2d) 317 (IRB-AppDiv); 
Sall, above n 96; Sidhu v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1991) 15 Imm 
LR (2d) 122 (IRB-AppDiv). A considerable number of these cases involve family members 
who have been refused because of mental retardation. The additional evidence used to counter 
the medical opinion in these cases is frequenlty a video of the person in question carrying out 
day to day tasks. The treatment of mental health in Canadian immigration law receives detailed 
treatment in Mosoff J, "Excessive Demand' on the Canadian Conscience: Disability, Family and 
Immigration" (1998-99) 26 Manitoba Law Journal, in press. 
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arguing that the medical refusal is invalid in law, when arguably the court is 
being influenced by what might accurately be called compassionate 
considerations. The difference is significant as winning in law (s.77(3)(a)) 
usually results in the matter being returned to the original decision maker, 
whereas the IRB Appeal Division or the Federal Court will exercise what is 
alternatively known as its "discretionary" or its "equitable" jurisdiction to grant 
special relief when it grounds its decision in humanitarian or compassionate 
considerations ( s. 77 (3 )(b)). 102 A humanitarian and compassionate "win" is 
superior to a legal win not because of the stated law but because of what the 
Appeal Division is willing to do in the name of humanitarianism. In some 
cases, the original decision is simply overturned without a clear statement as to 
whether this is being done because of an appealable error or humanitarian 
consideration. While this is clearly shoddy decision-making, it highlights the 
affinity between an "unreasonable" medical opinion about a close family 
member who would never be left to burden the state, and a decision drawing 
explicitly on the extra-legal humanitarian and compassionate jurisdiction. 
These patterns show again that the concept of humanitarianism is being used to 
patch over difficulties in the law, rather than developing a jurisprudence which 
attaches some stable and inherent meaning to the term. It is arguable that there 
are fewer humanitarian and compassionate grounds cases under s.77(3)(b) than 
there would otherwise be if the medical refusal jurisprudence were not itself so 
malleable. 
102 Jeganathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)(1997) 42 Imm LR (2d) 186 
(IRB-AppDiv); Rudrakumar, above n 96; Sidhu v Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration) (1994) 28 Imm LR (2d) 236 (IRB-AppDiv). 
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One part of the story of the humanitarian jurisprudence, therefore, is that 
the theoretical flexibility of the concept is well reflected in the judicial 
interpretations. It does tend to support Seidman's observation that 
humanitarianism is a good basis for political compromise but not a workable 
legal standard. The Federal Court has stated that the words" 'humanitarian and 
compassionate' have some kind of objective meaning intended by 
Parliament."103 Indeed, I have referred to some objective core of meaning in 
talking of the intuitive or commonsense meanings. An early formulation by the 
Immigration Appeals Commission, which is still occasionally referred to, 
captures most of that essence and also illustrates a key to understanding the 
fluidity of the term, when it states that compassionate or humanitarian grounds 
will depend upon " ... those facts, established by evidence, which would excite in 
a reasonable man in a civilised community a desire to relieve the misfortunes of 
another."104 But the standard is hard to assess. In one case failure to allow a 
pregnant woman to apply for permanent residency inland constitutes failure to 
"consider the application as a reasonable person would have done."105 In 
another, a man whose house, farm and village were buried by a volcano while 
he was visiting Canada does not meet the threshold for humanitarian exception 
to the rule. 106 One explanation is that the situations are incomparable. Leaving 
the decision to the individual bureaucrat ensures that the courts do not have to 
establish a hierarchy of human tragedy. Nonetheless, the idea that some 
103 Vidal above n 73 at para 9. 
104 Chirwa (1970) 4 IAC 338. (a decision of the fonner Immigration Appeals Commission). 
105 Drame v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994) 29 Imm LR (2d) 304 
(FCTD). 
106 Mendoza v Canada (Minister o/Citizenship and Immigration) (1997) 41 Imm LR (2d) 71 
(FCTD). 
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individuals deserve our humanitarian consideration while others do not relies on 
the assumption of just such a hierarchy. In yet another case, a man whose wife 
had withdrawn her sponsorship of his application claiming he was involved in 
criminal activities and was physically violent towards her was allowed 
permanent residency on humanitarian and compassionate grounds because the 
Board did not believe her allegations. 107 While this case is a exception, it is 
worth noting the extent to which the term humanitarian and compassionate 
grounds can stretch. There was nothing dire about his circumstances. The 
decision concentrates on his professional education and earning capacity and 
her lack of credibility. 
The Supreme Court of Canada's Baker108 decision will not, of course, end 
the diversity of views in the lower courts because it is addressing discretionary 
decision-making under s.114(2) that is left to the bureaucratic decision-
maker. 109 The ruling does, however, set out clear directions. Ms Baker had 
been illegally resident in Canada since 1981. She had four Canadian born 
children and was the sole carer for two of them. She had been diagnosed as 
paranoid schizophrenic. As such, her case combines establishment and medical 
107 Hundal v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994) 26 Imm LR (2d) 47 
(IRB-AppDiv). The Federal Court of Appeal upheld this decision in Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration) v Hundal (1994) 167 N.R. 75, a ruling which has become the 
leading case on the separate issue of when a visa is valid. The wife did not give evidence before 
the Board. The Board notes that the applicant's sister did not believe his wife's allegation and 
also notes that Mr. Hundal held an engineering diploma and had gotten a good job in Canada 
while waiting for his appeal to be heard. The Board found the applicant to be trustworthy and 
rejected evidence that an Immigration Officer had found potential evidence oflinks with a Sikh 
militant movement in his possession when he arrived in Canada. The case is one of the more 
bizarre humanitarian and compassionate successes I have read. 
108 Above n 71. 
109 But note that Justice L'Heureux-Dube for the majority writes that, "It is, however, inaccurate 
to speak of a rigid dichotomy of "discretionary" or "non-discretionary" decisions." (at ibid para 
54.) 
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factors as well as presenting an individual in genuine need of state support. The 
officer reviewing her case stated: 
The PC is paranoid schizophrenic and on welfare. She has no 
qualifications other than as a domestic. She has FOUR CHILDREN IN 
JAMAICA AND ANOTHER FOUR BORN HERE. She will, of course, 
be a tremendous strain on our social welfare systems for (probably) the 
rest of her life. There are no H&C factors other than her FOUR 
CANADIAN BORN CHILDREN. Do we let her stay because of that? I 
am of the opinion that Canada can no longer afford this kind of 
generosity. However, because of the circumstances involved, there is a 
potential for adverse publicity. I recommend refusal but you may wish to 
clear this with someone at the Region.110 
The Court held that the decision was both biased and unreasonable. Bias 
was found in the officer's emphasis on Ms Baker as a single mother with a 
mental illness, with apparent disregard for other evidence available. 
Acknowledging that standards of bias vary with the context of the decision, 
Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dube wrote: 
The context here is one where immigration officers must regularly make 
decisions that have great importance to the individuals affected by them, 
but are also often critical to the interests of Canada as a country. The are 
individualised, rather than decisions of a general nature. They also 
require special sensitivity. Canada is a nation made up largely of people 
whose families migrated here in recent centuries. Our history is one that 
shows the importance of immigration, and our society shows the benefits 
of having a diversity of people whose origins are in a multitude of places 
around the world. Because they necessarily relate to people of diverse 
backgrounds, from different cultures, races, and continents, immigration 
decisions demand sensitivity and understanding by those making them. 
They require a recognition of diversity, an understanding of others, and an 
openness to difference. 111 
Accordingly, the assessment of bias must take into account the interests of the 
nation as a whole, and in particular its interests as a nation with a founding 
mythology rooted in immigration. 
110 Ibid at para 5. Capitals in original. 
111 Ibid at para 47. 
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The decision was unreasonable because it departed from the values 
underlying the grant of discretion: humanitarianism and compassion. Madam 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube wrote: 
These words and their meaning must be central in determining whether an 
individual H&C decision was a reasonable exercise of the power 
conferred by Parliament. The legislation and regulations direct the 
Minister to determine whether the person's admission should be 
facilitated owing to the existence of such considerations. They show 
Parliament's intention that those exercising the discretion conferred by the 
statute act in a humanitarian and compassionate manner. [ ... ] ... when 
considering it, the request must be evaluated in a manner that is respectful 
of humanitarian and compassionate consideration. 112 
While the content of humanitarianism is not specified, Justice L'Heureux-
Dube's intent is that individuals like Ms Baker are at least potential 
beneficiaries. The ruling also exemplifies the annoyance with the bureaucracy 
that is a theme in the lower court decisions. This ruling, therefore, may have 
some potential to bring the jurisprudence of humanitarianism closer to its 
extralegal meaning. 113 
Canadian administrative and judicial interpretations of humanitarianism 
vary considerably. Even without accepting a complete radical indeterminacy of 
law, the humanitarian jurisprudence shows trends broad enough to contain a 
series of contradictory interpretations. It is unlikely that Baker will eliminate 
this. The body of Federal Court decisions belies the assertion of an objective 
standard. A considerable part of the jurisprudence concerns factors which do 
not accord with non-legal meanings of humanitarianism. While neither legal 
112 Ibid at para 66. 
113 One additional reason that this may not happen is that the key issue in the case was whether 
the unincorporated Convention on the Rights of the Child had any bearing on the decision. The 
majority held that the issue was one of procedural fairness, but nonetheless referred to the 
convention in its analysis. Justice Iacobucci in dissent held that unincorporated treaties ought 
not be referred to, particularly as the majority had chosen to resolve the case without recourse to 
the Charter. These importance precedents may overshadow the one paragraph in the decision 
where humanitarianism is directly addressed. 
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nor non-legal understandings will ever be completely stable, the legal meanings 
clearly function as a guise at least some of the time. This accords with the place 
of the humanitarian consensus in liberal theory and with the place of migration 
law in the liberal nation. Humanitarianism is a loose enough term on which to 
build a consensus among the diverse strands of liberalism. The range of its 
interpretation, even just within the Canadian setting, demonstrates how fragile 
that consensus is and that it therefore cannot generate a standard for the moral 
behaviour of liberal nations. This same flexibility allows humanitarianism to 
function as a key feature of migration law's project of accommodating shifting 
national identities and priorities. Despite still fitting in the framework of liberal 
migration laws, the Australian approach to humanitarianism in migration law 
diverges greatly from the Canadian. The next section provides an sketch of that 
approach to facilitate comparative analysis. 
4. Australian Acts of Grace 
Under the Migration Act, humanitarian admissions to Australia are left in 
the hands of the Minister in charge of immigration, either through the power to 
reverse negative decisions or in the power to designate and alter the 
characteristics and quotas of the Humanitarian Program. Ministerial authority 
to substitute a more favourable decision extends to decisions of the Migration 
Review Tribunal, 114 the Refugee Review Tribunal 115, the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal, 116 and internal review decisions which are not subject to 
114 Section 351. The jurisdiction of the MRT belonged to the Immigration Review Tribunal 
until 1 June 1999 when the IRT was disbanded. 
115 Section 417 
116 Sections 391 and 454. The option of either specialist tribunal referring a case to the AAT 
rather than deciding it is rarely used. In 1995-1998 the Minister did not overturn any AA T 
decisions. 
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tribunal scrutiny. 117 Requests to overturn decisions of the RRT are the most 
significant of these as they make up the largest group of requests and the largest 
group of resulting ministerial actions. 118 Importantly for my analysis, between 
May 1994 and May 1999 these decisions were made under the "guidelines for 
stay in Australia on humanitarian grounds."119 The new guidelines are entitled 
"Ministerial Guidelines for the Identification of Unique or Exceptional Cases 
Where It May Be In The Public Interest to Substitute A More Favourable 
Decision Under s345, 351, 391, 417, 454 of the Migration Act." However, 
aside from more formal presentation and explicit warnings that this is a non-
compellable discretion, little else has changed. Unlike the Canadian 
discretionary review on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, each 
application made for the Minister to exercise one of these powers must be 
reviewed by the Minister personally and there is no duty upon the Minister to 
even consider these requests. In both Australia and Canada the decision is 
discretionary, but the breadth of that discretion differs enormously. 
The guidelines are issued from the Minister's office and are not subject 
scrutiny outside the department before being made public. The 1994 guidelines 
were accompanied by a press release stating that they are aimed at people 
unable to sustain a refugee claim but whose "claims evoke a strong 
117 Section 345 
118 Official statistics on the numbers of requests received are not recorded by either the 
Department or the Minister's office. Ministerial staff confirm that requests to overturn RRT 
decisions make up a significant majority of requests received. An examination of the tabled 
papers demonstrates that RRT decisions make of the majority of the Minister's personal 
decisions here. 
119 The guidelines in place from May 1994 to May 1999 had this title. The new guidelines 
issued 4 May 1999 are named "Ministerial Guidelines for the Identification of Unique or 
Exceptional Cases Where It May Be In The Public Interest to Substitute A More Favourable 
Decision Under s345, 351, 391, 417, 454 of the Migration Act". 
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humanitarian response." The nature of that humanitarian response was 
circumscribed by noting that "Ministerial discretion is not designed to cover 
people seeking residence on compassionate, non-refugee related grounds such 
as family, medical or economic reasons."120 The current guidelines open by 
stating that "the public interest may be served by the Australian government 
responding with care and compassion to the plight of certain individuals in 
particular circumstances." They provide a list of factors which may be relevant 
considerations including: threats to the person's security, human rights or 
human dignity, individualised persecution, former refugee status, risk of facing 
torture or breaches of the Convention on the Rights of the Child or International 
Convenant on Civil and Political Rights. This formula encapsulates both the 
idea that this protection is aimed at those in refugee-like circumstances who fall 
outside the strict definition of a refugee and the principle that behaving in a 
humanitarian way is in the public interest. 121 
This principle is at the heart of my inquiry in this Chapter. While public 
immigration discourse so frequently echoes this coupling that it seems correct, 
its content is nebulous or worse. The public cannot be served by being 
humanitarian in the same direct way it can be by selecting migrants on the basis 
of economic need or family reunification. The public interest that is, however, 
served by being humanitarian is the need to be seen to be humanitarian. We as 
a nation, at the level of the individual, at the level of the political actor and at 
the level of the nation-as-actor on the international stage, derive some value 
120 Media Release B28/94, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 24 May 1994. People 
in such situations would ask for Ministerial dispensation under another section not covered by 
these guidelines but nonetheless open to humanitarian concerns. The tabled papers reveal that 
humanitarian considerations are sometimes listed in these instances. 
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from being humanitarian. The public interest that is served here is an identity 
building, a nation building, interest. The commitment to humanitarianism 
represented in these guidelines provides evidence for that enterprise. Through 
this commitment to do more than required by law, and to consider 
circumstances on an individual basis we construct an identity for ourselves - the 
"in" group - as "good." 
This role of humanitarianism is reinforced by examining the tabled 
reasons for Ministerial reversals under s.417. 122 What is most remarkable about 
these reasons is the scant information they contain. In most instances it is 
impossible to discern even which country the individual concerned has come 
from. 123 The Ministerial statements are vague and formulaic, but we do learn 
about the formula. Each is three or four paragraphs. The first paragraph 124 
describes the process the applicant has followed to this point, second paragraph 
purports to give some information about the actual case and the third paragraph 
almost invariably states: 
In the circumstances, I have decided that as a discretionary and 
humanitarian act to an individual with a genuine on-going need, it is in the 
interest of Australia as a humane and generous society to grant the 
applicant a [ ... ]visa. 
121 Regarding the narrowness of the refugee definition see Chapter Three passim and especially 
pp. 102-107. 
122 I examined all tabled "statements under the Migration Act" tabled between 1995 and 
November 1998, as complied at my request by the staff of the Parliamentary Table Office. I 
have retained a copy of each statement in my files. 
123 Of the 242 statements examined, 8 contained the name of the country and I contained the 
name of a person. A further 29 were accompanied by a list of names (from which country of 
origin could be speculated) but the names were not linked to the stated reasons. 
124 Or first two paragraphs in the longer formula. 
229 
This specifies that the interest for Australia in humanitarian admissions is its 
interest as a humane and generous society. That interest is in both being - and 
being perceived as - humane and generous. If the perception were not 
important, this part of the formula would be unnecessary. This is also an 
important part of the formula given the incredibly small success rate of these 
applications. 125 Rejecting approximately 99 percent of these last ditch 
humanitarian appeals could be regarded as less than compassionate and perhaps 
this rhetoric provides some bulwark against that assessment. 
The second paragraph of the formula, the "detailed one", is also notable. 
The key to this aspect of the formula is the importance of the public interest and 
the particular circumstances and personal characteristics of the individual 
involved. The emphasis on the uniqueness of the individual reinforces that this 
is an exceptional admission and that as there are unlikely to be similar 
circumstances, arguments for similar treatment will be futile. There is no 
description of what the public interest in admitting this unique individual might 
be. Sometimes the paragraph mentions nothing more than these two factors. In 
most cases when additional information is given it echoes one of the phrases in 
the guidelines such as "personal hardship," "safety at risk," "genuine subjective 
fear," "trauma," or even- in a perfect tautology - that to return the person 
would be "inhumane." One set of applications refers to assimilation to the 
Australian community and having been here for more than three years. 126 The 
level of vagueness ensures that merits of the Ministerial decision cannot be 
125 Staff of the current Minister, Hon. Phillip Ruddock, estimate that he reverses decisions in 
less than 1 % of the applications he reviews, interview October 1998. 
126 This formula is reminiscent of the Canadian "establishment factors." However, little can be 
drawn from the comparison as the Australian formulation does not contain enough information 
to elaborate. 
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publicly impugned and that the assertion by practitioners that only high profile 
applicants whose cases are taken up by colleagues of the Minister will be 
successful cannot be tested. 127 The requirement to table reasons amounts to little 
when this type of formulaic presentation is used and there is no way to link 
Ministerial statements to tribunal rulings on particular facts. There is also no 
way of comparing with instances where an application for grace is made but 
rejected. This reinforces the argument that humanitarianism is a useful concept 
in migration law partially due to its vagueness. Nothing more is revealed than 
the fact that it serves the interest of the generous nation and it is an exception 
related to unique circumstances. The guidelines and the humanitarian 
categories give us some further information, but in the end even less than the 
Canadian jurisprudence of humanitarianism problematically reveals. 
The humanitarian aspects of the Australian law have not always been so 
carefully concealed. The current absence of humanitarianism.as a clearly 
named concept in the Migration Act can be interpreted as a response to the 
courts' interpretations of the pre-1989128 provision that permanent residence 
could be granted to any non-citizen legally in Australia who could demonstrate 
"strong compassionate or humanitarian grounds for the grant of a permit."129 
This provision allowed the courts an opportunity to interpret the concept of 
127 Interviews with refugee law practitioners in Melbourne, December 1997, and in Sydney, 
January 1998. 
128 In 1989, the Migration Act was significantly amended (Migration Law Amendment Act 1989, 
proclaimed December 1989) with the aim of reducing discretionary decision making under the 
Act. For discussion of the amendments see Cronin K, "Concerning Equity and Control: A Look 
at the New Immigration Law" (1990 - June Law Society Journal 50. Other articles in the June 
1990 Law Society Journal's "Forum: Immigration Law" discuss the effects of the amendments 
on particular parts of the immigration program. One of particular interest is Joel A, "The 
Edifice of Compassion" ( 1990) June Law Society Journal 67. 
129 Section 6A{l)(e). 
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humanitarianism, which proved to have a broad range of applications and 
contained the potential to develop in the disparate directions of the Canadian 
jurisprudence. 
The Australian courts were no more able or willing than the Canadian to 
define humanitarianism. In Ates the Federal Court linked humanitarianism to 
the good of the nation with this expansive language: 
.. .in the administration of good government there is not only room, but a 
legal duty, to consider, even, on occasion with compassion, the 
circumstances of particular cases. The prima facie strictness of the law is 
designed to achieve population security and national security. That 
strictness is to be justified also on the basis that, in the area of entry to this 
country, the law may be seen to be strictly enforced. But in this case there 
is no security or even economic consideration. [ ... ] The law must be 
administered by the Minister in the best interests of Australia. So to do 
extends Australia's interests broadly regarded and embraces, on occasion 
and according to circumstances, the taking of decisions by reference to a 
liberal and even compassionate outlook approfriate to a free and confident 
nation and conscious of its reputation as such. 30 
The High Court in Kioa131 accepted without comment the bureaucratic decision 
that a Tongan family with an Australian born daughter132 who had overstayed 
their visas to earn money to assist relatives whose homes had been destroyed by 
a cyclone did not present strong humanitarian and compassionate 
considerations. The merits of the decision were beyond review and, notably, 
natural justice was found to have been breached. But the High Court was much 
more restrained than the Canadian courts in its obiter. Commenting on the 
humanitarian admission provision Mason J. (as he then was) stated that strong 
compassionate or humanitarian grounds " ... may be very much a matter of 
130 Ates v Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs ( 1983), 67 FLR 449 at 455-6; 
note that s.6A( 1 )( e) was not at issue. 
131 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550. 
132 At that time, birth in Australia assured Australian citizenship. The Australian Citizenship Act 
1948 (Cth) has since been amended to provide that Australian born children inherit their parents 
visa status s 10(2), Migration Act s.78. 
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opinion."133 Wilson J. stated that humanitarian grounds may have a relevance, 
"albeit attenuated" to a discretionary decision to deport, and that this may 
strengthen a claim that natural justice in this situation requires a hearing. 134 
Damouni135 and McPhee 136 both provide examples of the Federal Court 
attempting to weigh up factors for and against granting a visa on 'strong 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds.' Justice French in Damouni began 
by dissecting dictionary definitions of humanitarianism and compassion and 
isolated "hardship" as the common element to all the circumstances 
addressed. 137 Factors going to granting the visa on these grounds included fear 
of returning to their home country to face death or imprisonment, inability to go 
elsewhere, three young children at school in Australia and family support in 
Australia. On what Justice French termed "the debit side" were entering 
Australia on false premises, falsely claiming not to know their visa conditions, 
and the majority of their family members residing elsewhere. 138 Justice French 
remitted the case to the decision maker below with specific suggestions about 
humanitarian considerations. Mr. McPhee was similarly awarded 
reconsideration of his circumstances when the Court ruled that his juvenile 
record should not have weighed in the delegate's deliberations and that the 
133 Above n 131 at 582. 
134 Ibid at 600. 
135 Damouni and Anor v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 
87 ALR 97 (FC). 
136 McPhee and Ors v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 16 ALD 77 (Fed Full 
Ct). 
137 Above note 135 at 102-3. 
138 Ibid at 110-111. 
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delegate failed to allocate sufficient weight to McPhee's sense of frustration. 139 
While the approach of the Australian courts to humanitarianism was not 
permitted much time to develop, the balancing of factors which doubles as a 
notion of desert is present as it is in the Canadian jurisprudence. As well, 
humanitarianism was at least sometimes linked to the good of the nation in 
expansive terms and certainly the potential for further expansion seemed to have 
been obvious to lawmakers. 
During the nine years this provision was in place admissions increased 
each year, paralleling the courts' expansive treatment of the provision. 140 
Removing humanitarianism and other types of discretionary decision-making 
from the Act ensures the control over the content of the term humanitarian 
remains with the executive. As is evident in the Canadian jurisprudence, once 
humanitarianism is put to the courts in any fashion the language of duty and 
fairness inevitably becomes part of the equation and precedent has a role to 
play. This is part of the reason that the Canadian interpretations of 
humanitarianism are so counter-intuitive. Humanitarianism, outside this narrow 
migration law context, is not about fairness and desert, it is about bestowing 
something out of goodness. The Australian executive control approach, 
characterised by merciful individuated decisions, may preserve a meaning for 
humanitarianism which is closer to its extra legal meaning, even while far more 
people per capita and per application are turned away and the circumstances of 
those refusals are rendered invisible. 
139 Above n 136 at 80. 
14° Crock M, Immigration and Refugee Law in Australia, Federation Press, Sydney, 1998, at 
131. 
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C. HUMANITARIANISM AND IDENTITY 
The contrasts between how humanitarianism is deployed in the Australian 
and Canadian laws allow for analyses of the relationship between 
humanitarianism and identity in Australia and Canada and for reflection on 
liberalism's humanitarian consensus. Three aspects of the legal positioning of 
humanitarianism are important to completing the portrait of its role in liberal 
theory and in liberal migration laws. First, significant differences can be 
explained by contrasting the effects of locating humanitarianism decision-
making with the courts or with the executive. Second, attention to identity in the 
analysis requires considering who the 'beneficiaries' of these decisions are. 
Finally, drawing on these two phases of the analysis, the mirror of 
humanitarianism in which both the nation its members are reflected can be 
understood. 
1. Legislative or executive control 
The use of the term humanitarian throughout the Immigration Act ensures 
that Canadian courts have a significant role in determining interpretations and 
appropriate uses of the term. By contrast, in Australia, humanitarianism is 
reserved to the executive. One consequence of this difference is that we have 
far more evidence of Canadian interpretations of the term, and therefore it is 
much easier to see how the term is used in disparate situations and often 
counter-intuitively by the Canadian courts. Fewer conclusions can be drawn in 
the Australian case about the meaning of humanitarianism. There is at least the 
possibility that because humanitarian decision-making in Australia is carried out 
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on a case by case basis that it may be informed solely by concerns which are 
very close to extra-legal meanings. 
The principal conclusions to be drawn from the locus of humanitarian 
decision-making go beyond what can be said about its meaning to the crucial 
questions of control and sovereignty. When the executive makes these 
decisions the government of the day retains control over the decision-making. 
Australia's quick abandonment of section 6A(l)(e) provides one example of 
this. Executive control over migration decisions keeps these decisions at the 
heart of the sovereign nation. Two important strands of analysis come together 
at this point. First, that immigration has long been associated with the core of 
national sovereignty. 141 Legomsky argues that British immigration law is at 
least overshadowed by the royal prerogative, under which decisions relating to 
foreign affairs or to acts of state were completely beyond judicial review. 142 
Even in Britain this doctrine has lost much of its historical importance, and the 
federal constitutions of Australia and Canada dint its impact, yet the line of 
cases which Legomsky draws on to demonstrate the influence of the prerogative 
in immigration law143 are part of the common law of both these former colonies. 
The strong historical link of control over immigration and nationhood itself is 
seen in these century old prerogative decisions, as well as in the early twentieth 
century removal of citizenship and migration concerns from the international 
141 This is a cornerstone of Stephen Legomsky' s explanation for the inordinate deference of 
British and American courts to immigration decisions. See Legomsky S H, Immigration and the 
Judiciary: Law and Politics in Britain and America Clarendon Press, Oxford, and Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1997, especially Chapter 4, "Patterns and Trends: A Descriptive 
View". 
142 Ibid at 87-105 and passim. 
143 Musgrove v Chun Teeong Toy [1981] AC 272 (PC); Poll v Lord Advocate [1899[ 1 F.823 (Ct 
ofSess); Attorney-Genera/for Canada v Cain [1906] AC 542 (PC). 
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legal sphere to the domestic144 and in the use of control over immigration at a 
national level as an argument for the establishment of both the Australian and 
Canadian confederations. Control over immigration, over its own borders, is 
defining of the nation. It marks out the nation qua nation, rather than mere 
colony or quasi-dependent state. 145 The second strand of analysis engaged by 
executive control in this area is that if migration law is to be harnessed to the 
needs of the liberal nation, there are strong incentives to control the contents 
and interpretations of the law. 146 
Australian and Canadian approaches to humanitarianism reveal important 
differences about the strength of the national need for control over migration, 
which in turn tell us something about national mythos and identity building. 
Writing humanitarianism all over the Immigration Act allows the Canadian 
courts the latitude to "leave the door ajar". Canadian discourses about 
immigration are much less concerned with leaving that door swinging than 
Australian discourses are. Canada lets in many more immigrants each year on a 
per capita basis147 and sits north of what I proudly learned in primary school 
was the "longest undefended border in the world." Even if Canada wanted to 
develop the same kind of "control culture"148 as island Australia, it could not. 
144 Discussed in Brawley S, The White Peril: Foreign Relations and Asian Immigration to 
Australasia and North America 1919-1987, UNSW Press, Sydney, 1995. 
145 The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 1933, Art I, 165 LNTS 19 states: 
The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a 
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; ( c) government; and ( d) capacity to enter into 
relations with other States. 
146 This argument is fully developed in Chapter Two at pp.82-90. 
147 Approximately 1% of the population, compared with approximately 0.3% of the population 
through the 1990s. 
148 This term was coined and applied to Australian migration law by Dr. Kathryn Cronin in "A 
Culture of Control: An Overview oflmmigration Policy-Making" in Jupp J and Kabala M (eds) 
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The encroaching hordes imagery - which still lurks in the edges of Australian 
migration discourses - is not there either. 149 There has never been a sense in 
Canada that the massive population of the United States might suddenly want to 
come north. Thus Canadian politicians are much more confident in leaving 
humanitarianism to the courts, to relinquishing a bit of control. Control over the 
border, and the quest for an impermeable border, are close to the core of 
Australian nationhood. The universal visa system and the national panic over 
"boat people" are evidence of this. 15° Canada is by no means free of the culture 
of control 151 but there are more counters to it. One important cultural difference 
is played out in the way the population debate intertwines with concerns about 
immigration. In Australia there is an on-going popular and academic debate 
about the maximum population of the nation. While there is disagreement about 
the number, the idea of a maximum is agreed upon. 152 Despite geographic 
The Politics of Australian Immigration Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 
1993, ch 5. 
149 This mythology has recently been revived by the Minister of Immigration's comment that 
"whole Middle Eastern villages" are planning to pack up and come to Australia by boat. This 
comment attracted widespread attention in the Australian media in November 1999. McGregor 
R, "10,000 Illegals on Way, Says Ruddock "Australian, 16 November 1999 at 1, Saunders M, 
"Ruddock 'Hysteria' Makes Waves: Beazley" Australian 7 December 1999 at 4. 
150 Australia is the only major tourist destination and only major "Western" nation requiring 
every non-citizen entering the country to hold a visa. Regarding boat people, between the first 
arrivals in the late 1980s and mid 1999, approximately 3000 people arrived in Australia by boat. 
These arrivals prompted reform of the Migration Act to allow for non-reviewable detention of 
these people. Yet, if all boat arrivals had been allowed to stay, their numbers would make up 
less than 5% of the annual migration intake for any one of those years. This situation is 
challenged somewhat by the approximately 2000 arrivals in the second half of 1999. This 
significantly higher number is 2.5% of the migrant target for this year. It has returned the 
national panic to a daily news story. 
151 Examples of this rhetoric are easy to pick from the Canadian press. "Immigrant Smugglers 
Switch Entry Route" Edmonton Journal 9 Feb 1999; Bronskill J, "Thousands of People 
Smuggled into Canada" Vancouver Sun 25 August, 1998. 
152 Ruddock P, "Temporary Influx of the Highly Skilled Makes Sense" Australian 17 November 
1999 at 17; Hodge A, "Plea to Populate to 50m or Perish" Australian 25 November 1999 at 3; 
Pradd D, "Refugee Alert Sounds Like a Wake-up Call Australian 25 November 1999 at 13; 
Campbell D, "Just How Big a Nation Should We Aim to Be?" Australian 15 October 1996 at 
13. 
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similarities (large tracts of empty land which are not easily made productive) 
this question is never put in Canadian debate. When migration and population 
meet in popular discourse, the concern is that population rate of increase may be 
affected one way or another by migrant intake. This is another manifestation of 
the control discourse, of the importance of control to the national imagination of 
itself. Locating discretionary humanitarian decisions with the executive, at the 
sovereign core of the nation, facilitates these nation-building, nation-controlling 
objectives. 
Closely related to the difference in judicial or executive determinations is 
the construction of humanitarian decision-making as discretionary decision-
making. Here the most fruitful aspect of the analysis is considering the 
interaction between humanitarianism and discretion rather than drawing out 
differences between the Australian and Canadian situations. 153 In both systems, 
decisions about humanitarian and compassionate considerations are made 
almost entirely on a case by case discretionary basis. 154 In many ways, these 
decisions are paradigmatic discretionary decisions. The indeterminacy of 
humanitarianism fits well in the discretion paradigm which Lacey describes as, 
"allowing the ideological gaps between the rhetoric and substance of the law to 
be managed."155 In humanitarian admissions, the ideological gap between 
153 Although this could certainly be done. The Australian humanitarian decisions fit within 
definitions of strong discretion, the Canadian are much closer to definitions of weak discretion. 
The Australian discretion is exercised at the highest level of the executive, the Canadian at a 
range of levels and sometimes even at the lowest. The range of discretionary decisions is much 
smaller in Australia than in Canada. These factors contribute to the earlier analysis of a stronger 
control culture in Australia. 
154 Subject to my discussion in the next section of the humanitarian categories of admission. 
155 Lacey N, "The Jurisprudence of Discretion: Escaping the Legal Paradigm" in Hawkins K 
(ed), The Uses of Discretion Clarendon Press, Oxford and Oxford University Press, New York, 
1992, 361at364. 
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rhetoric and substance is particularly large. The nebulous content of 
humanitarianism allows for even more slippage than standard discretionary 
decision-making, and the legal device of discretion limits, even in the Canadian 
setting, judicial inquiry. While the classic description of the relationship 
between law and discretion states that law sets the boundaries within which 
discretion is to work, 156 writing humanitarianism into the law allows the 
discretionary element of the decision to overlap its legal borders. This is 
important to ensuring the complete flexibility of the migration law framework. 
In order for migration law to function at the behest of the constantly changing 
national need, and at the same time retain its appearance of stability and support 
the rule of law ideology, porous concepts like humanitarianism - to repair 
porous borders - are essential tools. 
This type of discretionary decision-making fits within Schneider's "rule-
building discretion" category because the rapidity of change makes the rules 
controversial, the discretion and the extent of the change are uncertain, and the 
rules must be replaced frequently. 157 Schneider asserts that this type of 
discretion is most useful in times of great social change, and could take issue 
with my use of his categorisation scheme on that basis. 158 But it is because of 
this that my assignment is most appropriate. Migration law is a perpetual 
setting of great social change. This is precisely why it is an important site of the 
construction of national identity, as a work in progress. I discussed in Chapter 
156 Discussed and summarised in J Bell, "Discretionary Decision-Making: A Jurisprudential 
View" in K Hawkins (ed) above n 155, 89 at 93. 
157 Schneider CE, "Discretion and Rules: A Lawyer's View" in Hawkins K (ed) above n 155 47 
at64. 
158 His other categories are khadi-discretion, rule-failure discretion, and rule compromise 
discretion, at ibid 61-65. 
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Two the important dual function of migration law in establishing appearance of 
stability and yet accommodating on-going shifts in understanding of the 
national self. 159 The framework of the Act ensures that ever shifting political 
whim and national need can be poured into the sieve and made law. The rules 
in migration are controversial, do require frequent change, and are highly 
uncertain, especially in humanitarian decision making. What the combination 
of the term humanitarianism and discretion allow is for this incessant change to 
be hidden, and for the law, the border of the community, our constituted 
identity, to appear stable. The Canadian law, with its high levels of 
humanitarianism and discretion is amended much less frequently than the 
Australian. This is the counterbalance to direct executive control. But stability 
is required nonetheless, and hence upholding the control ideology is even more 
vital in Australia. 
2. The Chosen Ones 
As an humanitarian admission is an act of grace, the identity of the 
beneficiary is highly important, just as it is in the humanitarian sub-category of 
refugee. 160 If precious membership to our national community it to be bestowed 
on one who does not bring us a direct benefit and to whom justice requires that 
we owe nothing, that individual must be deserving. The importance of the 
identity of the individual in humanitarian admissions is seen in the Canadian 
jurisprudence and is hinted at in the Australian ministerial decisions. 161 As 
these types of admission are not pegged to a particular national benefit, identity 
159 See pp. 82-90. 
160 See Chapter 3 at pp. l 09-115. 
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is closely scrutinised. This scrutiny, as the cases, guidelines, and arguments 
show, goes two ways: to ensuring the person is sufficiently destitute to be 
deserving of our mercy and to ensuring that the person is acceptable as a 
member of the community. This accounts for some of the diversity in the law 
such as the contradictory emphasis in the Canadian cases on both need and 
establishment factors. The other in this scenario must be both apart and 
acceptable. 
This dual scrutiny of identity is also related to the emphasis on 
individuality. As both the Australian and Canadian courts have said, 
humanitarianism is matter of emotion, of what stirs a compassionate response in 
an individual. Further, humanitarianism is analytically an exception to the rule, 
a way to circumvent the law, therefore it cannot be open to everyone but only to 
individuals. It is both individually defined and individually applied. -This 
provides double strength resistance against any floodgates argument, which is 
indispensable to the control ideology. This is similar to the role of 
individualisation in the refugee definition but is heightened here as there is no 
group identity aspect to the analysis. 
The humanitarian admission categories contribute to this analysis. In 
Australia, and in Canada until very recently, certain categories have been 
designated for priority humanitarian admission. While this may seem to depart 
from the linkage between humanitarianism and individuation, the category 
labels are highly identity specific, even moreso than the refugee definition. 
Categories open in Australia in 1998-99 included women at risk, Vietnamese in 
161 My argument here provides further support for Legomsky's observation that judicial 
responses to immigration cases are highly sensitive to the status of the individuals involved. 
Legomsky, above n 141 at 265-66. 
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refugee camps, citizens of the former SFR Yugoslavia, minorities of the former 
USSR, Burmese in Burma, Burmese in Thailand, Sudanese, Sri Lankans, 
Ahmadis in Pakistan, Vietnamese repatriated under the Comprehensive Plan of 
Action or living in Germany. 162 In addition to these requirements and others, 
each category contains a detailed list of specific identity requirements which an 
applicant must construct herself to conform to. For example, to come within the 
women at risk category, a woman must be subject to persecution, identified as 
"of concern" by the UNHCR, must be without the protection of a male relative, 
be in danger of violence, victimisation or abuse because of her gendered 
identity, and must not fit with another part of the refugee or humanitarian 
program. In addition to having to construct oneself this way, humanitarian 
program visa processing is also prioritised on the basis of degrees of connection 
to Australia. 163 Like the refugee, the humanitarian migrant must be not-like us 
in order to need our protection but also able to shed that identity and merge with 
the nation when required. The paradoxical requirement to be both other and 
not-other is overt here. These humanitarian entry categories are so narrowly 
defined that they do not detract from the argument that humanitarian concern is 
tied to individuals to facilitate control over it. Control is also facilitated by 
ensuring, in both Australia and Canada, that the categories can be created and 
dismantled by the executive, as can the number of visas accorded to each. 
162 These are the special assistance categories for 1998-99. Other visas in the humanitarian 
program include refugee visa, in-country humanitarian visa, global special humanitarian visa, 
and emergency rescue visa. Very similar identity named categories in use in Canada prior to 
1997. 
163 Highest priority goes to those with relatives in Australia, next to those with other close ties in 
Australia (friends, more distant relatives, past visits, especially for education or business), third 
to those with "resettlement potential." These factors make the humanitarian categories mimic 
the priorities of family and economic migration. 
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These identity specific categories, the more generic categories which 
make up the remainder of the Australian program (in-country humanitarian visa, 
global special humanitarian visa, emergency rescue visa) and all of the current 
Canadian designated class program, are all alternatives to a broader definition of 
refugee. To that extent, they could be subject to the same analysis of identity as 
the refugee definition in Chapter Three. What is crucial in relation to these 
supplementary humanitarian categories is that both Australia and Canada (and 
other nations as well) choose this option rather than a more expansive definition 
of refugee. Using ad hoc humanitarian categories allows for direct manipulation 
of the identities to be admitted. The narrow defining of each category, like the 
narrow refugee definition itself, provide that identity constructions at the border 
can be closely scrutinised. 
Considering who is chosen as deserving also communicates national 
values. In the Canadian humanitarian jurisprudence values of family 
independence and self-sufficiency are enshrined alongside a strong work ethic 
and a vision of economic and academic success as contributions to the national 
community. Family rather than state responsibility for weak members is valued. 
Australian decision-making is veiled but in the brief time when 
humanitarianism and compassion were before the courts the value of nuclear 
family and of certain contributions to society were referred to. The tabled 
discretionary decisions do communicate somewhat the importance of being able 
to become established in Australian society. 
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D. CONCLUSON: REFLECTING OURSELVES-THE MIRROR OF 
HUMANITARIANISM 
From all of these elements we can frame the mirror of humanitarianism. 
Humanitarianism occupies an inordinate amount of space in rhetoric about 
migration and migration law because of the liberal consensus that the just nation 
must, at some unspecified point, open its borders to needy outsiders. Yet 
humanitarianism is no exception to the principle that migration law serves the 
national need. In the case of humanitarian admissions, the need most readily 
catered to is the need to be fair and right and even just, and the perhaps identical 
need to be perceived in this light. This need of the liberal nation is intertwined 
with the liberal consensus and both contribute to migration discourses of 
humanitarianism. The philosophical dissonance over the meaning of 
humanitarianism is paralleled in the various ways the law represents · 
humanitarianism. The instability inherent in the term also makes it an apt 
device to ease the coupling of national need and migration law. 
Simultaneously it accounts for how intuitive and extra-legal interpretations of 
humanitarianism can so often diverge from the legal uses of the term. 164 
Looking at the use and position of humanitarianism in Australian and 
Canadian migration law we see a subtly expressed difference in the power of a 
public and political discourse about control over immigration, control over 
borders, and therefore control over community membership and identity. The 
layers at which this control functions were expressed by then Justice Brennan 
when he defined the purpose of the migration legislation as "control of the 
164 I reject the radical postmoderm position that would hold that humanitarianism has no core 
meaning. I hold instead that in our Australian and Canadian national communities there is a 
consensus of meaning about humanitarianism, even if it is not precise in its contours. 
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membership of the Australian people."165 In the comparison between the two 
nations we also see that the Canadian law is far more concerned with 
humanitarianism. While this multiplies the easily demonstrated contradictions 
and inconsistencies in legal manipulation of the term, it cannot detract from the 
fact that the Canadian law has a more generous face. This, backed up by the 
numbers, adds up to a more generous or humanitarian law no matter the extent 
of textual indeterminacy. Humanitarianism is closer to the heart of the 
Canadian rhetoric about migration than it is in Australia, closer to the tradition 
Canadian law-makers seek to construct, closer to the mythology that Canadians 
as individuals are willing to honour and reify. 
The comparison of Canadian and Australian humanitarianism also 
deepens our understanding of the liberal humanitarian consensus. The 
consensus is exposed as a false non-agreement, strengthening the conclusion 
that liberal theory provides little guidance to moral behaviour in migration law-
making. This absence of guidance is linked both to the hegemony of nation 
states - that each can and evidently does build its own humanitarian mirror -
and to liberal legalism's hermeneutics-that once a term is adopted and made 
legal the techniques of the law tum the term into a category and remove it from 
its extra-legal moorings. 
Humanitarianism is about identity. The individual identity of the other 
who benefits from our grace is important, but only because of the light it reflects 
back on us. When we admit the deserving, we are good. We bestow grace and 
hold up that mirror to admire ourselves. The instances of this in Australian and 
Canadian migration discourses are myriad. Humanitarianism in migration law 
165 Kioa v West above n 131 at 626. 
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is often a self-serving ruse. But there are two critical qualifiers. Despite all of 
this, humanitarianism is the touchstone of consensus in liberal migration laws. 
It has theoretical and rhetorical weight across a wide range of liberal theory and 
it resonates in popular discourses. For these reasons it is the strongest 
mobilising principle we have for rallying to alter the law. To seek change in 
migration law, so that more people for more reasons may be admitted to share 
our prosperity we must appeal to the vanity through the mirror. 
For the final qualifier I must address the obvious: that both Australia and 
Canada have over history taken in large numbers of some of the most needy 
people in the world. 166 The people in these waves of humanitarian migration 
have arrived from great distances, with national assistance, have remade their 
lives and found good and positive ways to make these nations their own, 
intertwining their identities with the other. These migrations have had little to 
do, however, with the texts of our migration statutes, and most of these people 
would be inadmissible today. They have largely been facilitated through 
spontaneous eruptions of popular and political goodwill. Australian Prime 
Minister Hawke's invitation to Chinese nationals after the Tiannamen massacre 
or Prime Minister Howard's recent, if recanted, expression to ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia167 are good examples, as is the outpouring of private citizen 
sponsorship of Indochinese refugees in the early 1980s for which the Canadian 
people, as a nation, won the UNHCR Nansen medal. This kind of 
166 This must be understood in the context of this distance of these countries from situations of 
human crisis. Howard Adelman made the point in 1994 that Canada addresses fewer refugee 
claims per capita that the average among western nations. (Adelman H, "Justice, Immigration 
and Refugees" in Adelman H et al (eds) Immigration and Refugee Policy: Australia and 
Canada Compared, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1994, 63 at 90. There is no reason 
to believe this has changed. Australia addresses fewer claims. 
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humanitarianism is not counter-intuitive, but it is counter-legal. Once 
humanitarianism is moved into the texts of our law and policy, it loses what is 
most attractive about it. 
The image of the nation that humanitarianism creates stands in stark 
contrast to the image of the nation when migration law intersects with rights 
discourse. When the other asserts a claim to justice rather than petitioning for 
mercy, the nation responds in kind. This intersection of rights, identities and the 
liberal nation is the subject of Chapter Five. 
167 At the time of heightened and violent against them in 1998, as part of the social tunnoil 
following the Asian economic crisis. Reported in Shanahan D, "Refugee Door Open to Ethnic 
Chinese" Australian, 2 March 1998 at 1. 
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Chapter Five 
Identities Rights and Nations 
This Chapter scrutinises the interrelationships between migration law and 
national identity through the perspective of rights discourses. In doing so it 
takes up another aspect of the law and identity analysis set out in the Chapter 
Two framework and pushes the reasoning thus far in a new direction. Chapter 
Three considered the othering of the refugee determination process and the 
reciprocal emergence of national identity in contrast to this ultimate other to the 
nation. Chapter Four looked at how humanitarianism is located within liberal 
theory and liberal migration law to reflect a beneficent image of the nation and 
its members. Those two Chapters examine the identity construction process 
from contrasting perspectives: first from the outside, considering how the absent 
other reflects contours of the nation, and then from the inside by looking at how 
the nation seeks to present itself. In taking up the analysis of national identity 
through the perspective of rights discourses, these two analytic positions are 
brought together. Rights are the paradigm oflegal discourse and identity-based 
critiques of rights discourses have emphasised how they embed both 
categorisations, such as refugee, and normative perspectives, such as the 
beneficent nation. Rights claims are raised at many instances in and around 
migration law. To some extent rights discourse does replicate the insider-
outsider dichotomy, but attention to identities in migration law reveals that 
rights play a variety of more nuanced roles in migration law as well. My 
analysis in this Chapter uses identity as an hermeneutic tool as well as using 
national identity as a subject of analysis. Attention to identity allows us to 
explore variations in rights discourses in the migration law setting and to see 
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how these discourses contribute to the construction and reproduction of national 
identities. 
In Chapter Two I considered how rights discourses are assessed in 
critiques of law which use identity as an organising concept. 1 Identity calls our 
attention to the categorical, hierarchical and tightly bounded nature of legal 
reasoning. Because of the pervasive presence of rights discourses in law, the 
idea of a "right" has become a vague catch-all. At the outset of this Chapter, 
then, I set out the range of rights which are deployed in migration laws in 
Australia and Canada. This serves in part to illustrate the plethora of rights 
discourses but also allows for the analysis of the hierarchy which exists between 
varieties of rights. 
The analysis of rights in migration law also allows me to amplify and 
build on the identity based critique of rights. In this Chapter I take up and 
examine rights as "images of power,"2 look at rights as a phenomenon of 
collective identity, 3 and consider how the position of rights in migration law 
offers a particular illustration of Minow' s thesis that there is a central instability 
in rights discourse which hinges on the inability of this discourse to offer an 
adequate reckoning of sameness and difference.4 In contrasting Australian and 
Canadian migration law rights discourses, an important qualifier to the critique 
of rights discourses emerges. Since the rights deployed in migration law are 
1 See pp. 38-45. 
2 Williams P, The Alchemy of Race and Rights, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass, 
191, at 233-34. 
3 Hunt A, Explorations in Law and Society: Toward a Constitutive Theory of Law, Routledge, 
London and New York, 1993 at 247. 
4 Minow M, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 1990 at I 08. 
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themselves hierarchically arranged, it is important to consider how rights 
interact differently with identities at differing positions in the hierarchy. In 
some contexts, "strong" rights open a space for more robust identities of rights 
claimants. The potential for multifaceted relationships between rights and 
identities is one of the themes I take up here. An understanding of these 
relationships is also of strategic importance as provides insights into when rights 
are likely to carry the potential for social transformations and when they will be 
inevitably tied to existing constellations of power relationships in society. This 
analysis, therefore, contributes also to that on-going aspect of the critique of 
rights discourses. 5 
The final step in the analysis of the interrelationship between migration 
law and national identity is to situate rights discourse in migration law at the 
border of the liberal nation. That is, to link my analysis of rights discourses in 
migration law to the broader analytic framework for migration law which runs 
through the thesis. While the analysis to this point allows for nuancing and 
extension of the identity based critique of rights, locating the analysis in that 
broader framework demonstrates the importance and strength of that critique. 
In the realm of migration law, once a claim is articulated as a rights claim, the 
liberal nation's "right" to exclude all outsiders is triggered as an almost 
automatic response. For this reason, the most significant differences in 
migration rights discourses in Australia and Canada do not relate to Canada's 
5 This issue is address by Williams (above n2), Hunt (above n3), Minow (above n4) and others 
such as Bakan J, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs, University of Toronto 
Press, Toronto, 1997; Fudge J, "The Effects of Entrenching a Bill of Rights Upon Political 
Discourse: Feminist Demands and Sexual Violence in Canada" (1989) 17 International Journal 
of the Sociology of Law 445; Bartholomew A and Hunt A, "What's Wrong With Rights?" 
(1990) 9 Law and Inequality 1. 
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constitutionally entrenched human rights and the absence of entrenched rights in 
the Australian constitution, but to differing perceptions of national identity. 
In Chapters Three and Four my empirical analysis focused on the day to 
day workings of refugee determination and humanitarian decision making. In 
this Chapter, I consider instead the most significant judicial pronouncements 
concerning refugee and humanitarian admissions to Australia and Canada. 
These highest court judgments provide a contrast to the day to day workings of 
the law discussed earlier. As contemporary higher court judgments in these 
areas are reasonably rare, I also examine some cases on related migration law 
topics which offer insights into rights and national identities. I proceed through 
the Chapter by first locating the array of rights discourses in migration law. I 
then take up the Chapter Three discussion of refugee claims as rights claims and 
the conclusions to be drawn here about the hierarchy of rights. The next section 
considers the substance of process rights, and the subsequent one considers 
cases decided under Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In the final 
section I draw out the linkages between rights discourses and the liberal nation 
which are foundational to the thesis as a whole. 
A. THE VARIETY OF RIGHTS IN MIGRATION LAW 
A straight forward functional definition of a right is that a right is any 
claim recognised by the law which some legal body will, in some 
circumstances, determine and enforce. This definition separates what I am 
discussing as rights from the use of the term right in popular discourse, and also 
from its use in aspirational and moral discourse. The second exclusion is 
troubling, for it excludes claims such as the "right to live in a clean and healthy 
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environment," or the "right to a decent standard of living," claims which have 
moral and political resonance in many societies including the ones I am 
comparing here. 6 The point of narrowing the definition of a right this way is to 
focus the discussion on what the courts can and will do in the realm of 
migration law, and to draw a close connection between a right and a national 
legal system. At a rhetorical level, a rights claim may be free-floating. To be 
enforceable in law it must ultimately be harnessed to some national legal 
system. Increasingly, national legal systems are enforcing international law 
norms and this may one day become a matter of course. The moral and 
persuasive power of international law legitimates it as law in its own right, 7 but 
the domestic legal systems of the world's nations remain the proving ground for 
rights claims. The ability of a nation to reject rights determinations made in the 
international arena, even if this only happens occasionally,8 is evidence of the 
hegemony of national legal systems in this regard. 
1. Rights and Privileges 
The rights discourses of migration law cluster around two dichotomies I 
explore in this chapter: the right-privilege distinction and the substantive rights-
procedural rights distinction. The short version of the story is that admission to 
6 Indeed, a number of claims which I would exclude from the definition of rights are contained 
in international law statements ofrights such as the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 1966 973 UNTS3 and the Declaration on the Right to Development 1986, GAOR 41 •1 
Sess., Supp 53 at 186. 
7 Along with the willingness of nations to act in the international realm on the basis of 
international law. But even in this realm, it is the nation which functions as actor to make the 
law extant. 
8 An example in the migration law area is the Australian government's response to the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee ruling in Australia v Applicant A, Communication No 
560/1993, UN Doc CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (30 April 1997) that conditions of detention of 
some refugee applicants were in breach of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights I 966 999 UNTS 171. The government distanced itself from the ruling and reaffirmed its 
practices. 
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the nation for non-members is a privilege and never a right and therefore the 
"rights" of those seeking entry are at most procedural. The simplicity of the 
story is an important part of understanding the limited potential for making 
rights claims the basis of legal change in migration law. It is also crucial to 
understanding the pre-eminent role of the nation's identity to migration law 
provisions and outcomes. As outsiders claim no rights, this law reflects national 
self-identifications and priorities exclusively, rather than other claims. 
That non-members have no right to entry is the brightest beacon guiding 
the development of migration law. In the words of Canada's Justice Sopinka, 
"The most fundamental principle of immigration law is that non-citizens do not 
have an unqualified right to enter or remain in the country. "9 The Canadian 
Immigration Act draws the right-privilege distinction under the subheading 
"Principles of Canadian Immigration Policy" in sections 4 and 5. Subsection 
4(1) states that "A Canadian citizen and a permanent resident have a right to 
come into Canada ... " subject to some exceptions for permanent residents. 
Subsection 4(2) defines the "right to remain" of the same group; subsection 
4(2.1) sets out a right to remain for "Convention refugees" which is subject to 
significant qualifications and subsection 4(3) provides rights to enter and remain 
for people registered under Canada's Indian Act10 whether or not they are 
citizens.11 Immediately following these provisions, subsection 5(1) states that 
9 Chiarelli v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992), 90 DLR (4th) 289 
(SCC) at 303. 
10 RSC 1985 c. 1-5. 
11 The provisions of s.4 read in full: 
( 1) A Canadian citizen and a permanent resident have a right to come into Canada except where, 
in the case of a permanent resident, it is established that the person is a person described in 
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"No person, other than a person described in section 4, has a right to come into 
or remain in Canada." 
The distinction of right versus privilege is the core principle of Canadian 
immigration policy. While permanent residents, Convention Refugees and 
lndians12 also have rights to remain (and enter in the case of permanent 
residents and Indians) these rights are qualified claims. For the first two groups, 
the limits are drawn by criminal behaviour. Over the past decade, the limits on 
these rights have been expanded by broadening the criminal behaviour 
exclusions under ss. 19 and 27. 13 The rights of status Indians are also subject to 
the provisions of a separate governing regime. While it is difficult to deprive a 
subsection 27(1) [setting out exclusions based on serious criminal convictions or suspicion of 
activities which could attract a serious criminal conviction]. 
(2) Subject to any other Act of Parliament, a Canadian citizen and a permanent resident have a 
right to remain in Canada except where, in the case of a permanent resident, it is established that 
that person is a person described in subsection 27(1). 
(2.1) Subject to any other act of Parliament, a person who is determined under this Act or the 
regulations to be a Convention refugee has, while lawfully in Canada, a right to remain in 
Canada except where it is established that the person is a person described in paragraph 
19(1 )( c. l ), ( c.2), ( d), ( e ), (t), (g), G), (k), or (l) [relating to serious criminal activities] or a person 
who has been convicted of an offence under any Act of Parliament for which a term of 
imprisonment of more than six months has been imposed; or five years or more may be 
imposed. 
(3) A person who is registered as an Indian pursuant to the Indian Act has, whether or not that 
person is a Canadian citizen, the same rights and obligations under this Act as a Canadian 
citizen. 
12 The identity label "Indian" is used in the Act and is the legally relevant category under 
Canada's Indian Act RSC 1985 c.1-5. This term is no longer culturally appropriate in Canada 
where the First Nations people are increasingly use the name of their nation, or are "categorised" 
generically as First Nations peoples. 
13 Amended by SC 1992 c.49. While the provisions are myriad an example is paragraph 
19(1 )(d): 
persons who there are reasonable grounds to believe will commit one or more 
offences that may be punishable under any Act of Parliament by way of indictment, 
other than offences designated as contraventions under the Contraventions Act, or 
engage in activity that is part of a pattern of criminal activity planned and organised 
by a number of persons acting in concert in furtherance of the commission of any 
offence that may be punishable under any Act of Parliament by way of indictment; ... 
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person of Indian status, not every member of a First Nation holds or chooses to 
seek this status. The rights of Indians within the Immigration Act underscore the 
uneasy relationship of First Nations with the migration law. First Nations are 
awkwardly positioned as neither members nor others, and thus distanced from 
the monolithic nation created in the law. This echoes the absence of First 
Nations in the immigration mythologies of Canada as nation. Despite the array 
of rights set out in sections 4 and 5, the only unassailable rights are those of the 
citizen to enter and remain. 
The Australian Migration Act has the same effect, but achieves it in a 
more direct way through stating in its section 4 that its objective it to regulate ... 
"the coming into and presence in, Australia of non-citizens."14 This introduces 
a theme that resonates in many of the comparisons to be drawn between 
Australia and Canada in this Chapter. Canadian migration law is more overtly 
concerned with substantive rights. While Australian permanent residents and 
persons determined by Australia to be refugees can be excluded for 
approximately the same reasons as in Canada, 15 their rights to remain are not 
enshrined as "principles" of Australian migration policy. They could bring 
similar claims to their respective courts, and seek to have them enforced in 
similar ways. The significance lies in what the nation chooses to say about 
itself in its law. To broaden the list of those with some basic rights claims 
makes the membership of the nation more diverse and more inclusive. That its 
promise may not be met in the Canadian setting can then become a legal 
argument with different rhetorical weight than the parallel Australian argument 
14 This section is discussed in Chapter Two at pp. 85-87. Notably, each of the four subsections 
refers to the non-citizen/citizen dichotomy directly. 
15 Migration Act, ss.200-203. 
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that a given subsection of the Act is being wrongly interpreted. This is a clear 
instance of the nation writing its aspirational self into the migration law. The 
specific reference to Indians in the Canadian Act focuses attention on the 
contested place of First Nations within the nation. A similar relationship exists, 
of course, in Australia but the Migration Act proclaims the message "we are all 
Australians," submerging troublesome distinctions in that universalising 
statement. It also has implications for the hierarchy of rights and the covert 
power of rights discourses which are explored later in this Chapter. 
Another lesson to be drawn from how the right-privilege dichotomy is 
written into migration law comes from its alignment with citizenship. 
Citizenship is the cornerstone of rights discourse because its universalising and 
homogenising impulse16 extends only to the border of the nation. That is, 
citizenship as a generic category is not homogenising in itself, rather it is the 
citizenship of some particular geographically and historically located nation 
which is universalised. Rights gain their power from their ability to be enforced 
by national legal systems. Citizens have the most secure and complete access to 
those systems. Citizens and rights are both attached to the nation. From the 
identity of the nation, citizens gauge some aspects of their self-identification. 
From that same identity of the nation, rights garner some of their substantive 
content. While other gradations of attachment to the nation exist (such as 
"permanent resident," "refugee," "Indian") these are defined by how the rights 
they carry compare to the rights of citizenship. 
16 See Ch 2 at pp. 92-94. 
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2. Rights in the courts 
As those with a right to enter the nation without prior categorisation 
through migration law are limited to citizens and in Canada, Indians, the rights 
which surround the process of categorisation by the immigration law are crucial 
to those seeking to become members of the nation. In liberal nations, where 
suspicion of the power of the state is a component of the rule oflaw ideology, 
the procedural rights are arguably the most important which are accorded the 
individual. While citizens are entitled to superior procedural protections, non-
citizens are not completely deprived of them. 17 There are a myriad of 
procedural rights inscribed in the Australian and the Canadian migration laws. 
While there is not a right to apply for admission, applications do attract some of 
the rights associated with natural justice, 18 rights to some kinds of information, 19 
and rights to be told of decisions and the reasons for them.20 Some applicants 
have a rights to appeal decisions on their merits21 and rights to have those 
decisions judicially reviewed, or at least to petition the court to do so.22 
17 For example, in the Australian case of Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLRl the 
High Court held that mandatory detention of some non-Australians was constitutional since it 
was applied only to aliens. The court's reasoning is linked to the legislative power of the 
Commonwealth government, but also acknowledges superior rights provisions for members. 
18 In Australia, review on grounds of procedural fairness is restricted by s.476 of the Migration 
Act. 
19 People entering Canada must be informed of their rights under the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, if they are detained R v Kwok (1986) 31 CCC (3d) 196 (OntCA). By contrast, there 
is no legal obligation to a dive boat people detained in Australia that they must complete a 
particular form to apply for refugee status; Fang v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 
(1996) 135 ALR 583(FedCt). 
20 The Immigration Act provides that the CRDD must provide reasons in all cases rejected, 
s.69 .1. Under the Migration Act, applicants in Australia receive reasons at each phase in the 
decision-making process. 
21 Merits appeal is available in Australia to all refugee and most immigrant applicants; 
Migration Act Parts 5, 6, 7. 
22 Migration Act, Part 8, Immigration Act ss.82.1-84. 
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The allotment of these rights form concentric circles with citizenship in 
the centre. A refugee in an overseas camp hoping to resettle in either Australia 
or Canada has no rights at all when that government's representative is making 
selection decisions. A person arriving in Australia with no documents and not 
asserting a refugee claim at the border does not even have the right to be told of 
their right to have legal assistance or of their right to make a refugee claim. 23 
Someone applying for permanent residence status in Canada at an overseas post 
does not have a right to be heard in person by the decision-maker.24 Someone 
detained in Australia because of arriving without a visa has only a limited right 
to have their detention reviewed by a court. 25 An unsuccessful refugee claimant 
in Canada does not have a right to have that decision judicially reviewed. 26 A 
rejected refugee claimant in Australia has the right to a hearing on merits 
review,27 while their rights on judicial review are curtailed by legislation.28 A 
permanent resident of Canada who has applied to sponsor a new immigrant can 
appeal the rejection of that sponsorship, although the individual who was 
23 Fang, above nl9. 
24 Muliadi v Minister of Employment and Immigration (1986) 18 Admin LR 243 (FedCA). 
25 Lim, above n 17. 
26 Although they do have the right to seek leave of the Federal Court to conduct judicial review. 
They may also seek humanitarian and compassionate review of their situation from the 
Department. See Ch 4 at pp. 203-209. Compassion is not a right. 
27 Migration Act s.411. 
28 Migration Act s.476. As discussed in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Eshetu 
[1999] HCA 21 andAbebe v The Commonwealth; Re Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs [1999] HCA 14. The Commonwealth Constitution provides some rights to 
judicial review ins. 75. The extent to which these rights may allow those shut out of the 
Federal Court by the Migration Act to move directly into the High Court is still an open question 
in my view. It remains open to that court to define the ground for prohibition, mandamus and 
injunction narrowly, although this has not been the case to date. Traditional and contemporary 
deference to the Executive as exemplified in Abebe and Eshetu suggests that such a narrowing 
may be on the cards. 
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rejected cannot.29 A permanent resident facing deportation from Australia has 
access to the full range of review and appeal possibilities.30 The concentric 
circles are not the same in each nation, but the principle is. The closer one is to 
belonging to the nation, the more rights one has in the migration realm. 
Citizenship is the centre of the circle, where one has the full bundle of rights, so 
much so that migration law is almost completely inapplicable to citizens save 
for some provisions providing sanctions for citizens who aid others in 
circumventing the law or where citizens can assist others in joining the nation 
through sponsorship. As the circles become smaller, the connection between 
the nation and the individual is more tightly drawn, until the centre where the 
nation and the individual are co-identified. 
The concentric circles allow for comparison between Australia and 
Canada as well. By using this image to visualise these rights we can see that 
one can get further away from the centre in Australia than in Canada. That is, 
once a person has physically arrived on national soil, they can have no rights at 
all in Australia, except rights they need not be informed of and a right to be 
released from unlawful detention. In similar circumstances in Canada, a person 
must lawfully be told of their right to counsel. This may not amount to much, if 
we imagine the situation in which one might seek to enforce this right. How 
much does an uninformed and uncomprehending individual at port of entry 
really benefit from it? There are two counters to this. First, that not all 
individuals at point of entry are uninformed or uncomprehending; and second, 
29 Immigration Act S. 77. 
30 With some limited exceptions (on national security grounds) this person could seek merits 
review followed by judicial review in the Federal Court and then the High Court of Australia. 
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that an accretion of minor rights distinctions does eventually amass a noticeable 
difference between the migration laws of Australia and Canada. 
Australian and Canadian migration law are an appropriate backdrop for to 
considering the legal power and potential for social transformation of 
constitutionally protected human rights. Since 1982, the Constitution Act of 
Canada has included the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms31 and 
Canadians have entered a robust conversation about whether the Charter 
improves or entrenches social and legal inequalities. Australia is a similarly 
situated nation, with a similar approach to immigration and with considerable 
parallels in its legal system, but without a constitutional rights document. The 
Charter does not replicate the Immigration Act's statements about rights to enter 
and remain in Canada, but it does provide that "Every citizen of Canada has the 
right to enter, remain in and leave Canada" and that both citizens and permanent 
residents have the right to " ... a) move and take up residence in any province; 
and (b) to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province. "32 Aside from this 
provision and from the right to vote and to minority language education, the 
Charter does not refer to citizenship, setting out instead rights for individuals, 
persons, and First Nations. The Supreme Court of Canada's first and ground-
breaking equality rights decision, while not a migration matter, struck down 
provisions which prevented permanent residents from practising law.33 The 
decision had considerable implications for the meaning of membership of the 
31 Schedule B, Part I, to the Constitution Act, 1982 
32 Section 6. 
33 Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [1989] I SCR 143. 
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Canadian community, but few for crossing the membership hurdle. In Singh34 
the Supreme Court of Canada established that anyone physically present in 
Canada has the benefit of the Charter, setting the stage for a meaningful test of 
the utility of the Charter for those applying inland to become members of the 
community. Section D of this Chapter considers Charter arguments which have 
been raised in the area of migration law. In the broader context of comparing 
migration rights discourses in both nations, the Charter has a covert effect on 
the way rights and identities can be manipulated in this area of the law. 
International law adds little or nothing to the array of rights available to 
those who seek access to a country where they are not already citizens or 
residents.35 There is no international right to enter a foreign country, or to leave 
one's own. Even the narrow potential right of genuine refugees not to be 
returned to face harm is so limited that it is at best a very weak rights claim. My 
next step in analysing the relationship of rights, identities and nations is to 
explore why the claims of refugees fail as rights claims and how this contributes 
to refugee identity and to the identity-based critique of rights. 
B. REFUGEE CLAIMS AS RIGHTS CLAIMS 
While prima facie at international law a refugee has no right to enter any 
country except that of their nationality, I also argued in Chapter Three that the 
Refugee Convention's36 provision that refugees must not be returned to 
countries where they risk persecution does not effectively translate into a right to 
34 Re Singh and the Minister of Employment and Immigration (1985) 17 DLR (4th) 422. 
35 Discussed above in Chapter Three at pp. 106-107. 
36 Convention Relating to the Status of Refagees 1951, 189 UNTS 150 with 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refagees, 606 UNTS 267. 
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remain. I agree with Hathaway's assertion that, "The notion of refugee law as a 
rights based regime is largely illusory."37 The reasons for this are related to the 
refugee's position as the ultimate other to the nation, and to the refugee's role as 
a humanitarian claimant seeking the mercy of the nation. A claim for 
compassion does not effectively function as a right because rights are grounded 
in equality but compassion is grounded in generosity and inequality. Efforts to 
shift the claims of refugees to some other basis have not been successful, in part 
because of the liberal humanitarian consensus surrounding the admission of 
outsiders. These factors draw the relationship between refugee identities, rights 
and the nation into a curious alignment which provides a fuller picture of the 
reasons for the weakness refugee rights discourses. 
1. The Refugee Definition in the Highest Courts 
Opinions of the highest courts in Australia and Canada interpreting the 
refugee definition can be analysed by considering the extent to which the 
interpretation is conducted within, alongside or at a distance from rights 
discourse. Broadly speaking, decisions which have been most favourable to 
refugee claimants have analysed that claim in the context of fundamental human 
rights. That is, they have identified refugees as "rights holders" of some sort, 
even while keeping some distance from the proposition that the Refugee 
Convention provides a right to remain in the country of refuge. 
Canada (Attorney-General) v Warcf8is the most comprehensive of the 
relevant decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court of 
37 Hathaway JC, "Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection" (1991) 4 Journal of 
Refugee Studies 113. Hathaway argues that positive reforms in refugee law could be achieved 
by reformulating the law around the concept of a fundamental right to return to one's own state. 
38 (1993), 103 DLR (4t11) 1 (SCC). 
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Australia as it deals systematically with many aspects of the refugee definition. 
It is also a rare unanimous pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Canada. 39 
Writing for the Court, Justice La Forest begins by exploring " ... the rationale 
underlying the international refugee protection regime"40 and makes thorough 
use of the traditional sources of treaty interpretation including travaux 
preparatoires, academic commentary and prevailing authorities.41 He draws on 
the Preamble to the Refugee Convention to conclude that: 
Underlying the Convention is the international community's 
commitment to the assurance of basic human rights without 
discrimination ..... This theme outlines the boundaries of the objectives 
sought to be achieved and consented to by the delegates. It sets out, in a 
general fashion, the intention of the drafters and thereby the inherent limit 
to the cases embraced by the Convention.42 
La Forest keeps the principle of human rights without discrimination at the 
forefront of his approach to all aspects of the refugee definition. It provides the 
justification for his use of Charter interpretation techniques43 and his definition 
of a "particular social group."44 The Ward decision sorts and categorises a 
number of Federal Court of Appeal decisions which had preceded it. In keeping 
with the human rights focus, the decision takes a reasonably sympathetic 
39 Although the case was argued before a five member panel (of a possible nine) and Stevenson 
J. did not participate in the judgment. 
40 Above n38 at 12. 
41 Interestingly, Justice La Forest moves to these sources without elaborating his reasons for 
doing so, in marked contrast to the High Court of Australia's approach in Applicant A and Anor 
v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs andAnor (1997) 142 ALR 331. One explanation 
for this may be that the refugee definition is written directly into the Canadian law, see above 
Chapter Three at pp. 119-121. 
42 Above n38 at 29. 
43 Ibid at 32-33. 
44 Ibid at 33-34. He states, "The meaning assigned to "particular social group" in the Act should 
take into account the general underlying themes of the defence of human rights and anti-
discrimination that form the basis for international refugee protection" at 33. 
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approach to aspects of the definition presented to the court such as state 
complicity in persecution, the test for determining fear of persecution, and 
exclusions from the refugee definition. Justice La Forest, however, could not 
overlook Ward's dual citizenship and the case was returned to the IRB to 
consider whether Ward, an Irish citizen, could be adequately protected in 
Britain, where he also held citizenship. He was ultimately denied refugee status 
and returned to Britain. 
The effect of the Justice La Forest's human rights focus is easier to 
appreciate in cases where there are varying opinions. In Chan v Canada 
(Minister of Employment and Immigration)45 the majority dismissed the appeal 
on the basis of the evidence given before the CRDD. In an unjustifiable twist 
on the refugee definition, Justice Major wrote that the applicant had failed to 
establish "that his fear of forced sterilisation was objectively well-founded,"46 
neatly sidestepping the issue of whether forced sterilisation amounts to 
persecution and using the relaxed evidentiary requirements of a refugee hearing 
to argue that more anecdotal evidence should have been introduced. Justice 
Major made no mention of rights in any guise in his judgment. 
In his strongly worded dissent, Justice La Forest cast his analysis in the 
human rights discourse he introduced in Ward. He linked refugee claims to 
45 (1995), 128 DLR (4th) 213. The CRDD had found that Mr. Chan was not a refugee and the 
Federal Court of Appeal agreed. (While formally the Federal Court of Appeal was engaged in 
judicial review, the decision amounts to an agreement.) 
46 Ibid at 268. Major J. makes also "assumes without deciding" that Cheung v Canada (Minister 
for Employment and Immigration) (1993), 102 DLR (4th) 214 (FCA, deciding that a woman who 
had fled China in fear of forced sterilisation was a refugee on the basis of persecution for being 
a member of a particular social group) was correctly decided (at 258) and refers to the standard 
of proof in a refugee hearing as "balance of probabilities" (at 268). These statements could have 
introduced considerable confusion into Canadian refugee jurisprudence were this decision not so 
clearly based on the majority's suspicion of the evidence given through an interpreter to the 
CRDD. 
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human rights violations directly, and rejects the argument that support for his 
position could lead to a flood of refugees to Canada's borders: 
To alter the focus of refugee law away from its paramount concern with 
basic human rights frustrates the possibility that foreign persecution may 
be eventually halted by international pressure. To accept at a judicial 
level that fundamental human rights violations do not serve to grant 
Convention refugee status minimises one of the principle incentives the 
international community has to denounce foreign persecution and attempt 
to effect change abroad: to avoid a flood of refugee claimants. 47 
He repeats the reference to "basic human rights" throughout the judgment and 
uses it to rework the definition of particular social group he outlined in Ward.48 
One of the most significant aspects of Justice La Forest's approach is that he 
does not qualify the human rights violations referred to in any way. While the 
rights violated must be "basic" the violations need not be "serious", "repeated", 
or otherwise narrowed. 
A similar analysis applies to the Supreme Court of Canada's most recent 
decision interpreting the Refugee Convention, Pushpanathan v Canada 
(Minister for Citizenship and lmmigration).49 Although the question of the 
appropriate standard of review for an IRB decision was not argued in the Trial 
Division of the Federal Court, or in the Federal Court of Appeal, Justice 
Bastarache began his analysis of the case from this point. Following the 
Supreme Court of Canada's "functional and pragmatic" approach to standard of 
review, this analysis starts with a focus on the legislative intent of the statute 
47 Ibid at 237. 
48 In "Chinese Fleeing Sterilisation: Australia's Response Against a Canadian Backdrop" (1998) 
I 0 International Journal of Refugee Law 77. I argued that La Forest's definition is awkwardly 
worded and that this dissent provides further evidence of how unworkable it it. 
49 [ 1998] I SCR 982; [ 1998] SCR No. 46 (QL, paragraph references are to this electronic 
version). 
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creating the tribunal under review. 50 In a chain of reasoning which involves 
some slippage from strict logic, Justice Bastarache looked to Ward to determine 
that the purpose of the Refugee Convention is to protect human rights without 
discrimination. He then ~gued that the CRDD is not expert in human rights 
decision-making and uses this as a strong plank in his conclusion that a 
correctness standard of review should apply. 51 The purposes of the Immigration 
Act and the expertise of the IRB as a whole (initially named as the tribunal 
under review) are fully addressed. After setting the opinion on a human rights 
footing, Justice Bastarache linked the exclusions from the refugee definition to 
human rights.52 He summarised the logic of the exclusions as " ... that those who 
are responsible for persecution which creates refugees should not enjoy the 
benefits of a Convention designed to protect those refugees .... 53 Following this, 
his conclusion that drug trafficking does not "<?ome[ .. ] close to the core or even 
form a part of the corpus of fundamental human rights"54 comes as no surprise. 
Justice Cory, in dissent, opened his opinion by stating, "Mr. Pushpanathan 
was a member of a group convicted of trafficking in heroin with a street value 
of$10 million."55 Justice Bastarache had minimised this aspect of the case by 
noting that the facts in the case were not in dispute. While the majority opinion 
so Para. 26. 
st Paras. 42-47. This is the least deferential standard ofreview available under the pragmatic 
and functional approach. 
52 Pushpanathan, a permanent resident, had been sentenced to 8 years jail after pleading guilty to 
trafficking heroin. When he was paroled, the Canadian government issued a deportation order. 
Pushpanathan applied for refugee status and the CRDD determined he was not a refugee 
because of the exclusion in Article lF(c) of the Refugee Convention for those who are " ... guilty 
of Acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations." 
s3 Above n 49 at para 63. 
s4 Ibid para 72. 
ss Ibid para 78. 
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canvassed principles of treaty interpretation and UN human rights instruments, 
Justice Cory examines international drug trafficking and the links between 
drugs and crime. Significantly, he agrees with Justice Bastarache that the 
Refugee Convention is a human rights instrument, 56 but also states that human 
rights violations are not the only conduct central to the UN' s purpose and 
principles.57 Justice Cory sidelines the role of human rights in interpreting the 
Refugee Convention, without dismissing it altogether. He is careful to reject the 
Federal Court of Appeal's proposition that refugee status is a privilege and 
therefore that ambiguous exclusions should be resolved against the claimant. 
He asserts instead that, "the right to claim refugee status constitutes an 
important right, and any exclusions from that right must be interpreted in 
accordance with accepted principles."58 Unlike Justice Bastarache, Justice Cory 
does not, however, use human rights discourse as the core interpretive principle 
for the Refugee Convention. In the Canadian jurisprudence those judges who 
aim to achieve a generous or broad interpretation of refugee status have done so 
by invoking the discourse of fundamental human rights. 
A similar analysis of the High Court of Australia cases is revealing. The 
leading Australian decision on the interpretation of the refugee definition, Chan 
v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 59 establishes that a refugee must 
face a "real chance" of persecution and that the assessment of refugee status is 
to be made at the time of the determination in the receiving state rather than at 
56 Ibid para 127. 
57 Ibid para 126. 
58 Ibid para 136. 
59 (1989), 169 CLR 379. 
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the time of the claimant's decision to leave their home. Beyond these two 
points, little is agreed upon in the five opinions. The references to human rights 
in the judgment are not used as interpretive devices, but rather as references to 
actions which may not constitute persecution. For example, Justice Dawson 
states that it is unnecessary to determine whether " ... other serious violations of 
human rights for the same reasons would also constitute persecution. "60 Justice 
McHugh states that exile or imprisonment " .. .is such a gross invasion of his 
human rights as to constitute persecution for reasons of political opinion ... "61 
and that "not every threat of harm to a person or interference with his or her 
rights for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion constitutes 'being persecuted' ."62 Both justices leave 
open the possibility that some human rights violations would not constitute 
persecution. While undoubtedly the Canadian Supreme Court would agree with 
this proposition, it signifies a different approach to the refugee definition and a 
distinctly different interpretive principle informing the jurisprudence. 
Two of the justices in Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 
cast the intent of the Refugee Convention as humanitarian. Justice Toohey 
asserts that the "real chance" test " ... gives effect to the language of the 
Convention and to its humanitarian intendment"63 and Justice Gaudron argues 
that the "humanitarian purpose of the Convention," along with the difficulty of 
finding facts in refugee determinations should ''. .. curb enthusiasm for judicial 
60 Ibid at 400. 
61 Ibid at 434. 
62 Ibid at 429. 
63 Ibid at 407. 
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specification of the content of the expression 'well-founded fear' ... ".64 The 
significance of these statements lies in the distinction between humanitarian 
discourse and rights discourse which I explored in Chapter Four.65 
Humanitarianism is rooted in inequality and mercy whereas rights are rooted in 
justice and equ~lity. The difference between categorising the Refugee 
Convention as being about human rights without discrimination as Ward did 
and being about humanitarianism seems innocuous on its face. Nonetheless, the 
distinction positions subsequent interpretations of the refugee definition 
differently within liberal legal discourse. The power of rights rhetoric is 
missing from discussions of humanitarianism, as is the legal power of rights. 
The analytic importance of rights discourse is highlighted in the 
Applicants A and B v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs66 where the 
High Court of Australia interprets the phrase "membership of a particular social 
group" in the case of two PRC nationals fleeing the reach of the one-child 
policy. For Chief Justice Brennan in dissent, fundamental human rights are the 
key to interpreting the refugee definition. They inform the interpretation of 
persecution and, in turn, of particular social group: 
If a putative refugee's enjoyment of his or her fundamental rights and 
freedoms is denied by a well-founded fear of persecution for a reason that 
distinguishes the victims as a group from society at large, it would be 
contrary to the 'principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental 
rights and freedoms without discrimination' [Refugee Convention 
Preamble]. It would therefore be contrary to the object and purpose of the 
Convention to exclude that putative refugee from the protection which the 
Convention requires Contracting Parties to accord.67 
64 Ibid at 413. 
65 See especially pp. 195-200. 
66 (1997) 142 ALR 133. 
67 Ibid. at 336. 
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The other dissentient, Justice Kirby, takes the opposite approach, stating that, 
"The appeal is not about 'fundamental human rights' as such, although clearly 
upon one view, they are affected. The appellants seek no more than the 
enforcement of Australia's domestic law."68 The distinction here is crucial. It 
plainly indicates the superior power of domestic rights claims and the potential 
weakness that fundamental human rights, because of their universality, carry 
with them. Those claiming a right directly under the Migration Act raise a 
superior, specific, claim against Australia. 
For the majority justices,69 fundamental human rights are only discussed 
in reference to the Canadian cases which were argued. Their comments reflect 
the Court's unanimous, but flawed,70 view that the Canadian jurisprudence 
results from the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The framework work of this 
decision closely resembles the more recent Pushpanathan case in the Supreme 
Court of Canada, with an emphasis on human rights corresponding with broader 
interpretations of all aspects of the refugee definition. Justice Kirby's view, 
which moves the rights discourse to within the nation, is even more expansive. 
In a recent refugee case brought in the High Court's original jurisdiction 
to issue prerogative writs against Commonwealth officers 71 Justice Hayne 
sitting alone explicitly rejected arguments put to him in human rights terms. 
The unsuccessful refugee claimant whom the government was attempting to 
68 Ibid. at 385. 
69 Dawson, McHugh and Gummow JJ. 
70 I discuss this in "Chinese Fleeing Sterilisation" above n48. 
71 The case is Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs & Anor; Ex Parte SE 
[1998] HCA 72 (25 November 1998, paragraph references are to the electronic version in the 
AustLii Database). 
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return to Somalia argued that the section of the Migration Act which made his 
removal mandatory should be interpreted in light of human rights obligations. 
In the words of the judgment: " ... to remove to a place where the applicant's 
human rights may be violated was not reasonable and that the Act should be 
construed as not permitting or requiring action that would violate Australia's 
obligations under various intefllational instruments concerning human rights."72 
Justice Hayne's response makes no mention of human rights: 
To read the provisions of s 198(6) of the Act as limited in the way for 
which the applicant contends would, in effect, require the first respondent 
to exercise his power to permit the applicant to remain in Australia despite 
his having been refused refugee status. The power under ss 48B and 41 7 
to permit persons such as the applicant to remain in the country are 
powers that are expressed as discretionary powers which the Minister is 
not under a duty to consider using. That being so, the construction of s. 
198(6) for which the applicant contends is not arguable.73 
This response strikes the tone of procedural distancing which is typical of 
several recent High Court decisions about refugees to be discussed below. 74 It 
is shocking in the context of the SE case not to discuss human rights. British 
Airways was required to remove SE from Australia as he had arrived without 
documents on a British Airways flight. They arranged to do so with the help of 
an specialist, non-Australian company which intended to escort him in 
handcuffs and to be with him at all times at flight stopovers. Despite evidence 
that the Department had rejected the company's suggestion that SE be sedated 
to facilitate removal, Justice Hayne held that: 
.. .it is not necessary to consider whether the obligation to remove an 
unlawful non-citizen carries with it a power to exercise any force or 
72 Ibid at para 18. 
73 Ibid at para 19. 
74 At pp. 289-293. 
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physical restraint over that person until arrival at the first port of call or 
ultimate destination. It is not necessary to consider those matters because 
there is no evidence to suggest that the Minister or the Department or any 
officer of it threatens or intends to assert such a power over the 
applicant. 75 
Obviously forcibly removing individuals from the country is a messy business. 
Nonetheless, it would be one thing for the Court to assert that the resultant 
human rights violations are a unpleasant accompaniment to a sovereign's rights, 
it is quite another to say that what British Airways chooses to do is none of our 
business. Despite this decision, SE was not removed immediately. The UN 
Torture Committee found that further attempts to remove him would violate the 
1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. 76 
Decisions of the highest courts interpreting the Refugee Convention are 
few. This is a new area of jurisprudential concern in each nation and the 
barriers to reaching the highest court are myriad. Nonetheless, each decision 
comments on a wide array of Federal Court decisions and sets a tone for those 
courts and for the refugee tribunals in each nation. Further, considering these 
cases bears out what my examination of the refugee process in Chapter Three 
found - that how a decision-maker approaches the factual situations which are 
so foreign to our legal systems has more influence on outcomes for individual 
claimants than how the highest courts guide the interpretation of the refugee 
definition. This is seen most dramatically in the contrast between the majority 
and dissenting opinions in the Canadian Chan case, where even at the highest 
appellate level the case turned on whether the claimant was viewed as credible. 
75 Ibid at para 13. 
76 23 ILM 1027 and 24 ILM 535. 
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The role of human rights discourses in these decisions is closely aligned with 
the Courts' approaches to refugee identities. 
2. Rights and Refugee Identities 
The story told by these cases complicates the critique of rights discourses. 
When the refugee definition is interpreted within a rights discourse, that of 
fundamental human rights, the result is a broader reading of the law and 
consequently a more likely successful claim. That is, rights discourse is 
favourable for refugee claimants to this extent at least. Nonetheless, the role of 
human rights discourses reinforces the narrow version of refugee identity I 
discussed in Chapter Three and falls short of ensuring that refugee claims are 
treated as rights claims in domestic courts. 
The discourse of fundamental human rights provides guidance in 
interpreting the Refugee Convention which draws on a vision of refugee identity 
and is strongly linked to international law discourses. In this discourse the 
refugee is identified as a holder of certain rights and as a victim of fundamental 
human rights abuses. The rights which are held are those fundamental to our 
humanity, rights which are held by all individuals. They are not rights to enter 
or remain in any nation, nor are they rights to be protected by a "foreign" 
nation. The discourse of fundamental human rights is closely linked to the 
international law context where it evolved and is marked with characteristics of 
that setting. Two of those characteristics which are important here are the 
simmering instability of fundamental human rights in the face of cultural 
relativity and the difficulties of enforcing human rights norms at all. A specific 
enumeration of fundamental human rights is difficult to achieve. There are 
strong links between the phrase and a sense of dignity and humanity; as is 
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echoed by Canadian Justice Linden in describing people refusing forced 
sterilisation as " ... united or identified by a purpose which is so fundamental to 
their human dignity that they should not be required to alter it. ... " 77 What is 
"fundamental" about fundamental human rights is often the emotional reaction 
provoked by their breach. This commonality - which parallels the definition of 
humanitarianism in Chapter Four - is not sufficient for the blunt reasoning of the 
law. It leaves a troublesome sense that we will know a fundamental human 
right when we see it. In combination with this difficulty of precise enumeration 
comes the recognition that fundamental human rights are related to our 
humanity, not tied to a national legal system. There is a strength and unity in 
this discourse which grounds legally powerful and strongly emotive decisions 
but it is not the same degree of strength which derives from, for example, 
constitutionally protected rights in domestic legal systems. 
By linking the refugee definition to the discourse of fundamental human 
rights the refugee is identified as a rights holder. The refugee thus occupies one 
of Patricia William's "islands of entitlement."78 But the island is a small one. 
The entitlement accorded to the refugee is nothing more than we would accord 
to anyone. As such the rights entitlement is minimal indeed, and the floodgates 
case for keeping it that way is strong. A successful refugee claim is based on 
fitting into the narrow configurations of the refugee definition. That is, 
identifying oneself as distinct from all others who have fundamental human 
rights in some ways. When the discourse of fundamental human rights is the 
interpretive tool it reinforces the identity of the refugee as a certain type of 
77 Cheungv Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993) 102 DLR (4th) 214 
(F.C.A.). 
78 Above n2 at 233-4. 
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victim, because the breach of a fundamental human rights is only part of the 
definition. This accords with what the examination of the refugee determination 
process in Chapter Three demonstrated - a narrowing of identity to a mere 
pinprick and a strong appeal to the liberal humanitarian consensus. 
The discourse of fundamental human rights identifies the refugee as a 
holder of certain rights and also identifies the refugee as a victim of certain 
types of rights breaches. It is because refugee identity is rooted in the breach of 
rights rather than in holding the rights themselves that the humanitarian impulse 
to view the refugee as deserving of compassion rather than justice is triggered. 
The identity as refugee is restrictive because in order to fit within it the 
individual must continue to be a figure worthy of compassion. Under the 
current Australian and Canadian programs of treating refugees as permanent 
migrants, 79 this puts the refugee in an impossible situation. As a migrant she is 
expected to assimilate and to serve the needs of nation; as a refugee she is 
expected to be unable to. 
Even when a refugee claim is analysed using the discourse of fundamental 
human rights, which these cases show only occurs some of the time, it falls 
short of being a rights claim. The rights which are accorded to members of the 
nation are rights to enter and to remain. The Refugee Convention's provision 
that refugees not be refouled could constitute a right to remain only because it is 
impossible to expel individuals into some empty non-national space. Analysing 
79 In 1999 Australia introduced temporary refugee visas. First for ethnic Albanians fleeing 
Kosovo and then for East Timorese at the time when the international peacekeeping force led by 
Australia was deployed. In November 1999 the government introduced temporary protection 
visas for "boat people'', Visa subclass 785. This is a significant difference as both the Kosovars 
and the East Timorese were brought to Australia from elsewhere and thus do not come within 
Australia's Refugee Convention obligations. Those arriving on boats do trigger the Convention 
obligation if they are determined to be refugees and if they reach Australian territorial waters. 
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the refugee definition using a discourse of fundamental human rights is not 
enough to counter the weight of quotas, political pressure and national 
sovereignty which ensure that refugees are allowed to remain because of the 
goodness of the nation rather than due to their fundamental right to stay. 
Moreover, the discourse of human rights is used to analyse what the other 
nation has done or failed to do for the refugee claimant. It assists us in 
understanding what persecution is, when a fear is well-founded, how to define a 
particular social group. Fundamental human rights are things breached by the 
others, not claims made against us. The analysis of fundamental human rights 
in these cases is focused outside the nation, not turned inward to look at our 
own behaviour or our own obligations. When the refugee raises a fundamental 
human rights argument it is linked to something that happened to them in the 
past and will happen to them in the future, rather than being some entitlement 
they are claiming in the present. 
An important aspect of any critique of rights discourse is the 
understanding that rights are hierarchically arranged legal categories. That is, 
that some rights are better than others. The rights which command the most 
persuasive power are those most closely associated with the liberal legal 
tradition, and hence most relevant to the mythic struggle between the individual 
and the state. For this reason, the rights of the criminal accused are often more 
powerful than the more recently devised "rights" of victims of crime80 and the 
civil and political rights expressed in the International Convention on Civil and 
80 I develop this argument in " Reassessment of the Effects of a Constitutional Charter of Rights 
on the discourse of Sexual Violence in Canada" (1994) 22 International Journal of the 
Sociology of Law 29 l. 
277 
Political Rights81 are regarded as more important than the social and group 
rights of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 82 The potential 
right of a refugee not to be returned to a persecutory state is far from the core of 
liberal legalism as most liberal frameworks consider only what happens inside 
the state and it is consequently low in any version of the hierarchy of rights. 
While the individual may be involved in a struggle with the state, as a non-
member her claims do not resonate within the nation. This is one more factor 
contributing to the failure of refugee claims for protection to function 
effectively as rights claims. 
Despite all of this, the discourse of fundamental human rights remains the 
most persuasive alternative presently available for interpreting the refugee 
definition. As the highest courts' decisions demonstrate, it is the discourse of 
fundamental human rights which is invoked when judges seek to rule in favour 
of refugee claims, and broad appeals to fundamental human rights are effective 
in patching over infelicities in legal reasoning. 83 As well, any rights based 
discourse contains at least some transformative potential, some chance that the 
right in question may ascend the hierarchy ofrights.84 In Patricia Williams' 
words, all rights are "islands of entitlement."85 An identity as a rights holder is a 
stronger base from which to mount an argument which resonates within liberal 
81 Aboven8. 
82 Aboven6. 
83 See especially Justice La Forest in Ward, Justice Bastarache in Pushpanathan and Justice 
Brennan in Applicant A, all discussed in the preceding section. 
84 Evidence of this is found in the Pushpanathan decision where Justice Cory, in dissent, states 
that there is an important "right" to make a refugee claim (above n49 at para 136) even though 
his approach to interpreting the definition is not grounded in rights discourse and his 
conclusions are unfavourable to the applicant. Depending on future developments, this may 
constitute some early evidence of a shift in Canadian legal discourse about refugees. 
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legalism than any other. The following section on the process rights illustrates 
this point further. 
C. THE SUBSTANCE OF PROCESS RIGHTS 
The traditional process rights are crucial in migration law's administrative 
decision-making setting. Given the linkage of admission decisions to the 
historically non-reviewable royal prerogative86 and the absence of a substantive 
right to enter a nation, the development of procedural safeguards in migration 
law processes reveals a great deal about identifications of the nation and the 
potential right holder. Procedural rights are crucial to the liberal dichotomy 
between the individual and the state. The way these rights are constructed and 
deployed depicts both sides of that dichotomy. The range of potential 
differences is seen in contrasting judicial opinion regarding process rights in the 
migration area. Justice Kirby classifies the refugee claimant as similar to all 
other people in Australia by stating that judicial review does not entitle an 
applicant to be accepted as a refugee, " .. .it simply secures to him or her the 
basic entitlement, enjoyed by every person sheltering under the laws of this 
country, citizen or not... ". 87 In contrast, Justice Callinan reinforces a strict 
distinction between "us" and "them" regardless of whether "they" are already in 
Australia and subject to the Australian legal system, with the view that the 
limited provisions for judicial review under the Migration Act " ... gave entrants 
to Australia [ ... ] certain rights in respect of what would otherwise be matters for 
85 See above at n2. 
86 See discussion in Chapter Four at pp. 235-241. 
87 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 292. 
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the executive exclusively ... ".88 The distance between these two Australian 
perspectives marks the length of the spectrum. Irt discussing the substance of 
process rights I argue in turn that process rights depict those who hold them in 
substantial ways; that procedural rights are at the core of liberal legality and 
therefore closely linked to the nation itself; and that the Canadian Charter 
jurisprudence enhances the important slippage between substance and process 
rights. 
1. The 1985 Watershed Decisions: Singh and Kioa 
In both Australia and Canada an important procedural rights decision 
marks the watershed for migration law in the highest courts and introduces the 
contemporary era of migration jurisprudence. The Supreme Court of Canada 
handed down its decision in Re Singh and the Minister of Employment and 
lmmigration89 in April 1985, eight months before the High Court of Australia 
decision in Kioa v West. 90 Both cases concerned the meaning of natural justice 
for potential refugee or humanitarian entrants who were already in the country, 
and in particular whether claimants were entitled to be heard in person. 
Singh was argued during the early days of the Canadian Charter, but the 
Supreme Court split 3 :3 on whether to decide the case under the Charter or 
under the moribund Canadian Bill of Rights.91 Justice Wilson's Charter-based 
88 Abebe v The Commonwealth; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex 
[1999] HCA 14 (14th April 1999) at para 277. 
89 (1985) 17 DLR (4th) 422. 
90 (1985) 159 CLR 550. 
91 SC 1960, c.44. Justice Beetz penned the opinion based on the Bill of Rights, with Estey and 
Mcintyre JJ. concurring. The opinion must have surprised those involved in the case as no Bill 
of Rights arguments had been put to the Court. The rights-privilege distinction had previously 
been fatal to use of the Bill of Rights and in the realm of migration law it would surely have 
been seen by 1985 as almost entirely useless. 
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decision is the part of the judgment which is frequently cited and which looms 
large in Canadian mythic jurisprudence. 92 She reasoned that the use of the term 
"everyone" in section 7 of the Charter meant that the provision applied to all 
who were physically present in Canada, regardless of citizenship and of whether 
they had been allowed through border controls or not. 93 The second step in 
Justice Wilson's analysis was to determine that the substantive right of a refugee 
not to be refouled triggered the interests in life, liberty and security of the 
person protected under section 7.94 This reasoning introduces the important 
slippage between substantive and procedural rights in Charter jurisprudence 
which I discuss below. 95 It also provides some hint of a possibility of treating a 
refugee claim as a substantive right, within a confined framework. 96 On 
concluding that both liberty and security of the person were threatened by 
definition when a refugee was refouled, Justice Wilson concluded that 
procedures for refugee determination had to conform to section 7's "principles 
of fundamental justice". Although she concluded that section 7 would not 
always trigger a need for an oral hearing, " ... where a serious issue of credibility 
92 Eliadis F P, "The Swing from Singh: The Narrowing of Application of the Charter in 
Immigration Law" (1994) 26 Imm LR (2d) 130. Then Chief Justice Dickson and present Chief 
Justice Lamer signed on to the Wilson J. opinion. Beetz J. wrote the other opinion, to which 
Estey and Mcintyre JJ. committed themselves. One potential reason for the influence of Justice 
Wilson's opinion in Singh is the relative profiles of the judges involved. 
93 Above n 89 at 456; see also 462 - 463 where a distinction is drawn form the American 
approach to the same question. 
94 Section 7 reads, "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right 
not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." 
95 At pp. 296-309. 
96 For example, Justice Wilson states, "On these appeals this court is being asked by the 
appellants to accept that the substantive rights of Convention refugees have been determined by 
the Immigration Act, I 97 6 itself and the court need concern itself only with the question 
whether the procedural scheme set up by the Act for the determination of that status is 
consistent with the requirements of fundamental justice articulated in s.7 of the Charter." Above 
n89 at 463-464. 
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is involved, fundamental justice requires that credibility be determined on the 
basis of an oral hearing." In ruling that section 1 of the Charter91 did not save 
the section 7 infringement, Justice Wilson stated that: 
.. .it is important to bear in mind that the rights and freedoms set out in the 
Charter are fundamental to the political structure of Canada and are 
guaranteed by the Charter as part of the supreme law of our nation. I 
think that in determining whether a particular limitation is a reasonable 
limit prescribed by law which can be "demonstrably justified in free and 
democratic society" it is important to remember that the courts are 
conducting this inquiry in light of a commitment to ufshold the rights and 
freedoms set out in the other sections of the Charter. 8 
Both Justices Wilson and Beetz are concerned in Singh with an opportunity to 
know the case against oneself, with the reasons for decision and with 
determining procedural protections based on the consequences for the individual 
involved. They each conclude that while fundamental justice - either Charter or 
Bill of Rights style - may not always require an oral hearing, it does always 
require an oral hearing for those claiming refugee status when inside Canada. 
Bringing the decision under the Charter provided a way for Justice Wilson to 
link the issue directly to the values of Canada as a nation. 
Mr. Kioa did not claim refugee status but, rather, sought to remain in 
Australia under the former section 6A(l )( e) of the Migration Act, strong 
compassionate and humanitarian grounds for the grant of a permanent entry 
permit.99 All four of the majority judges held that the decision whether to grant 
an entry permit on this basis required that the decision-maker adhere to 
97 Section I reads: 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms 
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
98 Above n89 at 468. 
99 See full discussion of this section in Chapter 4 at pp. 231-234. 
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principles of natural justice. 100 They also agreed that in the particular 
circumstances of this case, natural justice included an opportunity to be 
heard. 101 There was a range of disagreement, however, over which particular 
facts triggered the need to be heard. Justices Mason and Wilson held that the 
implication that Mr. Kioa had been involved in illegal activities or had generally 
been deceptive triggered a natural justice requirement that he be able to respond 
to this potential basis for a discretionary decision. 102 Justice Wilson also stated 
that as strong humanitarian and compassionate grounds were in issue, " ... this 
may strengthen the claim to an expectation to be heard in relation to such a 
decision."103 Justice Brennan found that while a hearing had been required on 
these facts, the requirement could be overridden by the control objectives of the 
Migration Act: 
When the purpose for which the provision is conferred - control of the 
membership of the Australian people and their visitors - would be 
frustrated by giving a hearing, the principles of natural justice do not 
require that a hearing be given. But there is no reason to think that giving 
a hearing to Mr. Kioa would im~air the Minister's control over the 
disposition of the Kioa family .1 4 
Justice Brennan thereby subordinated process rights to the needs of the 
nation, in reasoning which is consistent with strong executive control over 
100 Gibbs C.J. dissented. Mason, Wilson, Brennan and Deane JJ. comprised the majority. 
101 Above n96 per Mason J. at p. 587, Wilson J. at 602, Brennan J. at 626 and Deane J. at 633. 
102 Mason J. stated the proposition this way: 
In the ordinary course of granting or refusing entry permits there is not occasion for 
the principles ofnaturaljustice to be called into play.[ ... ] But ifin fact the decision-
maker intends to reject the application by reference to some consideration personal to 
the applicant on the basis of information obtained from another source which has not 
been dealt with by the applicant in his application there may be a case for saying that 
procedural fairness requires that he be given an opportunity of responding to the 
matter .... (ibid. at 587). 
103 Ibid at 600. 
104 Ibid at 626. 
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admission to the nation and the royal prerogative pedigree. Justice Deane, on 
the other hand, wrote an opinion agreeing that Mr. Kioa ought to have been 
heard before a decision was made and speculating that few situations would 
justify denying such an opportunity. He stated: 
Putting aside cases of necessity however and in the absence of any 
clear legislative intent excluding or modifying the requirement of 
procedural fairness, it is difficult to envisage a case in which the 
particular circumstances would either exclude those requirements 
completely in relation to the making of a deportation order or so 
modify them that the person affected was not entitled to an adequate 
opportunity of being heard before he was subjected to the adverse 
effects of such an order. 105 
Like Justice Brennan, Justice Deane situates his reasoning in relation to the 
needs of the nation. He opens his analysis by asserting that, "An alien who is 
unlawfully within this country is not an outlaw,"106 and emphasises that "an 
alien is not without status or standing in the land ... " and " ... can invoke the 
protection of the law .... " 107 Justice Deane recognises the importance of 
procedural rights to identities and how the removal of procedural rights reduces 
the substance of identity: 
The making of a deportation order against a prohibited immigrant 
drastically and adversel(c changes his rights and, to some extent, 
dehumanises his status. 08 
While Justices Deane and Brennan reached the same conclusion in Kioa their 
agreement is almost coincidental. Justice Brennan privileges the identity of the 
105 Ibid at 633. 
106 Ibid at 631. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid at 632. 
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nation and Justice Deane the identity of the person. What their opinions share is 
an overt acknowledgment of the interests at stake. 
Singh and Kioa were both regarded as important victories for those in the 
most needy group of people hoping to join the Australian and Canadian 
communities. Both judgments contain some passages in which the judges 
reflect on the how the decision before them is linked to the needs and self-
perceptions of the nation, and both judgments demonstrate the paucity of the 
term "procedural" rights for outcomes which are linked to substantive rights. 109 
This latter point is underscored by how the respective governments responded to 
the decisions. In Canada, Singh was an important trigger for the establishment 
of the presently operative refugee determination procedure before the 
Immigration and Refugee Board. In Australia, Kioa was followed at a short 
interval by curtailing the operation of citizenship by birth.. In argument and in 
the press the fact that Kioa had an Australian born daughter who was a citizen 
was emphasised. While nothing turned on it in the judgment, each of the 
opinions addressed it. The Australian Citizenship Act was amended soon after 
to provide that only children born to citizens and permanent residents would 
become Australian citizens at birth. 110 As well, since Kioa the discretion to 
allow someone to remain on humanitarian grounds has been made non-
compellable and non-reviewable. Decisions under the Migration Act are no 
longer reviewable for compliance with the principles of natural justice. The 
story since Kioa is of increasing assertion of executive power over the 
109 For Singh this is true because of the influence the potentially substantive right not to be 
refouled has on Wilson J.' s reasoning. In Kioa this is the case because he has remained in 
Australia. 
110 Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth) s. l 0(2). 
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migration area. By contrast, the post-Singh story in Canada is of moving 
refugee determination further from the core of executive control. 111 
2. Narrowing process rights and identities 
Decisions since this time have continued to reflect the initial directions 
established by these governmental responses, with the Australian Court being 
called upon to assess a successive range of executive assertions of control in this 
area and the Canadian Court operating under the maturing Charter's monopoly 
over rights discourse in that country. As well, decisions of both courts have 
continued to be identifiable on the basis of their positioning of the nation and 
the other in process rights scenarios. 
In Lim v Minister for Immigration112 the High Court held that the 
provisions requiring mandatory detention of boat people arriving in Australia 
were constitutional with the exception of the provision that "a court is not to 
order the release from custody of a designated person," 113 which the majority 
held had to be read down to permit a court to order the release of persons 
111 This will be curtailed ifthe recommendations of the 1998 Legislative Review are followed. 
112 (1992), 176 CLR 1. 
113 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s. 177 [called s.54R at the time the case was argued]. 
The mandatory detention provisions at that time applied only to "designated persons" defined 
as: 
a non-citizen who: 
has been on a boat in the territorial sea of Australia after 19 November 1989 and before 1 
December 1992; 
and has not presented a visa; and is in Australia; 
and has not been granted an entry permit; and is a person to whom the Department has given a 
designation by: 
determining and recording which boat he or she was on; and 
giving him or her an identifier that is not the same as an identifier given to another 
non-citizen who was on that boat; 
and includes a non-citizen born in Australia whose mother is a designated person. 
Section has since been reworded slightly. Section 189 provides for mandatory detention of 
unlawful non-citizens who are not boat people. Detention can be terminated by the grant of a 
bridging visa. 
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unlawfully detained. 114 The impugned legislation had been explicitly enacted 
"in the national interest" 115 and was an attempt to remove all process rights from 
a narrowly defined group of" aliens." Having concluded that the power to 
detain aliens applying for refugee status was incidental to the power to exclude 
or deport aliens, and further that this "application detention" was not punitive in 
nature, the Court therefore held that it was not a prohibited exercise by the 
executive of judicial power. 116 It was precisely at the removal of process rights 
that the court baulked. In this legislation, the various process rights attendant to 
having detention reviewed by a court are the barest minimum of what 
constitutes procedural rights. 117 Protection against arbitrary detention by 
executive decree is a core value of the common law system, intertwined with 
the evolution of all process rights beginning with habeas corpus. The decision 
underscores how integral process rights are to liberal legalism and its rule of law 
ideology. 
While the decision preserves these rights, its tenor is considerably 
different from that of Kioa, as it revolves around the constitutional "aliens" 
power. The identity of the appellants in the case is primarily as "alien." 
Attempts made in argument to raise issues related to the Refugee Convention or 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - which would have 
114 Mason C.J., Toohey and McHugh JJ in dissent held that the section was to be read in this 
manner as it was written and hence that it was valid. 
115 Migration Act s.176. 
116 See Brennan, Deane, and Dawson JJ. above nl 12 at 30-32, Mason CJ. at 10, Gaudron J. at 
53, McHugh J. at 71. 
117 As Justices Brennan, Deane and Dawson state, " ... citizens of this country enjoy, at least in 
times of peace, a constitutional immunity from being imprisoned by Commonwealth authority 
except pursuant to an order by a court in the exercise of the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth." Ibid. at 28-29. 
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I 
1 
framed the applicants as something other than alien - are not taken up in the 
opinions. Alien identity is intertwined with the legislation which empowers the 
executive to "designate" individuals for detention by naming the boats on which 
they arrive and then assigning "identifiers" to particular individuals.118 The 
assumptions embedded in this "us-them" distinction are put in issue by Justice 
Gaudron who cautions against equating "non-citizen" with "alien," noting that 
" ... membership of the community constituting the Australian body politic, for 
which the criterion is now, but was not always, citizenship, is a matter of such 
fundamental importance that, in my view, it is necessary that the questions be 
acknowledged even if they are not answered." 119 Justice McHugh also brings 
the Australian community to the forefront in his analysis by characterising the 
purpose of the legislation as " ... to prevent the alien from entering into the 
community until the determination [regarding an entry permit or refugee status] 
is made." 120 This emphasises how detention contains these outsiders, despite the 
fact that the applicants are already within Australian territory. The case 
contrasts those identified as aliens, whose names and numbers are assigned by 
the state, with the Australian community. Lim leaves the nation with control 
over the identifiers of individuals and accepts reduction of their procedural 
rights on the basis of their alien status. 
A series of cases since Lim have tested additional reductions in procedural 
rights accorded to refugee claimants and upheld them in each case, with the 
us Under the impugned legislation, the state asserts complete control over the identity of the 
other. The state names each of the boats that these people arrive on and then numbers each of 
the people. The combination of naming and numbering is the executive act which brings 
individuals within the scope of the legislation. Someone who arrives on a boat illegally, but 
whose identity is not redefined in this way by the state, is beyond the reach of the legislation. 
u9 Above nl 12 at 53. 
120 Ibid. at 71. See also 73. 
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opinions relying in part on contrasts between national and outsider identities. In 
Fang v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs121 the Full Court of the 
Federal Court considered the case of a group of ethnic Chinese who had been 
born in Vietnam and expelled to China where they had allegedly been 
resettled. 122 The majority found that while the group was denied procedural 
fairness and the protection of provisions of international treaties, this was done 
expressly by Parliamentary intent and therefore could not be interfered with by 
the Court. 123 The procedures which were upheld included not informing those 
arriving of their right to make a visa application, not informing them of their 
right to legal advice, and requiring precise language to constitute a refugee 
claim. Rejecting the traditional statutory interpretation rule that strict 
compliance with particular forms is not fatal because of the evident 
Parliamentary intention to the contrary, the Court in Fang found that" ... the 
prescription of the form is one of substance and is not merely procedural." 124 
121 (1996) 135 ALR 583 (Full Court- Federal Court of Australia). Although this is not a High 
Court case, I have included it because is holdings are remarkable. 
122 The group included some in a younger generation who had been born in China. Their claims 
included claims of very poor treatment and social ostracism in China. 
123 Summing up his judgment, Justice Nicholson stated: 
This is a case in which parliament has negated the possibility of common law 
concepts of procedural fairness applying in favour of the non-citizen applicants. 
Parliament has achieved this by the enactment ofss45-57 and ss193(2) and 198(4) of 
the Migration Act. The inference from the findings of the trial judge is that the 
representatives of the relevant arm of the executive were well informed of this and 
avoided acting so as to place the applicants in the position where they had the means 
to apply for a protection visa when the course remained open to them, prior to its 
preclusion by legislation. While that executive conduct does not accord with 
internationally expressed goals relating to conduct in relation to refugees, the 
conditions for application of international law, as prescribed by Australian domestic 
law, are not present to enable international law to control that conduct. Furthermore, 
such conduct was supported by the enactments of the Australian Parliament which, to 
that extent, evince an intention in relation to non-citizens to negate the application of 
those internationally commended basic procedural requirements. Above n121 at 
634-34. 
124 Ibid at 617. 
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This demonstrates perversely the substantive dimension of process rights. The 
majority's acknowledgment that these applicants are likely to have cultural and 
linguistic difficulties, as well as being traumatised, isolated and detained 125 did 
not inspire them to find ambiguity in the legislation. 
Fang approved an important set of the executive's moves to limit 
procedural rights at the front-end of the refugee application process. The cases 
which followed upheld a narrowing of procedural rights in the post-decision 
phase. In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang126 the 
High Court held that an shift in the language of the Migration Act from 
empowering the Minister to make a determination as to refugee status to 
allowing that the Minister "may determine" that a person is a refugee "if the 
Minister is satisfied that the person is a refugee"127 alters the focus of judicial 
review. 128 The decision has the effect of increasing the degree of curial 
deference to refugee determination decision-makers. In the plurality judgment 
the issue is presented as one of pure procedure. In his separate judgment, where 
he concurs regarding "satisfaction,"129 Justice Kirby situates the decision at the 
border of the nation: 
The decisions committed to them [refugee decision makers] are extremely 
important for the persons involved. But they are also important to 
Australia as a recipient nation. This is because the composition of the 
community is in question. Its conformity with an important international 
125 Ibid at 633 and passim. 
126 (1986), 185 CLR 259. 
127 Migration Act s. 22AA (at that time). 
128 Above note 126 at 275-275. The court does also hold that it is no longer the case that a 
decision as to "satisfaction" is unreviewable. 
129 Ibid at 295. 
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convention is at stake. Its reputation as a country of refuye which decides 
claims of refugee status according to the law is involved. 30 
While this broader perspective does not lead to a different conclusion in the 
case, it serves as an important reminder of the contrast being played out 
between individual/outsider and the nation and the role of these decisions in 
constituting the boundary of the nation. The deference to the Refugee Review 
Tribunal is confirmed in Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo131 in 
which the High Court warns the Federal Court against " ... reading such [RR T] 
reasons with an over-zealous eye ... ". 132 
In its most recent refugee decisions, the High Court has upheld the 1994 
amendments to the Migration Act which reduced the grounds of review 
available to the Federal Court in considering refugee decisions. 133 In both Abe be 
v The Commonwealth; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs134 
and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu135 the High 
Court confronted cases where the RR T had dealt with credibility issues in 
problematic ways. 136 Despite this, the highest degree of deference is shown to 
130 Ibid at 292. 
131 (1997) 144 ALR 567 (HC) 
132 Ibid at 593 (per Kirby J in a separate concurring judgment). 
133 Part 8 of the Act, introduced by Migration Legislation (Amendment Act) 1992. RRT 
decisions can not now be reviewed on grounds of failure to observe procedures in the Act, 
inappropriate delegation, decision not authorised by Act or regulations, improper exercise of 
power, error of law, fraud or bias, no evidence. Decisions are not reviewable on the ground of 
unreasonableness or breach of the rules ofnaturaljustice. (Section 476). 
As well, Part 8 removes some decisions under the Act from any type of judicial scrutiny. 
134 [1999] HCA 14 (14 April 1999) 
135 [1999] HCA 21 (13 May 1999) 
136 With regard to Ms Abebe, the RRT states that "The applicant now has a long history, much 
of it admitted by her, of having told untruths. Her claims as to fear and confusion wear thin 
after six or seven occasions of 'clearing the state' as it were." (cited in above nl34 at para 76). 
In Mr. Eshetu's case, the Full Court of the Federal Court found the RRT's conclusions about his 
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RRT decision-makers. The Abebe case approves the reduction of grounds of 
review scheme and Eshetu affirms that the Court will not permit the one 
plausible end run around this scheme which had remained. 137 As two of the 
dissenters in Abe be state: 
... to define the jurisdiction of a federal court to determine controversies 
with respect to those rights and liabilities by excluding grounds for relief 
which otherwise would be available has the effect of restricting or 
denying the right or liability itself. 138 
The judges conclude that this " ... stultifies the exercise of the judicial power of 
the Commonwealth"139 and is therefore a constitutional wrong. The more 
serious wrong is, of course, to the rights holders. To hold a right with nowhere 
to exercise it makes it merely rhetorical as it moves it outside my functional 
definition of rights. 140 The story represented by the recent High Court of 
Australia cases is one of increasing restriction of procedural rights for refugee 
claimants. 
Procedural rights create a space for the identity of a refugee or other 
migration claimant to be articulated. In the High Court's ruling about Kioa we 
evidence to be so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have reached them. 
See Ch 3 pp. 134-151 regarding the difficulties of making credibility determinations in the RRT. 
Both sets ofRRT reasons emphasise reliance on DFAT information and an processes of 
comparing evidence which would not likely be acceptable under CRDD procedures. In each set 
of reasons it is clear that the Tribunal has developed an attitude of exasperation towards the 
claimant. 
137 On the basis of s.420 of the Migration Act and argument was put to the Court that 
"substantial justice" incorporated necessarily the principles of "natural justice". This argument 
was defeated in Eshetu. 
138 Above n 134 at para 143, per Gummow and Hayne JJ. Gaudron J. also dissented. 
139 Ibid. 
140 It is for this reason that I take issue with the conclusion of Gaudron and Kirby JJ. that "The 
effect of s.476(2) is not to relieve the Tribunal from observance of the rules of natural justice or 
to authorise the making ofunreasonable decisions. Rather, it is to forbid the Federal Court from 
reviewing a decision on those grounds." (above nl34 at para 64). While they note that the 
Constitution protects the right to seek mandamus or prohibition in the High Court, the tenor of 
these recent decisions leads little room for optimism about the Court interpreting the criteria for 
those writs broadly. 
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learn a considerable amount about Mr. Kioa himself. While this is presented 
through the words of the original decision-maker, the intense scrutiny of that 
decision makes it important to each opinion comprising the judgment. In 
contrast, we learn comparatively little about either Ms Abebe or Mr Eshetu as 
the decisions really have little to do with them. The restrictions which narrow 
their procedural rights, also narrow the space for their identities to seep through 
into appellate judgment. The negotiated and malleable nature of legally 
constructed identity facilitates this restriction and calls to our attention how the 
court controls the appearance of the individual's identity to fit its jurisprudential 
objectives. In a parallel movement to this, the contrast between the individual 
and the nation is much less evident in the later decisions such as Guo, Abebe 
and Eshetu and was diminishing in Fang and Wu Shan Liang. As the identity of 
the individual is diminished, that of the nation overwhelms the balance so that 
the contrast between the two, which situates what is at stake in these cases, is no 
longer visible. The tension between the individual and the state which is 
traditionally portrayed in process rights embodies a recognition of the 
individual. As alien outsiders disappear from the equation, they lose this 
recognition. Rights express a relationship between people on either side of the 
boundary created by the right. In this setting, the nation's boundary is at issue. 
When the right diminishes, its holder disappears from view. The nation is, as 
Fitzpatrick expresses, aspiring to unattainable universality.141 
These cases demonstrate the two ways that process rights are substantive. 
First, procedural rights are the substance itself of liberal legalism. In the 
enduring logic of the legal system, nothing is more significant than the rights 
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associated with being heard in a court. The falseness of the dichotomy between 
procedural and substantive rights is seen in the relationship between them: 
procedural rights are integral to the system, substantive rights are viewed as 
some type of additional entitlement. 142 Without the so-called procedural rights 
there is no access to the system and thus anything of substance cannot be called 
a right at all under a functional definition of right. Procedural rights are given 
effect within national legal systems. The cases delimiting these rights also, 
therefore, describe these systems. They depict the nation both explicitly and 
implicitly as its boundary is constructed through the decisions. 
The second substantive aspect of procedural rights is the space they create 
for the emergence of identity. While identity as rights-holder is restrictive and 
carries with it constraints in the extra-legal sphere, within that sphere it is 
crucial. Being identified as a rights-holder is the first step in being identified as 
one who deserves justice rather than mere compassion. Here the function of 
rights as "islands of entitlement" is evident. As a rights holder one can assert a 
claim; without a right one must beg the mercy of the state. Those who hold 
procedural rights are first identified as rights holders and in consequence 
accorded a legal space in which to make arguments which enrich perceptions of 
their identity. The two steps are intertwined, another aspect of the substance of 
process rights. 
It is arguably because of the substantive importance of procedural rights 
that both Australia and Canada have moved recently to keep migration 
claimants, and particularly refugee claimants, out of the courts. Additionally, 
141 See Chapter Two at n151. 
142 This is one of the enduring problems, which has been identified by feminist theorists, of 
viewing equality as a substantive right - it diminishes its importance to liberal legalism. 
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procedural rights directly reduce the control of the executive over migration 
decision-making as these rights are at the core of judicial function, as was 
articulated in both Lim and Abebe. There is, therefore, a contrast to be drawn 
between Canada's move to institute the requirement that unsuccessful refugee 
claimants seek leave from the Federal Court and Australia's ousting of 
jurisdiction. In the Canadian case, the procedural right remains with the 
claimant, but its shape is altered. In Australia, the executive assumes control of 
the process. The distinction drawn is another example of how a contrast in the 
self-perception of the nation is translated into legal effect in migration law 
decision-making. 
The Canadian Supreme Court cases illustrate the same story about the 
false dichotomy of procedural and substantive rights, and about the tension 
portrayed in these cases between the individual and the state. Similarly to the 
Australian cases, these cases are replete with images of the nation as the rights 
being articulated define the boundary between insider ~d outsider. In the 
Canadian context, however, contemporary arguments about rights entitlements 
are all contested either within or alongside the discourse of constitutionally 
entrenched rights. In the next section, I consider the role of the Charter in 
Canadian migration law and pay particular attention, as is mandated by the 
jurisprudence, to the substance of process rights. This continues the story to this 
point, and provides an avenue for assessing the potential of constitutional rights 
protections. 
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D. TESTING THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
As Justice Wilson's statement in Singh suggests, interpretation of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has provided a platform for 
articulating a vision of the political fabric of the Canadian nation. The 
requirement that all Charter arguments are subject to section 1143 has ensured 
that the vision of a free and democratic society, and of how Canada fulfils that 
description, is always in the background of Charter rights analyses. The "us-
them" setting of border law decision-making reinforces the depiction of the 
nation as the relationship between insiders and outsiders is incessantly refined. 
An assessment of the value of these rights for those who are not full members of 
the Canadian community is complicated by the variety of circumstances in 
which the cases arise; and by the fact that to date there are only one or two 
leading cases in each of the key legal scenarios where a border is encountered 
(i.e. the refugee setting, extradition, deportation, removal, port of entry 
procedures). Despite these challenges for analysis, the picture that emerges is 
similar to that which developed in considering why refugee claims fail to be 
considered as rights claims and in analysing the diminution of process rights for 
refugee claimants in Australia. That is, in an analysis of legal rights which by 
its structure pits the individual against the state, the greater the space retained 
for the development of individual identity, the more likely that individual will 
be in successfully asserting a rights claim. 
In Canadian Council ofChurches v Canada144 the Supreme Court of 
Canada rejected an argument that the Council, which has a long record of 
143 See above n97. 
144 (1992), 88 DLR (4th) 193 (per Cory J., writing for a unanimous court). 
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involvement in refugee advocacy, should be granted public interest standing to 
challenge a wide range of amendments to the Immigration Act which had been 
made in 1989.145 The case is interesting both because of the procedural 
question it raises, and because of the language used to quickly settle it. The 
issue of public interest standing arises in contexts where the classic opposition 
of the individual and the state breaks down for some reason. The refugee 
determination scenario fits this analysis well as it casts the state in opposition to 
an individual who is not a member of the polity. This feature of the argument 
for the Council of Churches to represent refugee interests, however, was ignored 
by the Court in its reasoning. Despite noting at several instances that the 
Charter guarantees the rights of "Canadians" and "citizens,"146 the Court does 
not note that those whose interests were being considered are not in this group. 
It is a curious omission given the attention the distinction between citizens and 
non-citizens had received in Singh seven years earlier. The Court explicitly 
rejects the argument that refugees as a group may have differing interests than 
individual claimants, or that they may face disadvantages in bringing litigation 
on their own behalf. 147 The case affirms the ideological link of most Charter 
rights to individuals and ignores that rights function in part as a phenomenon of 
group identity; for example, by generating a group of refugees entitled to raise 
similar claims. This further diminishes the potential of the Charter in the 
migration setting as the number of individuals inside Canada to assert these 
rights is much smaller than the numbers outside the country who cannot claim 
145 S.C. 1988, cc.35 and 36. 
146 Above n144 at 202-03. 
147 Above n144 at 205. 
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Charter protection but who may be considered part of any number of groups 
affected by immigration law. It also demonstrates that the logic of migration 
decision-making falls apart when the legally constructed differences between 
citizens and those more distant from the core of the nation are not examined. 
Identifying the differences between citizens and others does not guarantee 
any particular result, but shows that the Court is grappling with the significance 
of the distinction. The issue in Chiarelli v Canada (Minister of Employment 
and Immigration)148 was whether a series of deportation provisions infringed 
section 7 of the Charter by violating principles of fundamental justice. 
Following the precedent that Charter rights must be interpreted in context149 
Justice Sopinka stated that the fundamental principle of the immigration law 
context is " ... that non-citizens do not have an unqualified right to enter or 
remain in the country." 150 In this context, he held that no principle of-
fundamental justice was infringed by deporting permanent residents convicted 
of serious crimes regardless of the circumstances of the offence or the actual 
sentence, nor by determining in camera that an individual may be someone who 
will likely be involved in organised crime and as a result of that determination 
removing the right held by other permanent residents facing deportation to 
launch an appeal based on humanitarian and compassionate considerations. The 
decision to situate the reasoning in this criminal deportation case in the 
immigration context rather than the criminal context was crucial to the outcome 
as section 7 has been repeatedly used to reform the Canadian criminal law. In 
148 (1992), 90 DLR (4th) 289 (S.C.C., Sopinka J. writing for a unanimous court). 
149 R v Wholesale Travel Group Inc. (1991), 84 DLR (4th) 161 which distinguished the mens rea 
for the criminal context from the mens rea for the regulatory context. 
150 Above note 148 at 303. 
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the immigration context it is possible to conclude that "deportation is not 
imposed as a punishment" 151 and therefore cannot be reviewed as to whether it 
is cruel and unusual and that permanent residency is a conditional status. 152 
Section 7 of the Charter submerges the substantive - procedural rights 
distinction by its wording: 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the 
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice. 
The so-called substantive rights in the first clause; life, liberty, and security of 
the person are expressed in relation to the more-likely procedural rights 
described by the principles of fundamental justice. Fundamental justice itself 
has substantive elements, especially as it is to be determined in a given contexts. 
It is not contiguous with natural justice which may, in Justice Sopinka's words, 
"inform principles of fundamental justice in a particular context." 153 The 
substance of procedural rights is reinforced by section 7 of the Charter even in 
cases like Chiarelli where the court makes every effort to focus on narrow 
procedural questions only. The reason for this is that the link to life, liberty and 
security of person is always present in some degree. 
In Chiarelli Justice Sopinka uses the rhetorical device familiar to Charter 
scholars of asserting that he need not decide whether deportation infringes the 
right to life, liberty or security of person because he finds no deviation from 
principles of fundamental justice. 154 This allows him to circumvent the 
151 Ibid at 305. Paralleling the High Court of Australia's conclusion that "application detention" 
is not punitive. See above nl 16. 
152 Ibid at 304. 
153 Ibid at 311. 
154 Ibid at 302. 
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important question of the place of deportation itself in a rights discourse. It also 
ensures a focus on procedure rather than on the identity of the individual to 
whom a right to life, liberty or security belongs. This rhetorical manoeuvre 
allows Justice Sopinka to not look beyond the border of the nation and to focus 
his concerns exclusively on things happening in Canada. The identity of the 
other is suppressed in the rhetorical shift which provides a concise illustration of 
how rights discourse narrows identities. 
It is precisely on this point, whether to look beyond the border, that the 
majority and dissenting judgments in Kindler v Canada (Minister of Justice/55 
can be distinguished. Kindler had fled to Canada from the United States after 
being convicted of first degree murder in which the jury had recommended the 
death penalty. The Canadian Minister of Justice proposed to extradite him 
without seeking assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed. 156 For 
the majority judges who held that extradition without assurances did not breach 
the Charter, the case is primarily one about extradition. For the dissentients, the 
case is about the death penalty. In the first analysis, the sovereign nation and its 
border is central to the story, in the second the border disappears as the 
relationship between what happens on either side of it becomes the focus. 
Writing one of the majority decisions, Justice La Forest states, "the government 
has a right and duty to keep out and to expel aliens from this country if it 
considers it advisable to do so." 157 The link between extradition and the 
155 (1991), 84 DLR (4th) 438 (S.C.C.). 
156 Article 6 of the Extradition Treaty Between Canada and the United States, 1976, provides 
this possibility. 
157 Above n155 at 448, emphasis added. 
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protection of the nation is underlined in his statement that Kindler and the 
appellant in the companion case, Ng, " ... would seem to me to be precisely the 
kinds of individuals the Minister would wish to keep out of Canada for the 
protection of the public." 158 In her majority reasons, Justice McLachlin 
highlights the uniqueness of the Canadian nation and judicial system as a 
justification for extradition: 
... the law of extradition must accommodate many factors foreign to our 
internal criminal law. While our conceptions of what constitutes a fair 
criminal law are important to the process of extradition, they are 
necessarily tempered by other considerations ..... The simple fact is that if 
we were to insist on strict conformity with our own system, there would 
be virtually no state in the world with which we could reciprocate. 
Canada, unable to obtain extradition of ~ersons who commit crimes here 
and flee elsewhere, would be the loser. 1 9 
This reasoning highlights Canadian values and identity, as does the Charter test 
of cruel and unusual punishment which is whether the punishment " 'sufficiently 
shocks' the Canadian conscience." 16° For both of the justices who penned 
majority opinions, the need to protect Canada from an influx of people fleeing 
the American legal system was crucial. 161 Justice McLachlin refers explicitly to 
Canada's " .. .long undefended common border with the United States ... " 162 
drawing on imagery of the legal nation and its boundedness and echoing a 
phrase familiar to generations of Canadian school children. That is, the decision 
taps directly into, and thereby reinforces, images of the nation. 
158 Ibid at 449. 
159 Ibid at 488. From January 7, 2000, The Hon. Beverley McLachlin will be Chief Justice of 
Canada. 
160 Ibid at 492. The 'shock the conscience' test originated in R v Schmidt (1987), 39 DLR (4th) 
18. 
161 Ibid at 450-451 and 495. 
162 Ibid at 495. 
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For those judges who argued that extraditing Kindler to face the death 
penalty would offend section 7 of the Charter, the Canadian nation held a 
different place in the analysis. Justice Cory viewed the argument that any cruel 
and unusual punishment would be applied not by Canada but by the United 
States as "an indefensible abdication of moral responsibility." 163 The existence 
of the border is irrelevant to his assessment of the punishment and of morality. 
For Justice Cory the identity of the nation is a lesser value than the harm of the 
death penalty. Justice Cory also referred to the open border, but emphasised 
that to cross it a fugitive must first escape custody.164 Justice Cory's presentation 
of Canadian values and identity situated these as belonging to the international 
community, rather than being unique: 
... Canada has committed itself in the international community to the 
recognition and support of human dignity and to the abolition of the death 
penalty. These commitments were not lightly made. They reflect 
Canadian values and principles. Canada cannot, on the one hand, give an 
international commitment to support the abolition of the death penalty and 
at the same time extradite a fugitive without seeking the very assurances 
contemplated by the Treaty.165 
Canada is not a nation so unique that it must accept differences in order to make 
extradition function. Rather it is a member of the community of nations and of 
values. The opinions in Kindler present a clear contrast of visions of the nation 
faced with giving meaning to fundamental justice at the border. 166 In the 
extradition scenario the Canadian community must be protected, while in the 
163 Ibid at 479. 
164 Ibid at 480. 
165 Ibid at 481. 
166 Justice Sopinka's brief dissenting presents yet another variation on this theme as he focuses 
on the fact the Canadian Parliament had voted just four years early not to reinstate the death 
penalty despite public opinion polls favouring it (see ibid 452-455). In his analysis, the values 
of the community are reflected in the Parliament, whereas in the analysis of Justice Laforest, 
the opinion polls were influential (ibid at 447). 
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reasoning which begins with an analysis of the death penalty the importance of 
the nation taking a moral stand is highlighted. The tension in Kindler is a 
reflection of what Minow labels the instability of rights discourse which renders 
this discourse unable to give an adequate account of sameness and difference. 
In this instance, it is impossible for rights discourse to express in the same 
moment the importance of the boundary and the relationships between what 
happens on either side of it. In this tension, identity is manipulated and some 
parts of it are squeezed from the picture. 
In the most recent important Supreme Court of Canada judgment in 
migration law, Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 167 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube for the majority states at the outset that the question of 
what standard of procedural fairness is required in determining a humanitarian 
and compassionate appeal does not raise any Charter questions168 and thus 
there is no need to address the Charter arguments made in the case. The appeal 
was allowed due to breaches of the applicable principles of procedural fairness. 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube holds that a determination on a humanitarian and 
compassionate appeal " ... must be made following an approach that respects 
humanitarian and compassionate values." 169 While the decision to reject 
Charter arguments could have been made to avoid the overlap of substance and 
procedure which section 7 entails, or to circumvent a determination that 
deportation affects life, liberty or security of person, Justice L'Heureux-Dube's 
167 Court File number 25823, 9 July 1999. SCR version not yet available. 
168 Ibid para 11 of electronic version. For a further discussion of humanitarian and 
compassionate appeals under the Canadian Immigration Act and Baker in particular see Chapter 
Four at pp. 223-226. 
169 Ibid at para 74. 
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reasoning belies her commitment to decide the case on purely procedural 
grounds. Humanitarian and compassionate values are clearly substantive. 
Furthermore, the influence of the approach to international human rights 
instruments which has evolved under the Charter seeps into the analysis of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child despite her statement that this 
Convention is inapplicable. 170 This case may signify the development of an 
approach to statutory interpretation in Canada which is influenced by the place 
the Charter has had in shifting the parameters of legal discourse in Canada. 
The sum of these cases in the Supreme Court of Canada is not a 
compelling change in the debates or the outcomes of border law disputes under 
the influence of entrenched constitutional rights. The Charter has hastened 
acknowledgment of the falsity in the distinction between substantive and 
procedural rights, and has fostered the development of a jurisprudence which 
focuses overtly on national identity and values, but it has led to few changes for 
those crossing Canada's borders. Mr. Chiarelli, Mr. Kindler, the Council of 
Churches, and even Ms Baker were all told that the Charter did not assist them. 
Other less well known litigants such as Mr. Reza171 and Mr. Delghani172 have 
170 Ibid at para 69-71. By this I mean that the Charter has been interpreted with reference to 
international conventions since its inception (see Ward above n3 8 and R v Keegstra [ 1990] 3 
SCR 697). This tradition of interpretation seems to have influenced L'Heureux-Dube J. to put 
more emphasis than would otherwise be possible on the weight of an unincorporated 
Convention. It is precisely on this point the Iacobucci J. disagrees with her (ibid at paras 78-
81 ). This decision raises the same issue as Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh 
(1995) 128 ALR 353 did in Australia and resolves it in a very different way. 
171 Reza v Canada (1994), 116 DLR (4th) 61. Reza, a refugee claimant who had exhausted all 
avenues of appeal under the Immigration Act sought to commence an action in the Ontario 
Court arguing that various sections of that Act were inoperative under the Charter. The motions 
judge stayed his application. In a very brief judgment, the Supreme Court of Canada agreed. 
172 Delghani v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 101 DLR (4th) 654. 
Delghani claimed refugee status at the airport and was denied counsel. He argued that his 
Charter right to counsel was infringed. The Supreme Court of Canada responded by stating that 
he had not been "detained" in the sense contemplated by the Charter, despite a line of cases 
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likewise found that the Charter has not changed their position before the 
Canadian courts. On the other hand, refugee claimants before the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the post-Charter era have met with considerable success. 
While Singh173 was not solely a Charter decision, its most memorable judgment 
does rely on the Charter and its influence on refugee law in Canada has been 
far-reaching. Both Ward174 and Pushpanathan175 have extended the scope for 
refugee protection in Canada through their interpretations of the refugee 
definition. In Ward this was done explicitly with reference to Charter 
jurisprudence, even though the Court held that no Charter rights were engaged. 
In Pushpanathan, the Charter was not key to the Court's reasoning, but the 
Ward decision was, leading to a similar result. 
Identity contributes to an understanding of these cases in two ways. First, 
the role of a refugee identity has considerable importance in these outcomes. 
While Pushpanathan and Ward had committed crimes similar to those of 
Chiarelli and Kindler, the Court portrays them as refugees rather than criminals. 
The importance of this distinction is highlighted by the dissent in Pushpanathan 
emphasising drug trafficking: when the criminal identity predominates a 
positive outcome is unlikely in the immigration setting. This effect also points 
to how rights represent collective identities. The refugee exists not as the 
individual before the Court but as a group, a category, which could potentially 
be before a court. The Canadian Council of Churches decision rejects this view 
establishing that secondary immigration examination, the process Mr. Delghani was involved in, 
constitutes detention in the case of Canadian citizens (R v Grejfe [1990) 1 SCR 755) 
173 Above n89. 
174 Above n38. 
175 Above n49. 
305 
and thus amounts to a statement of preference by the court to determine the 
rights and identities of the refugee individually, fitting more directly into liberal 
rights discourse. 
In the refugee cases the influence of the Charter is covert. The Charter 
creates the space for an emerging and constitutionally legitimated discourse of 
human rights. This is a discourse in which the refugee identity can develop, in 
opposition to both a criminal identity and an identity as alien; it is an image of 
power. The Charter's influence on these cases serves as a vehicle for 
incorporation by interpretive convention of international human rights discourse 
and for a jurisprudential reflection on what values a free and democratic society 
would like to be seen to embrace. A similar analysis holds for Baker, even 
though there the interpretive movement occurs implicitly. This may signify a 
maturing of the Charter's role in this jurisprudence. As the critique of 
constitutional rights predicts, rights discourse tends to permeate all legal 
discourse once unleashed. 176 
But considering the Charter in the migration setting, and especially in 
contrast to the Australian setting, allows a more textured analysis of the effect 
of rights discourses. The Charter has amplified the effect of procedural rights 
at the core of liberal legalism by emphasising their substantive effects. The 
percolation of rights discourses in Canada, led by the Charter creates a 
possibility of arguing about the refugee definition in fundamental human rights 
terms. While refugee claims do not function as rights claims, this discourses 
enlarges rather than constricts the potential for broad interpretations of the 
refugee definition's other, non-rights, aspects. Finally, however limited rights 
176 Fudge, above n5; Bakan, above n5. 
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discourses are, they contain a hierarchy of rights and therefore they unleash the 
potential of ascending that hierarchy. These cases certainly do not give rise to 
unbridled optimism but they do show that the potential of the Charter must be 
carefully assessed in each context, and that the identities at play are key to 
understanding those contexts, and that legal argument can be manipulated by 
considering the rights-identity linkages to encourage given outcomes. 
Considering identity in the analysis also calls our attention to how the 
potential of rights discourse is disappointed in these cases. In cases where the 
claimants are ultimately unsuccessful, they are portrayed as alien others whose 
interests are pitted against those of the nation. Their differences from members 
of the community are emphasised, as is the fact that the nation tolerates their 
presence generously and does not have the same responsibilities towards them 
that it does towards its citizens. Despite the potential for the development of 
robust substantive/procedural rights under the Charter the section 7 cases in the 
migration realm have been almost entirely unsuccessful. Even Singh, which led 
to the development of the CRDD hearing process for refugee determinations 
does not explicitly require the full extent of procedural protections presently in 
place. Current proposals to largely replace the CRDD process with interviews 
by bureaucrats would also likely come within the letter of the Singh ruling and 
are certainly designed to do so. 177 While substantive procedural developments 
in the laws of evidence and crime have been some of the most significant 
Charter results, changes resulting from section 7 arguments about immigration 
177 Building on a Strong Foundation for the 21"1 Century, Supply and Services, Hull Canada, 
1999, Chapter 11. 
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law have been minimal. The message sent by the Court is that in spite of Singh, 
non-citizens have fewer rights protections than citizens in a variety of areas. 
This result then, is not so different from the result in the Australian High 
Court. Arguably, the Charter could be used to prevent the Canadian 
government from rolling back procedural protections to the same extent that the 
Australian government has done. While this would likely be the case, there is 
no way to conclusively state it, particularly recalling the strong similarities 
between Singh and Kioa. The biggest differences in the Australian and 
Canadian jurisprudence are not the result of the presence or absence of 
constitutionally entrenched rights, but rather relate to the respective 
governments' interactions with the courts in the area of migration law. The 
Charter is necessarily the vehicle by which immigrant rights arguments are 
brought before the Canadian courts. Nonetheless, the resulting jurisprudence is 
similar to that in Australia in that there have been no significant rights victories 
since the mid-1980s. Even Ward and Pushpanathan are not strictly rights 
cases, but revolve around interpretations of narrow slices of the refugee 
definition. The jurisprudence in both countries portrays the nation itself. 
Differences in those portraits, in the national identities, explain more about the 
differences in legal outcomes than the constitutional settings do. 
E. CONCLUSION: RIGHTS DISCOURSES AND THE LIBERAL 
NATION 
Rights discourses in migration law reflect the place of migration law in 
the liberal nation. Analysing the place of rights in the law and identity linkage 
is the final phase of my theoretical framework, tapping into some of the most 
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extensive identity-based legal critiques and pulling the argument directly back 
to its foundation stone: the inability to establish a justice standard for evaluating 
liberal migration laws. Migration law constitutes the community and responds 
to the perceived needs of the nation, the national interest. The principal 
problem of using rights discourses to bring about changes in migration law is 
that a rights-based argument triggers a rights-based response. In this area of the 
law, the most unambiguous right is the right of the nation to exclude all 
outsiders. The tension been any rights claim brought in the migration area and 
this sovereign right to exclude is frequently the difference which splits judicial 
opinions, as the cases in this Chapter illustrate. Rights exist in a hierarchy. The 
sovereign right to exclude the other is at the top of the hierarchy. Of the diverse 
rights that liberal legalism will recognise and put its considerable power behind, 
the right to exclude the other is paramount because the existence of liberal 
legalism is intertwined with the existence of the liberal nation. It is for this 
reason that evaluations of migration laws are best made by comparing the 
national self-identifications they reflect, generate, and reify. 
Images of the nation are present implicitly and explicitly in this 
jurisprudence. The nation is represented in its sovereign right to exclude, and in 
statements about the national interest or the values of the national community. 
The nation is also represented in the procedural rights which balance the 
interests of individual and state. While in theoretical terms we can postulate 
some generic state in this equation, the terms a court reasons with always put 
the interest of some particular individual against those of some existing state. 
Because of this, the attributes of the nation are always a backdrop to the 
discussion. The emotive content and sense of belonging (which are reasons for 
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my preference for "nation" rather than "state") permeate the state versus 
individual dichotomy when it is brought into a real decision-making setting. 
That is, the state cannot be separated from the content which the term "nation" 
injects it with. These characteristics of migration law jurisprudence reinforce its 
role as a vital site for constituting the nation. The nation is, after all, a myth. 
Understanding the diversity of factors which make the nation present in 
migration law jurisprudence helps understand how migration law operates as a 
site for the construction and re-construction of the national myth. The 
jurisprudence of the highest courts is particularly important because of its 
influence on lower courts and because of its role as a hegemonic social ordering 
discourse in legalistic societies such as Australia and Canada. The 
jurisprudence is not the extent of migration law's role in constituting the 
nation, 178 but it is an vital part of it. 
The central instability of rights discourse which Minow emphasises is 
crucial in migration law as the needs of the nation are themselves unstable. One 
of the most important tricks of migration law is to create the appearance of 
stability, of a core of meaning, which grounds the existence of the nation. 
Without borders, without some limit to the community, the nation could not 
claim existence. Accordingly migration law, which posits some control over the 
border and the membership of the community is essential to the enterprise. The 
framework of migration law allows adjustments in the national interest to be 
easily made into legal projections with a minimum of change. The need for an 
appearance of stability but an inherent flexibility is achieved through these 
mechanisms. Rights discourse runs a parallel course. In Minow's analysis, the 
178 See Chapter Two at 76-82. 
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inherent instability of rights discourse is due to the inability of rights to fully 
represent the relationship which they always express. In migration law, that 
relationship is between the insider and the outsider, the nation and the other .. 
The right of one is always exercised against the right of the other, so that any 
expression of right somehow obscures the relationship between the two. The 
central instability is, then, a product of this relationship, a reaction of the contest 
which is set up by rights discourse. 
In Minow' s analysis of rights in other contexts, she focuses on the 
boundaries which are created in rights discourses and the identities on either 
side of those boundaries which rights discourses obscure. In the migration law 
setting, the boundary is that of the nation, and the relationship is between 
members and outsiders. Border law jurisprudence, as we have seen in the cases 
here, shows us again and again images of the nation and the other and 
manipulates them as a key reasoning technique. The manipulation of these 
images, the fact that the nation can be both the reason to reject extradition and 
the reason to permit it, shows us the instability which Minow discusses. 
Altering our perception of the other necessarily affects our perception of the 
nation as the two are defined by their boundary. This explains why the 
outsider/refugee is disappearing from view in the jurisprudence of a progressive 
removal of procedural rights in Australia. As the space generated by process 
rights for the development of an identity for the refugee/outsider is squeezed 
smaller and smaller, the nation takes up all the imaginary space that is left. 
Attention to identity helps us to focus on what rights discourses 
obscure. It helps us to understand their categories and hierarchies. In migration 
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law, considering the overlapping effects of rights and identities reveals how the 
discourse of fundamental human rights can open a space for refugee claimants 
without making a refugee claim a rights claim. It demonstrates how gradations 
in procedural rights entitlements express gradations of attachment to the nation, 
of belonging, of identity, at the centre of which the identity of the nation and the 
individual overlap in the category of citizen. Considering identity helps build 
an understanding of when Charter rights are most effective, and when they are 
more likely to be overlooked. The migration law context brings together a 
number of rights discourses. Understanding the differences between them, and 
the ways in which they crosscut and reinforce each other, enriches our 
understanding of migration law and of rights discourses themselves. Both are 
necessary to predict legal outcomes in this area, to strategise for legal change, 
and to theorise the relationship between migration law and the liberal nation. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusions 
The insights drawn from applying the framework of analysis I set out in 
Chapter Two to the refugee determination process, the place of humanitarianism 
in migration law, and the hierarchy of rights for potential migrants, suggest 
several clarifications of that framework. One set of clarifications comes from 
using this study to elaborate the way the concept identity is used in legal 
critique. First is to look at how identity is analysed as a social phenomenon and 
to consider how identity in law is positioned in the essentialist - constructivist 
debate. The relationship between migration law and national identity adds 
texture to what Hunt describes as the dichotomy between the importance and 
the unimportance of law1 by providing examples and explanations of when law 
may be an important facet of the construction of identity and when it is more 
likely to be irrelevant or overtaken by other factors. It is the place of migration 
law within the liberal nation that makes it an important site for locating images 
of national identification and value. Nonetheless, this law is most important for 
those crossing or attempting to cross the national boundary it erects. For many 
who are already members of the nation, the content and meaning of migration 
law can be safely ignored. The importance and unimportance of the law as a 
social phenomenon is tied to perspectives in the analysis and to the way the 
social sphere is constituted at a given moment. If the community is assumed, as 
is most often the case in liberal theory, then migration law fades into the 
1 See Chapter Two at p.21. 
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background, into an axiom of an already constituted social sphere. Linking 
migration law to national identity provides a way of assessing its importance. 
I earlier asserted that law and identity scholars tend towards the 
constructivist side of the on-going debate about whether identity is constructed 
or essential and did not engage directly in this debate, despite its vitality for 
many others who use identity as an analytic tool. The reasons for this emerge 
through the application of an identity based framework. In making identity a 
central focus of legal analysis, scholars necessarily assume a constructivist 
analysis. That is, they assume that identity is constructed, or at least partially 
constructed, in and through the law functioning as a social ordering system. In 
considering how the construction of legal categories such as refugee, 
humanitarian migrant, or rights holders are identified in the law, the 
assumptions of an identity based approach to law become clearer. One of these 
assumptions is that law is a powerful enough social discourse to construct 
identities that matter, and that there is no need to look outside the law and see 
where the identities it moulds, constrains or ignores may exist elsewhere. Law 
and identity theory provides the insights and analytic potential I have drawn on 
here without addressing the essentialist - constructivist tension overtly because 
it presumes the importance of the law. To this end, it takes a position in the 
dichotomy that Hunt describes. Ignoring the essentialist - constructivist tension 
is defensible because resolving it is not crucial to using its insights. 
Nonetheless, it is vital to consider how legal scholarship only partially engages 
with this tension in broader social theory and to reveal the story of self-
importance that underlies this position. 
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The position of law and identity theory in this debate establishes a parallel 
with the intermediate position of law and identity theory generally as both 
constitutive and constituting. Or, as I have argued here, that migration law is 
both affected by our perceptions of national identity while at other moments it 
influences those perceptions. Sometimes the most important insight gained by 
examining identity in migration law is that it is responding to a shift in the 
nation's view of its priorities and values- as in the recent shift to preferring 
economic migrants. At other times, however, the perspicacity of the theory is in 
demonstrating that the view of the nation written into the law constrains the 
law's application - as when humanitarian discretion is used to approve 
economic independence. The key to appropriate use of this type of intermediate 
theorisation is to consider what is gained from the insights it generates and 
thereby avoid leading only to the rather vacuous conclusion that law both 
constitutes and is constituting. In this study, the chapter by chapter conclusions 
have therefore addressed how a focus on identity in migration law identifies 
strengths and weaknesses in the refugee hearing process, how an understanding 
of the role and limits of humanitarianism as both jurisprudence and rhetoric can 
be built into law reform strategies, and how detailed analysis of rights 
discourses contributes to predicting successes in the courtroom and to 
developing successful arguments for that setting. 
The insights of law and identity scholarship can also be pushed further 
here to give an account of slippage between legal and popular discourse which 
is crucial in the realm of migration law because, in the absence of a liberal 
justice standard, the parameters for debate are purely political, above and 
beyond the way this is true for law generally. Previous work in law and 
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identity scholarship draws our attention to the importance of who is constructing 
the legally positioned identity and for what purpose. This is central to the 
account of the negotiated and flexible quality of identity. In the realm of 
migration law, the malleability of identity is evident, and indeed forms a vital 
reason for using identity-based analyses in this setting. The dissonance between 
legal and popular or political discourses on questions such as the meaning of 
refugee, the rights of citizens, or the identity of the nation is facilitated by the 
malleability of legally constructed identity. The identities that appear in legal 
discourses are linked to the purposes for which they are elaborated. This is no 
different in popular discourse. The slippages are explained by considering the 
purpose at issue. In legal discourse, refugee is defined primarily in order to 
limit access to the nation and to contain the responsibilities of the nation. In 
popular discourse, refugee is understood in a much broader way. The use of the 
legal label outside the law is a telling signifier of the hegemony of legal 
discourses in social and political arenas. The slippage in meaning points to the 
ends that are served by discursive transformations. These ends in turn lead us to 
an enhanced analysis of the ways migration law serves the needs of the nation. 
It becomes another dimension in the capacity of identity analysis to draw our 
attention to hidden dimensions of legal categories. 
The use of this framework for analysing migration law also highlights the 
relationship between identity as an individual phenomenon and as a group 
phenomenon, which is in turn important for using identity-based analyses in a 
liberal legal paradigm. Important parts of the analysis of refugee determination, 
of humanitarian acts of grace and of rights allotments are focused on individuals 
specifically. Nonetheless, by its categorising nature, the law creates group 
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identities. This is a critical part of understanding how migration law affects the 
individuals who pass through it to join the nation. They become members of the 
social group of"immigrants," as "refugees," "dependant spouses," "temporary 
workers." These labels affect their legal entitlements, but go beyond that as 
well. Membership in these groups also affects how the community perceives 
them and how they form attachments with the nation. Identity is about 
individuals and groups at the same time. Both are relevant simultaneously, in a 
relationship which Turner's work provides a matrix for understanding.2 The 
individual and group relevance of identity is important for having a full picture 
of the function of the law, and also for grasping the notion of national identity. 
The nation has an identity even when it does not have a collective mind or 
function as an agent. To understand this identity, an appreciation of how 
individuals participate in the mythic constitution of the nation is essential. 
National identity is by definition a group identity, but is located in the 
individuals who experience it. 
Minow's important observation that some individuals choose identities 
and others are consigned to them is a power analysis. Using identity to evaluate 
migration law, the power dynamic of identity becomes obvious. Not only do 
some choose their identities, but some have a wider range of choices. Further, 
the consequences of one's choices also leave an imprint of how powerful or 
powerless that person is in a given setting. For many, fitting into the narrow 
strictures of a refugee identity or a deserving recipient of humanitarian 
consideration is the best outcome of their situation. That such a narrow identity 
is constraining and will texture their experience of a host country is a luxury 
2 See Chapter Two at pp. 45-55. 
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they cannot afford to consider. For a tribunal member there are also 
consequences of choosing how to position oneself within the parameters of that 
identity - but the consequences attached to the choice are different. You may 
feel better or worse about the job you are doing, and your prospects for 
continuing it may be altered, but your location as a privileged member of a 
prosperous nation is not affected. You have an enormous freedom in how you 
identify yourself as a Tribunal member, or even if you do so at all. Power is 
embedded in the identities located in the law. It becomes visible when we focus 
on how choices are made and how identities are negotiated. 
Power is especially significant in considering the rights discourses of 
migration law. The discourse of rights does more than establish a simple binary 
code between rights holders and non-rights holders. Rights are hierarchically 
arranged. Those with more power have greater rights and a greater potential for 
accommodating the diversity of their identity within the discourse of rights. 
Examining the deployment of rights in migration law complicates our 
understanding of the relationship of rights and identities. Even being at the 
bottom of the hierarchy of rights is still to have some access to those "islands of 
empowerment" and to have an identity which is discernible by the law. The 
importance of dissecting rights discourses in this way is strategic. While much 
may be traded away to fit oneself or one's group into a narrow box at the 
bottom of the hierarchy, the trade-off may be worth it if the legal outcome is the 
best, or the only, outcome that is sought. Migration law provides stark evidence 
of the power of rights discourse to obscure the relationship between those on 
either side of the principal rights-nonrights boundary: the border of the nation. 
The line between members and others is about rights. The power that attaches 
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to rights varies in the hierarchy of rights and helps us to understand that rights 
discourses are only perceived as monolithic when viewed at a great distance. 
In these various ways, this analysis contributes to refining our 
understanding of the analytic capacity of identity in examining legal provisions. 
I This was one of the goals of constructing and testing the Chapter Two 
I 
framework. The second principal aim was to provide an evaluation of the place 
of migration law in the liberal nation generally and to evaluate some particular 
provisions of Australian and Canadian migration law. As is apparent 
throughout the empirical work in this thesis, in many cases the assessment of 
Australian and Canadian provisions runs parallel. The legal provisions for 
migration in these two middle-sized nations of immigration are very similar. 
The framework is not calibrated to tell us that one law is better than another. 
Indeed, it takes as axiomatic that such conclusions are not only outside this 
framework but are generally unsound because of the place of migration law in 
liberal nations. Liberal justice standards operate within societies, not between 
them. 
Instead of a morally grounded comparison that one migration law scheme 
is better than the other, the examinations here generate pictures of the laws in 
each place which tell us something about the way these nations understand 
themselves. Against these understandings, particular alternations in the law can 
then be evaluated by whether they are in harmony with the nation's own internal 
values. The Australian law enshrines an ideology of control, with mechanisms 
such as application detention, inflexible target numbers, executive decision 
making, high level location of discretionary decision-making, and a progressive 
narrowing of rights for intending migrants. These factors combine with 
319 
language in Ministerial statements, in policy guidelines, in discretionary 
decisions, and in judicial statements to present an image of Australia as a nation 
which guards its generosity closely, which picks migrants carefully, which feels 
vulnerable and needs to protect itself, which feels isolated on its island 
continent. Australian migration law sends the message that this nation is distant 
from those migrants it has most affinity with and is surrounded by those whose 
values may threaten its control over its membership. Australia is more 
concerned with controlling its population than with humanitarian gestures, more 
concerned with efficiency than with the rights of outsiders. Similar elements 
appear in the Canadian law, but in a different mixture. Canada's law is filled 
with humari.itarianism and with discretion. The impulse to control is weaker: 
targets are more flexible, discretion is more openly used, judicial decision-
making is given a wider scope. The law is constructed in such a way that more 
divergent meanings are generated. The balance in the refugee program is 
towards inland processing rather than the more easily controlled overseas cases. 
The jurisprudence of humanitarianism is revealingly counter-intuitive, 
demonstrating both that the nation values economic self-sufficiency, social 
success and small independent families and also that being perceived as 
humanitarian is vital. Canadian law and rhetoric displays more pride in the 
generosity of the nation, and therefore constructs a more generous nation. 3 
For many concerned about people whose homelands are poor or 
dangerous or do not respect human rights, this makes the Canadian law and 
3 On 3 December 1999 the Honourable Eleanor Caplan stated: 
I mention this target [1% of population as total migrant intake each year] again 
because I consider it to be about more than just planning. I consider it to be about 
core Canadian values, and an awareness of where we, as a country, came from ... 
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policy at least potentially better. But the hegemonic liberal theory which 
provides the standard for relationships between nations does not provide a way 
of defending this statement, or a vantage point from which to assert it. All it 
provides is a notion of humanitarianism that is vague enough that all nations can 
aspire to it, while taking very different actions. It is, thus, a perfect fit with the 
political position of migration law. Humanitarianism runs into liberalism's 
threshold of heroism, and the principle that heroism is not required for moral 
action. The growing international commitment to human rights has likewise not 
generated a standard to assess the behaviour of nations which refugees seek to 
resettle in, especially when those nations are far from the states refugees are 
fleeing. The discourse of fundamental human rights has made some inroads into 
influencing how we interpret what other countries do to refugees but does not 
establish either an interpretation of humanitarianism or a right to enter another 
nation. In both liberal discourse and the discourse of fundamental human rights, 
those who argue that admitting refugees threatens the nation's self-interest, 
economic prosperity, job markets and cultural protection can also find support. 
When the influence of economic and family migration is also considered, 
the differences between the two nations in these humanitarian areas start to 
disappear. Here we see both nations presenting a model of an independent, 
able-bodied nuclear family. Economic success is presently the most sought 
after value of each nation, whether in the form of skills which are easily 
transferable into the job market, including established fluency in English, or 
whether in the form of sufficient money to purchase a niche in the economy. 
Now if immigration has been a vital part of Canada's social, economic and cultural 
success, our refugee system has earned us our reputation as a humanitarian leader in 
the world" Address to Canadian Council for Refugees, Niagara Falls. 
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These values are masked in the area of humanitarian admissions, but as my 
discussions of the deserving humanitarian migrant and the overseas refugee 
indicate, they are present nonetheless. These values too exclude and silence 
certain identities. The high values placed on market worth, independence, a 
narrowly defined family, and an ability to adapt quickly to the host society show 
that while the racist face of migration law has been disguised by the "neutral" 
terms of the point system and the market economy, the biases of what success 
means in Australia or Canada, of the identity politics within the nation, are 
strongly present. Admissions in the economic, family, and humanitarian 
categories are, for example, all highly gendered. 4 
Migration law continues to be very much on the public and political 
agenda in both Canada and Australia. The negotiation about the border of the 
nation, the line between us and them, is on-going. Since 1994, Canada has 
undergone an almost unceasing process of public consultation about potential 
changes to its immigration law. In 1994 consultations across the country were 
held which were later incorporated into the extended version of the 1995 
Immigration Plan entitled Into the 2 J8' Century: A Strategy for Immigration and 
Citizenship5 released in late 1994. These plans generated further public 
discussion, and were followed in late 1996 with the appointment of a three 
member Legislative Review panel which again conducted country-wide 
consultations with a mandate to propose a major overhaul for the immigration 
legislation. These proposals were presented late in 1997 under the title Not Just 
4 See my paper "Women at the Border: Gendering Permanent Residency Applications," 
presently under revision. 
5 Minister of Supply and Services, Hull, Canada, 1994. 
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Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future Immigration. 6 The government 
then conducted further consultations about the recommendations, and issued a 
response entitled Building a Strong Foundation for the 21st Century7 in early 
1999. Further consultations on this report were initiated at that time. 
The extent of public consultation signifies the importance of migration 
issues to the public agenda. Public consultation assists the government in 
asserting that changes in either policy (e.g. the Into the 2rt Century documents) 
or law (as proposed in Not Just Numbers) respond to what the nation, as 
constituted by individual voices, wants. National interest is crucial to the law, 
and therefore no changes will be made without extensive high profile attention 
to it. The devotion of such intense resources to these public processes also 
signifies the intertwining of public, political and legal discourses of migration. 
While consultation functions to gather public information, it also promotes the 
government's view and the government's ability to form the agenda. It fosters 
overlap between public and legal discourse, and can also serve to point up when 
the dissonance between those two is used by governments in meeting their 
goals. Interestingly, the government was quick to reject the Not Just Numbers 
recommendation that migration issues be divided into two pieces of legislation, 
one dealing with immigrants and the other with those whom the nation seeks to 
protect. The logic of this recommendation is compelling, but following through 
on it would reduce the potential for the government to harness humanitarian 
admissions, as well as economic and family admissions, to the needs and 
priorities of the nation. 
6 Minister of Supply and Services, Hull, Canada, 1997. 
7 Minister of Supply and Services, Hull, Canada, 1999. 
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In Australia in November 1999 the newspapers were carrying almost daily 
stories about the unprecedented number of boat arrivals over the past few 
months and the government's response to them.8 The nation is verging on a 
moral panic over the issue, the seeds of which were clearly visible in earlier 
responses to boat arrivals. As of 18 November 1999, 1671 people had arrived 
in Australia in 1999 by boat. This number is approximately half the previously 
recorded total number of boat arrivals, and is approximately two percent of the 
annual total targeted migrant intake. Detention centres are being hastily 
completely to accommodate the influx. Early indications are that many of these 
people will be found to be "genuine refugees." The government's response has 
been to limit the access of refugees arriving by boat to state support, to 
introduce temporary visas for people arriving by boat, to deprive them of the 
potential of family reunion provisions available to other refugees.9 Legislation 
heightening powers to warn off boats before they enter territorial waters and to 
penalise people smugglers more severely has been introduced. 10 Given that the 
major opposition party has decided to support these initiatives, they are likely to 
become law in the near future. The result is a shift in Australia's refugee 
regime, but not one that is out of line with the dominance of its control ideology 
8 Examples include: 
Toohey P, "A Roo Shooter and His Ute Hold the Line Against Illegals" Australian, 13-14 
November 1999 at 1, Saunders M, "Refugees Coming on Flood Tide" Australian, 13-14 
November at 2; "Videnieks M and Saunders M," Ruddock Rejects Court Call on Illegals" 
Australian 3 November 199 at 3; Saunders Metal, "Action Urged on Wave of Illegals" 
Australian'', 10 November 1999 at 5, Toohey P and Saunders M, "Human Cargo, Return to 
Sender'' Australian 12 November 1999 at 1. Media coverage has been intense throughout 1999 
including articles such as O'Donnell L, "When the Boat Comes In" Australian 17-18 April 1999 
at 19 and O'Brien N and Green P, "Boat People Influx a Matter of Crime" Australian 17 August 
1999 at 4. 
9 New visa subclass 785. 
10 Border Protection Legislation Amendment Bil/ 1999 (Cth) has now b~en passed by both 
Houses. The Crimes At Sea Bil/ 1999 (Cth) is before the Senate as of7 December 1999. 
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documented in this thesis. Australia is yet again constructing itself as isolated 
and vulnerable, in need of the strongest protection it can muster as it is beseiged 
by a handful of desperate people. The Minister of Immigration has argued that 
the new laws are necessary to ensure that Australia is "sending the right 
message."11 
As I have argued, it is impossible to find a broadly acceptable basis in 
Australian, or Canadian, society from which to contest this view of the "right 
message." The strength of both support and opposition for the measures reflects 
and reaffirms this. Whatever else can be said, however, the message Australia 
is sending about itself, as a nation, is loud and clear. The national panic, and the 
bipartisan political response demonstrate again the role of migration law in 
defining the limits of the liberal nation. Like the incessant public consultation 
in Canada, the Minister's strategic use of inflammatory language - like the 
assertion that 10, 000 people and entire Middle Eastern villages are packing up 
and coming to Australia 12 - cements the use of migration law to meet the nation 
agenda, and underscores the flexibility of migration law to make quick 
responses to adjustments of the national need. In the absence of a justice 
standard to anchor the public discourse of migration law, politics becomes its 
essence and the public discourse of migration becomes vital to fuelling the 
process. 
11 This has become a government catch phrase. One example is provided by the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation's television program 7:30 Report on 15 November 1999. 
12 This statement was widely reported. See for example McGregor R, "10, 000 Illegals on Way 
Says Ruddock" Australian 16 November 1999 at l; McGregor R, "Labour in Two Minds on 
Boatpeople Law" Australian, 17 November 1999 at 5; Saunders M, "Ruddock 'Hysteria' Makes 
Waves: Beazley" Australian, 7 December 1999 at 4. 
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Appendix A 
Immigration Statistics 
Australia 
Migration Target Numbers for the Three Most Recent Years 
This table is compiled from information available on DIMA's webpage. It 
reflects the targets which were first published for each year in question. 
1999-2000 1998-99 1997-98 
Economic 35,000 35,000 35,260 
Family 32,000 30,500 32,000 
Humanitarian 12,000 12,000 12,000 
T otal(includes "special 82,000 80,000 80,000 
eligibility" category) 
Canada 
Immigration Target Numbers for the Three Most Recent Years 
This table is compiled based on Canada's Annual Immigration Plan, tabled 
each year in Parliament as required under section 7 of the Immigration Act. 
2000 1999 1998 
Economic 120,900-134,700 124,400-13 7 ,400 122,400-134,400 
Family 57,000-61,000 53,500-58,300 53,500-58,300 
Humanitarian 22,100-29,300 22,100-29,300 24, 100-32,300 
Total 200,000-225 ,000 200,000-225,000 200,000-225,000 
United States 
Immigrants Admitted in the Three Most Recent Years 
This table is provided for the contrast it presents. The statistics are drawn 
from the document entitled Legal Immigration: Fiscal Year 1998, available on the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service Website (www.ins.usdoj.gov). 
1998 1997 1996 
Economic 77,517 90,607 117,499 
Family 475,750 535,771 596,264 
Humanitarian 67,280 114,740 131,790 
Total (includes diversity 660,477 798,378 915,900 
programs not counted above) 
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AppendixB 
Court Hierarchies in Australia and Canada 
Australia 
High Court of Australia 
Full Court- Federal Court of Australia 
Federal Court of Australia 
Migration Review Tribunal Refugee Review Tribunal 
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Canada 
Supreme Court of Canada 
Federal Court of Appeal 
Federal Court 
Immigration and Refugee Board 
Convention Refugee Detennination Division 
Immigration Appeal Division 
Adjudication Division 
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